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My hypothesis is that the structure of football and football clubs in the former Soviet Union 
adapted and evolved with the rapidly changing political and economic environment of the 1980s 
and 1990s in the Soviet Union and its successor states. During the time of the Soviet Union, 
football clubs relied on patronage from the Soviet state, its institutions, state owned companies, 
as well as local institutions. When the Soviet Union collapsed, football clubs were expected to 
gain independence from the organizations, or state institutions, and go private. Some clubs were 
able to sustain their operations by selling their top players to clubs in Western Europe. By the 
mid-1990s, however, state patronage was replaced by new forms of patronage. The use of the 
term patronage in this dissertation refers to the political and financial support of football clubs by 
state institutions, private companies, or individuals (the latter two being only the case in the post-
Soviet era). Football patrons use their money and political influence to ensure the financial 
stability of clubs. After the fall of the Soviet Union, oligarchs and private companies bought 
football clubs as playthings, for sponsorship, or to legitimize their business operations, and/or to 
gain political influence. State owned institutions that still owned football clubs rediscovered the 
political value of football in the post-Soviet world. The popularity of football with the masses 
meant that football could be used as a political vehicle; this is especially the case in the post-
Soviet states where football is often used as a legitimization of business magnates that aim for 
political posts. The objective of this work is to outline the transition that football clubs 
underwent, after the death of Brezhnev, under the Gorbachev reforms, to the fall of communism, 
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In 2012 Ukraine became the first post-Soviet country to host the European Championships, and 
in 2018 Russia will host the FIFA World Cup, which is the world’s largest sporting event. The 
aftermath of the European Championship and the preparations for the 2018 World Cup have 
created a global interest in the football of the two largest states of the post-Soviet space. This 
thesis tells the story of football’s transition from communism to capitalism in the period between 
1987 and 2014 in the Soviet Union and later the successor states.  Unlike other literature on the 
history of sport in the Soviet Union, this thesis does not focus on providing a precise account of 
the struggles and the triumphs that Soviet football clubs experienced on the playing field. 
Instead, the intent of this work is to explain, through the perspective of football, the political and 
economic transition that the Soviet Union and its successor states underwent in the above-
mentioned period. This thesis will focus on football as a way to explain both the unsuccessful 
attempts to reform the political and economic spheres of the Soviet Union as well as the 
economic and political struggle that occurred in some of the successor states following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. The major themes are: ‘economic and political reform’, ‘patronage and 
ownership’, ‘politics and football in the post-Soviet sphere’, ‘post-Soviet football in the 
international sphere’, and ‘clubs and stadiums as symbols of regional political identity’. The 
analysis of these key topics as they relate to the politics and economics of football in the Soviet 
Union and the successor states serve as a window through which an understanding can be gained 
of the transformation in the region from 1987 to 2014.   
Economic and Political Reform 	
This thesis will focus primarily on the period between 1987 and 2014. At times, however, it will 
be necessary to put the Gorbachev reforms into perspective by referring to economic and 
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political reforms that took place before 1987.  Research in Ukrainian archives, for example, has 
shown that the introduction of reforms in football began even before Brezhnev’s death in 1982.1 
Major reform packages in Ukrainian football were introduced as a result of the poor performance 
of the Soviet national team in the 1970s. That Ukrainian football was, in many ways, the centre 
of the sport in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, is highlighted by the success of the 
Ukrainian clubs, which won 11 out of the last 20 championships contested in the Soviet Vysshaia 
Liga (Soviet Top League). Due to the stagnation of Soviet football in the 1970s, Soviet sport 
officials conducted a reassessment of the sport between 1979 and 1983 in which they analysed 
both the strengths and shortcomings of the previous five-year plan for the sport that had been 
introduced in order to train more adolescent players in the Soviet Union.  
 
The head of the Ukrainian football association, Mykola Fominykh, was instrumental in 
reforming football in Ukraine and in making the Soviet Union, by the late 1980s, one of the most 
competitive football nations in Europe. Fominykh produced critical analysis and reform 
initiatives, which focused on reform packages in the Ukrainian SSR between 1979 and 1983 and 
later, up to 1987. In 1983 he published a paper that outlined some of the structural changes that 
had been introduced immediately following the 1982 World Cup in Spain.2 Fominykh, at the 
same time, did not want to completely reshuffle the football structures, but rather advocated 
using common Soviet methods of centralization to achieve his objective, which was to produce 
more youth players in Ukraine and ultimately in the entire Soviet Union. Some of his proposals 
included the merging of football clubs, and the restructuring of clubs in the territory of Ukraine. 																																																								
1 For a full list of Ukrainian archives used for this research see the bibliography. 
2 TsDAVO, f. 5090 op. 3 d. 1671, ll 16-22. (Essay by N. F. Fominykh presented to the Football Federation of 
Ukraine 23 April 1983) 
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The idea was that having clubs utilize the youth system of an entire city would be a more 
effective way to produce talent for the national team. Fominykh’s work on the need for 
organizational changes of Ukrainian football demonstrates that the need for reform in Soviet 
football was felt even before 1982. Indeed, the general feeling of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
was that the major political actors were aware of the economic and political stagnation of the 
country, and reform measures were introduced to rectify some of the economic problems that 
plagued the Soviet system in general and football in particular. These reforms, however, did not 
include new structural ideas, but rather tried to more efficiently utilize the system that was 
already in place.  
 
While Ukrainian football was a test case for football reform in the entire Soviet Union, it 
also illustrates how reformers attempted to maximize industrial output by tweaking the system 
rather than abandoning it. This reform movement was born within the confines of the Soviet 
system, yet as this thesis will show, football reforms in Ukraine could be called a success 
because they eventually did improve the results of club teams as well as the national team. The 
reformers used typical Soviet practices such as five-year plans, centralization, and production 
methods common to heavy industry, to facilitate and explain their methods. The reforms could 
be interpreted as a way of making Soviet football more Soviet. This can be explained by the 
language of the day: the bureaucrats of the sport committee and the football federation were 
operating within the parameters set by the culture and politics of the Soviet state. Clubs 
previously had operated in a less centralized manner and much of the production of football 
talent was the product of chance rather than design. Perhaps the reformers of Ukrainian football 
were merely following the prevalent economic principles of the Soviet Union, but they did 
	 12	
succeed in creating a highly competitive system, which by the end of the 1980s led the Soviet 
Union to produce one of the best national teams on the European continent. 
 
The tendency to initiate a reform package in a single Soviet Republic was typical of 
reform initiation in the Soviet Union prior to 1987; the Central Committee would often select 
one Soviet Republic as a test case before introducing Union-wide reform. Also, in 1979, 
legislation was passed, as part of the tenth five-year plan, which gave individual republics greater 
autonomy and provided both the republic and local administrative bodies with a broader 
policymaking authority. This was intended to help individual republics fulfil the goals of the 
tenth five-year plan, and also was calculated to promote greater effectiveness in production, and 
improve the quality of work.3 In one example in the late 1970s, the Belorussian construction 
industry was reformed as a test case: some of the Belorussian construction ministries were put 
under the operationalization (vvod v deistvie) system in which incentives were given for timely 
completion. The idea was that, if the system worked in Belarus, it would be copied as a model 
for the entire Soviet Union, which did occur in 1981.4 This is similar to what transpired in 
football when the Ukrainian football federation pressed forward to reform the entire foundation 
of the republican football system. Economic reform packages were tested in order to minimize 
the potential for negative repercussions due to radical changes made to the economic landscape 
of the Soviet Union. Structural reform of Soviet football was introduced in Ukrainian football in 
the late 1970s, and continued until 1987 when Mikhail Gorbachev announced larger reform 
packages that were applied Union-wide. This initial objective was especially important in the 																																																								
3 Jan Ake Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma (London, 1986), 110. 
4 David A. Dyker, Restructuring the Soviet Economy (London, 1992), 138.  	
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early 1980s leading up to 1987, for the reason that Soviet football functionaries believed the 
Soviet national team was underperforming. The second goal, set in motion after 1987, involved 
the attempt by Soviet football functionaries to reduce the cost of football to the country, and to 
maximize the financial gains that could be made from highly talented players.  
 
 Reform in the context of this thesis, therefore, has various facets; there is the constant 
reform process that the Soviet Union underwent, in the sense of adjustments and improvements 
to the existing system, and then there is the more radical political and economic reform package 
introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev after 1987. Historians and analysts at the time, such as Ed 
Hewett, Padma Dasmai, David A. Dyker, and David Lane, shed much light both on the scope of 
the reforms and on the challenges that the Soviet authorities faced when introducing reform.5 Ed 
Hewett, in his 1988 book Reforming the Soviet Economy, for example, pointed out that ‘it was 
too early to assess the results of this latest effort.’6 Yet Hewett’s study, and others of the time, 
provide an important framework for understanding the economic changes that Soviet football 
underwent after 1987. The major catch phrases of Soviet reform after 1987 were khozraschet 
(cost-accountability) and samofinasirovanie (self-financing). Soviet enterprises were supposed to 
move to full cost-accountability; in other words, they were expected to generate sufficient funds 
to cover their own labour and production costs.7 After 1987 Gorbachev began to change the rules 
under which the Soviet economy, politics, and society were operating. For football, this meant 
that reforms were no longer focused on improving results on the playing field, but rather on 																																																								
5 For Reform of the Soviet system see: Ed A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy (Washington, 1988); Padma 
Dasmai, The Soviet Economy, (Oxford, 1987); David A. Dyker, Restructuring the Soviet Economy, David Lane, 
Soviet Economy and Society (Oxford, 1987). 
6 Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, 3. 
7 Ibid. 331.  
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weaning clubs off financial support from the state and turning them into commercial enterprises 
that could generate a profit. 
   
In his book Serious Fun, Robert Edelman describes the period between 1987 and the fall 
of the Soviet Union as a struggle between clubs and the football federation to gain control over 
football assets. This thesis attempts to build on Edelman’s excellent study of the period between 
1987 and 1991 by drawing in the works of political analysts like Hewett to put football reforms 
into a wider perspective. Edelman believed that the debate on football was about who would 
wield the commercial benefits. Yet there was more to the debate, as clubs used Gorbachev’s 
reform packages as a way to gain independence from the football federation, which was viewed 
by many officials as a major roadblock to the creation of modern sports club structures. The 
struggle over the decision making process and the organization of Soviet football is best 
illustrated by the conflict between the manager of Dinamo Kiev, Valerii Lobanovskii, and the 
head of the Soviet Football Federation, Viacheslav Koloskov, over the re-organization and 
reform of the football league structure in the Soviet Union. In essence, the professionals 
operating the clubs believed that they, rather than the football federation, should run the top 
leagues in the Soviet Union; the football federation, was considered part of the decaying Soviet 
system and operated by party cadres.8  
 
As the historian Archie Brown points out: ‘In the Soviet Union there was a basic tension 
between trying to make the existing economic system work better and replacing that system with 
																																																								
8 Robert Edelman, Serious Fun (New York, 1993), 231-238. 
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an essentially market economy that would operate on different principles.’9 Some of this tension 
is reflected in the struggle between the clubs and the federation on how football should be 
operated in the Soviet Union. The point of the thesis in terms of analysing the structural changes 
in football is, therefore, to align them with economic studies outside the sphere of sports, and 
also with studies conducted on the disintegration of Soviet institutions. Steven L. Solnick in 
Stealing the State writes that the Soviet Union fell victim to opportunism from within, as Soviet 
civil servants ceased to obey orders from above.10 This was reflected in football, as coaches 
began to question the leadership of the football federation. The football federation must, 
therefore, be understood as an institution, with the clubs—and their managers—as bureaucratic 
actors.  
 
Furthermore, reform did not end with the fall of the Soviet Union. The successor states of 
the Soviet Union were given the daunting task of making the difficult transition from a planned 
economy to a western-style free market economy and, in turn, the football clubs and the newly 
created football federations were left to deal with a rapidly changing environment. In Russia, for 
example, extensive privatization was introduced by the Boris El’tsin administration after 1992. 
Even more radically than the previous Gorbachev reforms, the El’tsin reforms changed the 
economic and political landscape in which Russian football clubs had to operate. Russian clubs 
had to, yet again, adapt to shifting economic realities. This makes Russian football after the fall 
of the Soviet Union an interesting case study of what the stipulations of El’tsin’s reforms meant 
in practice. Football, in many ways, illustrates the economic problems that Russia was facing in 																																																								
9 Archie Brown, ‘The Soviet Union: Reform of the System or Systematic Transformation?’, Slavic Review, Vol. 63, 
No. 3 (Autumn 2004), 494. 
10 Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State, (London, 1999). 
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the 1990s. These problems included not only the mass migration of talent to countries abroad, 
the privatization of clubs by ministries, and the takeover by managers as owners, but also the 
issue of having to deal with aging infrastructure such as football stadiums. In addition, after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, football federations and league structures had to be reformed in Russia, 
and built from scratch in the newly independent successor states.  
Patronage and Politics 	
In the strict sense, all clubs were state property and were usually associated with ministries, 
workers unions, or specific factories. As part of their association with certain state apparatuses, 
Soviet football clubs received both actual funds and favours through a complicated patronage 
system. Geoffrey Hosking describes patronage as  
an ongoing hierarchical but to some extent mutual relationship under which a client 
offers goods, services or support to a patron in return for protection and perhaps 
promotion of the client’s interests or other benefits.11  
 
Soviet clubs, and later many clubs from the successor states, existed within the patronage 
system. In the Soviet Union this was mainly due to the fact that clubs were not given enough 
resources by the institution to which they were formally attached and therefore had to find other 
means to gain resources such as players, to compete not only within the Soviet league system but 
also with other major European clubs. In order to understand the transition of Soviet football to 
post-Soviet football, one has to recognize the role of major patrons in both the Soviet and post-
Soviet societies, and the relationship of those patrons to football clubs.  
  
																																																								
11 Geoffrey Hosking, ‘Patronage and the Russian State’, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 78, No. 2 
(April, 2008), 301. 
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 Patrons were an integral part of the Soviet football system, and the rise or demise of a 
club was often dependent on the political influence of a club’s patron. Patrons were usually part 
of the upper echelons of the sport hierarchy and/or high-ranking members of the party hierarchy. 
Patrons also included the managers and high-ranking bureaucrats of industrial conglomerates, as 
well as leading members of Komsomol organizations. The historian Marsil Farkhshatov in the 
German publication ‘Breitensport oder Wettkampf der Industriegiganten?’ paints a wonderful 
picture of football sport patronage in Soviet Bashkortostan in the 1970s and early 1980s. As 
Farkhshatov explains in his essay, patrons were openly involved in the industrial football clubs 
of the region.12 This thesis will expand on Farkhshatov’s case study by showing that patronage 
was a Union-wide phenomenon, and the patrons were part of a football shadow economy that 
operated underneath the façade of sport amateurism. In order to obtain advantages for their 
respective clubs, patrons would ensure that the “sponsored” clubs gained resources beyond the 
capabilities of the institutions that officially owned the club.13  The most prominent example of a 
club operating under such a patronage system was Dinamo Kiev, as highlighted in Thomas 
Pomian’s essay ‘“Loba” macht den Meister’, where he shows that Dinamo, which was formally 
part of the Ministry of Interior of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (from now on UkSSR), 
that the club was heavily supported by the party secretary of the UkSSR Vladimir Shcherbitskii. 
Shcherbitskii was a fan of Dinamo Kiev, and it was through Shcherbitskii’s influence that 
																																																								
12 Marsil N. Farkhshatov, ‘Breitensport oder Wettkampf der Industriegiganten?’, in  Dittmar Dahlmann, Anke 
Hilbrenner, and Britta Lenz (ed.),  Überall ist der Ball rund: Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des Fußballs in Ost- 
und Südosteuropa – Die Zweite Halbzeit, (Essen, 2008), 69. 
13 Thorsten Pomian, ‘“Loba” macht den Meister’ in Dittmar Dahlmann, Anke Hilbrenner, and Britta Lenz (ed.),  
Überall ist der Ball rund, (Essen, 2006), 64.  
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Dinamo had all of the political and economic resources necessary to build a team that was the 
most competitive club in the former Soviet Union and one of the best clubs in Europe.14 
 
 The patrons were an integral part of the Soviet football ownership culture, and were, 
therefore, an important factor in the reform programs and the transfer of ownership of football 
clubs during the transition from communism to capitalism after 1987. As shown through the 
example of Dinamo Kiev, the patrons were not the actual owners of the individual clubs, but 
instead were key benefactors who used their political influence to guarantee the success of their 
favourite teams. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between patrons and clubs 
changed significantly and a clear divergence can be observed in the transition of ownership in 
the different successor states.  
 
In Russia, the transition of ownership from state institutions to private entities was a slow 
process and, in many cases, state-owned institutions hold significant proportions of shares of 
football clubs up to the present day.15 The mass privatization that occurred, especially under the 
early leadership of Boris El’tsin, which was later somewhat reversed by his successor Vladimir 
Putin, will provide a framework for the development of Russian football after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Here the transition of football clubs will be considered in the light of previous 
studies that have explained Russia’s difficult economic changeover. As we will later see, Russia 
took a very different path to a free market economy than the other Soviet successor states, and 
																																																								
14 Segodnia, 24 July 2009 http://sport.segodnya.ua/football/vo-vremena-cccr-v-dinamo-vce-ezdili-na-volhakh.html 
accessed 31 January 2012.	
15 For the development of Russian football after the fall of the Soviet Union see Marc Bennetts, Football Dynamo, 
(London, 2008).  
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this was largely due to the fact that, in Russia, many of the former state institutions as well as 
state actors of the former Soviet Union were very much involved in the process of ownership 
transition and privatization. This is especially revealed in Andrew Barnes book Owning Russia, 
in which he describes the power struggle over ownership in post-Soviet Russia. Barnes shows 
how the competition over redistribution of assets took place in Russia. Further, he describes the 
fluidity of power structures in post-Soviet Russia. This thesis builds on Barnes’ account, in that it 
analyses the redistribution of assets in the sphere of Russian football, and describes in particular 
how some of the main economic actors that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union. 
These actors, such as the Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, LUKoil co-owner Leonid 
Fedun, and state-owned companies such as Gazprom, have played important roles in the fortunes 
of professional football clubs in Russia. Other authors such as Lynn D. Nelson and Irina Kuzes 
have focused on privatization in the early 1990s but often with a one-dimensional perspective in 
that their analyses of the transition from communism to capitalism have focused on a simplified 
notion of privatization as a success indicator for the progress of reform in the Russian 
Federation. Yet, as we will see in the example of football, this privatization was not always 
orderly and, as we will see in the example of TsSKA Moscow, privatization did not necessarily 
mean that the government was no longer in control of a club.16  
 
The main focus for the study of patronage will be on Ukraine and Russia. Georgia will 
also feature in this section, but Georgia’s lack of competitiveness in football after the fall of the 
Soviet Union means that it will play a smaller role in the research. In Ukraine, and to some 
																																																								
16 For transition of ownership and privatisation in Russia see for example: Andrew Barnes, Owning Russia (Ithaca, 
2006); Anders Aslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution (Washington, 2007); Lynn D.Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, 
Radical Reform in Yeltsin’s Russia (London, 1995). 
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extent in Georgia, the disappearance of a central authority (Moscow), meant that private groups 
were quick to take control of football clubs, and in many cases incorporated them into larger 
private business structures. These new business people soon became known as oligarchs, and 
rapidly took control of the largest business operations in the country, including almost all of the 
major football clubs. Today, the oligarchs control all major economic sectors of the country and 
have a significant say in the fortune of the major political parties.17 Much like the situation in 
Ukraine, Georgian football clubs were taken over by local businessmen who benefitted from the 
chaotic aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, and some clubs even become part of mafia-like 
fraternities.18 The Georgian example is especially intriguing, as the country has come full circle 
and re-introduced a system in which most football clubs are fully state subsidized. Furthermore, 
while both Ukraine and Russia have managed to establish relatively strong football clubs and 
leagues, Georgia illustrates what the fall of the Soviet Union cost some of the smaller states in 
terms of success on the playing field.  
  
For the transition of ownership chapter, research was conducted primarily in Kiev and 
Moscow, but also to some extent in the Georgian capital Tbilisi. The differences in the transition 
of ownership in these three successor states will be used as case studies to explain the impact that 
the major event, which was the fall of the Soviet Union and the introduction of a free market 
																																																								
17 For Ukrainian oligarchs in football see for example Stefan Wellgraf, ‘Die Millionengaben’ in Dittmar Dahlmann, 
Anke Hilbrenner, and Britta Lenz (ed.),  Überall ist der Ball rund, (Essen, 2011), 97-105; Olaf Sundermeyer,  Tor 
zum Osten, (Göttingen, 2012); Simon Kuper, Soccer Against the Enemy (London 2003); Jonathan Wilson, Behind 
the Curtain, (London, 2006); Franklin Foer, How Soccer Explains the World, (New York 2004). 
18 For football’s transition from Communism to capitalism in Georgia see Lincoln Allison, ‘Sport Among the Soviet 




economy, had on the three aforementioned states. While these countries had very different 
approaches toward establishing free market economies and forms of government, they remain 
heavily dependent on forms of patronage. Oligarchical ownership, for example, is extremely 
dominant in Ukraine where rich businessmen dominate the local economy and, as a result, also 
own almost all the football clubs in the country. Unlike Ukraine, where oligarchs had, and still 
have, a virtual monopoly over football ownership, Russian club ownership is more diverse in that 
both state enterprises and oligarchs control most of the clubs. The close relationship between the 
state and the oligarchs in football became largely representative of the current Russian 
government’s relationship with the new business elite. The relationship between the government 
and the oligarchy is outlined in detail by David E. Hoffman in his, at times, overly sensationalist 
book The Oligarchs, as well as in Karen Dawisha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy. Yet most accounts of 
the oligarchs do not discuss the involvement of oligarchs in football, or the importance of 
football as a global marketing tool for Russian business.19 The purpose of this thesis is to expand 
on the studies conducted by Hoffman and Dawisha by showing the role of the oligarchs in the 
sphere of sport, and also to highlight the state’s decisive role when it came to oligarchs investing 
in Russian football. Finally, in Georgia, only a few wealthy owners operate a handful of clubs, 
with the majority of clubs receiving direct state subsidies. In his book The Caucasus, Thomas De 
Waal touches on Dinamo Tbilisi’s connection with Georgia’s political elite.20 This thesis, 
however, will go even further to explain the changing ownership structures of football clubs in 
Georgia, and how they compare to those in Ukraine and Russia. While there are differences in 
the form of ownership in the three states, the fact that clubs are not independent, and instead 																																																								
19 On the oligarchs see David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (New York, 2011) 
and Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (London, 2014). 
20 See Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, (New York, 2010). 
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depend on patronage, and in many cases on state patronage, shows a direct lineage to the Soviet 
tradition. 
 
Another development saw the politicization of football clubs by their patrons, a trend that 
first began in Ukraine in the late 1990s, and continued in Russia in the 2000s. The politicization 
of football clubs in the context of this thesis means the use of well-known football clubs as a 
propaganda tool to attract support and influence popular political opinion. This process of using 
football clubs as a political tool is categorized in this thesis as Berlusconization, a process named 
after the former Italian President Silvio Berlusconi, who used the popularity he had gained 
through the purchase of the prominent Italian football club A.C. Milan to launch a career in 
politics. The thesis follows the theory of the Italian football historian John Foot, who believes 
that the entanglement of politicians, business tycoons, and the media has led to a futbolocracy in 
Italy.21 In their respective studies on Ukraine, Andrew Wilson and Serhy Yekelchyk also 
highlight the interconnection between sport, media, and politics. Wilson especially, believes that 
oligarchs have tried to use the popularity of football clubs to increase their political profile. In 
the Ukrainian model, the oligarchs have, similar to Berlusconi, taken control of football clubs 
and used them as vehicles to launch political careers, or as political tools to gain economic 
advantages. These oligarchs include the Surkis brothers in Kiev, Rinat Akhmetov in Donetsk, 
and Igor’ Kolomoiskii in Dnepropetrovsk. While none of these authors use the word 
Berlusconization to describe the role of Ukrainian oligarchs, it is a fitting term to describe the 
																																																								
21 The term futbolocracy is a taken from John Foot, Calcio, (London, 2006) who uses the term Calciocracy to define 
the new political class in Italy that achieved political success through the utilization of football clubs. The most 
prominent example is Berlusconi. Berlusconization is a media phrase that defines the interconnection between sport, 
media, and politics. For Berlusconization of the Caucasus for example see: Sueddeutsche Zeitung 3 March 2011. 
Print. 29. 
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process and, as we will later see in the thesis, some oligarchs have even admitted that Berlusconi 
served as a role model.22 Indeed, by using the term Berlusconization, the thesis helps to bring 
political processes in post-Soviet football into the global context, as the oligarchs copied 
business practices from abroad—in this case from Italy. As a global institution, football has been 
part of an international exchange network of ideas, politics, and finance that dates back to the 
time of the Soviet Union. 	
Post-Soviet Football in the International Sphere 	
Another important aspect of this thesis regarding the transition of football from communism to 
capitalism is the introduction of advertisement and the players’ freedom to transfer abroad. In 
many ways, the two are related, as the freedom for players to move abroad was introduced at 
around the same time as advertising in Soviet football, and both measures were designed to 
generate cash for the Soviet administration. Both of these activities were handled by 
Sovintersport, the first Soviet sport agency, an institution that represented the Soviet Union in its 
last ditch effort to capitalize financially on the successes of the Soviet sports program. As the 
relevant documents have only become available fairly recently, researchers of Soviet and post-
Soviet football, such as Edelman, did not have access to the primary documentation that helps us 
to trace some of the major transfers of football players from the Soviet Union to leading teams in 
Western Europe. This thesis is therefore able to demonstrate what had been only hypothesised in 
previous studies.  
 
																																																								
22 For the role of oligarchs in Ukrainian society after the fall of the Soviet Union see: Andrew Wilson, The 
Ukrainians: An Unexpected Nation, (New Haven, 2002); Andrew Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, (London, 
2005); Albrecht Rothacher, Stalins langer Schatten (Graz, 2008); Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: Birth of a Modern 
Nation, (Oxford, 2007). 
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The files on Sovintersport will provide the backbone for my account of what happened 
when the state opened the market for Soviet clubs to both sell their most valuable assets (football 
players) and also to allow foreign companies to use Soviet clubs and stadiums as vehicles for 
advertisement. This section of the thesis stands in contrast to the patronage section as it outlines 
how football clubs dealt with the changing economic situation by utilizing market reforms 
introduced by the Soviet state.  Chapter 2 will highlight the ways in which clubs took creative 
measures in order to maximize their financial profit. One such example is Dinamo Kiev, which 
utilized international trade laws introduced by the Soviet government in order to start an import-
export operation that, for a time, helped the club to navigate the economic uncertainties of the 
day.  
 
 The transfer of football players has been researched to a certain extent in Robert 
Edelman’s book Serious Fun, but Edelman’s study ends with the fall of the Soviet Union, and his 
work differs from this thesis in that it does not examine the transfer of football players and the 
onset of advertisement in the light of the economic and political shifts that were occurring 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In his article ‘There are no rules on Planet Russia’, which is a 
study of Russian sports in the early 1990s, Edelman includes an interesting debate by Russian 
media and football personalities about the morals of Russian footballers who were leaving 
Russia to play for foreign currency abroad.23 While the debate on the morality of football players 
moving abroad is important, this thesis will attempt to understand the actual business operations 
of football clubs in the early 1990s as they were struggling with the new economic realities 
presented by privatization and the onset of a free market economy. Furthermore, while ‘There 																																																								
23 Robert Edelman, ‘There are no rules on planet Russia: post-Soviet spectator sport’, in Adele Marie Barker (ed.), 
Consuming Russia,  (Durham, 1999), 217-244. 
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are no rules on Planet Russia’ focuses on the cultural and economic struggles of sport in post-
Soviet Russia in the early 1990s, this thesis, however, also looked beyond Russia, by examining 
the difficulties that football faced in other successor states, particularly Ukraine.  
 
The transfer of major football stars from the Soviet Union, later Russia and the successor 
states, helps to trace the economic fortunes of football in the region.  After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, major clubs, in Ukraine and Russia especially, turned from being sellers to buyers of 
global football talent. The world football market, in many ways, has become a reflection of the 
globalization of industry and can be used to explain the role of the successor states in the 
changing global economic landscape of the 1990s and 2000s.24 The purchase of talented players 
from South America and Africa by Russian and Ukrainian clubs illustrates the changing 
economic fortunes of football clubs in the post-Soviet regions.25 Russian clubs became, in many 
cases, the most multi-national squads in Europe.26 In some cases Russian football clubs became 
the marketing vehicle of major international companies based in the Russian Federation. This 
thesis will, therefore, map where the successor states of the Soviet Union fit into the global 
football economy. Gazprom, which as a sponsor and owner of Zenit Sankt Petersburg is heavily 
invested in football, has firmly established itself as an international brand with subsidiary 
companies all over Europe. This is especially highlighted in Chapter 5, which will not only trace 																																																								
24 For footballs and globalization see:  Matthew Taylor, “Global Players? Football, Migration and Globalization, c. 
1930-2000”, Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, Vol. 31, No. 1 (115) (2006), 7-30. David 
Goldblatt, The Ball is Round: A Global History of Football, (London, 2006); Alex Bellos, Futebol: The Brazilian 
Way of Life, (London, 2002); Barbara J. Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in 
the 1930s,  (London, 2006). 
25 For Africa as a player market in the global context see: Raffaele Poldi. “Migration and Trade of African Football 
Players: Historic, Geographical and Cultural Aspects”, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2006), 393-414.  
26 Jim Riordan, ‘Football: Nation, City and the Dream. Playing the Game for Russia, Money and Power’, Soccer & 
Society, 8: 4 (2007), 554-555. 
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the global investment of Gazprom in the football world and beyond, but also that of other post-
Soviet companies, such as the Azerbaijani oil and gas company SOCAR, and the Ukrainian 
investment holding SCM. In this case the thesis will build on the pre-existing literature on 
globalization in football, but also, more importantly, will go further and show that the fall of the 
Soviet Union had a significant impact on the globalization of football in the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
Advertisement and sponsorship will be the other major theme of this chapter. Like the 
transfer of football talent, advertising has become a part of the globalization of football. 
Advertising was first introduced in the Soviet Union in 1987 and negotiations between clubs and 
foreign brands were conducted through intermediary agencies directed by Sovintersport. With 
the opening of the advertising market in the Soviet Union to foreign companies, new sources of 
revenue were allowed and facilitated by the authorities. The introduction of advertisement was, 
at first, limited only to the jerseys and advertisement boards for clubs that participated in 
international football.27 In general, however, Soviet football was not far behind the rest of 
Europe when it came to allowing advertisement at professional football matches, and it can be 
argued that the authorities reacted much the same as a general European-wide trend in the 1980s 
in which advertisement was more widely introduced in football as a new form of revenue, and 
which began to replace traditional forms of revenue such as money generated from gate 
receipts.28 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Vysshaia Liga was even one of the first 
major European competitions to introduce a name sponsor for its league.29 The late 1980s saw a 																																																								
27 Spiegel March 24 1989. 194. Print. 
28 Wladimir Andreff, and Paul D. Staudohar, ‘The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finances,’ 
Journal of Sports Economics 1: 257 (2000), 263. 
29 Izvestiia April 1, 1995. 4. 
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general globalisation of the European game, and late Soviet reforms and eventual fall of the 
Soviet Union played a significant role in the globalization of European football.  
Football clubs and stadiums as symbols for regional politics 	
The use of football to define regional and national politics will connect the work of this thesis 
with the studies conducted on Soviet football by Robert Edelman and Manfred Zeller.  Zeller, in 
particular, has done noteworthy research into the connection of regional identity, fan culture and 
the display of national identity during football games in stadiums.30 Zeller’s recently published 
book Das sowjetische Fieber: Fußballfans im poststalinistischen Vielvölkerreich is an excellent 
study on the history of football fan culture in the Soviet Union.31 This thesis will draw on 
Zeller’s recent work, as well as on the research by Edelman. The research conducted here, 
however, will also enter new territory by applying economic and political motivations for 
football clubs to market themselves as centers of regional identity. Here Shakhtar Donetsk will 
serve as an example, as the Ukrainian club has promoted itself as a beacon of regionalism, 
though not necessarily to promote national sentiment, but rather to increase the political and 
economic value of the club’s owner Rinat Akhmetov. 
 
 Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out the importance of sport and football as a medium for 
declaring national feelings: “the individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of 
his nation himself.”32 Sport, football especially, can serve as a vehicle to express and define 
																																																								
30 See for example: Nikolaus Katzer, Alexander Köhring, and Manfred Zeller, ‘Sport als Bühne sowjetischer 
Weltgeltung? Globale und locale Sportkultur in der späten Sowjetunion’ in Martin Aust, Russland und Sowjetunion 
global (1851-1991), (Frankfurt/Main 2013), 373-391. 
31 Manfred Zeller, Das sowjetische Fieber: Fußballfans im poststalinistischen Vielvölkerreich, (Stuttgart, 2015). 
32 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, (Cambridge, 1990), 143. 	
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national and regional identity.33 In the case of the Soviet Union, a state of many nations, this 
process was first observed in 1966 when Dinamo Kiev’s cup-winning team became a symbol of 
regionalism and subdued resentment against the central government in Moscow. 34  This 
resistance was was not violent and did not hold open demonstrations against the regime, as was 
the case in the late 1980s. During the Soviet Union the theme of ‘us versus them’ is best 
demonstrated by the contrast of the periphery (regions, cities, and national republic) versus the 
centre (Russia, and Moscow). Here stadiums played a particular role, as it was within their walls 
that regional identities could be displayed openly without the fear of repression.  Following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, this pattern can be observed in some of the successor states, 
especially in Ukraine.  
 
For this section, the thesis will draw on case studies, which extend from the Caucasus 
republics of Armenia and Georgia to the Baltic republics in Soviet times, and the scope will be 
expanded to track regionalism and nationalism in football in Ukraine and Russia after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. These regions were selected because they provide especially strong case 
studies on how economic and political concerns can turn to national resentment against a 
centralized regime. This became especially apparent during the introduction of reforms by 
Gorbachev after 1987, and again when many federations chose independence from the Soviet 																																																								
33 For sport and national identity also see: Sven Ismer, ‘Embodying the nation: football, emotions and the 
construction of collective identity’, Nationalities Paper: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 39:4 (2011), 547-
565; Michael Holmes, and David Storey. ‘Who are the boys in green? Irish identity and soccer in the Republic of 
Ireland’, in Adrian Smith, and Dilwyn Porter (ed.), Sport and National Identity in the Post-War World,  (London, 
2004), 88-104. 
34 See Manfred Zeller. ““Our Own Internationale,” 1966”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasion History 12, 
1 (Winter 2011), 53-82. 
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Football Federation as a way to achieve political legitimization of their newfound independence. 
In Armenia, for example, the hope was that economic and political reforms would result in more 
socio-economic advantages for Armenians. When the reforms failed to bring this about, 
however, Gorbachev’s glasnost policy turned into a vehicle that many Armenians understood 
could be used to voice national grievances against the centralized regime.35 John Sudgen and 
Alan Tomlinson point out that, all across the Soviet Union, football games became a means to 
express political opposition against the centralized government located in Moscow.36 The case of 
Armenia, amongst others, is expressed in the concept of us (in this case the national republic) 
versus them (Moscow and the central government). In many cases the resentment that was 
created was not due to cultural differences but over the lack of economic and political 
concessions. Here the national stadium of Armenia Hrazdan became a symbol of national hope; 
the facility was the theatre in which Armenians could express their wish for independence. Yet 
what happens to such a facility once independence is achieved? By showing the current state of 
stadiums the thesis will demonstrate that clubs and facilities were simply a means to achieve 
more political attention, for stadiums such as the Hrazdan in Armenia received little attention 
post-independence.     
 
Even more important than the example of the Caucasus, is the case of football in Ukraine, 
which at the time of the writing of this thesis, was undergoing its second revolution of the 2000s. 
The author lived in Ukraine in the spring of 2013, and was able to witness the divisions of 																																																								
35 For the Armenian struggle of independence see Peter Rutland. “Democracy and Nationalism in Armenia”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 5 (1995), 840-846. 
36 For football as a platform for resistance in the Soviet Union see: John Sudgen, and Alan Tomlinson. ‘Football, 
ressentiment and resistance in the break-up of the former Soviet Union’, Culture, Sport, Society: Culture Commerce, 
Media, Politics, 3:2 (2000), 89-108. 
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language and culture first-hand. Ukraine is perhaps the most difficult country to understand in 
terms of nationality, as the country is divided into three groups: Ukrainian speakers, Russian 
speakers, and people who use the two languages interchangeably (this slang is often referred to 
as surzhik and literally means mixed grains in Ukrainian).37 Language is, therefore, an unreliable 
indicator of nationality in Ukraine, and it is football that helps to clarify some of the regional 
boundaries. In Ukraine, this gives further plausibility to the notion of futbolocracy, which uses a 
combination of economic might, media control, and populism to achieve political and economic 
goals. The east of the country, in particular the Donbass, is the centre of the Russian-speaking 
minority, and clubs such as Shakhtar Donetsk were a vehicle for Russian speakers to voice 
grievances against the centre, which in this case is represented by Kiev. In the case of the 
Russian-speaking minority in the Donbass, many of the grievances are not centred on national 
self-determination or resentment of domination by Ukrainian speakers, but instead are mostly of 
an economic nature. Russian speaking workers from the steel and coal industry discovered that 
the football club Shakhtar Donetsk could be a platform from which they could voice grievances 
over economic issues such as poor wages against the government in Kiev. This has been 
particularly noticeable in the Ukrainian Super-Derbi between Shakhtar Donetsk and Dinamo 
Kiev.38 As was the case in Armenia, the stadium of Shakhtar Donetsk, the Donbass Arena, 
became a symbol of regional pride, and for many Donetskites an expression of the belief that 
regional politicians were more committed to the interests of the local population than were the 
politicians in far away Kiev. For the most part, this competition has been about economic and 
																																																								
37 For nationalism and language in Ukraine see: Michael S. Flier ‘The Rules of Engagement’ Harvard Ukrainian 
Studies, Vol. 22, Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe (1998), 113-136.	
38 This is especially highlighted in the wonderful documentary on Shakhtar Donetsk The Other Chelsea: A Story 
from Donetsk, dir. Jacob Preuss (Kloos & Co. Medien GmbH, 2010). 
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political grievances, with nationality and language playing a minor role.39 The situation in 
Ukraine is especially fluid and by the time of this writing, the Maidan revolution of 2013/14 had 
turned into a full-scale conflict in the Donbass. In addition, clubs became platforms for the 
political performances of the oligarchs, which further underlines the link between football, 
politics, and regionalism in the country. 	
Methodology and Research 	
Archive research for this project was conducted in Russia and Ukraine. Archival work was 
especially important for research into the period leading up to the implementation of the 
Gorbachev reforms.40 The core of the research was conducted in Russia and Ukraine, with 
Georgian and Armenian elements representing thinner and more marginal elements of the whole. 
Russia and Ukraine were the two strongest republics in Soviet football, and after the fall of the 
Soviet Union were also the only two nations to emerge with a competitive league structure, and 
national teams. Hence, the two countries are essential for any research on Soviet and post-Soviet 
football. The author, however, also had the opportunity to visit Georgia and Armenia in the 
spring of 2014. Initially it was hoped that the archives in Tbilisi could yield essential information 
regarding reform in football outside of Russia and Ukraine, but their poor state meant that much 
of the research centred in Georgia was conducted in the form of interviews with officials 
involved with the game in the republic.  
 																																																								
39 For regional identity in the Donbass see: Kerstin Zimmer, ‘Trapped in past glory: Self-identification and self-
symbolisation in the Donbass’ in Adam Swain (ed.), Reconstructing the Post-Soviet Industrial Region, (Abingdon, 
2007), 97-121; Elena Kovaleva, ‘Regional politics in Ukraine’s transition: the Donetsk elite’, in Adam Swain (ed.), 
Reconstructing the Post-Soviet Industrial Region: The Donbass in transition, (Abingdon, 2007), 62-77. 
40 A full list of archives can be found in the bibliography.  
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 Unfortunately, the implementation of khozraschet in Soviet football meant that clubs that 
gained independence from their respective state institutions were no longer required to send 
documents to the respective party and state organs of the Soviet Republics and later to the 
independent states. Many football clubs today have created museums in which the most 
important artifacts of their football history are put on display. These artifacts include shirts, 
trophies, and photographs of the most significant moments in club history; unfortunately, 
however, material that is relevant for this thesis is almost impossible to come by through modern 
clubs. Statistics on budgets, transfer sums, and attendance after the fall of the Soviet Union were, 
therefore, collected through newspaper articles and Internet sources.  Archival work on the 
structure of football clubs was for the most part only possible for the period leading up to 1987—
though in the case of Sovintersport, material was available up to 1992. Research into 
Sovintersport was conducted in Moscow at the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
(GARF). Little is known about the agency, and western researchers investigating sport have 
largely ignored it.41 Robert Edelman, for example, makes one mention of Sovintersport in his 
book Serious Fun but his source is not from the GARF and instead was a press report published 
in Sovetskii Sport. As Edelman notes, the agency was responsible for a “Brawn Drain” of the 
best Soviet athletes to clubs abroad.42 In conversation with the author in May 2015, Edelman 
confirmed he had long suspected that Sovintersport played an important role in the brawn drain, 
yet the fact that the material was not available when Edelman conducted his research means that 
this thesis can significantly expand on Edelman’s already excellent investigation.  																																																								
41 Based on the user index history of the Sovintersport files at the GARF, I may be the first person to have 
researched these fondy. 
42 Edelman, Serious Fun, 221. For the mass exodus of sportsmen from communist countries to the west also see: Jim 




 One of the most important sources for this research was the Soviet sports daily Sovetskii 
Sport. Many libraries in the former Soviet Union hold the newspaper, but this author found that 
these were often in disarray with many issues missing. Fortunately, the author was able to work 
at the Bavarian State Library (BSB) in Munich in the fall of 2012; the BSB has every issue of 
Sovetskii Sport available from the first issue when the newspaper was founded up until 2000. 
Through Sovetskii Sport it was possible to trace much of the debate that came with the reform 
process in Soviet football. After 1987 Sovetskii Sport took a drastic step towards openness 
(glasnost’), which meant that the paper often became a public platform for debates on how to 
reform football. Another important source for research was Sport-Ekspress, a Russian language 
sport daily that was founded after the fall of the Soviet Union and which is available throughout 
the former Soviet Union as well as online in digitalized form. Sport-Ekspress was founded by 14 
journalists who left Sovetskii Sport in 1991, and aimed at putting the interests of sport ahead of 
political interests of the government. Although Sport-Ekspress can be judged as apolitical—as 
opposed to Sovetskii Sport, which despite being supportive of glasnost’ followed the interests of 
the government—it started to play a significant role in uncovering some of the more bizarre 
transfer stories of the late Soviet period.43 Other newspapers included in the research were the 
Soviet dailies Izvestiia and Pravda and, where applicable, local daily newspapers. Next to 
Sovetskii Sport, Izvestiia was the most important Soviet newspaper for this thesis. Izvestiia was 
published by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as the official voice of the 
government. The paper supported reform but at the same time its role as the official publication 
																																																								
43 http://www.afisha.ru/article/mediahistory/page5/ accessed 22 February 2016.  
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of the Supreme Soviet meant that it sided with government actors.44 Another important source 
was the weekly magazine Argumenty i Fakty, which during the time of perestroika became the 
first independent news magazine in the Soviet Union, with very little state supervision or 
control.45 The research on Izvestiia, Pravda, and Argumenty i Fakty was conducted mostly in 
London at the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies at University College London. 
Many European periodicals also proved to be interesting sources for particular stories or cases.46  
 
In addition, interviews with sports journalists and football officials were conducted in 
both Georgia and Ukraine. These interviews were conducted in the form of informal 
conversations (unstructured interviews) that were recorded by the author. This form of interview 
was chosen because it enabled the interviewer to explore different lines of enquiry than were 
originally anticipated (or that would have been possible with semi-structured or structured 
interviews). One of the limitations of this style of interview is the fact that interviews can 
descend into anecdotal gossip, hence it was often necessary to fact-check the information 
provided by the interviewees with material collected elsewhere. Overall, however, the interviews 
provided important background information. Interviewees were also able to point out sources 
that might otherwise have been overlooked. As is common when covering recent historical 
events in sport, the Internet was also an essential source for research. Internet sources provided 
information on clubs via official homepages as well as online newspaper databases and academic 
databases. The Internet was also a useful source of old films of Soviet football, which were 																																																								
44 See Andrei G. Richter, ‘The Russian Press after Perestroika.’ Canadian Journal of Communication [Online], 20.1 
(1995): n. pag. Web. 10 Mar. 2015 
45 http://corp.aif.ru/page/89/ accessed 6 April 2016. 
46 A full list of newspapers, sportpapers, and magazines can be found in the bibliography. 
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available on YouTube. Finally, the online football data page transfermarkt.de was a valuable 
source when tracking transfer flows of post-Soviet football clubs. Transparency has been an 
issue in the world of football, and many clubs do not publish transfer sums of players, hence 
transfermarkt.de bases its valuations on press reports, estimations by its online community, as 
well as insider reports. Recent studies have found that there is a 93 per cent correlation 
coefficient between the sums published on the page, and the sums spent by clubs on players.47 
Some pages had to be treated with care, however, as official club pages often provided important 
data regarding dates and successes, but also often painted the past with nostalgia. Club pages 
were also extensively used in Chapter 5 to highlight the interconnection between between 
advertisers and football clubs. In this regard, club pages have to be viewed with care as they have 
to be understood as marketing vehicles for their respective clubs—and their sponsors—and, 










47 Jürgen Gerhards, Michael Mutz, and Gerd G. Wagner. ‘Die Berechnung des Siegers: Marktwert, Ungleichheit, 
Diversität und Routine als Einflussfaktoren auf die Leistung professioneller Fußballteams’, Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie, Vol. 43, No. 3 (June 2013), 240.  
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Beginning in the second half of the 1980s there were attempts to professionalize the league 
structure of the Soviet Union as well as to reform the relationship between the football leagues 
and the governing body of Soviet football, the Football Federation of the USSR (Federatsiia 
Futbola SSSR, which will be referred to from now on as FFU). The plan was to introduce a new 
governing body for football, which would be called the Football Union (futbol’nyi soiuz), and to 
place the leagues under its administrative jurisdiction. The debate on the structure of the football 
leagues continued through 1990, and in the end Goskomsport threatened to terminate the attempt 
to introduce an independent Football Union. Football was a microcosm that revealed the 
considerable power that state organs could still muster—even toward the end of the Soviet 
Union—in opposition to reform. Football especially highlights this as nowhere else was the 
debate on reform of the system as public as it was in football. Football, therefore, offers a rare 
insight into the thinking behind the political and economic reform process that the Soviet Union 
underwent, especially between 1987 and 1991, a period that includes both the introduction of 
major reforms by Gorbachev and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
 
  The 1990 season had already seen the withdrawal of the Georgian and Baltic teams, and 
1991 would prove to be the last the season of Soviet football. Instead of remaining in a unified 
Soviet League, the 15 newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union each introduced 
independent national leagues and football federations. Some countries became part of the Asian 
Football Confederation (AFC), while others remained with UEFA (the European governing body 
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of football). The chapter will show how the newly created football federations were incorporated 
into UEFA. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent collapse of communism, meant that 
UEFA expanded from 25 to eventually 54 member states. As a result, the competitive structures 
in European football underwent drastic changes, as UEFA expanded the European 
Championships, and changed existing international club competitions. 
 
As we will later see, there was a big difference in the power held, between the clubs and 
the FFU within the Soviet institutional system, in that the football federation and the league 
system, were true state institutions that were directly controlled by Moscow. The study of the 
football federation and its league structure therefore provides insight into the process of 
transformation of government institutions in the transition period from communism to 
capitalism. As we will see, football mirrored other institutions such as, for example, Gazprom 
which was formerly owned by the state and became partly privatized. Old Soviet enterprise 
directors, nomenklatura youth turned oligarchs, as well as the state itself, gained the upper hand, 
and thus ensured political continuity from the Soviet era.48 As in the industrial sectors, football 
federations often remained under the control of the same actors who had already been in charge 
before the fall of the Soviet Union, and who would stay in place well into the 2000s. 
 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation inherited all Soviet 
institutions located in its territory, including the Soviet Football Federation and its leagues.  It is, 
therefore, the Russian football leagues and the Russian Football Union that will be the main 																																																								
48 Susanne A. Wengle, ‘Post-Soviet Developmentalism and the Political Economy of Russia’s Electricity Sector 
Liberalization’, St Comp Int Dev (2012) 47: 92. 
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focus of the second half of this chapter.  As official successors of Soviet institutions, they best 
represent the transition of institutions from communism to capitalism in the post-Soviet space. 
The Soviet Vysshaia Liga: A Short History of an All-Union Structure 	
The Soviet football league structure was introduced in 1936 and underwent several name and 
structural changes up to 1970.49 In essence, the revolutionary regime in the Soviet Union copied 
a league structure that was found in many Western European countries.50 Unlike leagues in 
Britain or in Western Europe, however, the creation of the Soviet football league pyramid for the 
most part took place at the same time as the formation of the football clubs that participated in it. 
In the 1930s football was primarily played in Moscow, which fielded as many as five teams. In 
addition, the large regional capitals of Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk and Tbilisi each had a team. As 
will be outlined in chapter 2, clubs were created along the lines of sport societies, which were 
operated by Soviet institutions such as the army, ministry of interior, and trade unions. 
Urbanization in the Soviet Union after World War II meant that more cities gained the resources 
that were necessary to operate high performance sports. As a result, sport societies expanded 
their operations into such secondary cities of the Soviet Union as Donetsk (Shakhtar), Kharkov 
(Metallist), Baku (Neftchi), Dnepropetrovsk (Dnepr), Erevan (Ararat) and Tashkent (Pakhtakor). 
As of 1970 the top division of Soviet football was known as the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. As Robert 
Edelman writes in his book Serious Fun, prior to the 1960s, the highest division of Soviet 
football was mainly a Russian affair, with most teams coming from the capital Moscow.  
By the midsixties a flight from Moscow to Tashkent, … was no longer a daunting 
prospect. The mass media expanded and became more efficient. For lovers of the 
game who wanted to know the scores, television, radio, and an increasingly effective 																																																								
49 Edelman, Serious Fun, 192. 
50 Robert Edelman, Spartak Moscow (Ithaca, 2009), 78.  
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and nimble sports press provided quick information. With more teams in more cities, 
there were more games to be played, watched, and reported on. The entire edifice of 
Soviet football became bigger and more complicated.51 
  
At this point the Soviet Vysshaia Liga became a multi-national league with teams that 
represented many of the Soviet Republics. Despite the fact that not every Soviet Republic was 
there, and that most clubs came from Russia, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, the Soviet Vysshaia 
Liga nonetheless could be described as a Eurasian Champions League in which the best teams 
from several republics were represented to compete over a multi-national championship.52  
 
Also, the size of the league was standardised to a regular format: 16 teams competed 
from 1970 to 1979, after which the league was expanded to 18 teams. As shown in Table 1, the 
structure of the Soviet football leagues remained more or less stable during the period between 
1981 and 1991. There were small changes to the size of the leagues as well as reforms to the 
point system. There were also discussions on the operative command of the individual football 
leagues. These discussions intensified in the mid-1980s and lasted until the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The reform of the Soviet football league structure became part of the overall discussion 
on perestroika that had engulfed almost every aspect of Soviet society in the final years of the 
USSR. 
Table 1: The Soviet Football League Pyramid between 1981 and 1991 
Level League Division 
I Soviet Supreme League (Vysshaia Liga) 16 to 18 teams 
																																																								
51 Edelman, Spartak Moscow, 261.  
52 Zeller, Das sowjetische Fieber, 23. 
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II First Division (Pervaia Liga) 22 to 24 teams 
III 
Second Division (Vtoraia Liga) 
I Zona II Zona III Zona IV Zona V Zona VI Zona VII Zona VIII Zona IX Zona 
IV 
Amateur Leagues and Komitet po Fizicheskoi Kul’turne Competitions  
Regulated on the Republican Level  
 
Professionalization of the League Structure  	
Goskomsport (Sport Committee) was in charge of running all administrative aspects of the game 
such as transfers, player suspensions, and legal correspondence with the international football 
governing bodies FIFA and UEFA. As the 1980s progressed, Goskomsport frequently found 
itself in conflict with the clubs of the Vysshaia and Pervaia Liga over suspensions and player 
transfers. Archive material gathered at the Russian State Archive (GARF Goskomsport Fond) 
reveals the somewhat convoluted lines of communication between clubs, the republican football 
federations, the Soviet football federation, and Goskomsport. While disputes over player 
suspensions and transfers are not surprising, and are often the centre of conflict in football even 
today, it is the number of actors that were involved in these conflicts that is surprising. One such 
example is the suspension of Torpedo Moscow coach Valentin Ivanov in 1984, followed by 
Ivanov’s audacious challenge of this ruling. What ensued was a long chain of communication 
which involved Goskomsport, the Soviet Football Federation, Ivanov (as the accused party), and 
later, E. Moiseev, the Party Secretary of the Moscow Automobile Factory (ZiL). The argument 
over the suspension went back and forth, and eventually the Technical Commission announced 
the final decision in Sovetskii Sport, and had the article attached to the final communiqué to 
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Torpedo Moscow, thereby pre-empting any further argument with the club by making the 
announcement public.53 There are countless other examples of instances in which various actors 
were involved in matters that should have been simply resolved with a straightforward statement 
by the technical commission of the football federation. The problem, in many instances, was the 
involvement of various bureaucratic actors in the operation of football clubs in addition to the 
football federation and the league. It was not uncommon, for example, that factory directors, 
secretaries of cities, oblasts, or even republican governments, would write protest letters to the 
Soviet football federation after players or coaches had been suspended.54 This highlights not only 
the amount of administrative red tape that was involved in the day-to-day operation of the Soviet 
football league system, but also the daily political intrigues, especially between the various 
patrons who were formally in charge of clubs.  
 
As we will see in Chapter 2, the professionalization of football clubs was stimulated by 
several resolutions and government decrees passed after Gorbachev came to power in 1985. 
Dnepr became the first club to start the “experiment” of professionalization in 1987, and in 1988 
a total of 194 teams initiated the process of khozraschet (self-accountability) as it was called in 
the Soviet Union. Clubs were supposed to become self-funded through ticket sales, 
advertisement, TV-rights, sales of players, and the state lottery SPORTPROGNOZ.55 But the 
restructuring of football clubs also brought on the larger question of what kind of structure the 																																																								
53 GARF, f. R7576, op. 34, d. 425, ll. 89-92. 
(Sport Technical Commission Transfer Sheets, 9 January 1984). 
 
54 Some examples include GARF, f. R7576, op. 34, d. 425, l. 19, 129, and 161.  
Also see: GARF, f. R7576, op. 34, d. 426, ll 77-78, and 161. 
(Sport Technical Commission, 1984) 
55 Izvestiia, 8 Mar. 1988. 6.  
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clubs would compete in, and even more important, who would be in charge of the league. The 
professionalization of club structures was only one side of the solution to the problems of 
bureaucratization and inefficiency in Soviet football.  The now independent clubs also wanted to 
have professional football leagues that were separate from the Soviet Football Federation and 
that instead were placed under the administrative jurisdiction of a new body called the Soviet 
Football Union (futbol’nyi soiuz).56 This new Football Union would take over the administrative 
procedures of the Soviet football leagues (support clubs that represented the Soviet Union in 
European competition) and take over the organization of the Soviet national team. The old 
football federation would be left with the organization of amateur and youth football.57 The hope 
was that an independent body run by football professionals would limit the number of political 
actors involved in the game, and therefore reinforce the professionalization of the game in the 
Soviet Union. 
 
 As in other sectors of the Soviet Union, the perestroika of the football federation, and the 
discussion of how to limit bureaucracy in the league structure, morphed into a power struggle 
between the centre, the football federation, and the periphery represented by the clubs and their 
respective managers. After 1988 this conflict is best illustrated by the rivalry between two of the 
most influential figures in Soviet football at the time; Viacheslav Koloskov, the president of the 
FFU, was on one side, and Valerii Lobanovskii the manager of both the Soviet national team and 
the Soviet Union’s most successful club Dinamo Kiev, was on the other. Much of the discussion 																																																								
56 Robert Edelman, ‘The Professionalization of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’, Journal of Sport 
History, 17: 1 (Spring, 1990), 46. 
57 Sovetskii Sport, 20 Aug. 1988. 3. 
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regarding the reform of Soviet football revolved around these two characters in the period 
between 1988 and 1991. Lobanovskii proposed complete independence for the clubs and the 
Soviet Vysshaia Liga from the FFU, while Koloskov envisioned a league in which self-financed 
teams competed alongside state supported teams such as the Dinamo teams (financed by the 
various Ministries of Interior throughout the USSR), as well as clubs like TsSKA Moscow or 
SKA Rostov that were supported financially by the army.58 It was through these clubs in 
particular that the government, in the form of Goskomsport, hoped to maintain some control over 
the new Football Union. Those who were directly involved in the game strongly opposed this. As 
we will see later in chapter 2 Lobanovskii was a reluctant reformer when it came to his club but 
was strongly in favour of more modern structures in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. Lobanovskii had 
almost unlimited freedom to build a super club in Kiev due to the immense resources given to 
Lobanovskii by the Ukrainian Republican government. At the same time, the red tape required 
by the Soviet Football Federation and Goskomsport meant that Lobanovskii was often restricted 
in what he could achieve at Dinamo Kiev. The Football Federation, for example, frequently tried 
to interfere with his attempt to import the best players to Dinamo Kiev from all over Ukraine.59 
This must have been frustrating for Lobanovskii, who was able to witness, on his frequent trips 
to the west with the national team, the freedoms that clubs were given in Western Europe when it 
came to player recruitment and club development. Lobanovskii, therefore, did not want the end 
of state sponsorship of his club, but he did want to start a process whereby the same people who 
ran the best football clubs in the Soviet Union also ran the bureaucracy of football.  
																																																								
58 Edelman. ‘The Professionalization of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’, 46. 
59 TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 32, d. 2131, l. 38-39. 




  The reasons for the differences of opinion between the clubs and the football federation, 
therefore, boiled down to influence, power, and money. Clubs wanted to gain more freedom to 
develop without the limits set by the state apparatus in the form of Goskomsport. Although 
Goskomsport recognized the need for reform, it was not necessarily willing to part with control 
over the league for it contributed financially to the competition. In 1988, for instance, 
Goskomsport paid 1.2 million roubles a year toward the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. While the clubs 
were hoping for continued contributions from the state and at the same time for the freedom to 
operate the league, Goskomsport envisioned a system in which the league would be expected to 
run a profit and some of that profit would go back to Goskomsport.60 Clubs, however, did not 
want to pay for the privilege of self-support without receiving in return the power to reorganize 
the league, for they believed that they were more capable of modernizing the league on their 
own. This new body would be independent only in theory, as it would be answerable to 
Goskomsport and the Football Federation. This was not satisfactory to Lobanovskii and many 
other club managers, as it did not adequately deal with such issues as bureaucracy and the need 
for general independence by the clubs to run their own competition.61  
 
What Lobanovskii proposed was revolutionary not only for the Soviet Union, but also for 
football in Europe. At the time, national football federations ran all the national European 
leagues. Lobanovskii’s Union of Football Leagues or self-organization of the professional 
football leagues would have preceded the creation of the English Premier League, which became 
																																																								
60 Izvestiia, 8 Mar. 1988. 6.  
61 Sovetskii Sport, 15 Dec. 1988. 3.  
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independent from the English Football Association in 1992.62 Lobanovskii’s goal was to create a 
league that was free of the bureaucratic obligations set by Soviet officials, with an unambiguous 
legal concept that clarified the rights and obligations of players, coaches and teams.  Clubs 
would, most importantly, be freed from their obligations toward participant sports, and could 
therefore generate money solely for football operations.63 In other words, Lobanovskii wanted 
people in the football business to run the league in their own interests. As members of an 
independent football union, the professional teams would have been able to negotiate financial 
deals with sponsors, sign potential TV deals, and take full control over player contracts. Most 
importantly, the league’s independence from Goskomsport would have also freed them from 
financial contributions to the state.  
 
The football federation, however, fought hard to maintain control over the Soviet 
Vysshaia Liga. It was, therefore, no surprise that Koloskov met Lobanovskii’s idea with 
criticism. He did not want Goskomsport (or himself) to lose control over the football league 
structure, as this would have significantly reduced Goskomsport’s power over football, and 
therefore over the sport that had the potential to be the most lucrative sport business in a 
reformed Soviet Union. As Edelman writes, the main question was the following:  
would control of the Soviet Union’s most popular sport remain in the hands of 
those government and party figures who had shaped it for official ends, or would 
soccer pass into the control of an elite of trained specialists who sought to protect 
their own positions, while producing entertainment for the public?64 
 
																																																								
62 http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/about/history.html accessed at 24 November 2011. 
63 Edelman. ‘The Professionalization of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’, 48. 
64 Ibid. 48. 
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The debate on restructuring football therefore reflected the Soviet socio-political atmosphere of 
the time. Gorbachev’s administration worked hard on decentralization and privatization of the 
Soviet Union, a process that dramatically sped up in the period after 1987. In May 1988, for 
example, 33 enterprises withdrew from their respective ministries in Leningrad and formed 
independent associations.65 In 1989 a new State Commission on Economic Reform was set up 
with the mission to make recommendations on economic reforms, as well as to transform several 
ministries and sub-ministries into state owned companies.66 In effect, Lobanovskii’s idea of an 
independent Union for Football Leagues was no different from the withdrawal of an economic 
enterprise from its respective ministry. Perhaps the big difference between football and a factory 
was the fact that the struggle over structural changes was fought openly in the press due to the 
huge popularity of the sport.    
 
Media coverage was, in fact, an important element in the political struggle over football. 
Journalists such as Vladimir Maslachenko who was writing for the widely circulated Argumenty 
i Fakty argued that government officials had not yet learned that sport was also a business and 
that it was important to invest in sports in such a way as to not only offset the costs, but also to 
actually make a profit. Maslachenko pointed out that around the world football had become a 
large commercial enterprise, and that the organization of football in the Soviet Union lagged 
significantly behind. Furthermore, he explained that in other countries football associations had 
become more professional and independent from the government, and that this was also 
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necessary in the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, he noted that officials were reluctant 
to grant football more independence because many of them made money from the sport.67  
 
The debate over professionalization of the sport then became public domain when on 
May 23, 1989 Izvestiia published an interview with both Koloskov and Lobanovskii. In the 
interview, Koloskov stated that he was willing to allow the league to move toward independence 
after a transitional period of 2 to 3 years. Lobanovskii stated that the move toward independence 
of the football leagues would only be feasible with the support of Goskomsport.68 At this point, it 
seemed possible that the two sides could come to a compromise. Lobanovskii and Koloskov 
came up with a proposal that would put the new Union within the domain of Goskomsport but 
would enable it to operate independently, and the resulting Union of Football Leagues was 
introduced on June 1, 1989.69 This marked the end of false amateurism as practiced in Soviet 
football and made structural changes necessary for all clubs that had not already moved toward 
professionalization. How much influence and power the Union of Football Leagues was to 
receive still remained undecided. The Union wanted to be in charge of the top three divisions 
(vyshaia, pervaia and vtoraia liga). Goskomsport, on the other hand, stated that the vast vtoraia 
liga, which was divided into numerous regional zones and consisted of more than 150 teams, did 
not really have professional structures and therefore needed to remain under the jurisdiction of 
the Football Federation.70  
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This proposed compromise did not, however, mean an end to the debate on the structure 
of the football leagues. As the power struggle continued through 1990, Goskomsport even 
threatened to terminate the concept of an independent Union of Football Leagues. The Union, 
which was under the chairmanship of former football player Viktor Ponedel’nik, then accepted 
the previously considered compromise regarding control of the various divisions of Soviet 
football. The top two divisions would be managed by the Union of Football Leagues and the 
vtoraia liga would stay with the federation. Furthermore, the federation received the backing of 
the world governing body FIFA (of which, conveniently, Koloskov was the vice-President at the 
time): FIFA stated that the league and teams that represented the Soviet Union abroad must be 
under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Football Federation and Goskomsport.71  The example of the 
Football Union, therefore, demonstrated the considerable power that state organs could still 
muster in opposition to reform.72 The state had leverage due to the fact that the clubs that wanted 
to form this independent football structure were still financially dependent on state subsidiaries. 
The Soviet football federation only considered giving the league more economic independence 
because they themselves were under pressure to reform in the early years of perestroika. Yet, in 
due course, it became apparent that the economic reforms, while designed to maintain rather than 
undermine the Soviet system, were not compatible with that system.73 At this point the state 
fought back. In 1989 the government used Gosplan, for example, to augment its power over 
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consumer prices and wages. Other emergency controls pre-dating 1987 were also re-established 
by the state in an effort to tighten financial discipline.74  
 
While football was somewhat anomalous in that Koloskov used his international 
influence to torpedo any support for the Union of Football Leagues, what happened to the Union 
was still representative of what was going on elsewhere in the country. As Edelman writes: ‘the 
Union was never able to win support for its existence in either the Council of Ministers or the 
Supreme Soviet. At these levels of state power, Goskomsport was able to find many willing 
allies.’75 What Edelman could not know at the time was that the Soviet Union was already on the 
brink of extinction, that the 1990 season would see the withdrawal of the Georgian and Baltic 
teams, and that the 1991 season would prove to be last season of the Soviet Union. Despite the 
withdrawal of teams and the eventual disappearance of the Federation and its league, the fight 
over control of the league is an interesting example of what reform in the Soviet Union as a 
whole meant for smaller institutions such as those involved in football. The Football Union was 
in many ways an attempt by economic actors, in this case the clubs, to use the Gorbachev 
reforms to extract more power from government institutions such as Goskomsport. Perestroika in 
the case of the Football Union, therefore, turned into a power struggle between the centre, and 
the newly independent actors in the form of the clubs—and their managers. Solnick believes that 
the introduction of self-financing after 1987 caused a breakdown of hierarchies, and that this can 
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be observed in football.76 After clubs were moved into self-accountability, they naturally tended 
toward finding more revenue streams and, as a result, wanted more power to run football. 
Accordingly, they were weakening the architecture of the football federation by demanding to 
run the league, which then made it possible for entire football federations to break off from 
Goskomsport.  
Leading the Pack: Georgia and the Baltic States withdraw from Soviet Football 	
Each Soviet Republic had its own football federation, which was responsible for football 
development at both the regional and amateur level. As we will see later, the football federations 
of the individual republics also had influence over clubs in the higher division in that they were 
responsible for the education of youth players.  Every republic was given targets as to the 
number of youth players that had to be produced as part of the five-year plans.77 After the fall of 
the Soviet Union, some federations simply declared independence from the Football Federation 
of the Soviet Union, while others were founded as completely new institutions. The first 
republics to withdraw from the FFU were Georgia and the Baltic republics. The reasons they 
withdrew from Soviet competitions were twofold.  First, the federations believed that, by 
organizing their own competitions, they would benefit financially. Second, many republics 
within the Soviet Union experienced a national awakening, and nationalists demanded full 
national control over all aspects of culture, including football.  
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 The 1991 Soviet Vysshaia Liga finished its season one month before the Soviet Union 
collapsed in December 1991. Like the Soviet Union, however, Soviet football had also begun to 
fall apart before 1991. Georgia’s withdrawal from Soviet football came after Soviet troops 
violently put down a demonstration in Tbilisi in April 1989. In 2014 I was able to interview 
Mamuka Kvaratskhelia, who has worked in several capacities for Dinamo Tbilisi, UEFA, and the 
Georgian Football Federation (GFF) since the late 1980s. He is also a well-recognized sports 
journalist in Georgia and the Caucasus. Kvaratskhelia was present at the meeting in which the 
Georgian Football Federation decided in favour of independence from the Soviet Football 
Federation. Kvaratskhelia explained: ‘at the time we felt that the Soviet bear was not that strong, 
and officials believed that they could kick the bear and achieve independence [for] Georgian 
football.’ The meeting took place in November 1989 in a conference room at the Dinamo 
Stadium in Tbilisi. ‘The meeting room was very small, at the time it was sometimes used for 
press conferences, but today the rooms are the changing rooms for the referees.’ The meeting 
involved 21 people including officials and also former players, and they decided that as of 
February 1990 the Georgian Football Federation would organize an all-Georgian football 
championship independent from the Soviet Union.78 The GFF was the first institution in the 
Soviet Union to declare independence and, as a result, Georgian teams withdrew from Soviet 
league play on February 15.79 Before the announcement was made on February 15, 400 members 
of the GFF gathered at the House of Chess in Tbilisi, about one kilometre from the Dinamo 
Stadium, to introduce new regulations for the GFF. The most important questions included who 
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the president of the federation would be, as well as where the games of the Georgian national 
team would take place. The famous Georgian coach Nodar Akhalkatsi was elected as the first 
president of the independent Football Federation. Although Dinamo Tbilisi and the Ministry of 
Interior were opposed to independence they were outvoted by 95 per cent of the 400 delegates.80 
The GFF then began to organize a new competition in which the Georgian Umaglesi Liga was 
the top division. The Umaglesi Liga had been organized as the Georgian Republican 
championships since 1927, and was part of the Soviet League pyramid. Now the league, no 
longer a regional Soviet Republican championship, became the highest division for clubs within 
Georgia’s territory.  
 
In some ways, the meeting by the GFF reflected what was going on elsewhere in 
Georgia. The Caucasus historian Thomas De Waal describes the period between 1989 and 1991 
as ‘a collective national fever.’81 As Kvaratskhelia explained, in 1990, Georgian football was in a 
strong position as it had two representatives in the Vysshaia Liga and another two in the Soviet 
Pervaia Liga. Those four clubs would then be joined in 1990 in the newly independent Georgian 
Umaglesi Liga by Georgian teams that were playing in the republican Georgian level of the 
Soviet league pyramid. The newly independent league seemed to be hugely successful at first 
when 100,000 people attended the first match of the Georgian Umaglesi Liga in March 1990, but 
erosion of standards began almost right away. After the first season, for example, the league was 
expanded from 18 to 20 teams, an enormous number of clubs for a small country like Georgia, 
which had a population of about 5 million people at the time. The main reason for this, according 
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to Kvaratskhelia, was corruption; local party bosses, factory managers, and members of the 
Georgian mafia paid to have their clubs entered into the new competition. On top of that, the 
Georgian Football Federation was still subsidized by Moscow; Georgia was still officially part of 
the Soviet Union and possibly the centre hoped that by continuing subsidization the GFF would 
eventually return to the Soviet football federation. The higher a club was placed in the league 
pyramid, the greater the financial support made available by the state.82 In its early years the 
league was, therefore a huge cash cow for local “families”, who could funnel state funds into 
their own pockets. The GFF benefited in that through enlarging the league they were able to take 
bribes from clubs that normally did not have the opportunity to play first division football. In 
many ways, football reflected what was going on elsewhere in the country. Georgia was one of 
the Soviet Union’s most prosperous republics, but in the first three years after independence the 
country’s GDP dropped by 73 per cent.83   
 
While state subsidies could have allowed the GFF, between 1990 and 1992, to invest in 
football infrastructure, much of the money disappeared into back channels. As Kvaratskhelia 
explained: ‘In 1990, to go independent was a smart decision, as we had almost unlimited 
resources from the Soviet Union, but due to corruption a golden opportunity was lost. Instead of 
rebuilding our youth infrastructure, money disappeared. Money was in Georgia but the 
corruption not just in the federation meant that we ended up much worse then before.’84 Despite 
the fact that the GFF was organizing an independent league, and was applying for recognition by 																																																								
82 Kvaratskhelia  




FIFA and UEFA, the Soviet Football Federation, and Goskomsport kept subsidizing Georgian 
football. This was significant as it indicates that Goskomsport didn’t realize the changing 
political climate in some of the states in the Soviet periphery. This period is especially unclear, 
as Goskomsport had a huge financial leverage which it did not use to put pressure on the 
Georgian FF to return to Soviet football. In this very chaotic period, in addition to the possibility 
that Goskomsport hoped that by maintaining the cash flow the GFF would eventually return to 
the Soviet football federation, the most likely scenario appears that various Georgian officials 
who still worked at the central organs of Goskomsport syphoned funds to the GFF.   
 
Shortly after the Georgian clubs withdrew in 1990, the Baltic clubs also began to 
withdraw from Soviet football competitions to play in the newly independent leagues of their 
republics. The Soviet Vysshaia Liga side Zhal’giris Vilnius, for example, played one last game 
in 1990 and then joined the newly independent Lithuanian Football Federation (Lithuanian FF). 
All clubs from Estonia and Latvia also withdrew from Soviet Football Federation and joined the 
Estonian Football Association (EFA) and the Latvian Football Federation (Latvian FF) 
respectively.85  Just as was the case with GFF, the football associations of the Baltic republics 
were already independent entities within the Soviet Football Federation. All three countries had 
their own national championships within the Soviet league pyramid.  The Baltic republics also 
benefited from the changing economic structure within the Soviet Union. In 1989 the Soviet 
government introduced tax changes, which gave the three Baltic republics control over, tax 
revenue from enterprises on their territory. In return, Moscow began to reduce subsidy payments 
to the Republican governments. The new law was soon restricted in 1990, and Lithuania was 																																																								
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even economically blockaded and forced to pay back taxes, but then the newly elected President 
of the Russian Federation Boris El’tsin introduced economic sovereignty for the Russian 
Federation in the summer of 1990, and the blockade was lifted.86  
 
These new economics caused Soviet institutions to begin to crumble: Solnick calls this a 
“bank run” on Soviet institutions, as regional governments tried to grasp as much power as 
possible and, without fiscal power, central Soviet institutions were unable to withstand the 
pressure.87 In football the “bank run” can also be observed. With the introduction of a self-
financing Football Union, clubs and Republican Federations lost their financial incentive to stay 
within the structure of an all-Union wide football system. Because clubs were now self-financed, 
and were even expected to pay taxes on their profit, they no longer saw a reason to compete in 
the Soviet Union and pay for the privilege. The example of Georgia, with Moscow continuing to 
pay subsidies even after Georgian clubs and the Georgian Football Federation had declared 
independence, also shows that financial incentives played a major part in the football 
independence movements.  The Baltic States also introduced their own national championships 
for a mixture of financial benefit and nationalism, which boiled over in 1990. While Georgian 
clubs felt they could leave Soviet football and still receive financial subsidies, the Baltic clubs 
felt that they had to leave: they no longer saw a financial benefit in staying when the Soviet 
Union cracked down on their newly gained economic freedom. These examples show the extent 
of the disintegration of Soviet structures, as neither harsh measures nor financial incentives 
worked to keep republics attached to the centre.   
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The 1990 Soviet Vysshaia Liga season was a lopsided affair in which only 13 clubs 
competed for the Soviet championship after the withdrawal of the two Georgian clubs Dinamo 
Tbilisi and Guria Lanchkhuti before the start of the season, as well as the Lithuanian team 
Zhal’giris Vilnius after the first day of the season. The changes were even more dramatic further 
down the pyramid, where many clubs from the four renegade republics had been participating. 
Yet, whilst financial incentive was one of the reasons why clubs and federations wanted to leave 
the Soviet Union, it soon became clear that there was no long-term financial benefit from actual 
independence. Furthermore, FIFA, which was strongly influenced by Koloskov, the head of 
Goskomsport and the FFU, did not recognize the independence of Georgian football, and even 
forbade its member states from making formal contact with any members of the GFF. The fact 
that Georgian clubs were no longer participating in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga also meant that the 
English sports clothing company Umbro and the German sports clothing company Puma ended 
their sponsorship agreements with Georgian teams. Furthermore, many of the best Georgian 
players were leaving the country to play in Western Europe, or for clubs that still competed in 
the Soviet Vysshaia Liga.88 The Georgian newspaper Zaria Vostoka even published an article in 
Sovetskii Sport in which it stated that it was time to negotiate for a re-entry of Georgian clubs 
into the Soviet league structure.89 Since Georgia was not recognized by international institutions 
there was no way that UEFA would allow Georgian clubs to compete in international 
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competition; along with the lack of substantial competition, this made Georgian football a 
commercial wasteland for years to come.  
 
Zhal’giris Vilnius of Lithuania also struggled with the newly gained independence of the 
Lithuanian Football Federation. The manager, and former player of Zhal’giris, Benjaminas 
Zelkevičius, believed that the decision to leave Soviet football was an emotional mistake made 
when national sentiment was boiling over during the struggle for Lithuanian independence. But 
at the same time the head of the of the Lithuanian FF, Vitas Dirmeikis, believed that, overall, 
Lithuanian football had benefited from the withdrawal from Soviet football, as smaller clubs 
from all over the country were now able to compete against former power houses such as 
Zhal’giris.  Dirmeikis also pitched the idea of a Federation Cup in which teams from Lithuania 
could compete against clubs from the Soviet Union.90 For Lithuanian nationalists, however, the 
FFU and the Soviet Vysshaia Liga were just two of many Soviet institutions that were 
endangering the Lithuanian cultural heritage.  
 
The independence of the Baltic football federations and the Georgian Football Federation 
was then followed by a proclamation by the Ukrainian Football Federation in the Ukrainian 
sports daily Sportivnaia Gazeta on September 15, 1990. The proclamation stated that Ukraine 
wanted to be recognized as an independent entity at UEFA competitions, as well as at World 
championships and in the Olympic games. The initiative of the statement came from the People’s 




also signed by many coaches, players and functionaries of Ukrainian football.91 Rukh became a 
recognized political party in 1989 and in March 1990 Ukraine together with all other Soviet 
republics held legislative and local elections. In Ukraine, Rukh became part of the Democratic 
bloc, which won one hundred out of 450 seats in parliament, the Supreme Rada. The Democratic 
bloc gained further momentum when reformists in the Communist Party began to join it. By July 
1990 it was re-christened the People’s Council, which published a symbolic declaration of 
sovereignty.92  
 
Rukh’s call for sport sovereignty was the next step in Ukraine’s movement toward 
independence. That Ukrainian football officials supported this move is not surprising. As in the 
Baltic republics, Ukrainian officials such as Lobanovskii stated that Ukrainian football could 
actually benefit financially from being independent of state institutions. In reality, however, state 
officials of Ukraine had no interest in creating a Ukrainian football league and Football 
Federation for the good of the Ukrainian game, but rather saw the change as an opportunity to 
acquire wealth. The conflict between the Ukrainian Football Federation and the FFU therefore 
returns to the power struggle between the independent Football Union and the centre. Once again 
the main actors were Lobanovskii and Koloskov. But perhaps both underestimated the political 
forces operating under the flag of nationalism: in the end, nationalism and the desire for personal 
gain would destroy the Soviet Union and all its institutions outside of Russia, including the FFU 
and the Soviet league pyramid. While Lobanovskii certainly wanted to have more independence 
from Soviet institutions such as Goskomsport he did not want to dismantle the Vysshaia Liga 
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itself. Goskomsport was also unable to veto the independence of newly created sport associations 
at the international level because the constitution of the Soviet Union allowed individual Union 
Republics to leave the USSR. In the past this had not been an issue but with the Union collapsing 
politically, Goskomsport was not able to bind the football federations of the now newly 
independent republics into a new governing body. International governing bodies such as the 
International Olympic Committee or FIFA could therefore recognize the independent sport 
organizations of the Baltic States.93 The influence of Koloskov actually postponed international 
recognition of the new football associations. The withdrawal of the Ukraine Football Federation, 
however, was the final blow to the Soviet Football Federation, its leagues, and national team. 
Ukraine was the prize asset of Soviet football; next to Russia it fielded the most clubs in the 
Vysshaia Liga, and the majority of national team players came from the republic. With Ukraine, 
the Soviet Union was a football powerhouse, without Ukraine, it was merely a fringe player in 
the European game. 
Splitting the Spoils: The new Football Federations of the former Soviet Union 	
In 1991, the last season of the all-Union competition, the league returned to its normal format of 
16 teams, including clubs from six Soviet Republics. Ukraine held its referendum on the 
“Declaration of Sovereignty” on December 1, 1991, and an overwhelming 90.3 percent voted in 
favour.94 Just 16 days after the referendum, on December 17, 1991 Sovetskii Sport announced the 
declaration of sovereignty of the Ukrainian Football Federation, as well as the termination of its 
membership in the FFU. The Ukrainian Football Federation also announced that it had made a 																																																								
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formal application for membership to both FIFA and UEFA. This meant that after seven decades 
of Soviet football, the Ukrainian clubs would leave the Soviet championship to play in a national 
Ukrainian championship. This was the worst-case scenario for Soviet football. As Sovetskii Sport 
pointed out, Ukraine was the home of over five-dozen professional, and thousands of amateur 
teams. 120 thousand children were registered in Ukrainian football schools.95 The members of 
the UFF presidium assured their audience that they would make every effort to be recognized by 
UEFA no later than the summer of 1992. Yet many questions remained, for example: how would 
the newly created Ukrainian football championship be structured? The UFF would also have to 
work out with UEFA details such as qualification places for European club competitions.  
 
 The UFF believed that Ukrainian clubs could compete in European competitions starting 
with the 1992-93 season, which meant that a Ukrainian championship would have to be 
completed within six months. Some officials such as Chernomorets Odessa coach Viktor 
Pokopenko believed that such an undertaking would be very ambitious. On the other hand, the 
federation seemed very well prepared to start a new season right away. Along with its statement 
of independence, a plenum of the UFF also announced the framework for the first Ukrainian 
Vysshaia Liga season: a three-month competition played from March 6, 1992 to June 21, 1992. 
The league was divided into two groups with a total of 20 teams, and the two winners of the 
group stage would compete for the first Ukrainian championship. The federation also announced 
the framework for the entire Ukrainian football league pyramid and laid down the rules for the 
first Ukrainian cup competition. The results of the 1992 championship would determine where 
clubs would be placed in the following season, which would be played from the fall of 1992 to 																																																								
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the spring of 1993.96 The competition rules were announced at a time when the Soviet Union was 
still nominally alive, however, the announcement by the UFF reflected what was going on 
elsewhere:  Ukraine was now fully prepared to cut its ties with the Soviet Union.  
 
As federations broke away from the Soviet Football Federation, it became clear to those 
running the Russian game that Soviet football could not be salvaged, and on December 18, 1991 
the new Football Federation of Russia announced that on January 9, 1992 a conference would be 
held in Moscow to create a new All-Russian Football Federation. At the time, however, there 
were two football federations claiming that they represented the interests of Russian football. On 
the one hand there was the new body under the leadership of Anzor Kavazashvili, a former 
goalkeeper for Spartak, Torpedo Moscow and Torpedo Kutaisi, and a member of the Soviet 
national team between 1965 and 1970; 38 delegates of the administrative territories of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) created this federation on December 3, 
1991. The other body was the old Football Federation of the RSFSR (FFR), under the leadership 
of Iuri Nyrkov, who had a brief playing career for TsDKA Moscow (later TsSKA) and was also 
a Major General in the Soviet army. The FFR, like the UFF and the GFF, was a former member 
of the Soviet Football Federation.97 Both Nyrkov and Kavazashvili came from outside the 
national and international football bureaucracy in which Koloskov had navigated his entire 
career. Koloskov chaired the still existing, although now in its death throes, Football Federation 
of the USSR. Under Koloskov the FFU made one final bid to survive the breakup of the Soviet 
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Union. On December 26, 1991 Koloskov declared that the political problems in the Soviet Union 
and Russia could have massive consequences ‘for football in our country’ and that there was a 
real danger that the country could be excluded from international competitions such as the 1992 
European championships. He therefore called for an end to the split between the two Football 
Federations in Russia. Just five days after the fall of the Soviet Union, Koloskov produced a 
rough draft for a new season but, unlike the Ukrainians, the Russians were still confused over 
what kind of structure the new league would have.98 While most states of the former Soviet 
Union were able to quickly create league structures and working football federations, things were 
not quite so clear in Russia. What was obvious was that the Soviet Union was a thing of the past, 
and that Russia needed an independent football federation, but it was much harder to determine 
whether the former Russian Football Federation, a new body, or the old Soviet Football 
Federation would be in charge of football in the Russian Federation.  
 
On January 9, 1992 Kavazashvili was confirmed as the president of the all-Russian 
Football Association (RFA). Kavazashvili, however, benefited from the fact that three other 
candidates A. Kozlov, V. Ponedel’nik and I. Varlamov did not stand for election and instead 
took vice-presidential positions; the three must have made a backroom deal regarding the 
division of power. The conference also announced the termination of the old Football Federation 
of the RSFSR. This was necessary, according to Kavazashvili, because Russian law stipulated 
that Russian organizations had to be public institutions independent from the state organizations, 
and because the Football Federation of the RSFSR had failed to send a letter of application to the 
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Russian Ministry of Justice. Sovetskii Sport, however, pointed out that this was not true: the 
Football Federation of Russia had sent all the necessary documents to the Ministry of Justice, 
and the all-Russian Football Association had no right to liquidate the old football federation. 
Kavazashvili also announced that he had sent a memo to FIFA in which he formally requested 
Russia’s restoration of membership, but again Sovetskii Sport pointed out that the Football 
Federation of the RSFSR had already done this.99 The future of Russian football was at stake: 
would it go to new actors such as Kavazashvili, who in the past had been active footballers, or 
would it remain with the old bureaucrats who were already in charge of the Soviet-era football 
federation?  
 
The power struggle over the structure of Russian football illustrates in many ways the 
broader struggle over Soviet institutions. The creation of the Russian Federation represented a 
Stunde Null: with the fall of the USSR, former Soviet institutions like the FFU were dissolved 
and new actors, mostly former football players, tried to use the situation to gain influence and 
control over the sport. These former players felt that they were better suited to shape the future of 
Russian football than the bureaucrats who had often stood in the way of reform. But the 
bureaucrats were not yet ready to depart the scene. Both the Football Federation of the RSFSR 
and the new body, the all-Russian Football Association, laid claim to football in the new Russia.  
On January 14, 1992 Viacheslav Koloskov took action and announced the transformation of the 
old Football Federation of the USSR into a new body that represented the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Koloskov, as the vice-president of FIFA, had the advantage that his 
association was the only recognized successor of the former FFU, and therefore put a temporary 																																																								
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hold on all independent football associations that had been created by the various republics. He 
also stated that only the Football Federation of the RSFSR had the legal authority to represent 
Russian football since it had been registered in timely fashion with Mossovet and had been in 
operation for more than two years.100 At that point, it still seemed possible that parts of the 
Soviet Union could create a new regional state. In this scenario the FFR would have been not the 
federation of an independent country but that of a regional football association under the 
umbrella of the new CIS football federation. 
 
Koloskov then issued a statement via Sovetskii Sport that there was tentative hope that the 
Soviet Vysshaia Liga could be continued under the leadership of the Football Association of the 
CIS. He hoped for a new championship that would include teams from Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan as well as Abkhazia and 
Transnistria. The football federations of Moldova and Armenia had joined Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Georgia in declaring they would initiate independent championships. According to 
Koloskov, the new championship would be played in two groups with eleven teams in each 
group. The best five in each group would advance to the next round to determine the medal 
places.101 The inclusion of Abkhazia (Dinamo Sukhumi) and Transnistria (Tiligul Tiraspol) was 
especially surprising, since these were not countries but territories of the newly independent 
states of Georgia and Moldova respectively. This was a politically provocative move, especially 
since neither club had ever participated at the highest level of Soviet football. It was also hard to 
imagine that the provincial towns of Sukhumi and Tiraspol would be able to support high 
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performance sport. On January 17, 1992 Viktor Ponedel’nik, the vice-president of the all-
Russian Football Union, issued a response to Koloskov’s declaration and the formation of a new 
CIS football association, heavily criticizing the inclusion of Transnistria and Abkhazia. He 
argued that Koloskov was using political events to strengthen his bid for a CIS Football 
Association. Ponedel’nik also criticized Koloskov’s fellow vice-president of FIFA Joseph Blatter 
and the president of FIFA João Havelange for supporting Koloskov’s football association.102  
 
Nikita Simonian, a former national team player and at that point a representative of the 
CIS Football Association, countered Ponedel’nik’s statement by arguing that because the 
Football Federations of Georgia and Moldova had declared their independence from the FFU 
they had also declared their independence from the official successor of the FFU, the new CIS 
Football Association. Because neither federation had been accepted into FIFA, they were now 
outside international football law. Simonian therefore believed that the football federations of 
Transnistria and Abkhazia were free to remain within the CIS Football Association. According to 
the rules of the CIS FA, all football federations of territories, republics, and cities of the former 
Soviet Union were allowed to join individually.103 Both Koloskov and Simonian believed that 
the rule of accession would preserve the old FFU. In principle, clubs from all over the former 
Soviet Union were free to join the new CIS Supreme League as independent entities.  
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At that point, however, Koloskov was politically outmanoeuvred. His patriotism for the 
Soviet Union, and his belief that he could use political events in Moldova and Georgia for his 
benefit, did not sit well with many clubs from the newly founded Russian Federation.  On 
February 4, 1992 the five big Moscow clubs, TsSKA, Torpedo, Lokomotiv, Dinamo and Spartak 
issued a memorandum on Koloskov’s proposal for a new CIS Supreme League. The clubs 
argued that the introduction of a free market economy within the CIS had resulted in a manifold 
increase in transportation tariffs, price spikes in food and hotel services, as well as the 
introduction of new currencies in the now sovereign Republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, the clubs were worried about the political situation in many of the now sovereign 
republics. Therefore the CIS championship, they argued, would constitute a real threat to the 
budget of their clubs, as participation would cost each team between 25 and 30 million roubles a 
year.104 The Moscow clubs also pointed out that many of the new states had already registered 
their membership with FIFA and that it was therefore quite likely that a new CIS championship 
could not be completed because clubs would leave as soon as their national federations had 
achieved independence.  
 
The Moscow clubs therefore called for the creation of a new and unified Russian 
federation and championship, since the present situation was threatening the “recovery” of 
Russia’s membership in FIFA and UEFA. They also made it clear that they would not participate 
in a CIS championship.105 The Moscow clubs had assessed the new political reality correctly: the 
																																																								




Soviet Union with all its institutions was at its end, and the failure to establish a new independent 
championship in the framework of an independent Russia could have seriously threatened the 
participation of the Moscow clubs in European club competitions, as UEFA might sanction a 
league that was used as a political tool in volatile regions.  Furthermore, the clubs wanted to 
move quickly in order to establish a new football federation that would retain the UEFA co-
efficient points—which determined the numbers of starters in European competitions—
previously allocated to the Soviet Vysshaia Liga and Soviet Football Federation. Their 
declaration can therefore be understood as a move to preserve as much of the international power 
of the old league as possible without actually retaining it as an institution. Iuri Nyrkov reacted by 
announcing that a Russian championship would be organized under the auspices of the Russian 
Football Federation.106  
 
The next turn of events was the re-creation of the Russian Football Union (RFU) on 
February 8, 1992. This body had already existed briefly between 1912 and 1917 and had been a 
member of FIFA during that period. Both the delegates and members of the RFF and the all-
Russian Football Association supported its establishment. The new president of the RFU was 
none other than the old president of the FFU, Viacheslav Koloskov, while Simonian became the 
vice-president.107 Koloskov is the most remarkable figure in the transition from the old FFU to 
the RFU. In the end he was able to preserve his power by mustering his political connections 
from the time of the Soviet Union. His gambles to preserve the structure of the old Soviet 
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Vysshaia Liga can be understood as a gambit to determine how much of the old structures of 
Soviet football could be preserved. When the Moscow clubs rebelled, Koloskov must have 
understood that the only way forward was by creating a national Russian Football Union. The 
reason that he survived this venture politically is because, as the former head of the Soviet 
Football Federation, he was in the comfortable position of having an extensive national and 
international network. This made the new Russian Football Union dependent on Koloskov, as 
only he could convince UEFA and FIFA that the Russian Football Union was indeed the 
legitimate successor of Soviet football, and this gave Russian football a huge advantage over 
other successor states of the Soviet Union. As the head of Goskomsport, the Football Federation 
of the USSR, and later the newly independent Russian Football Union, Koloskov therefore 
serves as an emblem of how old Soviet institutions and their political leadership were able to 
survive the fall of the old regime and extend and even expand their power in the Russian 
Federation.  
 
At the founding conference of the RFU, the framework of a new Russian football 
championship was also announced. The Russian Professional League (RPL), under the 
leadership of the General Director of Dinamo Moscow, Nikolai Tolstykh, began organizing the 
three top divisions of the country. Immediately, there were disputes about the size and make up 
of the new football league pyramid. The top clubs wanted only 14 teams in the new Russian 
Vysshaia Liga, whereas the smaller clubs wanted between 17 and 20, and up to 40 clubs in the 
second division (divided into two groups).108 The new league structure was announced on 
February 14, 1992 in Sovetskii Sport. The new Vysshaia Liga would consist of 20 teams that 																																																								
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would compete in two groups. The top four teams of the two groups would then form a 
championship group that would compete for the first Russian championship. The bottom six 
teams of each group would play for a place in the 1993 Russian championship, which was 
downsized to 18 clubs. Unlike Ukraine, the new Russian league system would remain on the 
spring to fall schedule.109 As in Georgia, the makeup and size of the new Russian Vysshaia Liga 
was also about political influence, as clubs that previously had no chance of playing in the top 
division were now trying to gain the best possible position for themselves in the context of 
Russia as a newly independent entity.  
 
The creation of the new Russian Football Union and the independent league structure 
ended the process of dismantling the old FFU and the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. By February 1992 it 
was clear that each of the former Soviet Republics would play independent national 
championships. The new organizations that were formed between 1990 and 1992 are shown in 
table 2. 
Table 2: The post-Soviet States and their Football Associations 
Football Federation of the Soviet Union and its successor organizations 
Successor State Football Federation Top League Founded 
Joined 
FIFA Affiliation 
Armenia Football Federation of Armenia 
Armenian Premier 






Premier League 1992 1994 UEFA 
Belarus Football Federation of Belarus 
Belarusian 
Supreme League 1992 1992 UEFA 
Estonia Estonian Football Association Meistriliiga 1923 
1923, 
1992 UEFA 																																																								
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1936 1992 UEFA 
Kazakhstan Football Federation of Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan 
Premier League 1992 1994 UEFA* 
Kyrgyzstan Football Federation of Kyrgyz Republic 
Kyrgyzstan 
League 1992 1994 AFC 





Lithuania Lithuanian Football Federation 




Moldova Football Association of Moldova 
Moldovan 
National League 1990 1994 UEFA 












Tajikistan  Tajikistan National Football Federation Tajik League 1936 1994 AFC 
Turkmenistan Football Federation of Turkmenistan Yokary Liga 1992 1994 AFC 
Ukraine Football Federation of Ukraine 
Ukrainian Premier 
League*** 1992 1992 UEFA 




1946 1994 AFC 
*from 1992 to 2002 member of AFC **until 2001 Russian Vysshaia Liga ***until 2008 
Ukrainian Vysshaia Liga 
 
Russia and the Russian Vysshaia Liga were recognized by UEFA as the successor of the Soviet 
Union and the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. This put them in an advantageous position in terms of 
qualification spots for European competitions and gave them an edge over other successor states 
like the Ukrainian Premier League: although recognized by UEFA, the Ukrainian Vysshaia Liga 
had to work its way up from the bottom in the UEFA coefficient standings. 
 
Some Russian football officials, however, still hoped that the countries of the CIS could 
continue to send national teams to the European and World championships. The first tournament 
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in question was the 1992 European Championships. Would the Soviet Union participate, and if it 
did, who would be the participating nations in such a Soviet team? The idea was soon born that 
the Soviet national team would participate at the tournament as the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). But the struggle for control of Russian and post-Soviet football meant 
there was a danger that the Soviet Union, like Yugoslavia, which at that point was embroiled in 
civil war, would be banned from the tournament. Koloskov’s proposal to include teams from 
several post-Soviet states in a newly created post-Soviet League was viewed by UEFA and FIFA 
as a potential problem.  In fact the international football federations could have sanctioned such a 
move by banning the CIS national team from the European Championship that took place in 
Sweden in 1992. It was not clear which football federation would act as the official 
representative of the CIS. Because a team would include many players from the now 
independent republics, there was a general debate between the football federations of the various 
now independent countries over jurisdiction and selection processes.110 In the end a compromise 
was reached which would see the various now independent federations of the former Soviet 
Union play together one last time under the auspice of an independent body. UEFA was always 
clear that the spot at Euro 1992 could only go to a team representing the entire former Soviet 
Union, as it was the USSR national team that qualified for the tournament. With the creation of 
an independent CIS team UEFA eventually cleared the participation of the CIS at the 1992 
tournament on February 4, 1992.111 
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For this reason the CIS FA continued to operate, and was not dissolved after the creation 
of the RFU. But already in February 1992 the football federations of Central Asia made it clear 
that they would only participate in a CIS national team if there was a CIS football 
championship.112 In the end, a compromise was reached and all the football federations of the 
former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltic States, sanctioned the CIS participation at 
Euro 1992. The CIS team that competed at the tournament was made up of 15 Russians, 3 
Ukrainians, a Georgian and a Belarusian. The team performed miserably and finished last in the 
group stage. The CIS team played their final game against Scotland, a game they lost 3-0, a sad 
conclusion to the history of a national team that had been crowned the first champion of Europe 
in 1960. Andrei Petrov from Izvestiia produced a fitting metaphor when he referred to the 
performance as the funeral of the Soviet national team. He noted that the team was made up of 
players who won the 1988 Olympic tournament in Seoul and came second in the 1988 European 
championship and therefore should have done much better. In many ways, the state of the CIS 
team resembled that of the former Soviet Union, where individuals played solely for themselves 
rather than for the team. Petrov believed that the dissolution of the USSR national team would 
hurt football not only in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but also in Ukraine and Russia.113 As 
we will later see, none of the national teams of the successor states ever matched the success of 
the USSR team. In particular, smaller countries such as Georgia and Armenia have done very 
poorly in international competitions. After the European Championships, the CIS Team (and 
therefore the Soviet national team) was dissolved and replaced by the national teams of the 
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successor states. Russia played its first international match as a sovereign nation on August 16, 
1992, beating Mexico 2-0 in Moscow.114  
Out of the Ashes: The Russian Premier League in the post-Soviet world 	
With the end of the Soviet Vysshaia Liga and the creation of national championships, it soon 
became apparent that only two post-Soviet states were able to stage meaningful national 
championships: Russia and Ukraine. Only those two countries had the population and the 
financial resources to compete with the national leagues of Western Europe. Furthermore, in the 
1990s, the economic landscape was changing dramatically in football. As television revenue 
skyrocketed in England, Spain, France, Italy, and later in Germany, Eastern Europe struggled to 
keep up. Former hotbeds of Soviet football like Armenia and Georgia lost importance. Their 
domestic football declined, and all the best players moved to Russia, Ukraine, or the west. In the 
1990s, only a handful of Russian and Ukrainian clubs could compete with the important clubs 
from Western Europe. 115 Many Russian and Ukrainian players also moved to the west to play in 
the big European leagues.116 Instead of competing with big clubs from all over the Soviet Union, 
the Russian league became a Moscow-only competition, which for almost ten years was 
dominated by one club, Spartak Moscow.  
 
Russia struggled for almost a decade before the leagues reached a competitive playing 
level. Until then, the Russian league system experienced reforms and uncertainty. One 
component that was changed regularly was the size of the league. Altering the size of the league 																																																								
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is a very public way of signalling reform without actually accomplishing much. The size of the 
first division does very little to improve youth development, the financial situation of clubs, or 
falling attendance figures. In 1993, the Russian Vysshaia Liga consisted of 18 teams but was 
reduced to 16 for the following season. The hope was that fewer teams would create a better 
product on the pitch, as fewer “top clubs” would actually mean better football.117 But reformers 
failed to understand that it was not the number of clubs in the Vysshaia Liga that led to falling 
attendance numbers, but rather the overall poor product of the league, as stadiums crumbled and 
the football failed to live up to the standards set by the old Soviet Vysshaia Liga. Match fixing 
further devalued the Russian game and caused fans to lose trust in the integrity of the league. For 
example, at the end of the season a six-team promotion tournament was played between the 14th, 
15th, and 16th placed teams of the Russian Supreme League and the three winners of the Russian 
First League divisions. The top three teams qualified for the 1994 Russian Top League.118 The 
three teams that were relegated were Chornomorets Novorossiysk, Luch Vladivostok, and Okean 
Nakhodka. Controversy surrounded this tournament, and Nakhodka alleged that matches were 
fixed in order to ensure that the Pacific clubs would go down.119 A 2010 report on match fixing 
by Sport Ekspress journalist Igor’ Rabiner supports this allegation. According to Rabiner, match 
fixing was used to ensure that Vladivostok and Nakhodka would go down, because teams in the 
Russian Premier League did not want to travel to the Russian Pacific region.120 In the light of the 
memorandum of the big five Moscow clubs that torpedoed the creation of a CIS championship, 
Rabiner’s allegations make sense. The European clubs of Russia’s championship simply could 																																																								
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not afford to have their teams travel all the way to Russia’s Far East region. Rabiner’s story 
becomes even more significant when one looks at the league reforms for the 1996 season, in 
which the league was expanded back up to 18 teams; clearly the reform that reduced the league 
to 16 teams was intended as measure to rid the Russian Vysshaia Liga of the two clubs based in 
the far east of the country.121  
 
The experiments were considered necessary because several clubs had begun to struggle: 
it was believed that more teams and consequently more home games would increase revenues 
through increased attendance numbers. But the reforms actually lowered the value of the league 
because the constant reforms gave fans the impression that the people who were running the 
competition lacked creative solutions that would make football more competitive in the country. 
In 1996, therefore, a new league board was introduced under the leadership of Nikolai Tolstykh. 
The goal was to reform the league by introducing professional standards similar to those in the 
United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the clubs of the former Football League broke away 
from the Football Association (FA) in order to set up a league that was able to negotiate 
independently  (without the consent of the FA) contracts with television and commercial 
partners. But in Russia, the new league remained under the structure of the federal Professional 
Football League (PFL), which was set up in 1992 to govern the upper echelons of Russian 
football. While club officials hoped that new structures would ensure greater economic stability, 
it soon become evident that the Russian Football Union to which the PFL had to answer was not 
able to bring prosperity to its first division. Several clubs, such as TsSKA Moscow and Torpedo 
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Moscow, struggled to meet the financial criteria set out by the PFL in the early 1990s (the latter 
was saved temporarily when the Luzhniki Group bought the club and transferred it to the 
Luzhniki stadium).122  
 
Furthermore, the league sold its commercial rights to the International Management 
Group (IMG). IMG then sold the naming rights of the league to the Danish toothpaste and gum 
company Stimorol, which meant that the league was officially called Stimorol Liga from 1996 
onwards.123 This sponsorship agreement rang in a new era of professionalization, but naming the 
league after a toothpaste producer did little to return glamour to a league that was still struggling 
from the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union and from the lack of competition caused 
by the fact that many top teams had left the league. Increasing the size of the league from 16 to 
18 clubs further watered down the competition, as Russia simply did not have the capacity for an 
18-team competition, and more teams simply meant more meaningless games. As a result the 
average attendance in the league dropped—for example Spartak Moscow saw its attendance drop 
from 11,750 average visitors per home game in 1995 to 8,594 in 1996.124 As Russia tried to 
come to grips with new political realities and high-speed capitalism, increasing the number of 
clubs was bound to produce an inferior product. Furthermore, with the memories of the old 
Soviet Vysshaia Liga games between big clubs from different republics still vivid, people were 
simply not interested in seeing Spartak demolish another provincial team from cities such as 
Sochi, Naberezhnye Chelny, or Kamyshin. 
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In 1998 the league pyramid was changed once more as Koloskov announced that Russian 
football would see yet more restructuring. The Russian Vysshaia Liga returned to its previous 
format of 16 teams, as most of the big clubs were still fighting the reduction in attendance 
numbers. But there were also reforms in the lower leagues. The RFU, for example, returned the 
control of the Russian Third League to the provincial football federations, which in turn returned 
the league to amateur status (from 1993 to 1997 the Russian Third League was a professional 
league). This restructuring, in some ways, saw a return of the Soviet practice whereby the lower 
tier leagues became regional competitions. As the Russian Second League was expanded from 
three to five divisions, football authorities hoped that clubs could save money by regionalizing 
lower leagues as teams could significantly cut down their transport costs. Travel was always one 
of the biggest expenses for smaller clubs in Russian football, especially for clubs like Chita, 
Vladivostok, and Nakhodka, which are located in the far east of the country. The splitting up of 
the league into more regional competitions was intended to limit the amount of travel for smaller 
clubs and increase attendance numbers through ensuring more games between local rivals.  
 
Another big problem for the clubs of the Second League was the transport cost of 
referees; Nizhny Novgorod, for example, had to pay 10 million roubles to transport one referee 
who came all the way from Moscow (which isn’t even that far by Russian standards) and other 
clubs had to pay even more for the transportation costs of officials. Koloskov promised that the 
RFU would make it possible for clubs to invite referees from the neighbouring regions. Another 
cost-cutting measure was to allow teams with especially long journey times to play three games 
in a row away from home followed by three games at home. Some of the smaller clubs 
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sponsored by governors, enterprises, or factories, were in financial trouble—at some clubs 
players had to sleep in the bus for away games and were required to bring their own food. 125 
Many of these reforms have to be seen in light of the financial crisis that hit Russia in 1998. The 
rouble was massively devalued, which certainly had an effect on the costs for smaller teams (the 
big teams from Moscow concluded most of their transactions in dollars).126  
 
Russian football, along with the Russian economy, began to recover in 1999. As the 
journalist Victor Gorlov remarked on the increase in attendance, ‘When there is no bread at least 
there is the spectacle of spring football’.127 In fact, attendance figures were up on the very first 
day of the Russian First Division season. In Astrakhan 17,000 fans (the stadium only fit 15,000) 
wanted to see the First Division match between the home team Volga-Gazprom and Metallurgist 
Lipetsk. The same phenomenon could be observed in cities like Saratov, Tomsk and Tula. 
Gorlov believed that the main reason was that in hard economic times, when many cinemas and 
theaters were closed and people could not go on holidays, football provided one of the few 
sources of entertainment. Furthermore ticket prices were relatively low.128  
 
In 2001 the league was once again reformed when clubs of the top division broke loose 
from the Russian Football Union and the PFL to create a new competition called the Russian 
Prem’er Liga (Russian Premier League, RPL). The clubs of the top division were now able to 
govern the league, and the league could make decisions without having to consult the clubs of 																																																								
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the First Division or the RFU.129 With this development, the top clubs of Russia’s top league 
followed the lead of other European leagues, most prominently the English Premier League, by 
creating a more independent competition governed by the clubs rather than by the national 
football federation. The English Premiership, established in 1992, had become the benchmark for 
independently run football leagues by the early 2000s. In England, the establishment of the 
Premiership was accompanied by rising TV revenue and attendance numbers, and had become a 
model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism—a deregulated and entrepreneurial free market.130 It was an 
alluring model, one that promised more revenue for the top clubs, because as an independent 
league the RPL was no longer forced to share revenue with the lower divisions. Yet as we will 
later see in chapter 2 the only thing that the Russian Prem’er Liga—aside from the name—would 
share with its English namesake was the fact that many of its top clubs were purchased either by 
corporations or by rich investors.  
 
In fact, even after it opened up to investors from abroad, the Russian league faced 
disadvantages compared to other competitions in Europe. For one, there were the issues of 
geography, travel, time differences, and weather. As we have already seen, the clubs based in the 
European Russia were not happy when clubs from the Russian Far East managed to be promoted 
to the Russian top flight. This became an issue again when Luch Vladivostok achieved 
promotion in 2006 and remained in the top division for three years. At the time, Vladivostok was 
seven time zones ahead of Moscow. The fans of the Moscow clubs had to travel eight hours by 
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plane or seven to eight days by train to travel with their team.131 The continued presence of clubs 
from the Far East threatened the competition financially as games in the Far East were extremely 
unpopular with the fans and television companies due to the big time difference. Fortunately for 
the clubs of the Russian Premier League, Vladivostok was relegated in 2008. Teams from the Far 
East also had a financial disadvantage due to the relatively low economic development of the 
Russian Pacific region in addition to the high cost of travel. Nakhodka and Vladivostok already 
had some of the highest budgets in the inaugural Russian Vysshaia Liga season, and were only 
able to survive because of financial contributions from the regional government.132 The new 
league structure gave more power to clubs from Western Russia, as these were the most popular 
and financially successful clubs. As part of an independent league, these clubs were now given 
new weapons that could be used to ensure that the football gulf between western Russia and the 
Far East would remain in place and that consequently, clubs such as Vladivostok could simply 
not survive in the RPL.  
 
The creation of the RPL also meant that there would be an even bigger gap between the 
RPL and the Russian First Division, which now fell under the jurisdiction of the PFL. Here, 
clubs from all of Russia’s time zones were present, from the enclave of Kaliningrad, which is 
located between Poland and Lithuania, to Khabarovsk on the Chinese border. The Russian based 
journalist Marc Bennetts wrote: ‘When the sun is rising in Kaliningrad, the working day has long 
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finished in Khabarovsk.’133 When Vladivostok played in the Premier League, the club would 
travel to Moscow and play three or four away games on one trip, in order to save money and to 
give players more time to recuperate.134 Long-distance travel has long been one of the main 
issues for Russia’s professional sport teams, and plane travel accounts for a significant 
proportion of clubs’ budgets. In 2011 the entire Kontinental Hockey League (KHL) team, 
Lokomotiv Yaroslavl, along with their coaching staff, perished when their plane crashed shortly 
after takeoff in Yaroslavl. The reason for the crash was the poor maintenance of the 32-year-old 
Yak-42 plane.135 It is hard to imagine that Russia’s top clubs use such old planes, but for the 
bottom clubs of the Russian Premier League and all the clubs of the Russian First Division, 
flying in poorly serviced aircraft is a common reality.  
 
The other issue is Russia’s winter and it was for this reason that the Soviet Vysshaia Liga 
and later the Russian Premier League played its season on a spring to fall schedule. Clubs, 
however, believed that this schedule gave them a disadvantage in international competitions, for 
all other European top leagues played from fall to spring. Beginning with the 2011 season, the 
Russian Premier League switched its calendar, with the first half of the season played between 
the spring of 2011 to the fall of 2012. The top eight teams of the spring to fall campaign then 
competed for the championship and European cup places. The bottom eight played to avoid 
relegation. The massive First Division was reduced from 20 to 18 teams.136 With this last reform 																																																								
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the Russian Premier League aligned its league system with the major European competitions. 
The hope was that clubs would be more competitive in international competitions. Yet the gulf 
between the big clubs and the smaller clubs in Russia is still wide and the league has not been 
able to achieve the international strength of the old Soviet Vysshaia Liga. The move to the 
European calendar, as it is often referred to in Russia, has not helped to improve the performance 
of Russian clubs in European competitions. While the big clubs have managed to survive the 
group stage of the Champions League, they usually then fail to make it past of the round of 16, 
which is played in February, at a time when the Russian Premier League is still holding its winter 
break. In 2013-14, for example, Zenit Sankt Petersburg managed to qualify for the round of 16, 
but lost at home to Borussia Dortmund 2-4. The game was played February 25 while Zenit was 
still preparing for the second half of the season, whereas Dortmund was already back in full 
competition mode as the German Bundesliga’s winter break ends in late January. The return 
match played March 19 showed a much stronger Sankt Petersburg side, as the Russians won the 
game in Germany 1-2, but as they had lost the home game so comprehensively the otherwise 
good result was not enough to see them qualify for the next round.137  
 
Zenit’s case in 2013-14 is exemplary of the failings of Russian football in Europe’s 
premier competition. New stadiums might, in the long term, make it possible for Russian football 
to align its calendar with that of other European leagues, but new arenas would not necessarily 
fix the vast competitive gulf between the top clubs and the bottom clubs in the Russian Premier 
League. As we have seen, the short history of the Russian Vysshaia Liga and later the Russian 
Premier League is one of constant reform, as the functionaries of Russian football have 																																																								
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repeatedly tampered with the makeup of the league in order to make it more competitive and 
appealing. Yet the 1990s and 2000s have demonstrated that the independent Russian football 
pyramid was inferior to the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. The RPL was supposed to make the league 
more attractive, and the league’s cycle was changed to fall to spring, as in most European 
countries, in order to increase the international competitiveness of Russian clubs. The creation of 
the RPL also heralded a new era of big investment in Russian clubs, but as we will see in chapter 
2 many of these investments were due to economic factors that were not under the control of the 
RPL and the Russian Football Union. Investment in Russia’s top clubs and the consistent failure 
to create a league that would be as competitive as the old Soviet Vysshaia Liga therefore soon 
turned into nostalgia for the old Soviet championship. Russian top clubs along with big clubs 
from other post-Soviet states hoped that the old Vysshaia Liga could be resurrected in the form 
of an independent international tournament.  
 
Football in the post-Soviet Space: From Rivalry to Cooperation? 	
The idea of a new international league that would involve some of the newly independent states 
is not new. As we saw above, Koloskov had already brought the idea into play right after the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. A tournament was soon set up and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Cup (CIS Cup) competition was held for the first time in 1993. This 
tournament, which would take place annually, was envisioned as a sort of Champions League for 
the countries of the former Soviet Union. The organization and finances of the tournament were 
arranged by Viacheslav Koloskov’s Football Union, and the main sponsor was Markos 
Shiapanis, a Greek businessmen and the owner of the lottery company Lotto Million.138  Lotto 
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Million along with the National Sport Fund sponsored the tournament, and paid for the prize 
money.139 The prize money for the tournament was set at US$50,000, a small sum especially 
when compared to today’s standards, but nonetheless a figure that clubs could not pass up within 
the financial insecurity of the post-Soviet collapse.140 Shiapanis, a Greek émigré, became a rather 
prominent business magnate in the early 1990s. According to an article published in the 
Kommersant in 1993, he was involved in a deal which saw the Soviet Olympic Committee 
purchase lottery licences. This venture became known as Lotto Million, and by 1993 kiosks 
operated in all major Russian cities; the new tournament was part of his investment strategy to 
grow his brand name even further in the post-Soviet space.141 All countries from the former 
Soviet Union (as well as the Baltic States, even though they were not part of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States) were willing to send their champions—except for Ukraine, which 
boycotted the event.142 In his article for Krasnaia Zvezda Sergei Aksenov writes that everything 
had been done to get the Ukrainian team to play in Russia, and that Ukraine’s champion Tavriia 
actually had wanted to participate. The club had to withdraw, however, when the president of the 
Ukrainian Football Union threatened to fine the club if it were to take part. Even high level talks 
between the advisor to the Russian President Shamil Tarpishchev and the Ukrainian Football 
Federation brought no results.143 The Ukrainian FF stated that they did not want Tavriia to 
participate because the tournament was played indoors and on synthetic grass. The real reason, 
however, was that Ukrainian officials feared that participation at the CIS Cup could result in 																																																								
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UFF losing independence, as Russia was still hoping to create a Eurasian Football Union.144 
Teams from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were also unable to attend as the economic situation in 
their countries made it impossible for these clubs to pay their travel expenses.145 Spartak won the 
tournament by beating Belarus Minsk (formerly Dinamo Minsk) 8-0, but as Pravda wrote in its 
post-tournament report, the full potential of the tournament was not reached due to the absence 
of the Ukrainian champion.146  
 
 It was not until 1995 that Ukrainian clubs would compete at the CIS Cup when Shakhtar 
Donetsk (not the Ukrainian champion Dinamo Kiev) participated.147 As the years passed, 
however, the tournament was increasingly demoted to a pre-season affair played in the long 
Russian winter break. By the early 2000s the big clubs from Russia and Ukraine only sent their 
reserve teams to compete.148 The problem was the wide gulf between the Russian and Ukrainian 
clubs and the clubs from the rest of the CIS countries. Results like Spartak’s 8-0 over Minsk 
became common and only the games between the Ukrainian and the Russian champion offered 
attractive football.  
 
The big clubs from Russia and Ukraine now focused on the financially more attractive 
UEFA Champions League. It is no coincidence that the inauguration of a more lucrative pan-																																																								
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European championship in 1992 came right after the fall of the Soviet Union. Until the early 
1990s UEFA was a relatively small operation within FIFA, but with the fall of communism in 
Eastern Europe, it expanded fast, absorbing the new successor states of Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and all the former Soviet Republics west of the Caucasus (Kazakhstan was also 
accepted in 2002). This not only gave UEFA enormous voting power within FIFA, but also 
bolstered UEFA’s capacity to fight off private investors who wanted to create a European Super 
league. Instead UEFA turned the old European Cup into a new enterprise known as the UEFA 
Champions League. The competition was completely rebranded and adopted the FIFA World 
Cup model of centralized television and exclusive sponsorship.149 The competition was a huge 
success: in 2006 the financial pot that went to the 32 starters of the Champions League was 
around €400 million, and clubs received €10 million just for qualifying.150 It was therefore no 
surprise that by the early 2000s the CIS Cup was no longer seen as a viable tournament by 
Russian and Ukrainian clubs.  
 
 Russian and Ukrainian clubs soon realized that their respective home leagues might 
simply not have the quality to allow clubs from Russia or Ukraine to be competitive at the 
Champions League level. The CIS Cup did not seem to fill that gap. But already in the late 1990s 
there were rumours that Ukrainian clubs would be interested in playing in a league with the best 
Russian clubs. Shakhtar’s long time coach Mircea Lucescu has spoken publicly that he would 
prefer to have his club play in the Russian league simply because he feels that he would be able 
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to build a more competitive club.151 Up to this point UEFA, with a few exceptions, had 
disallowed transnational competitions, because it did not want to have rivals for its own 
international tournaments. But as the first decade of the 21st century ended, such a new 
competition was looking much more possible. Anthony King of the University of Exeter believes 
that global economic changes will alter the way UEFA will negotiate with clubs and federations. 
King writes:  
the clubs are no longer subordinate, but are at least as important as the federation and 
UEFA themselves. Major European clubs, as part of a transnational network, are 
likely to constitute a critical nexus in this new geography, but interaction and 
competition between them may be mediated by collective agreements between 
multiple actors: the clubs themselves, UEFA, the federations, the European 
Commission, national governments, all heavily influenced by the media and 
sponsors.152 
 
In July 2012 Gazprom became one of the premium partners of UEFA and more importantly 
UEFA’s premium club competition the UEFA Champions League.153 As a major sponsor of 
UEFA and the Champions League the Russian gas company could soon be able to influence the 
power politics of the European football association.  
 
On November 24, 2012 Aleksei Miller, chairman of Gazprom, gave an interview on the 
official homepage of Zenit Sankt Petersburg in which he proposed the creation of a new 
Commonwealth of Independent States championship.154 The idea of a new CIS competition was 
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then the subject of various media platforms, and has wide support with many of the oligarchs 
who currently operate the biggest football clubs in Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the 
former Soviet Union. There are many examples of transnational football leagues: FC Vaduz 
(Lichtenstein), and Swansea City FC (Wales) play in the far more competitive national leagues 
of their bigger neighbours Switzerland and England respectively. The Netherlands and Belgium 
have introduced a newly combined women’s football league as of the 2012-13 season. In order to 
accept a new football league, the UEFA executive committee would have to vote in favour of 
such a move. When former UEFA president Michel Platini was voted president of UEFA in 
2007, many of his votes came from the football associations of Eastern Europe, and it was 
therefore believed that he would be accommodating.155 Many clubs came out in support of such a 
new league: Akhmetov the wealthy owner of Shakhtar Donetsk (Ukraine), as well as the 
management of Rubin Kazan (Russia), and BATE Borisov (Belarus) have publicly spoken in 
favour of such a new competition. 
 
As we have seen above, the creation of a new CIS Supreme League is not a new idea, and 
has been discussed since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The difference this time, perhaps, is 
the level of the talks, and the fact that the proposal has come from the chairman of Gazprom 
Aleksei Miller. The transnational hockey league KHL, for example, was created under the 
leadership of Aleksander Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Gazprom. The KHL, now in its 
seventh season, has expanded beyond the former Soviet Union and has teams active in Croatia, 
Slovakia, and Finland, with further expansion planned in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. The 
league also operates a franchise in Donetsk—but due to the political situation in the Donbass it 																																																								
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has chosen to sit out the 2014-15 and 2015-16 seasons.156 A new football league under the 
umbrella of Gazprom, with the support of UEFA, would even further sharpen the profile of the 
company as the big unifier of post-Soviet space.  
 
 The debate on creating a new competition gained even more momentum when 
Lokomotiv Moscow President, Ol’ga Smorodskaia, and all-powerful president of TsSKA 
Moscow, Evgenii Giner, backed the idea.157 Giner said that he would be especially interested in a 
Russian-Ukrainian Super League and that such a league could begin in the 2014-15 season. The 
two countries would, however, have to keep their respective starters in European competitions.158 
By 2013 the planning stage of a new competition continued under the leadership of Valerii 
Gazzaev, then president of the Russian club Alania Vladikavkaz. A non-profit organization had 
been set up that would oversee the establishment of the new league. Gazzaev believed that the 
new league would help to solve the financial and structural problems of football in Ukraine and 
Russia. He also hoped that the new league would increase the revenue of clubs in the region by 
30 to 50 per cent, due to the increase in sponsorship deals, television revenue, and spectator 
numbers.159 The competition even set up a Facebook page.160  
 
Another big incentive for Russian and Ukrainian clubs to create the new league was 
UEFA’s creation of Financial Fair Play (FFP). FFP was designed to prevent overspending by 																																																								
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football clubs that competed in UEFA competitions. The rule was meant to compel clubs to stay 
within their financial means without the help of investors; in other words, clubs were only 
permitted to spend money that they generated themselves. Furthermore, UEFA began to treat 
cash injections by owners as loans that counted against FFP.161 This posed a problem for clubs 
from Russia and Ukraine where there is almost no revenue apart from that provided by the 
oligarchs, and state companies. Furthermore, television stations in Russia and Ukraine pay very 
little for television rights, and ticket prices are cheap in comparison to those in Western Europe. 
The new league was supposed to fix that problem as Gazprom offered to pay €1 billion for the 
television and sponsorship rights of the competition, which would put the league in a financial 
category similar to the Champions League.162  
 
In the summer of 2013 the organizational committee of the league arranged a so-called 
Unified Tournament. The tournament, which included Dinamo Kiev and Shakhtar Donetsk from 
Ukraine, and Zenit Sankt Petersburg and Spartak Moscow from Russia, was played in Ukraine 
and Russia, with a turnout of 51,000 people at the final between Dinamo Kiev and Spartak 
Moscow in Kiev.163 The high attendance, for what was seemingly one of many friendly matches 
set up during pre-season, showed that a joint league between Ukraine and Russia might have 
been an attractive proposition. Yet the events of 2013-14 following the Maidan demonstrations 
in Kiev and annexation of the Crimea by Russia meant that clubs no longer publicly spoke about 
the possibility of such a competition.  
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Geopolitics aside, FIFA and UEFA also remain major stumbling blocks to the creation of 
a new competition. At a meeting on January 21, 2013 former FIFA president Joseph Blatter 
announced that FIFA would not support the creation of a new CIS Championship. He also urged 
the new head of the Russian Football Union, Nikolai Tolstykh, to ensure the stability of the 
Russian championship. Tolstykh was president of Dinamo when the club petitioned for an 
independent Russian football federation and league. Both Blatter and Tolstykh believed that a 
new CIS championship could threaten FIFA’s structure and would set a precedent that would 
dislodge the FIFA football pyramid structure.164 Gazzaev, in a response to Blatter in the Russian 
sports daily Sport Ekspress, stated that the work of the new CIS body would continue, and that a 
proposal would be put forward to UEFA to start as soon as 2014.165 But another obstacle was the 
fact that some post-Soviet states would not be allowed to participate; as it stood, only clubs from 
UEFA could participate in a new CIS League. This would mean that financially wealthy clubs 
from Central Asia would be excluded from the new competition.166  
 
While legal issues and the conflict in Ukraine have postponed the establishment of the 
competition, the creation of a new football league in the former Soviet Union could change the 
face of European football. Already the big clubs of small countries such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Portugal, and Scotland are seeking to create new championships that would allow them 
to compete with the big leagues of England, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. At the time, 
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Glasgow Rangers chairman, Charles Green, threatened UEFA that he would use sex-
discrimination laws in order to sue UEFA, which has so far banned the struggling club from 
transferring to the English competition. Green argued that the BeNe Women’s League sets a 
precedent for clubs to create new competitions.167 The precedent, however, would be even more 
significant if UEFA went ahead and allowed a new competition in Eastern Europe. This would 
explain Blatter’s strong reaction against a new competition within the CIS. Now the question 
arises as to what will happen if clubs like Rangers sue UEFA successfully at the European court. 
The Scottish lawsuit aside, the creation of a transnational post-Soviet league could result in 
fundamental changes in the structure of European football, in that other European countries may 
seek to merge their leagues with their neighbours in order to stay competitive with the major 
leagues in Italy, Germany, Spain, and England.  
 
While it appeared that geopolitics had killed the return of the Soviet Vysshaia Liga, the 
Russian Premier League continued a policy of expansion. In October 2014 the Russian Premier 
League (RPL) signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Professional Football League 
(PFL) of Kazakhstan. The agreement between the two leagues included the establishment, by the 
RPL, of an educational centre in Kazakhstan for coaches and football managers. Russian clubs 
were to set up cooperation agreements with clubs from Kazakhstan. There was also speculation 
that the two leagues could be merged in the future, but this suggestion was quashed by the head 
of the PFL, Olzhas Abraev.168 With the emergence of FFP, Russia’s top clubs were looking for 
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ways to generate more income through television and attendance revenues, and it seemed that the 
only way to do so was by creating a new competition. The expansionist policy of the RPL also 
came at a time when Russia, under president Vladimir Putin, was looking to expand and was 
negotiating deals with former Soviet republics to set up a Eurasian Union, which some 
commentators have suggested is fuelled by the countries’ nostalgia for the Soviet Union.169 The 
Russian sport journalist Aleksandr Poliakov has stated to EurasiaNet.org that the Unified League 
is now “a political project. Putin wants it. It’s a priority for him. He wants to go down in history 
as a ‘collector’ of lands.”170 It seems, therefore, that the Russian Premier League, once a 
geopolitical tool of the Soviet Union, has now become a tool in Russia’s geopolitical game. 
Conclusion 	
The transition of the Soviet Football Federation and its league structure, with its prime asset of 
the Vysshaia Liga, to a set of independent football federations and their respective leagues 
epitomizes what happened to Soviet institutions in the period between 1987 and 2014. The 
power struggle between the clubs and the football federation over the legacy of the Vysshaia 
Liga is similar to other power games that were played out during the reform process of the 
Gorbachev administration. The administration of a league has prerogatives such as setting 
transfer rules, issuing bans on players, and imposing rule changes over important matters such as 
the size of the competition. The struggle between the Football Federation and the top Soviet 
clubs was, therefore, in essence, a struggle over power, money and influence, as whoever was in 
charge of the league would be able to set rules that would strongly influence decision-making 
processes in the club structures. Between 1987 and 1991 Koloskov, as the representative of 																																																								
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170 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68531 accessed 14 December 2014. 
	 94	
Goskomsport, represented the old institutional nomenklatura whereas Lobanovskii represented 
the clubs who were fighting to dissolve the old centralized structures of football. The clubs 
believed that they were better suited to manage the upper echelons of Soviet football and were 
increasingly frustrated with the bureaucratic and centralizing approach of Goskomsport and the 
Football Federation.  
 
 We will never know how the story might have ended as the Soviet Union collapsed in 
December 1991. At the same time, events that took place in the Baltic States and Georgia 
indicate that Koloskov was not all-powerful. All three federations were able to gain 
independence from Soviet football before the actual independence of the countries to which they 
were attached. While Koloskov successfully blocked the entrance of the newly independent 
federations to the world and European football government bodies FIFA and UEFA, he was 
unable to defer the independence of the Ukrainian Football Federation. The fact that the newly 
independent Georgian Football Federation and its league still received cash from the centre 
shows that Koloskov and Goskomsport were either unable to the grasp new political realities or 
were simply fighting to preserve as much power of the old Soviet Football Federation as 
possible. The events that occurred in Russian football following the break up of the Soviet Union 
were closely followed by Sovetskii Sport, and it appeared that in the early years following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union the paper maintained its line of openness by reporting on events as 
they happened.  
 
 The theory that Koloskov was simply trying to preserve as much power as possible for a 
new football governing body is further supported by the political intrigue that played out in the 
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immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The debate as to whether or not Soviet football could 
be preserved in a new guise saw the same old conflict between new and old actors in the recently 
independent Russian Federation. Once again, Koloskov was at the centre of the fray, fighting an 
apparently losing battle to preserve as much as possible of the Soviet Football Federation and its 
league in a new format known as the CIS League and CIS Football Federation. While it appeared 
for a long time that new actors would take over control of Russian football, in the end it was 
Koloskov who was able to preserve his power, and provide continuity of leadership by creating a 
direct successor of the Soviet Football Federation in the form of the Russian Football Union. 
Once he had given up on the creation of a CIS Football Federation, Koloskov emerged as a 
winner, for through his influence with FIFA and UEFA he was able to guarantee that the newly 
created Russian Football Union would be considered the only successor of the Soviet Football 
Federation.  
 
In some ways, his earlier ploys to create a CIS competition could be understood as a test, 
both in Russia, and abroad, to determine how much of Soviet football could be preserved. While 
Koloskov failed in his attempt to preserve Soviet football, he was successful in presenting the 
Russian Football Union as the only successor of Soviet football, and this gave the newly created 
governing body a big head start over the other post-Soviet states. This meant that Russian clubs 
could claim the same number of places in the lucrative European competitions as the teams of 
the now disbanded Soviet Vysshaia Liga had enjoyed. Thus, in the struggle for control of 
Russian football, the former nomenklatura emerged victorious. Although, in Russia, institutions 
might see many nominal reforms, the actors at the top are often essentially the same people who 
were running football in the Soviet era.  
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Yet the globalization and commercialization of football from the 1990s onwards meant 
that these actors had to navigate a very different world. Under these changed conditions, Russian 
football was unable to come up with a reform package that would return the league to the former 
glory of the Soviet Union. Alterations to the size of the league, calendar changes, and the 
introduction of the CIS Cup have all failed to bring an increase in attendance numbers, or make 
Russian clubs more successful in Europe. This explains why, in the end, reformers came up with 
the idea of re-creating the old Soviet football pyramid by merging the leagues of several post-
Soviet states. For observers from the media, the expansionist tendencies of the Russian Premier 
League showed that the failures of reform have been joined by a strong nostalgia for the days of 
the Soviet Union. Yet there is more to the story, as the idea of creating a more international 
competition must also be seen as a response to both a more globalized football world and the fact 











Owning the People’s Game: Football Clubs and Ownership Structures in the Soviet Union 
and its Successor States 
 
Introduction 	
The shifts in the political and economic landscape of the Soviet Union and its successor states 
after Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985 had a monumental impact on the ownership structure 
of football clubs located in the USSR and later in the successor states of the Soviet Union. 
Before the reforms, clubs were not independent entities, as they were affiliated to and operated 
by state institutions, state-owned companies, or trade unions, which in the Soviet Union were 
subordinate to their respective ministries. Following the political and economic reforms of the 
Gorbachev era, football clubs in the Soviet Union were forced to become independent from the 
state or the state-owned institutions that controlled them. The main issue was ownership: who 
would own clubs, and how would they be structured after they became autonomous? Another 
question was finance: how were the clubs to survive without the financial support provided by 
the state? In the 1990s the game became more commercialized as clubs began to explore 
different ways of financing their daily business operations.  Clubs were confronted not only with 
a change in government policies but also with a change in the commercial structure of 
international football—particularly in relation to sponsorship, merchandise, TV rights, and the 
globalization of the transfer market. Because they were dealing with these dual challenges, 
football clubs in the Soviet Union needed to find ownership models that would ensure financial 
stability along with success in the wider European context.  
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Ownership Structures prior to the Gorbachev Reforms 	
In general, there were three different affiliation models for Soviet football clubs. In the first 
model, the club was affiliated with a Soviet or Republican ministry, for example the Ministry of 
Defence or the Ministry of the Interior. In the second scenario, a local government agency, for 
example a city council or a provincial government, acted as the patron of the club. In the third 
category, teams affiliated with companies and factories were operated directly by the factory or 
by a workers’ union. Clubs in the third category were originally designed to be recreational 
teams for factory workers, but soon developed into clubs that were, in fact, professional. In all 
three cases, the sponsor or patron was responsible for the team’s maintenance and management, 
as well as the infrastructure of the club. Affiliation was also flexible; some clubs moved from 
one branch of the state to another, and thus effectively changed ownership. This, of course, 
directly influenced the fortunes of individual clubs since some organizations were more capable 
sponsors in terms of the financial and non-financial benefits (apartments, cars, and other 
valuables) that they could offer individual players or the squad in general.  
 
After the communist revolution, football clubs were immediately integrated into the state 
structure. In Moscow, for example, the sports association OLLS (Obshchestvo Liubitelei 
Lyzhnogo Sporta), which before the revolution was an officers’ club of the Tsarist army, was 
renamed OPPV	(Opytno-Pokazatel'naia Ploshchadka Vseobucha) and came under the control of 
the military Vsevobuch (universal military training) organization in 1924. In 1928 the club was 
renamed TsDKA (Tsentral'nogo Doma Krasnoi Armii) and the sports club was formally 
transferred to the ownership of the Red Army (what is today the Ministry of Defence). The Red 
Army team went through several name changes up to 1960 when it received its present name 
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TsSKA (Tsentral'nyi Sportivnyi Klub Armii). The Central Sports Club of the Army in Moscow 
was not the only sports club that was owned by the Ministry of Defence: most Soviet Republics 
boasted a TsSKA sports association, and minor branches known as SKA (Sportivnyi Klub 
Armii) operated in all military districts of the Soviet Union.171 TsSKA Moscow was not the only 
Red Army team that played in the Soviet Top Division. The other most prominent Red Army 
teams were SKA Rostov-na-Donu and Pomir Dushanbe, clubs that also reached the Soviet Top 
Division in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
 Another example of a sports association that was part of a ministry was the Dinamo 
sports association, which was founded in 1923 in Moscow as a part of the institutional structure 
of the secret service under the State Political Directorate (later the Ministry of the Interior).172 
Like the Army sports association, Dinamo was a far-reaching sport association with branches in 
several cities and regions of the Soviet Union. The first Dinamo team to play topflight football in 
the Soviet Union was Dinamo Moscow, and by 1925 a branch of the Dinamo society was 
founded in Tbilisi (Georgia).173 In 1927 both Minsk (Belarus) and Kiev (Ukraine) also received 
Dinamo teams. The respective Ministries of the Interior of the individual Soviet Republics 
controlled all of the Dinamo clubs, with the exception of Dinamo Moscow, which was part of the 
all-Soviet branch of the security apparatus. In Soviet sport the Dinamo society was the dominant 
force. There are four Dinamo clubs in the top ten of the all-time Soviet Vysshaia Liga table: 
Dinamo Moscow, Dinamo Kiev, Dinamo Tbilisi and Dinamo Minsk. Both the Dinamo and the 																																																								
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172  http://dynamo.su/about/history/, accessed 25 January 2012. 
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Red Army teams had a significant advantage when it came to signing players for their teams. 
Players were not officially professionals in the Soviet Union. The ministry or organization that 
supported their team employed them. All players for either Dinamo or TsSKA, for example, 
were employed either by the Ministry of the Interior or as officers by the Defence Forces.174  
This meant that ministry teams had greater resources available to finance the squads of their 
clubs. As we will later see in Chapter 4 there was a strong distinction between clubs and their 
players: players’ contracts were signed with the organization to which their club was affiliated.   
 
This was also true for clubs that were part of other organizations, such as Spartak 
Moscow, which was affiliated to Promkooperatsiia. This organization was, since 1931, the trade 
union for a variety of occupations—the retail trade and the service sector, for example.175 
Although its affiliation to Promkooperatsiia remained in place until the fall of the Soviet Union, 
Spartak Moscow was not a union team in the true sense because in the 1950s the club came 
under the patronage of the Moscow city party committee (gorkom) and the Moscow city council 
(Mossovet).176 While Spartak as a sports society remained with the Promkooperatsiia, the 
Moscow city committee and city council acted as the patrons of Spartak Moscow by supporting 
the team financially, and by giving the club access to apartments that were used as incentives for 
player transfers. Spartak, like Dinamo, was a sports society with many teams in many different 
parts of the Soviet Union.  Spartak Moscow, however, had a huge advantage over the other clubs 
of the Spartak society because it had the backing of the capital of the Soviet Union, and the city 																																																								
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administration used all available resources to make “Moscow’s team” one of the best in the 
Soviet Union. All the Spartak clubs were loosely associated under the umbrella of 
Promkooperatsiia and, like Spartak Moscow, had patrons within local governments. The football 
club Kuban Krasnodar, for example, (which despite its name was part of the Spartak society) 
was a pet project of Sergei Medunov, Party Secretary of the Krasnodar okrug (region), who 
ensured financial support for the club. Krasnodar is an excellent example of the degree to which 
the fortunes of a club depended on local support from party officials: Medunov lost his party 
position in July 1982, and, as a result, the club fell on hard times and was subsequently unable to 
survive in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga.177 Another well-known club of the Spartak sports society 
was the Armenian football team Ararat Erevan. Like Kuban, the club did not carry the team 
name Spartak, but instead used the more patriotic name Ararat (a mountain and national symbol 
of Armenia). While these clubs shared the Spartak connection, national or regional symbolism 
not only helped to differentiate them from one another but also guaranteed more significant 
funding from regional bodies. As with Spartak Moscow, Ararat and Kuban became prestige 
projects, and football offered an opportunity for these regions to show off their cultural, 
economic, and political achievements on the pitch. 
 
The third category included workers’ union teams that were directly attached to a factory 
or industrial conglomerate. Prominent company teams included Zenit Leningrad, Dnepr 
Dnepropetrovsk, and Torpedo Moscow. The Zenit sports society, which was founded as the 
Stalinets, was associated with several factories in the armaments industry. Zenit Leningrad then 
became associated with the optical plant LOMO (Leningradskoe Optiko-Mekhanicheskoe 																																																								
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Ob”edinenie) after World War II.178 Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk from Ukraine was also a factory 
team. In 1918 students who studied with the Bryansk Metallurgical Plant founded Dnepr as 
BRIT (Brianskii rabochii industrial’nyi tekhnikum). In the 1930s the club became associated 
with a local piping factory, and the team was renamed Stal’. After World War II the team was 
renamed again as Metalurg and became associated with the Petrovskii Metallurgical plant. 
Finally, in 1961 team ownership was transferred to the Southern Machine-building Plant 
Yuzhmash and the team received its current name Dnepr. Thanks to the funds provided by 
Yuzhmash, the club was able to build a new stadium and training facilities, and Dnepr was 
finally promoted to top-flight football in 1971.179 In addition to factory teams from the defence 
sector, there were also several teams from the car production sector, one of the largest industries 
of the former Soviet Union. Torpedo Moscow was founded as the company team of the 
automobile manufacturer AMO, which in the 1950s became the Russian car company ZiL 
(Zavod imeni Likhacheva).180 Torpedo Moscow is not the only team in the former Soviet Union 
to carry the name Torpedo. Other Torpedo clubs, such as Torpedo Kutaisi from Georgia, were 
founded after World War II, and they were all affiliated with car companies and the Trud 
(Labour) sports society.181  
 
The most prominent examples of clubs that were affiliated with labour unions were 
Shakhtar Donetsk (miners) and Lokomotiv Moscow (rail workers). Shakhtar was founded as 
Stakhanovets (named after the miner Aleksei Stakhanov) in 1936 to represent the workers of the 																																																								
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Donbass mining district; the club was renamed Shakhtar (Miners) in 1946.182 Shakhtar teams 
existed across the Soviet Union, and during the Soviet period Shakhtar Donetsk was part of a 
voluntary sports society that represented the miners’ unions of various Soviet Republics.183 The 
Lokomotiv sports society was founded in 1935 to provide cultural and physical education to the 
workers of the Russian railways and their families. This club, even though it was founded as part 
of a workers union, was actually owned by the Ministry of Transport. In Moscow, the Lokomotiv 
sports society in 1936 took over control of the “Club of the October Revolution”, which was a 
football team based at the Moscow Kazan train station.184 Unions in the Soviet Union were 
responsible for setting work standards, as well as defending workers’ rights at the highest 
echelons of Soviet politics. These unions were also responsible for organizing countless leisure 
activities that would make jobs more attractive for individual workers; these activities included 
the sponsorship of high performance sports teams.185 In a society where enterprises could not 
offer financial incentives, as wages were often fixed within a certain job category, other ways of 
attracting highly skilled labour were sought. A successful club associated to an industry was 
therefore a form of self-advertisement for the employer, in that it offered workers leisure activity 
in the form of high-class football.186  
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Ukraine and the Dawn of Reform in Soviet Football 	
When Brezhnev died in 1982, Iurii Andropov replaced him as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party. Although a cautious reformer, Andropov was willing to make changes to the 
Soviet economy that were later reflected in the structural reform of football clubs. In Soviet 
football much of the debate between 1982 and 1985 was centred on the need to restructure and 
reform. One example was an article written by the sports journalist N. Glebov in Izvestiia in 
October 1984. Glebov believed that the following measures were necessary: the elimination of 
egalitarianism in the distribution of revenues, the greater promotion of football, and 
professionalization of football clubs. In other words Glebov believed that clubs should receive 
revenue from Goskomsport on a performance basis.187 Although khozraschet already had a 
considerable pedigree in Soviet discussion the term would later become a catch phrase for the 
restructuring of Soviet football. But although football functionaries were in general willing to 
look at reform ideas, the practice of economic restructuring would have to wait until after 1987 
when Gorbachev introduced far reaching economic reforms to the country.  
 
Football reforms in Ukraine, in the period between 1982 and 1985, show that football 
authorities were willing to merge and restructure clubs, but at the same time were unwilling to 
contemplate actual financial independence for football clubs. Ukraine is an especially interesting 
example of how reforms were carried out in Soviet football in general, leading up to the wide 
sweeping economic reform packages that were introduced by Gorbachev after 1987. In Ukraine 
between 1982 and 1985, football officials were aware that the inferior results of the national 
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team, and the poor performances of club teams in UEFA tournaments had led to stagnation of 
Soviet football. The authorities therefore reacted by introducing reforms that used the typical 
Soviet mechanism of centralization of club structures, and by telling clubs to use their available 
resources more efficiently. Ukraine was used as a test case to introduce more centralized 
structures by merging clubs, a process that was supervised by the Ukrainian sport committee. 
Although the Ukrainian sport committee did not technically control the operational aspects of 
senior teams on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, it had significant influence over youth 
development at all clubs and could set the quota of youth players that a club had to meet. It thus 
controlled the distribution of youth players to the main squads in Ukraine.188 While coaches 
might have been in charge of selection, coaching, and perhaps recruitment of players from 
outside the youth team, the government’s interference in the youth strategies of individual clubs 
significantly undermined their autonomy.  
 
The sport committee also used youth development as an excuse to restructure entire 
clubs. In 1982, for example, the Sport Committee of Ukraine, in an effort to promote 
centralization, identified several regions that had not fulfilled targets in bringing youth players up 
to the first team. One of these regions was the city of L’vov, and the football clubs affected were 
Karpaty L’vov, which was affiliated with a local trade union, and Sports Club of the Army 
(SKA) L’vov, which was affiliated with the army. The two clubs were merged into a single club, 
SKA Karpaty L’vov, and this club was put under the command of the Red Army in Ukraine. The 
goal was to create a club in western Ukraine that would unify the football resources of an entire 
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area and thereby improve youth structures and football infrastructure in the region. The new club 
was put on top of a youth development pyramid that included 43 stadiums and 1407 football 
fields. The Ukrainian sport committee and the Ukrainian football federation placed this program 
under extreme scrutiny, and progress reports were sent both to Moscow and Kiev in order to 
keep Goskomsport and the Sport Committee of Ukraine up to date. At the same time as the 
unification of the two clubs SKA and Karpaty, there was also an overall restructuring of the 
youth schools Spetsializirovannia Detsko-Iunosheskaia Sportivnaia Shkola Olimpiiskogo 
Rezerva (SDIuShOR) Karpaty and Spetsializirovannia Detsko-Iunosheskaia Sportivnaia Shkola 
(SDIuSSh) SKA Karpaty, which were now merged under the umbrella of the single club, and put 
under the command of the army sports society.  
 
By 1985, however, there was a general feeling that the project had not yet been 
satisfactorily executed; calls to reform the SDIuShOR Karpaty and Detsko-Iunosheskaia 
Sportivnaia Shkola (DIuSSh) SKA Iunost were made because the club had not produced enough 
young players and had failed to gain promotion to the Soviet Vysshaia Liga.189 A similar attempt 
was made in Poltava, where the local club Kolos underperformed in terms of both youth player 
education and actual results on the pitch, despite having a new 35,000 capacity stadium. The 
football federation felt that this degree of investment should result in improved performances on 
the pitch. When the desired outcomes failed to materialize, Kolos Poltava was dissolved, and a 
new club was founded under the name Vorskla Poltava. The new club was given control of the 
football infrastructure of the entire region, in an attempt to maximize the return on the significant 
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investments that had been made in new the facilities.190 The name change to Vorskla, the major 
river of the region, indicates that the club was being given a more local identity. Both SKA 
Karpaty and Vorskla demonstrate that there was a willingness by football officials to reform the 
affiliation of clubs in the period between 1982 and 1985. Ukraine was also a typical example of 
the sort of reforms that took place in Soviet football in the period from 1985 to 1987. Clubs had 
been renamed before 1982, but the form of reorganization described above was rather untypical 
prior to the 1980s, and highlights the fact that Soviet football authorities in general had become 
willing to make some changes in football. At the same time, however, these changes were an 
attempt to maximize the effectiveness of the current economic system, without actually making 
dramatic changes to the overall structure of football clubs, as both Karpaty and Vorskla remained 
affiliated to state bodies.  
 
 SKA Karpaty and Kolos were not the only clubs that came under scrutiny. In May 1985 
the Football Federation under the leadership of Mykola Fominykh summoned the managing 
committee of the football club Zaria Voroshilovgrad and their affiliated junior teams DIuSSh 
Torpedo Lutsk and SDIuShOR Zaria Voroshilovgrad. After a round of criticism in which the 
sport committee pointed out that youth development in Voroshilovgrad was not competitive 
enough, and that not enough young players were graduating to the Master Sport level, Fominykh 
advised the committee that young players should be put on individual training regimes. This was 
deemed necessary for Voroshilovgrad to fulfil the planned output of young players as set by the 
five-year plan. The criticism of the team and the tinkering with team policy once again shows the 
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influence that the Ukrainian Football Federation as well as the sport committee had on individual 
teams and even players. 191  
 
As the reform program progressed, it became apparent that many of the improvements 
were actually a series of ad hoc measures that continued the Soviet tradition of meddling in club 
affairs. For example, the Ukrainian sport committee also tried to interfere in the work of the 
clubs at the highest level. By controlling the distribution of youth players by the clubs, the 
football federation took charge of a vital component of every football club in the region. These 
clubs included the Vysshaia Liga teams Shakhtar Donetsk, Metallist Khar’kov, Dnepr 
Dnepropetrovsk, and Chernomorets Odessa as well as clubs from the Soviet First and Second 
Leagues. As the reform measures continued, the football federation as well as the sport 
committee began to invite coaches to plenum sessions in which they demanded to hear the 
progress of the measures introduced in the youth development sector. Coaches of the above 
mentioned teams were ordered by the sport committee to give full reports by the end of the 
season.192 The Football Federation of Ukraine relentlessly tried to improve the results of 
individual clubs by inviting coaches of successful clubs to share their achievements with less 
successful clubs of the same republic, which in turn were often heavily criticised. Chernomorets 
Odessa’s coach was, for example, praised in January 1985 for the team’s success in the 1984 
season, but when the team had a poor start in 1985 and only gained five points out of the first 
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eight games, the football federation began to try to control the coach’s training methods and 
tactical methodology in an attempt to better the results.193  
 
 There was only one team within Ukraine that escaped the interference of the football 
federation: Dinamo Kiev. The management staff of Dinamo, led from the late 1970s onwards by 
Valerii Lobanovskii, reported directly to the Party Secretary of the Ukraine Shcherbitskii. After 
1984, however, there were attempts by the Ukrainian Football Federation to gain power over the 
operations of Dinamo Kiev as well. Dinamo was accused by coaches of other teams and the 
football federation of centralizing the football youth development of the entire republic by 
effectively creating a Ukrainian national team. In 1984 only three players from Kiev were 
playing in the squad  (Blokhin, Lozinskii, and Mikhailichenko) despite the fact that the city had 
three specialised schools: Dinamo, SKA and DIuSSh. The football federation, therefore, wanted 
to take more control over youth development in the city, and through that maneuver, control of 
the actual club. The president of the Ukrainian Football Federation singled out Lobanovskii for 
failing to cooperate with the football federation, and Shcherbitskii was called to moderate 
between the Dinamo coach and the football federation. Shcherbitskii, however, protected 
Lobanovskii, and Dinamo Kiev, from the influence of the Ukrainian football federation.194 
Political patronage was a common phenomenon in Soviet football, and many clubs were not just 
sponsored by a state institution or factory, but also received political protection from a patron. 
Dinamo Kiev was a good example of this, as the club received patronage from the Central 
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Committee of the Ukrainian SSR. Shcherbitskii’s predecessor—head of the Central Committee, 
Lazar Kaganovich—most famously prevented Dinamo’s relegation after the 1946 season.195 This 
last example points out the weakness of the reform program that was initiated by the sport 
committee and football federation of the Ukrainian SSR. As smaller clubs were merged and 
placed under the direct control of the Ukrainian sport committee, bigger clubs like Dinamo were 
protected by political patrons, and were therefore exempt from structural reform that could 
undermine their status as a top club of the republic.  
 
Furthermore, while clubs were merged or moved from one supporting organization to 
another in an attempt to increase efficiency, the actual financial dependence of football on the 
state remained unchanged. The reform efforts in Ukrainian football were therefore consistent 
with Andropov’s overall reform attempts: he wanted greater autonomy for enterprises and 
production associations, but his industrial planning experiment failed to tackle the problems of 
centralization, as enterprises were still supposed to work within the standard set by the centre 
(Moscow) and the five-year plans. The measures introduced by Andropov simply were the 
outcome of an approach which involved continuous adjustment and restructuring to the system, 
but which constituted no fundamental change.196 Instead of introducing new vanguard economic, 
and financial structures to football clubs, the Ukrainian sport committee merged clubs in order to 
increase efficiency and centralize youth development. In many ways the period demonstrates that 
what was considered a reform program was just continuous meddling by Soviet football officials 
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that produced no positive results.   There were few real structural changes to football clubs, as 
they were still dependent on the state for financial support. In the case of Karpaty, the merger 
with SKA simply meant that they now had a new patron in the Army to take care of the finances.  
Khozraschet: From Dnepropetrovsk to Union-Wide Structural Reform  	
Fundamental financial restructuring of clubs, therefore, had to wait until after Gorbachev came 
to power in 1985. In 1986 the Leningradskii finansovo-ekonomicheskii institut imeni N. A. 
Voznesenskogo (Leningrad Institute for Finance and Economics, also known as Finec) published 
an article in the Soviet business journal EKO on the possible restructuring of football clubs in the 
Soviet Union. Hoffman in his book The Oligarchs describes Finec as a typical Soviet institution 
‘where Soviet specialists were supposedly working on the colossal unsolved problem of the 
Brezhnev era: how to make socialism work better.’197 The institute’s job, according to Hoffman, 
was to find indicators that would help to improve the Soviet economy. Every industry had its 
own department at the institute, but Hoffman argued that free prices was not part of the 
institute’s agenda.  
‘The one all-encompassing, great indicator of market capitalism, free prices, was not 
a possibility in Soviet socialism, so hundreds of thousands of researchers spent 
tedious years looking for other, inevitably artificial measurements of what was right 
or wrong, good or bad in economic life.’198 
 
As stated in the introduction, Hoffman’s account must often be classified as sensationalist, and 
his numbers are therefore sometimes exaggerated. Yet, his assessment of Finec is interesting as it 
points out the ultimate flaw of the economic report issued by the institute, which is the fact that it 
looked to improve the sport without taking into account free market principles. At the same time, 
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the institute pointed out the importance of running clubs as financially self-sufficient entities. As 
we will later see the result was, therefore, a hybrid system in which clubs were supposed to be 
reformed to become financially independent from the state, but were not given full access to free 
market mechanisms.  
 
Finec believed that 40 per cent of funding had to come through membership, no less than 
30 per cent from stadium ticket sales, and no less than 15 per cent from the sale of lottery tickets, 
which was a funding system already in place at the time and was organized by the company 
Sportprognoz. Selling television rights, advertisement deals, and even selling players to the west 
would cover the remaining costs. Finec hoped that top teams in Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev 
could implement ‘organizational and economic restructuring’ (organizatsionno-ekonomicheskaia 
perestroika) by 1988.199 The idea of organizational and economic restructuring was not new; 
indeed a similar idea had been around earlier in the form of khozraschet. Since the 1960s and 
1970s the planners of the Soviet economy had already experimented with measures called self-
management and cost-accountability, in which enterprises were pooled together into production 
associations and made to function under a cost accounting system.200 In 1979, the Belorussian 
Ministry of Industrial Construction was placed on khozraschet, and in 1981 the entire 
construction sector followed its lead.201 While limited to one sector, the idea of self-financing 
was later expanded when Andropov came to power in 1982. Now with the publication of the 
Finec article, the discussion of khozraschet had reached football. 
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The article by Finec reconfirmed what Soviet football officials already knew, that 
football needed to be reformed. In 1987 Viacheslav Koloskov told Argumenty i Fakty that after 
the 1982 World Cup, Goskomsport and the Soviet Football Federations would discuss changing 
the structure of Soviet football to make clubs economically independent from the state and self-
sustainable.202  The economic authorities of the Soviet Union used the pretext of reform to force 
clubs to think about making economic changes, because professionalization of football was a 
way to end the subsidization of high performance sport. Finec’s recommendation was an attempt 
to sell clubs on ending the costly affiliation between clubs and state authorities. In a survey 
conducted by Sovetskii Sport, players such as Iurii Savichev from Torpedo Moscow and 
Aleksandr Novikov, from Dinamo Moscow agreed in principle that clubs needed to be 
professionalized, but expressed doubt regarding the methods proposed by Finec. They believed 
that new financial models would not guarantee financial success, and that the end of state 
subsidies could destroy club structures such as youth development. 203  Players were also 
concerned that if the state was no longer in charge, clubs might not be able to afford to pay their 
salaries and both managers and players worried that not enough income would be generated to 
balance the budget. In 1986, Spartak Moscow, for example, was able to take in 420,000 roubles 
from ticket sales alone, but was still about one million roubles short of its required budget. Clubs 
also feared that external revenue sources such as television and merchandise sales were simply 
not practical in the economic environment of the Soviet Union.204  
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At the same time, however, the idea that clubs could become self-sustainable through 
membership fees gained popularity, especially with officials of the organizations that paid for the 
clubs. The former Dinamo Tbilisi player G. Antadze, in his capacity as member of the Georgian 
section of Goskomsport, rather optimistically believed that Dinamo Tbilisi could get 100,000 
members to pay 10 roubles a year and in this way make up for much of the funding that the club 
usually received from the state.205 Another voice in favour was N. Zakharov who, as the main 
accountant of the Production Association Donetskugol’, to which Shakhtar was affiliated at the 
time, was responsible for directing funds to the club. He believed that Shakhtar could generate 
no less than 450,000 roubles per season by getting the miners of the different steel collectives of 
the Donbass to sign on as paying members.206 Antadze and Zakharov’s agendas were very clear: 
they thought that moving the clubs toward self-sufficiency, financed partly by membership fees, 
would remove the cost of running clubs from their organizations. In both cases they wanted to 
transfer the financial burden of financing high calibre football to the fans through ticket sales and 
membership fees.  
 
The Law on State Enterprise of July 1987, changed the playing field for Soviet football: 
The new set of laws did little to address the concerns of the Soviet clubs, instead it stipulated that 
clubs now had to cover all expenses (wages, taxes, supplies, and debt service) through revenues. 
In this way khozraschet and professionalization were introduced, and clubs had to start changing 
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their operations.207 There was, however, a huge difference between the professionalization of 
player contracts and club structures, and the establishment of new ownership structures.208 The 
Law on State Enterprises provided a foundation for reform of football clubs, but because the 
government continuously tweaked the law in the period between 1987 and 1990, this foundation 
shifted as new forms of collective ownership models emerged. These new corporate forms 
included joint-stock societies, economic societies, and partnerships.209 As we will see later, some 
clubs took until 1990 to introduce changes to their management structures, but all of the clubs 
that restructured financially chose collective partnership models. These models allowed 
individuals to become effective owners of the clubs by purchasing shares or yearly memberships. 
This provided an immediate cash flow, and in theory would remove the clubs from financial 
dependence on the state.   
 
The first club to experiment with its membership model was Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk, 
which was previously attached to the Southern Machine-Building Plant Yuzhmash and switched 
its status to become a khozraschet club. Dnepr was in many ways the ideal club for this 
experiment in that as a mainstay in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga, it was not affiliated to one of the 
large ministries, and also was not backed by a patron. Like Shakhtar and Donetskugol’, 
Yuzhmash was supportive of the club’s break with the factory because the club would then no 
longer be dependent on its financial assistance. The club also closely followed the 																																																								
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recommendations made by Finec. When the club announced their move to self-sufficiency, 
Gennady Zhizdik, manager of the club, declared that most of the income would come from 
spectators and from the club’s membership fees. He expected that about 30,000 people from a 
multitude of organizations would join. When Dnepr went professional it chose to become a 
public institution in which members paid an annual fee in order to be allowed to take part in the 
politics of the football club. Members, or shareholders, were able to elect the president of the 
club, who in turn would dictate club policy. 210  
 
Zhizdik anticipated an annual income of about 315,000 roubles as well as another 80,000 
roubles from the sale of sporting goods. This budget did not include income generated through 
sponsorship or ticket prices, which as Zhizdik explained, amounted to 600,000 roubles due to the 
relatively small size of Meteor, Dnepr’s football stadium. Altogether Dnepr generated almost 1 
million roubles in its first season as a professional team, Zhizdik explained that most of this 
income was reinvested into the squad. All players, for example, received five-year contracts. The 
flow of cash in the wild years of perestroika was not always traceable, however, and some of the 
money could have ended up in Zhizdik’s pockets—this would explain why Zhizdik did not 
include certain posts in the budget.211 The new status of Eksperimental’nyi vedomstvennyi 
khozraschetnyi Klub Dnepr also allowed the club more freedom to negotiate advertisement 
agreements with Soviet and international agencies.212 As we will see later, the long-term 
contracts arranged by the club also provided Dnepr with financial stability once the transfer 																																																								
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market was modified and players from the Soviet Union were allowed to move abroad. Dnepr 
was placed second in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga when Zhizhdik gave his account of the club’s 
finances in September 1987, a position that they would maintain until the end of the season.213 
This qualified the team for the 1988/89 UEFA Cup, and in 1988 Dnepr finished first in the 
Soviet Vysshaia Liga.214 In 1989 the German investigative news magazine Der Spiegel reported 
on the privatization of Soviet sport, and stated that Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk made a profit of 
300,000 roubles in its first five months after going professional.215 There were no comparable 
numbers found in the Soviet press, and furthermore no official budget numbers are available. 
What we do have to remember is that the Soviet authorities favoured professionalization, and 
that the numbers published might not have been reliable. 
 
 Despite Dnepr’s announced profits, other clubs, including Ukraine’s principal club, 
Dinamo Kiev, were hesitant to introduce new organizational structures. As discussed in Chapter 
1, Dinamo’s manager Valerii Lobanovskii was a strong supporter of restructuring Soviet 
football, and especially of establishing a football union run by the clubs. At the same time, 
however, he and the management staff at the club were somewhat reluctant to apply for 
khozraschet status. This was influenced by Dinamo Kiev’s dependence on a powerful patron, the 
leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Vladimir Shcherbitskii. Under Shcherbitskii’s rule 
(1972-89), Kiev won the Soviet championship seven times, and twice captured the European 
Cup Winners’ Cup (1975, 1986). Shcherbitskii was strongly connected with what became known 
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as the Dnepropetrovsk Clan. Dnepropetrovsk was the hometown of Brezhnev, and during 
Brezhnev’s time in power, numerous cadres from Dnepropetrovsk were rewarded with leading 
positions in the state apparatus and the communist party. Shcherbitskii was supposed to become 
Brezhnev’s successor after the latter’s death in 1982, but Andropov was able to wrestle the party 
leadership away from the Ukrainian. Nevertheless Shcherbitskii was able to create a hierarchy of 
party officials in Ukraine who were personally loyal to him.216  
 
At a time when Soviet football players were still officially amateurs, Shcherbitskii 
succeeded in luring the best players of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) to 
Dinamo by promising them better apartments, new cars, and even fur coats for their wives. 
Although the club was associated with the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior, Shcherbitskii was 
the real power behind the club, and he used his influence to ensure that the club received 
unlimited resources.217  Archival material confirms that, regarding the development of the 
Dinamo Kiev football club, officials of the Ukrainian Sport Committee had to report directly to 
Shcherbitskii.218 Members of the Ukrainian Sport Committee of Ukraine believed that Dinamo, 
and Lobanovskii in particular, were not following the reform program set out by the Ukrainian 
football federation in the early 1980s. In fact, Shcherbitskii gave Lobanovskii absolute control 
over the club, and instead of acting as an intermediary, he was a buffer for Lobanovskii, who was 
consequently able to construct an all-Ukrainian powerhouse in Kiev. In turn Shcherbitskii could 
bask in the glory, as the club’s success brought recognition to his leadership both abroad and at 																																																								
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home. It was, therefore, not until January 1989 that Dinamo’s president V. Bezverkhii officially 
applied to have the club’s status changed to khozraschet, and Lobanovskii was charged with 
changing the club’s structures.219 Dinamo started to accept the necessity of changing its club 
structures only when the leadership under Shcherbitskii was put under political pressure by the 
Gorbachev administration. Shcherbitskii had clashed with Gorbachev on various aspects of 
economic and political reform, but this struggle ended when Gorbachev finally became powerful 
enough to remove him as the head of the Communist Party in Ukraine in the fall of 1989.220 With 
the crumbling of Shcherbitskii’s power base in Ukraine and the Soviet Union in general, 
Lobanovskii was forced to act and, together with Bezverkhii, put the club on an independent 
footing.  
 
Another club that waited to restructure was Spartak Moscow. On March 10, 1989 Spartak 
did, however, announce that, in conformity with the principles and rules of khozraschet, the club 
would become a completely open, self-supporting football club run on a membership basis.221 Of 
all the sports clubs in the Soviet Union, Spartak was bound to have the easiest transition to a 
“free-market economy.” The club’s sponsors Mossovet and Gorkom were in charge of housing 
distribution in Moscow and, in order to attract star players to Spartak, many apartments in the 
prime real estate of the city were given to the club. In an interview with Edelman, sports 
journalist and Spartak fan Arkadii Galinskii stated that Spartak was a very wealthy team: ‘if you 
put together all the apartments they have given [to Spartak] over the years, you could construct 
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an entire region.’222 Statements like that of course have to be taken with a grain of salt, as fans of 
clubs have the tendency to overplay the actual strengths of the organization that they support. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how many of those facilities Spartak was able to keep after fall of the 
USSR. Even when one takes into account the possibility of exaggeration by Galinskii, however, 
it is clear that Spartak was already operating as an unofficially self-financed organization before 
it made the switch to khozraschet. Edelman writes that in 1989 the club was running a profit of 
960,000 roubles. It cost Spartak 1,200,000 roubles a year to run the team, and another 300,000 
roubles to keep up Tarasovka (its training facility). The club generated 700,000 roubles through 
ticket sales, and 100,000 roubles through renting out club facilities to various organizations. Not 
included in the list is the income generated through player transfers and foreign tours.223 With 
those numbers in mind, Spartak was in a comfortable position to make the transition to 
khozraschet and, as we will see later, would use its strong financial position to dominate Russian 
football after the fall of the USSR. 
  
Khozraschet was not always a financially lucrative option, as the example of Zenit 
Leningrad highlights. Zenit was one of the first clubs to announce its intention to become a self-
financed entity, but it failed to come up with a model that covered the club’s costs. The problem 
was that, despite having access to one of the Soviet Union’s largest arenas, the Kirov Stadium 
with 70,000 seats, Zenit simply did not have the necessary attendance numbers to cover the daily 
operations of the club—the club, for example, only generated 275,000 roubles from its 17 home 
games in the 1987 season. The club averaged 5000 people per home game and, as a result, found 
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itself in a situation where it could not even afford to pay the rent for the Kirov Stadium. Zenit’s 
management did not believe that other measures such as membership fees could cover the 
remaining operational costs.224 The economic troubles of the club forced its management to 
delay the move to khozraschet, and it was not until August 6, 1990, that the Zenit finally cut its 
ties with LOMO and, like Dnepr, became a public institution in which members could elect a 
president. Vladislav Gusev, a sports journalist, became the first president. Zenit did, however, 
maintain connections to the city council of Leningrad (soon to be Sankt Petersburg), which  
continued to help the club by balancing its budget.225 Zenit, with no competitor in the city, 
should have been a role model for khozraschet, but the club’s inability to secure additional 
financial support meant that important structural reforms could not be made in time for the club 
to stay competitive. Zenit was relegated from the Soviet Vysshaia Liga in 1991, and was only 
temporarily saved from the consequences by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Other less popular 
clubs were similarly unable to raise the necessary finances to make the Finec model work. Self-
sustainability in football, as in in other economic spheres of the Soviet Union, was an experiment 
with many flaws, as important free market mechanisms that existed in football leagues of other 
European leagues, such as revenues from television, merchandise, and advertisement either did 
not exist or were not sufficiently developed to cover the costs of operating football clubs 
independently from the state.  
After the Fall: Ownership Structures in the 1990s 	
After 1987 the Soviet Union began to adopt new ownership rules, among them was the 1988 
statute on joint-stock societies which made it possible for individuals, and companies, to become 
																																																								
224 Sovetskii Sport 10 Jan. 1988, 3.  
225 http://en.fc-zenit.ru/main/history/historyclub/p90/, accessed at 18 January 2012. 
	 122	
shareholders in Soviet football clubs.226 After the fall of the Soviet Union, this law was carried 
over by the Russian Federation and the idea was that the state would transfer its enterprises to a 
wide stratum of the Russian population. The decree gave managers and workers early access to 
the shares of the companies where they were employed. The state would, however, maintain a 
minority stock in all companies. Between 1992 and 1994 over twenty thousand enterprises 
became joint-stock companies, and state agencies lost control over many clubs that were not 
associated with ministries or other government organizations.227 Although they often tinkered 
with the details, in general the Russian Federation at first upheld many of the regulations that 
were passed in final years of the Soviet Union, including the statute of the joint-stock 
societies.228 In practice this meant that clubs in Russia, for example, operated under Soviet law 
until the Russian Federation implemented a new Civil Code in 1995.229 The Soviet law on joint-
stock societies was crucial in the privatization process of football clubs in the early 1990s as 
ministries and military organizations were now able to capitalize on their football assets by 
turning them into joint-stock societies, and in turn selling them to private investors.  
 
In the end most of the state property was taken over by the managers of the individual 
factories, farms, or in the case of football, clubs. In many cases the former directors of state 
enterprises maintained control over operations, and in 1994 only 10 per cent of the directors of 
enterprises had been replaced as a direct result of the rapid privatization. Furthermore, many 																																																								
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directors were actually able to increase their power through the privatization process.230 This 
explains how a manager like Oleg Romantsev became the effective owner of Spartak Moscow: 
the club was turned into a closed joint-stock company in the early 1990s, and Romantsev, the 
person in charge of club finances promptly was listed as the majority shareholder. Romantsev 
had been appointed as the coach of Spartak in 1989 after a successful spell at Spartak 
Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz), and in 1993 he became the manager of Spartak Moscow. 
Spartak was basically handed to Romantsev for free; as coach and manager he was able to secure 
the necessary funds to operate the club, which in turn made him the effective owner.231 Spartak 
exemplifies the murkiness of ownership transition during the changeover from communism to 
capitalism, as the new owners often were simply people who were able to provide cash for 
football clubs. Romantsev’s ability to guarantee cash flow at the club, even in the difficult 
transitional period of the early 1990s, meant that he was also able to purchase the majority of the 
shares at the club. In Western Europe it is extremely rare for a club to be owned, coached, and 
managed by the same individual.  
 
Spartak, and therefore Romantsev, had a huge advantage because the club was the most 
recognizable football brand from the Russian Federation, and because its biggest competitor 
Dinamo Kiev was now playing in independent Ukraine. The club’s continued success in the 
Russian Vysshaia Liga meant that the club had access to money through the Champions League 
marketing pool, which was established in 1993. This provided Spartak with a stable income far 
above what the remaining clubs could generate through domestic league play. Between 1991 and 
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1999 UEFA shared 75 per cent of the European Cup/Champions League marketing pool with 
clubs according to their performance.232 Spartak missed only one Champions League season 
during that period and was therefore consistently making more money than other Russian 
clubs.233 The club’s dominance did, however, end in the early 2000s. Spartak won its last 
Russian championship in 2001 and as oligarchs and large corporations such as Gazprom entered 
the Russian Prem’er Liga other clubs overtook the club, both financially and on the playing 
field.234  
 
 But in the 1990s other clubs were not able to flaunt a history of success and tradition as 
Spartak did, and therefore could not attract sponsorship deals from the west that promised a 
stable income. A few other clubs were, however, able to mount a challenge. In 1995 Spartak-
Alania Vladikavkaz, a small club from the Caucasus won the Russian championship. This feat 
was only possible because the club received the financial support of the North Ossetian-Alania 
government under the leadership of President Akhsarbek Galazov.235 Galazov was in many ways 
a patron of the old Soviet school, who used his government position to finance the operations of 
the club. He was in the fortunate position that financial support of a club that bordered a crisis 
region was a way for Moscow (which was responsible for the allocation of funds to all of its 
republics) to take attention away from the Chechnia conflict and to secure border regions through 
sporting success. Vladikavkaz’s victory has another peculiarity, however: Spartak-Alania was 																																																								
232 Trudo Dejonghe and Wim Van Opstal, “Competitive Balance between National Leagues in European Football 
after the Bosman Case”, Rivista Di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, VI (2010), 41-58. 
 
233 http://www.spartak.com/main/club/82/, accessed 7 February 2012. 
234 The Blizzard Jan. 2012. 
235 Izvestiia 25 Oct.1995, 6.  
	 125	
able to finance the squad thanks to a semi-illegal trade in alcohol across the Georgian border.236  
Vladikavkaz was not the only club to benefit from an import-export business. The Russian 
government under Boris El’tsin had given some sporting organizations within the Russian 
Federation the right to import alcohol and cigarettes free of tax, as a way to subsidize 
professional football after the fall of the Soviet Union, and Spartak Moscow was one of many 
clubs that took advantage of this opportunity.237  
 
The example of Vladikavkaz indicates the extent to which football was still reliant on 
patronage by state institutions in the early 1990s. In fact, the privatization reforms guaranteed 
that the government of the Russian Federation would maintain a minority stake in many former 
enterprises of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, ‘a combination of factors steadily weakened 
central control over regional governments in the mid-1990s, giving them almost free rein in 
dealing with firms on their territory.’238 Galazov, who ran North Ossetia like a small fiefdom, 
was able to harness the glory that came with Alania’s success and use it to boost his own 
popularity. For several years Spartak-Alania organized a tournament called the President’s Cup 
in celebration of the President of North Ossetia-Alania. The tournament was able to attract some 
high profile clubs from Western Europe and South America.239 Tournaments like the President’s 
Cup are not cheap to organize—the big clubs from the west would not have competed for free in 
a tournament that required them travel to the border of a war zone. During the 1996 season 																																																								
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Alania remained the top opponent of Spartak. The clubs finished even on points, and therefore a 
play-off match had to be arranged. Spartak defeated Alania 2-1 at the Petrovskii Stadium in 
Sankt Petersburg and won the Russian championship.240 The following two seasons the club 
finished in the middle of the table, and after 1998 Galazov was no longer President of North 
Ossetia-Alania. Alania’s decline continued after 1998 and finally in 2005 the club had to declare 
bankruptcy.  
 
Privatization also affected football clubs that had not previously opted to become self-
sufficient in the late 1980s. Torpedo Moscow, for example, had forgone the self-accountability 
process in the last years of the Soviet Union, and was still affiliated with the car manufacturer 
ZiL, which became a private enterprise under El’tsin. By 1996 the plant was experiencing 
economic difficulties, and was no longer able to support the football club. ZiL, Russia’s largest 
car company, had owned Torpedo for almost 60 years, and Torpedo was one of the most storied 
clubs from the former Soviet Union. At this point the club, which had been so firmly associated 
with the automobile industry, became part of a private entertainment company called the 
Luzhniki Group, which ran and operated the Luzhniki Stadium. The Luzhniki Group wanted to 
have a team that was associated with the stadium, and since it seemed impossible to buy 
Spartak—Romantsev was unwilling to sell the club—Torpedo seemed to be a logical choice. In 
addition, a former Torpedo player, Vladimir Aleshin, ran the Luzhniki Complex entertainment 
company.241 Aleshin also had financial backing from Pavel Borodin, who at the time was the 
head of the Russia-Belarus Council (and had previously been the Kremlin chief of staff), and the 
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city government in the form of then Moscow mayor Iuri Luzhkov.242 Torpedo subsequently 
became wedged into what would turn out to be a political struggle between private investors and 
the Moscow city government. 
 
The transfer of Torpedo from ZiL to the joint-stock Luzhniki Group was finalized on 
February 27, 1996. The club was then saved from bankruptcy and moved from its home ground 
the Eduard Strel’tsov Stadium to the Luzhniki Stadium for the 1997 season.243 ZiL was freed 
from bankruptcy at the end of 1996 when the Moscow city government under mayor Luzhkov 
took over the car company by purchasing a majority stake.244 The firm thereby gave up its 
independence and returned to state ownership. The company was thereafter able to create a new 
team that performed as Torpedo-ZiL (and later as Torpedo-Metalurg) in the lower levels. 
Torpedo Moscow’s transfer from the Eduard Strel’tsov Stadium to the Luzhniki Stadium was 
one of the more questionable business adventures of post-Soviet era football. In 2007 I attended 
a Spartak game at the Luzhniki Stadium and even with 30,000 fans in the stands, the atmosphere 
at the stadium was rather ghostly, and Torpedo’s attendance rarely rose above 5000.245 While 
low attendance makes for a poor atmosphere at a gigantic stadium like the Luzhniki, one also has 
to consider the cost of simply opening the gates for a match in such a gigantic facility. Torpedo 
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therefore not only drowned in the gigantic bowl of the Luzhniki, but was also raking up a huge 
financial loss for the Luzhniki Group. 
 
The reasons why fans did not flock to the Luzhniki are manifold. ZiL was an important 
anchor for the identity of the football club; the club was a factory team and many fans associated 
themselves not only with the football club, but also with ZiL. The Strel’tsov Stadium, which was 
located near the car factory, was also a significant part of Torpedo’s identity, and so when ZiL 
chose to register a team from the lower leagues in order to fill the vacant stadium, many Torpedo 
fans decided to support the new team instead of the old Torpedo team that had moved across 
town. In 2003 the new Torpedo-ZiL reached the Russian Prem’er Liga, but ZiL again was forced 
to sell the club, which then became part of MMC Norilsk Nickel and eventually became known 
as FC Moskva.246 Meanwhile the Torpedo Moscow team under the ownership of the Luzhniki 
Group struggled, suffering relegation in 2006, and again to the third division in 2008. In 2009 the 
club returned to the umbrella of ZiL, and the team returned to its historic home ground, the 
Strel’tsov Stadium, when the carmaker bought back the shares of the football club from 
Luzhniki.247 After years in the lower divisions, Torpedo Moscow managed to be promoted to the 
Russian Prem’er Liga in 2014 where the club stayed for one season before being relegated, and 
declared bankrupt once again.    
 
 Ministry teams remained attached to their respective sports societies, and consequently 
the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) and the KGB (later FSB), as well as the armed forces. 																																																								
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Institutions like the KGB or the armed forces essentially survived the breakup of the Soviet 
Union intact, and ‘the KGB was, according to many accounts, the source of extensive funds for 
legal and illegal business activity in the post-Soviet environment’.248 Despite the fact that 
Dinamo Moscow was not able to win a title after the fall of the Soviet Union, it remained a 
competitor in the Russian Vysshaia Liga and in the 1990s consistently finished in the top 5. 
TsSKA was the last champion of the Soviet Union, and was therefore allowed to participate in 
the 1992-93 inaugural Champions League. The club managed to qualify for the group phase by 
knocking out the defending champion FC Barcelona. The club was not, however, allowed to 
compete in Moscow because no stadium in Russia was judged to be playable during the severe 
winter of that year. 249 As a result, TsSKA chose to play all its home games in Germany.250 
Whereas for most clubs Champions League participation meant a great deal of money, TsSKA 
was not able to gain financially from the campaign.  
 
Then, in the second half of the 1990s, TsSKA’s ownership structure became part of a 
dispute that showcases how violent the struggle over property could be in Russia after the fall of 
communism. The trouble at the Red Army team began in 1996 when an argument over 
ownership of the club broke out between the Manager/President of the TsSKA football club 
Aleksandr Tarkhanov and the TsSKA sports society. After a series of poor results the Army 
appointed Pavel Sadyrin as the new coach. Tarkhanov responded by claiming that he was the 																																																								
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main shareholder at the club, and that the club was an organization independent of the sports 
society of the army. It turned out, however, that Tarkhanov was not the majority shareholder 
after all, and only owned a minority stake in the club, which he then decided to sell to Shakhrudi 
Dadakhanov, a Chechen businessman. Tarkhanov was subsequently hired by Torpedo Moscow 
as coach.251 With Tarkhanov admitting that the military was still effectively the majority owner, 
the Russian armed forces was able to turn the club into a professional football club (PFC), and 
officially changed its operational structure to that of a joint-stock company in 1997.252 The 
ministry then sold 49 per cent of the overall shares to a Chechen consortium that was headed by 
the above-mentioned Dadakhanov. Dadakhanov hired Chernomorets Odessa coach Oleg 
Dolmatov, who would play a major role in the continuing TsSKA saga. At this time it appeared 
that there were other investors who were willing to pay even more money for TsSKA than 
Dadakhanov had. The military responded by starting a campaign to regain control over the club 
once again in order to sell it to the next investor and increase its revenue.  
 
What happened next at TsSKA is a great example of the struggle over property rights in 
the Russian Federation in the 1990s. In 2014 a documentary broadcast and produced by the 
German-French television station Arte called Enteignung auf Russisch showed how in Russia 
takeovers often involved extortion by the party that wanted to take over a business. This 
documentary showed some significant insight into the more bizarre business practices that have 
taken place in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it shows that the state was 
often involved in these takeovers if the company in question was targeted for re-nationalization 
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in order that the state profit from a resale.253 The campaign on the part of the Ministry of 
Defence to regain control of TsSKA fits the pattern. First, the Defence Ministry accused the 
Chechen shareholders of using the club as a way to smuggle arms and money to rebels in 
Chechnia. Later, physical pressure was also applied—Dolmatov’s wife, for example, vanished 
without a trace. Then in 2001 Dadakhanov’s nephew Aslanbek was arrested after the Moscow 
police claimed that they had found in his apartment $25,000 in counterfeit money along with 
videos of Russian soldiers being killed by Chechens. Dadakhanov protested foul play but 
eventually surrendered his shares, which allowed the club’s return to the Ministry of Defence.254 
The struggle over TsSKA was a perfect example of what Barnes calls the phase-to-phase 
struggle over property. As Barnes writes:  
‘Recognizing the range of key players chasing property in post-Soviet Russia, as well 
as the environment in which they operate, sheds light on how this or that player can 
appear dominant in one period but nonetheless be unseated in future rounds of 
redistributions.’255 
  
The takeover of TsSKA Moscow underlines this, and shows that the privatization process in the 
1990s constituted a struggle over ownership not only between different interest groups from the 
private sector but also between the state apparatus and these groups.     
A Step Ahead of Russia: Football Oligarchy in Ukraine’s Wild 1990s  	
Perhaps the most significant difference between the developments of Ukrainian football 
compared to that of the Russian Federation is the immediate influence of rich businessmen on 
the game. Aleksandr Tkach, at the time of writing, the chief editor of the Russian language sport 																																																								
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portal tribuna.com, a homepage that is dedicated to sport in Ukraine but also heavily focused on 
the connection of sport and politics in Ukraine following the Maidan Revolution, said to me in 
an interview: ‘In Ukraine the state never achieved a powerful role like it did in Russia. From the 
very start [since Ukraine’s independence] clubs have been locked in this economic model where 
oligarchs are powerful in the state, and also in football.’256 The transfer of power in Ukrainian 
football was very much the same as it was in other industries: with the removal of central power, 
businessmen were able to simply step into to the gap.  
 
When Dinamo proceeded to become an independent club in 1989, it set up joint venture 
companies in which Dinamo provided a portion of the capital and a Western firm supplied the 
remaining funds. The profits from these agreements were tax-free because Dinamo, as an official 
sports club, was exempt from taxation in the Soviet Union. In the period between 1989 and 1991, 
new commercial laws meant that the club became a means for foreign companies to invest 
capital into Soviet Ukraine. In 1987 government decree 49 had been introduced, which allowed 
the creation of joint enterprises between Soviet organizations and organizations from capitalist 
countries. Initially foreign capital was limited to a maximum of 49 per cent, but in October 1990 
foreign companies were permitted to hold 100 per cent of the investment. Even after October 
1990, however, any joint venture, even one in which all the capital came from the west, had to be 
founded by a Soviet organization or person.257 In this way, Dinamo became a front for foreign 
companies that wanted to invest capital in the Soviet Union, and its main joint venture, Dinamo 
Athletic, made a profit of up to $1.5 to $2.5 million a month. According to the sport’s journalist 
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Simon Kuper, this was only possible because the club’s new president Bezverkhii invited local 
mafia clans and communist party cadres to take part in the deals. In return for their participation 
in various Dinamo business ventures, Bezverkhii handed out favours to minor party politicians 
and mafia bosses (terms that seemed to be loosely interchangeable in the dying days of the 
Soviet Union). These bribes were often as minor as being included on the guest list of Dinamo 
games abroad. Major bribes would include money or high-ranking government positions. The 
club was also able to generate income through the sale of high calibre football players.258 In 
short, Dinamo began an export-import business; it had licenses to deal in everything from gold 
and platinum to parts of nuclear missiles. The British journalist Jonathan Wilson also believed 
that many of these activities took place in a legal grey zone, and that the financial success of 
Dinamo could not have been obtained without the blessing of organized crime.259 With the fall of 
communism, however, foreign companies no longer needed to go through middlemen in order to 
set up business ventures in Ukraine, and the club’s business model came under pressure. 
Bezverkhii never actually purchased the club, but was able to take control of Dinamo after 
Goskomsport appointed him to oversee the privatization of the club in the late 1980s. As the 
chairman, he was responsible for the financial well-being of the club and, as he was able to pay 
the bills, he became the de facto owner. When the Soviet Union collapsed these de facto owners 
would then formally take over their clubs in the privatization process that followed. As Tkach 
explained to me: ‘[During the collapse of the Soviet Union] where the legal system was 
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questioned, the people who were de-facto owners of the club in Ukraine soon became real 
owners simply by chance.’260  
 
But this also meant that the people who took control of clubs could be challenged easily, 
as there was no real legal system yet in place to protect these new acquisitions. This becomes 
evident when tracing Hryhorii Surkis’s rise to dominance at Dinamo. Surkis, an engineer by 
profession, was able to accumulate most of his financial capital in the late 1980s when he was 
the head of various councils in the Kiev city administration. From there he was able to join 
Dinamo-Atlantic, and through the connections that he developed in mid-level politics and in his 
business dealings with Dinamo in the late Soviet era, Surkis was able to build a small business 
empire. He gained control of Dinamo Kiev in 1993, when he learned that Bezverkhii’s business 
concerns had run out of money and that the club was on the verge of bankruptcy. Surkis disposed 
of Bezverkhii and turned Dinamo Kiev into a closed joint-stock company. The new board 
included the heads of the republic’s Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Security, the border 
guard service, and the General Prosecutor’s Office.	Surkis was able to use his business contacts 
from his time at Dinamo-Atlantic as well as the Kiev city council, and took control of the club 
from within.261 The way Surkis acquired Dinamo, and other business ventures later on, is a 
perfect example of what Ukrainians and Russians call prikhvatizatsiia, which loosely translates 
as grab-ization and is a word play on privatization.262 It was through his insider knowledge that 
Surkis knew of the financial difficulties at Dinamo and was able to gain control over the club. 																																																								
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Dinamo then became the new centre of the Surkis Empire. In 1993, Surkis set up the Slavutych 
conglomerate, which took control of all of Dinamo’s former business operations, and expanded 
them even further. The conglomerate controlled the Ukrainian Credit Bank, Dinamo-Atlantic, 
BIM International Law Firm, the “Alternative” TV company, and in addition had links to energy 
firms like ITERA-Ukraina and Energy-plus. At one point Slavutych delivered 10-15 per cent of 
all commercial oil to the Ukraine.263 In the late 1990s Surkis spent between $60 and $70 million 
a year on the Dinamo Football Club in addition to what the club was generating in the 
Champions League and through player transfers—these funds combined made Dinamo one of 
the richest clubs in Europe at the time.264  
 
The Surkis brothers also managed to maintain strong connections with the political elite 
of Ukraine. This was especially highlighted after Dinamo became involved in a match-fixing 
scheme before playing a Champions League match on September 13, 1995. The club was 
disqualified from the competition after the Spanish referee Lopez Nieto claimed that officials 
from Dinamo had offered him $30,000 and two fur coats prior to the match against 
Panathinaikos Athens. Nieto went ahead with the game because he feared how 100,000 fans in 
the stadium would react if the game were cancelled. As punishment, Dinamo Kiev was banned 
from participating in the 1995-96 Champions League as well as the following three seasons, and 
Ihor Surkis, Hryhorii’s brother and acting president of Dinamo Kiev at the time, for his 
involvement, received from UEFA a lifetime ban from any role in football.265 After personal 
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appeals by the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, and careful negotiations with UEFA, 
Dinamo’s ban from UEFA competitions was lifted in April 1996. Former Ukrainian president, 
Leonid Kravchuk, held over 20 meetings with UEFA in an effort to get the ban lifted.266 Ihor 
Surkis’ lifetime ban was also lifted, because the Spanish referee Nieto refused to travel to the 
UEFA hearing, and could therefore not speak against Surkis.267  
 
UEFA, although they still considered Dinamo guilty of match fixing, simply reversed 
their decision to uphold the three-year ban on the club. It is somewhat doubtful that the 
allegations against Surkis were dropped simply because the referee did not want to face Surkis in 
front of the UEFA committee. The entire affair left many questions, and it seemed that Dinamo 
was saved from UEFA sanctions because of the lobbying efforts of former Ukrainian president 
Leonid Kravchuk. Dinamo rewarded Kravchuk with shares in the club and with a position on the 
board.268 In 2013 Kravchuk was still one of the shareholders of the Dinamo joint-stock company,  
with the club owned 97 per cent by Surkis, one per cent by Lobanovskii’s daughter Svetlana, and 
one per cent by Dinamo itself.269 To this day it remains unclear what Kravchuk had offered to 
UEFA; it is doubtful that the European football association let Dinamo off the hook on goodwill 
alone. When confronted with this question Tkach said: ‘This is still one of the big mysteries of 
Ukrainian football. Some sort of deal must have been made, but no one knows the details.’270  
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Following the acquittal of the club, another change was the return of Lobanovskii in 1996. With 
seemingly unlimited funds available, as well as the backing of the Ukrainian government, 
Lobanovskii was able to build one of the best teams in Ukrainian history. In 1999 Dinamo 
narrowly missed the final of the Champions League when the club lost to Bayern Munich in the 
semi-final. In the 1990s Dinamo Kiev had a monopoly on the Ukrainian Premier League title, 
although this changed with the emergence of Shakhtar Donetsk, which after the fall of the Soviet 
Union came under the control of local business magnates.  
 
Shakhtar Donetsk’s establishment as a top club in Ukraine is strongly connected with the 
turbulent late 1980s and 1990s in the Donbass. In the late 1980s various local mafia groups 
pushed into the market by exploiting Gorbachev’s reforms and challenging the Soviet directors 
of large factories in the Donbass region. The most notorious mafia leader was Akhmat Bragin 
(also referred to as Aleksandr Bragin), or “Alik the Greek,” who started his business operations 
by taking over the Oktiabrsk market in Donetsk in 1988. Using Oktiabrsk as a foundation, he 
built up the trading company Liuks, which specialized in the distribution of luxury items. From 
there Bragin moved into the banking sector where he took over Dongorbank (Donetsk City 
Bank), and then in 1995 he bought his favourite team Shakhtar Donetsk. Shakhtar, like Dinamo, 
became a mini-empire and at one point even owned a hotel and a newspaper. It was soon alleged 
that Shakhtar was being used as a conduit for money laundering, allegations that were strongly 
denied by club officials.271			
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On October 15, 1995 Akhmat Bragin, who by then was the president of Shakhtar 
Donetsk, was assassinated during a football game against Tavriia Simferopol, when a bomb 
detonated in Bragin’s VIP box. Izvestiia reported that Bragin was murdered because of conflicts 
between various mafia groups in the Donbass.272 After the assassination of Bragin, Rinat 
Akhmetov, who was his business associate, was able to take control of his empire. Akhmetov 
was able to built on the empire by taking control of several coal and steel mines in the Donbass 
Region, and in 2000 he founded the System Capital Management Corporation (SCM), which 
controls several banks, insurance companies, hotels, agrarian complexes, telecommunication 
companies, power plants, and TV stations, as well as most of the heavy industry of the Donbass 
region.273 Akhmetov was born in Donetsk on September 21, 1966. His father was a Tatar 
coalminer and his mother a shop owner. He acquired most of his capital in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and according to the Forbes Magazine he made his first million by selling coal and 
coke (fuel).274 There have been repeated allegations of Akhmetov’s involvement in organized 
crime especially during the period between 1985 and 1995, claims that Akhmetov has denied and 
successfully challenged in court.275 In the late 1990s Shakhtar consistently finished second 
behind Dinamo Kiev, but every year the club came closer to overtaking its main rival, and in 
2001 the club won its first Ukrainian championship.  
 
Ukrainian clubs were the first in the former Soviet Union to become independent from 
the state; they were also the first to be taken over by private business people. This can only be 																																																								
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explained by the political structures of post-Soviet Ukraine under the Leonid Kravchuk (1991-
94) and Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) administrations. As in the case of Shakhtar Donetsk, the 
general lawlessness in the Ukrainian business world was an important factor. The biggest 
difference between Dinamo Kiev and Dinamo of Moscow, however, was the disappearance of 
the central authority. With the independence of the Ukraine, all sports clubs broke their link to 
the central command based in Moscow. The headquarters of the Dinamo sports society, for 
example, was in Moscow, and with Ukrainian independence, all of Dinamo Kiev’s links with the 
centralized sports society disappeared, which made Dinamo a vulnerable target for businessman 
like Bezverkhii and later Surkis. 
Football in Georgia: From State Support to State Gangsterism 	
Dinamo Tbilisi was forced out of the Soviet Vysshaia Liga for the 1990 season because of the 
decision by the Georgian Football Association to support the Republic of Georgia’s claim of 
independence from the Soviet Union.276 Dinamo was one of the founding members of the Soviet 
Vysshaia Liga, and had won two Soviet titles (1964, 1978) as well as two Soviet Cups (1976, 
1979), and in 1981 the team also won the European Cup Winners’ Cup. When the decision for 
Georgian independence was made, David Kipiani, the manager of Dinamo Tbilisi, admitted that 
he was unhappy with the Georgian officials’ decision to leave the Soviet Vysshaia Liga, and 
predicted that Dinamo Tbilisi would eventually lose its best players to better leagues.277 That is 
precisely what happened, for the club turned into a feeder team for the clubs of the larger leagues 
in Russia, Ukraine, and the rest of Europe. Dinamo became a symbol for the political struggle 
that ensued over the control of Georgia when the state moved from state communism to state 																																																								
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gangsterism, and then returned to relative political stability after the Rose Revolution of 2003.278 
Georgia, unlike Ukraine, maintained a course in which football remained largely dependent on 
the patronage of various state sectors. 
 
Mamuka Kvaratskhelia, who has an official post with both Dinamo and UEFA, and who 
has worked as a journalist in the past, explained that during Soviet era, the Georgian police 
owned Dinamo Tbilisi. The police were originally opposed to Dinamo Tbilisi playing in an 
independent Georgian football competition, but eventually obeyed the majority decision of the 
Georgian Football Federation. Although the police remained the owner on paper, they had 
already lost operational control of the club in 1988 when Dinamo became a self-financed 
institution. In 1990 the Georgian Football Federation declared its independence, but the centre 
(in other words Moscow) continued to subsidize clubs all over Georgia—the money was used to 
finance foreign players until 1991. Meanwhile, Dinamo Tbilisi (from 1990 to 1992 the club 
competed as Iberia Tbilisi) operated as an independent club until 1992, while still receiving 
government funds, in what can only be described as the best of both worlds.279 
 
 Dinamo’s ownership structure then changed in 1992, when its former player Merab 
Jordania was able to purchase the club with the help of a group of investors. Jordania built one of 
the most exciting young teams in the history of Georgian football.280 But as mentioned, Jordania 
was just one of many investors in the club, and by the mid-1990s a large number of Dinamo 
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Tbilisi’s board members were also members of the so-called Mkhedrioni (cavaliers). Mkhedrioni 
was a patriotic organization with a mafia-like structure that supported Eduard Shevardnadze’s 
government. A member of the Mkhedrioni, Djaba Ioseliani, was also the deputy leader of 
Georgia in the period between 1992 and 1995 (when the Mkhedrioni were outlawed).281 During 
that period Dinamo experienced its last golden age by producing a club full of young talented 
Georgian players. A consequence of the club’s failure to qualify for the Champions League and 
the political pressure applied to Jordania and the Mkhedrioni, was that the club ran into financial 
difficulties, and was forced to sell many of its best players.282  
 
By the late 1990s Dinamo was in financially unstable waters and the state had to 
intervene to save the club. According to Kvaratskhelia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs under 
Kakha Targamadze	 gained control of all operations of the club in 2000. According to the 
Caucasus historian Thomas de Waal Georgia’s president Shevardnadze had to make several 
‘Faustian power-sharing deals with businessmen and local governs.’283 Shevardnadze also gave 
extensive power to the Ministry of Internal Affair, which de Waal describes as a 
‘semicriminalized monster.’284 It was in this period that Dinamo was part of the ministry, and the 
club would not be privatized again until Targamadze was forced to resign his ministerial position 
in 2001, after an internal power struggle and street protest.285  
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Dinamo once again, a victim of Georgia’s political instability, and was sold to a private 
investor, this time to the oligarch Arkady “Badri” Patarkatsishvili. Patarkatsisvhili had made 
most of his money with Boris Berezovskii by building a media empire in Russia, and returned to 
Georgia after he and Berezovskii fell out of favour with Vladimir Putin. In 2004 Patarkatsishvili 
provided financial support for the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, and later his television 
company Imedi ran a positive image campaign in support of Mikhail Saakashvili’s bid for the 
presidency. In 2006, however, the honeymoon was over; Patarkatsishvili and other oligarchs fell 
out of favour with the Georgian government, and Patarkatsishvili left the country for the United 
Kingdom. The media group Imedi, in turn, began to run an image campaign against president 
Saakashvili, which helped to produce mass protests in Tbilisi against the formerly successful 
members of the Rose Revolution. Badri then decided to run for President in the May 2008 
Georgian election against Saakashvili, but was found dead in his United Kingdom home in 
February 2008.286 During this period of chaos it was no surprise that Dinamo Tbilisi did not do 
well internationally, even though it dominated the Umaglesi League. Most club competitions in 
the country were also affected by political insecurity, as various families fought over political 
and economic control. Dinamo Tbilisi has won 13 Georgian titles since Georgia’s independence 
from the Soviet Union, but like the Ukrainian Premier League, the Georgian First League started 
at the bottom of the UEFA 5 co-efficient ranking. Dinamo was, therefore, not guaranteed income 
from Europe’s top competition, the Champions League. As Dinamo was the only team that could 
compete at the international level, the Georgian First League was not able to collect enough 
points to guarantee a place in European football and with it the income to keep its best talents. 
With the local Georgian economy a shambles, there were not many sources of income for a club 
like Dinamo, and therefore the best players began to leave to play in top leagues in Western 																																																								
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Europe, Russia and the Ukraine. When Patarkastsisvhili promised to invest heavily into the club, 
the management was more than willing to let him take control.  
 
After Patarkastsisvhili sold the club, the Georgian businessman Roman Pipia bought the 
team in 2011, and since then Dinamo has seen a period of relative stability and success. Once he 
took over, Pipia pumped money into Dinamo’s infrastructure: the club’s youth complex was 
rebuilt, the aging Dinamo Stadium in Tbilisi was renovated, and the club was provided with a 
budget of between $4 and $5 million a year, which made Dinamo by far the richest team in the 
country. Mid-table clubs in Georgia operated with budgets between $500,000 and $1 million a 
year, and many teams had to survive on even less. 287 Despite Pipia’s investment and the club’s 
movement toward stability, it seemed impossible for Dinamo to recover the glory that the club 
once held as a member of the Soviet Vysshaia Liga, especially as Dinamo was now essentially 
competing against a collective of small clubs which had barely enough funds to provide players 
with basic needs such as jerseys and footballs for training and games. 
 
One of those small clubs was the South Ossetian club Spartaki Tskhinvali, which 
operated out of Tbilisi due to the international conflict between Georgia and Russia over South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. In the spring of 2014 I was able to interview Akhsar 
Sanakoev, who was the transfer manager at Spartaki Tskhinvali and was also deeply involved in 
the operation of the club.  Sanakoev is also the son of the former Prime Minister of South Ossetia 




Ossetia since 2007, which made him the head of South Ossetia’s government in exile at the time. 
Dimitri Sanakoev has also repeatedly acted as the president of Spartaki. In the interview 
Sanakoev explained the strong state involvement in the day-to-day running of Georgian football. 
 
 The club was created in 2007, but previous versions of Spartaki Tskhinvali had already 
competed in Soviet times, and had been operated by the administration of the Republic of South 
Ossetia in Georgia. Sanakoev explained that in order to finance the team, the exile government 
of South Ossetia had received between $500,000 and $600,000 per year from the Georgian 
Ministry of Finance since 2008. Tskhinvali is one of numerous examples of how the Georgian 
government distributed money to the football clubs of the first and second division in the late 
2000s.288 Although there may have been special motivations in this case because the club 
represented South Ossetia, Sanakoev pointed out that Spartaki was not a special case and that 
most clubs are heavily dependent on government subsidies or are even directly owned by certain 
ministries. Dila Gori, for example, was, for a long time, owned and operated by the Ministry of 
Interior before the club was passed on to the city administration in the late 2000s. A second 
example is Guria Lanchkhuti, which has been owned and operated by the regional government of 
Guria as well as by the Lanchkhuti city government.289 In a third example the Georgian energy 
company Wissol purchased Torpedo Kutaisi in 2010, and Wissol provided the club with an 
annual fund of GEL 2 million (about $1 million).290 But in 2013 Wissol pulled out of the club, as 
the club was not profitable and Georgian football did not provide a good enough brand name for 
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the organization, and the city administration of Kutaisi had to step in to secure the club’s 
budget.291 
 
Regional and city administrations were the main source of funding for football clubs until 
2014.  In 2014 the Georgian federal government stepped in and introduced a scheme in which 
the government provided €700,000 for every club in the first division for three years, including 
privately owned clubs like Dinamo. This was a scheme that was supposed to level the playing 
field and secure the financial future of the nation’s football in general. Out of the 12 clubs that 
participated in the Umaglesi Liga in 2013-14 only WIT-Georgia, Zestafoni, and Dinamo did not 
depend on government support. 292  Football in Georgia had become dependent on state 
subsidization; many clubs faced bankruptcy and were often not able to pay bills for their 
infrastructure or their players. Apart from Dinamo Tbilisi, Georgian football has never really 
moved away from the old structures of Soviet football. Any kind of privatization process in 
Georgian football was short-lived, and foreign investors were simply not interested in financing 
football, as the Umaglesi Liga did not provide an adequate stage for politically motivated 
investments. The story of its football clubs reflects the Georgian economy in general, which has 
struggled to regain the prosperity that the republic once had in the time of the Soviet Union. It is 
also representative of the difficult transition from communism to capitalism in many of the 
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The Oligarchs, Gazprom and the State: Shakhtar, Zenit, and TsSKA, the New Order in post-
Soviet Football 	
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, similar to the situation in Ukraine, many football clubs in 
Russia came under the control of business magnates. There was, however, another development 
from the late 1990s onwards—a trend that is best described as the re-institutionalization of 
football. This trend saw the passage of football teams that formerly were private entities to 
positions under the umbrella of large Russian state corporations. In August 1998, the Russian 
economy crashed, and this led to a shift away from the banking industry toward resource-based 
industry. Resource-based companies and their owners began to invest heavily in football after the 
turn of the millennium. So-called oligarchs began to buy football clubs not only in Russia, but 
also in the west, especially in Great Britain. The state also became more active in the football 
sphere once again, as companies that were nationalized under Vladimir Putin began to sponsor or 
own football teams. In other cases, national companies, such as the Russian Railways, 
discovered the commercial value of football clubs and began to make sizeable investments in the 
football operations of their clubs. Other nationalized companies like Gazprom began to invest in 
football.  
 
In the early 2000s it seemed that Spartak would remain the dominant club in Russian 
football, as the club won both the 2000 and the 2001 championships. The first signs that the club 
could be headed for trouble appeared in the late 1990s, with Romantsev and the ailing Nikolai 
Starostin in head to head conflict over the management of the club. Then in 1997 the co-owner 
and director of finance, Larisa Nechaeva, was shot dead whilst driving from the Tarasovka 
training ground to her home. Nechaeva was a young and ambitious businesswoman who had 
been brought in amidst promises to generate more money for the club by recruiting high-profile 
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sponsors. Nechaeva’s murder was never solved and according to the British paper Independent it 
was part of a struggle within mafia clans in the Russian Federation over the smuggling of 
cigarettes and alcohol.293 Various mafia groups had tried to influence club politics in order to 
gain government licences for the import and export of cigarettes and alcohol, which had been 
introduced as a supplementary scheme for Russian football. The Nechaeva murder was probably 
part of a strategy to pressure Spartak to cooperate with local mafia groups in this lucrative 
business. The case of Spartak demonstrates that by the end of the 1990s it became more and 
more difficult for people without the backing of big money to run Russian clubs independently. 
 
Then in 2001 Andrei Chervichenko approached Romantsev with the objective of buying 
shares of the closed joint-stock company. Chervichenko was a member of the board at Krasbank 
and had connections to LUKoil, where he had been a member of the board prior to his job at 
Krasbank. Chervichenko, through his banking connections, knew that Spartak was in financial 
trouble and offered Romantsev a deal, in which LUKoil would become the kit sponsor of the 
club. Part of the deal was that Chervichenko would become vice-President of Spartak and would 
oversee the financial dealings of the club. Spartak soon became dependent on LUKoil’s money, 
and in 2002 Romantsev sold his majority share to Chervichenko, who then became president of 
the club. In 2003 Chervichenko and Romantsev were involved in a battle over control of the 
club, and due to Spartak’s mediocre 13th position, the board members were not willing to give 
any more money to the club if Romantsev stayed on as the coach. In June 2003 Chervichenko 
announced that Romantsev needed a rest and would leave the club.294  
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 Chervichenko, in turn, was forced out in the spring of 2004 after he sold his controlling 
stake to Leonid Fedun, who was considered, at the time, to be the right hand of Vagit Alekperov, 
the former deputy minister in the Ministry of Oil and Gas who, in 1990, had established LUKoil  
as a vast holding company.295 Fedun then moved quickly to fill positions at the club with people 
who were also associated with LUKoil.296 In the 2000s LUKoil became Russia’s largest non-
state owned gas and oil company. Fedun had made his money in the early 1990s when he had 
helped Alekperov to privatize LUKoil, and he held 9.3 per cent of the company’s stock.297 With 
Fedun’s influence at both Spartak and LUKoil, it became hard to differentiate between the two 
companies, so much so, that LUKoil has become an important part of Spartak’s corporate 
identity. Furthermore, thanks to the investments of Fedun as well as Alekperov, Spartak was able 
to begin construction of a new football stadium at the former Tushino airfield—the project was 
completed in the summer of 2014. Even though the stadium management often emphasised that 
LUKoil didn’t finance the project outright, it was Fedun who was involved in making the 
stadium project possible in the first place, and his company benefited from the new marketing 
possibilities that the up-to-date facility provided for its sponsors.298 Spartak’s takeover by 
Chervichenko in 2001 was significant in that it heralded the rise of the oligarchs and corporate 
entities in Russian football. As we will see, Spartak was the first of many clubs that experienced 
a takeover by rich benefactors after 2001. In fact, by 2014, almost every club in the Russian 
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Prem’er Liga had a rich backer either from the regional government, private industry, or a state 
owned corporation.  
 
In 2013 Fedun proposed to change the ownership structure of Spartak by floating the club 
on the stock exchange.299 This was not the first time that Spartak had toyed with the idea of 
opening the club up to the stock exchange to create an open joint stock company (Otkrytoe 
Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo), similar to a Limited Company in the United Kingdom. Fedun hoped 
that this would make the club more self-sufficient and less reliant on the continued funding of 
Fedun and LUKoil. He has admitted that, on average, he had to spend $60 million a season, since 
taking over the club, in order to keep the club competitive in the Russian Prem’er Liga, and that 
he had invested another $500 million in the construction of Spartak’s new stadium.300 Floating 
Spartak on the stock exchange was a historic event in Russian football, as this was the first club 
in Russia to take such a step. Spartak believed that this was the only way they could compete 
with the new powers of Russian football that had emerged after 2001. Despite Fedun’s large 
investments, the club was unable to keep up with other clubs in the Russian Prem’er Liga, which 
were receiving the same amount or more than Fedun was able to provide at Spartak. Time will 
tell what Spartak’s move to the stock exchange will mean for the club, and whether Spartak’s 
action will create Russia’s first self-sustainable football enterprise.   
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Back in 2001, however, Leonid Fedun was not the only person interested in purchasing 
Spartak. In 2001 Evgenii Giner had approached Romantsev to buy shares of Spartak, but the 
coach turned down the offer when Giner laid out a plan for Spartak that included giving 
Romantsev a normal contract as coach. Giner then looked to invest his money in another football 
club.301 After having regained the majority share of their football club in 2001, the Russian 
Ministry of Defence sold its majority share of TsSKA to the investment groups AVO-Kapital 
and the British company Blue Castle Enterprise Limited. At the head of the consortium that 
bought TsSKA was Evgenii Giner. The club immediately spent money on 19 new players and 
brought in Gazzaev, who had been hugely successful with Alania, as its new coach.302 In 2002  
TsSKA finished second behind Lokomotiv, and in 2003 the club won its first Russian 
championship.  
 
Soon after, however, questions began to appear in the international press over the nature 
of the club’s investors. The British football magazine When Saturday Comes ran a story on 
TsSKA’s links with Roman Abramovich, owner of the Chelsea Football Club. The magazine 
reported that Roman Abramovich’s lawyer Alexander Mamut owned Blue Castle Enterprises, 
which held a 49 per cent share of the club; AVO-Kapital held another 26 per cent, and the 
Russian Ministry of Defense owned the remaining 25 per cent. In March 2003, the club also 
signed a sponsorship deal, worth $54 million over three years (their previous sponsorship deal 
with KONTI brought in $1.5 million a year) with Sibneft, which at the time was also owned by 
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Abramovich.303 Abramovich bought Chelsea FC in 2003, for a reported $233 million, which at 
the time was the costliest takeover of a football club in British football history.304 The possible 
connection between Chelsea and TsSKA was controversial, because UEFA laws stipulate that an 
individual is not allowed to be a majority owner of more then one club in a European 
competition. This was problematic because Chelsea and TsSKA were drawn against each other 
for the group phase of the 2004-05 UEFA Champions League season.305 UEFA launched an 
investigation against TsSKA prior to the Champions League matches between Chelsea and 
TsSKA in order to learn more about the nature of the investors at the club.306 Abramovich was 
later cleared by UEFA of all allegations that he had a controlling stake in both clubs.  
 
While Spartak and TsSKA were taken over by private investors after 2001, large state-
owned corporations started to play a role in financing football operations as well. In 2002 
Lokomotiv Moscow, owned by the Ministry of Transport, won the inaugural Russian Premier 
League season, which highlighted a change in the power dynamics not only of Russian football, 
but also of Russia itself—a shift that would see more involvement of state owned corporations. 
In Soviet times, Lokomotiv had been considered the weakest of all the Moscow teams. After the 
fall of the Soviet Union, however, the club became one of the strongest teams in Russia; the club 
won a record 5 Russian Cups (1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2007). Lokomotiv, unlike its main 
competitor Spartak, owned its own stadium, and in 2000 work began to build the first modern 
football-only stadium since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The project was finished in 2002, in 																																																								
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time to celebrate Lokomotiv’s first Russian championship. The facility had a capacity of 28,800 
and was also often used for the home games of the Russian national team.307 Equally important, 
the stadium was a symbol of intent by Russian Railways (Rossiiskie zheleznye dorogi, or 
RZhD). In 2003, Russian Railways became a company that was independent of the Ministry of 
Transport, but the Russian government remained the largest shareholder 308 despite attempts to 
privatize the company in the early 2000s.309  
 
RZhD’s investment in the stadium and the football team was part of a sponsorship 
strategy. RZhD has a complete monopoly over the Russian rail market and, therefore, economic 
growth could only come through investments in foreign transport markets. Football was an 
important means to draw attention to the resurrection of Russia’s transport sector both at home 
and abroad. The club also invested lavishly in both Russian and foreign players. In the period 
between 2002 and 2014 the club spent €200.95 million on new players, making the club and 
RZhD two of the biggest spenders in the Russian Prem’er Liga. With the rise of other rich 
competitors, Lokomotiv and RZhD increased the amount of money they invested in the club (in 
2005/06 spending €19.4 million, a sum that would be topped in 2008-09 by an expenditure of 
€23.2 million, in 2012-13 an outlay of €20 million, and in 2013-14 a figure of €32.2 million).310 
The increased spending of RZhD meant that the club was able to increase its popularity in the 
highly competitive Moscow market, where clubs had to fight for attendance not only with other 																																																								
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football clubs, but also with the countless other modes of entertainment available in the city. In 
2002 the average attendance was 6,700 per home game. By 2009 it was 15,293, which meant that 
the club had managed to increase its attendance by almost 300 per cent despite the fact that they 
only won another league title in 2004 and a cup title in 2007.311 As a result of the club’s failures 
in the league, attendance levels began to dip slightly after 2009.312 At the same time, the club 
increased its spending on players, which can be attributed to the fact that other clubs in Russia 
were also starting to spend more heavily, especially as other corporations began to invest in 
football after 2001 in what can almost be described as a sports arms race between ministries. 
This was a way of promoting an image abroad, but could also be understood as an internal power 
struggle over which ministry could hold the most influence within the Russian state. Lokomotiv 
was the first sign of a new actor on the Russian football scene: the Russian state in the form of 
ministries and resource-based corporations. 
 
RZhD’s investment was soon eclipsed by Gazprom’s ownership of Zenit Sankt 
Petersburg. No other club is as synonymous with the power of Russia’s state-owned resource 
industry than Zenit. Unlike Moscow, which always had several clubs in the Russian and Soviet 
Vysshaia Liga, Sankt Petersburg has only ever had one strong club—Zenit. Zenit, however, was 
also a troubled club; in Soviet times the club was only able to win one championship and was 
even relegated during the last Soviet Vysshaia Liga season. The club was also relegated from the 
Russian Vysshaia Liga in 1992, and spent three years in the Russian Second Division. Following 
relegation, the club was taken over by Vitalii Mutko, the vice-mayor of Sankt Petersburg at the 																																																								
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time, and was reorganized into a closed joint-stock company.313 The restructuring of Zenit from a 
public club, which was partly owned by the city, into a closed joint-stock company made it 
possible for investors to put money into the club. This meant that the Zenit could finally begin to 
tap the huge potential of being the only club in Russia’s second largest city.  
 
One investor was Gazprom, which had its headquarters in the city. In 1995, the club was 
promoted from the Russian Second Division to the Russian Vysshaia Liga. In 1997, Gazprom 
took over kit sponsorship from the Sankt Petersburg brewery Baltika.314 After Zenit won the 
1999 Russian cup, the chairman of Gazprom Petr Rodionov promised that Zenit would receive 
the funding needed to produce a team that could perform successfully on the world stage.315 In 
the following years, Gazprom’s investment in sports in Sankt Petersburg extended to the hockey 
team SKA, and then, in 2005, Gazprom took over as the only shareholder of Zenit when 
Chairman David Traktovenko stepped down and agreed to sell his shares.316 Gazprom had been 
created in 1989 as part of a reorganization of the state, and was known as the Ministry of Natural 
Gas Industry.317  Under the El’tsin administration the state only held 38 per cent of Gazprom’s 
shares, and was very non-interventionist. When Putin came to power, however, he wanted the 
government to reassert control over its assets, and, in 2001, he installed Aleksei Miller as the 
new CEO of the company.318 The installation of Miller and Dmitrii Medvedev, who are both 																																																								
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natives of Sankt Petersburg, in May 2001, was a major turning point in the government’s role in 
Gazprom, as the Putin administration began to use its shares in the company not only to reshuffle 
the leadership but also to acquire other gas and oil players in the Russian economy in order to 
return Gazprom to a purely state-owned enterprise.319  
 
In 2005, Gazprom was supposed to be merged with the state-owned company Rosneft, in 
order to create a holding that controlled the interests of the oil and gas resources of the Russian 
Federation. In exchange for the merger, the Russian state was supposed to receive a 13 per cent 
stake in Gazprom, which would effectively return the company to ownership by the Russian 
government. The intended merger between Gazprom and Rosneft came during the Mikhail 
Khordokovskii trial. Rosneft was to take over Khordokovskii’s company Yukos, which was 
declared bankrupt after it was hit with several back tax charges and was supposed to be 
auctioned off to Rosneft. Khordokovskii, however, had filed for bankruptcy in the United States 
in the hope that United States law would protect him from the strong arm of Russia’s legal 
system. The legal battle between Khordokovskii and the state lasted 2 years and resulted in 
Yukos merging with Rosneft.320 Although the state was successful in taking over the company of 
one of Russia’s most prominent oligarchs, the trial was criticized world wide, and certainly 
damaged Gazprom, despite the fact that the Russian government backpedalled on the possible 
merger between Gazprom and Rosneft. Gazprom, therefore, needed to improve its image, and 
the purchase of Sankt Petersburg’s most popular club, a team that claims several million 
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followers in Russia, was judged to be the perfect next step. For Zenit, this meant that the club 
returned to control under the helm of the state, and Gazprom became a very active owner 
involved with the daily operation of the club.  
 
Thanks to Gazprom’s investments, the club was able to hire the Dutch coach Dirk 
Advocaat in July 2006. In 2007 Zenit was able to break Moscow’s monopoly to become the first 
non-Moscow team since Alania Vladikavkaz to win the Russian championship. Zenit was, as a 
result, able to present itself at the highest international level—the Champions League. In 2008, 
Zenit won the UEFA Cup by defeating Glasgow Rangers 2-0 in Manchester. The club also beat 
Manchester United to win the UEFA Super Cup, which is played between the winner of the 
Champions League and the winner of the UEFA Cup.321 In 2009, the club won its second 
championship, a third in 2012, and a fourth title in 2015, and has consistently qualified for the 
Champions League.  
 
Berlusconization of post-Soviet football   	
The strong connection between oligarchs, football and politics became especially apparent in the 
Ukraine in the early 2000s and had a deep impact on the ownership structures of football clubs in 
the region. This was motivated by the success of the owners of the big two, the Surkis brothers at 
Dinamo and Akhmetov at Shakhtar. The connection between football and politics is not a new 
one, and it is not limited to Ukraine. In Europe, there are many examples of politicians forming 
close associations with sport. When the oligarchs took control of football in Ukraine in the early 
1990s, the Italian Serie A was the strongest league in the world. Italian football had become a 
catalyst for aspiring young politicians to make a name for themselves. The best example is Silvio 																																																								
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Berlusconi, who made his money by building a football media empire, which enabled him to buy 
AC Milan in 1986. Thanks to Berlusconi’s money, the club became one of the most successful in 
Europe, but, more importantly, the success at Milan gave Berlusconi a national stage; 
Berlusconi’s money and media influence allowed him to develop AC Milan into a successful and 
world-famous business, which in turn enabled Berlusconi to become Prime Minister of Italy.322 
Berlusconi’s involvement led to the development of a calciocracy in Italy as the country became 
dominated by personalities who developed their political profiles through football.323 Most of the 
Ukrainian oligarchs made their money in the early 1990s and often within legal grey zones. They 
then started to legitimize their business operations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, right at the 
time when Berlusconi was at his peak in Italy, and his methods must have served as an example. 
Ukraine underwent a process that led to the development of a futbolocracy, or Berlusconization. 
Berlusconization is, thereby, to be understood as the deep connection between football and 
media platforms to achieve political goals. In Kiev, the Surkis brothers achieved this through 
their connection with their business partner, Viktor Medvechuk, who was also in control of 
various media platforms such as the Slavutych Media Group, and the Alternative TV station.324  
 
 The connection of a popular club with a large media platform made it possible for the 
Surkis brothers and Medvechuk, to accumulate social capital, which the Surkis brothers have 
used to balance the political handicap of their Jewish background: in the 1990s and 2000s anti-
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Semitism was still a major part of Ukrainian society.325 Professor Andrew Wilson from the UCL 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies explains in his book The Ukrainians that Dinamo 
Kiev was, for example, a decisive instrument for the 1998 election in which the club supported 
Leonid Kravchuk’s Social Democratic Party, which won 25 seats in the election and did 
especially well in Kiev.326 As we learned earlier, Kravchuk played a decisive role in ensuring 
that Dinamo’s ban for match fixing was lifted by UEFA, in return Kravchuk not only gained a 
position on Dinamo’s board was also able to use the club’s connection to the media for his 
party’s political campaigns. In his book, Wilson points out that Dinamo may have postponed the 
transfer of star striker Andrei Shevchenko until after the 1998 election—Shevchenko was 
transferred to Milan in the summer of 1999—in order to strengthen politicians such as Kravchuk. 
Although Wilson admits that this notion was far too cynical to entertain—at the same time he did 
point out that the club received state support, and was an important political vehicle in Ukrainian 
politics, which is underlined by the fact that the entire Dynamo team publically declared their 
loyality to Surkis by joining the Social Democratic Party.327 In 1999, Hryhoriy Surkis ran in the 
election for the mayor of Kiev, however, the popularity of Dinamo Kiev and the support of the 
club’s media empire was not enough to defeat the incumbent Aleksandr Omelchenko. 
Omelchenko ran a hostile campaign that targeted not only Surkis’ wealth, but also his Jewish 
background.328  
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Andrew Wilson believes that football played an important role in boosting the political 
profile of would-be politicians such as the Surkis brothers, who used the combination of mass 
media and football to sharpen their profile as Berlusconi had done in Italy in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the Surkis brothers where not the only ones who discovered the potential of 
football, in 2001, for example, Karpaty L’vov was bought by Petro Dimyns’kii, a manager of 
coalmines in the communist era and a successful businessman after the fall. Dimyns’kii had used 
his old party contacts to amass an incredible fortune of several hundred million dollars by trading 
in gas, oil, and coal. Dimyns’kii was a fan of Berlusconi and, like Berlusconi, wanted to create a 
successful team and use the resulting publicity to launch a career in politics.329 In 2002, he was 
indeed voted into the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, in which he served one term.330 
Dimyns’kii was not alone in his ambition—the oligarchs had a great deal to gain politically by 
making their clubs as glamorous and successful as possible; the journalist Franklin Foer writes in 
his book How Soccer Explains the World: ‘[the oligarchs] told fans that they wanted their team 
to take its place alongside the greatest clubs of Italy, Spain, and England.’331  
 
Foer’s book was published in 2004, but the trend of oligarchs investing into Ukrainian 
football continued. In 2004, Metallist Khar’kov was bought by Aleksandr Iaroslavs’kii, who 
began to invest heavily in his club; he spent €20 million on new players, €50 million on a new 
stadium, and also invested heavily in the infrastructure of the city of Khar’kov by spending €200 
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million on a new airport for the city.332 Iaroslavs’kii had made his money in banking and in the 
construction business and his construction company DCH (Development Construction Holding) 
is the main sponsor of Metallist. Iaroslavs’kii’s connections to the construction business explain 
his investment in the infrastructure of Khar’kov. Iaroslavs’kii’s investments secured Khar’kov a 
place as a host city for the UEFA Euro 2012 tournament, which was hosted by Poland and  
Ukraine. This, in turn, benefited DCH because a major competition like the Euro tournament 
guarantees investment by the government into the infrastructure of the host city, and 
consequently, contracts for DCH. Like Dimyns’kii, Iaroslavs’kii served one term in the 
Verkhovna Rada, but left politics in 2006.  
 
The history of Shakhtar Donetsk is well explained in the publication World Soccer, which 
in November 2011 published a special report by the magazine’s Ukrainian correspondent Oleg 
Zadernovsky titled: ‘Club Focus Shakhtar Donetsk: Making dreams come true’. The report 
outlines both the history of the club as well as financial details. Shakhtar won its first Ukrainian 
championship in 2001. In 2005 Shakhtar won its second championship and by 2011 was able to 
add another four championships as well as two Ukrainian Cups to its collection. According to 
World Soccer Akhmetov soon realized that he would only be able to attract star players to the 
bleak mining town of Donetsk if he could provide them with special infrastructure, and he 
therefore invested heavily in the Kirsha Training Complex, which now covers 43 hectares and 
includes luxury rooms for players and staff, an elite medical and rehabilitation centre, 
restaurants, eight grass and artificial full-size pitches, an indoor arena, as well as a park. 
Akhmetov’s next step was to spend money on foreign professionals. After two foreign coaches, 																																																								
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oligarchisches-rundum-sorglos-paket-1.407916, accessed 17 February 2012.  
 
	 161	
the German Bernd Schuster and the Italian Nevio Scala, failed to bring international success to 
Donetsk, Akhmetov hired the Romanian Mircea Lucescu, who was able to unify the Eastern 
European players with the many Brazilians that Akhmetov had acquired, and formed a team that 
won the UEFA Cup in 2009.333 In September 2009, a brand new stadium for 52,000 (48,000 for 
European matches) people was opened. Named the Donbass Arena, the stadium has become a 
source of regional pride, and Shakhtar had the highest league attendance in the Ukrainian 
Premier League before the club was forced into exile in 2014 due to the fighting in the Donbass.  
 
According to World Soccer, Akhmetov—in the period between 1995 and 2011—spent 
£900 million on the club. This sum includes the price of the stadium, which cost £260 million to 
build, and Shakhtar’s annual budget of £64.5 million, which allows the club to maintain a squad 
of elite players from the Ukraine as well as top players from abroad. Shakhtar is completely 
dependent on Akhmetov’s investments: its annual revenue stands at £44.45 million, which is £20 
million short of the club’s budget, and all losses are covered by Akhmetov’s company SCM 
(System Capital Management), which is also the sponsor of the club.334 In 2006 SCM became 
the general sponsor of Shakhtar Donetsk when Akhmetov was the sole shareholder and held 90 
per cent of the shares of the SCM holding company (the remaining 10 per cent are held under his 
wife’s name).335 In April 2006 Shakhtar was transferred from Rinat Akhmetov and various other 
shareholders to SCM, which was able to take control of 99.998 per cent of the club (Akhmetov 
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retained the remaining 0.002 per cent). Nominally the club now became an official holding of 
SCM, with Oleg Popov as the official chairman of the club.336  
 
Tkach believes that the main motivation behind this move was to make Shakhtar and 
SCM appear to be a more modern and transparent business concern: ‘This move was not about 
hiding anything, quite the contrary, Shakhtar is actually one of the few clubs in Ukrainian 
football that pays their taxes.’337 Instead, the move was, most likely, about appearances, as 
Akhmetov’s absolute control over SCM means that the club remained under his control, and he 
retained his position as the club’s president. The restructuring of SCM and Shakhtar appear to be 
part of a modern business plan that is intended to call attention to SCM as a modern transparent 
corporation, and, in turn, Akhmetov as a clean and legitimate businessman. This was especially 
important because, like the oligarchs mentioned above, Akhmetov’s investment was politically 
motivated; in fact, he served as a role model for most of Ukraine’s oligarchs. Politically, 
Akhmetov was an elected member of the Verkhovna Rada, as a representative of the Partiia 
Regionov.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2012 UEFA European Championships in Poland and Ukraine, the 
connection between politics and football ownership structures became even more pronounced. In 
December 2012, Iaroslavs’kii made a surprising move and sold Metallist Khar’kov to the 
previously unknown businessman Sergei Kurchenko. Kurchenko, at only 27 years of age, is 
																																																								




believed to be the figurehead behind the gas import conglomerate GazUkraina-2009, a company 
that has since been rebranded as VETEK. At the time, Kurchenko was believed to be a close 
friend of Aleksandr Ianukovich, the son of then president Ianukovich.338 Iaroslavs’kii justified 
the sale of the club by referring to the enormous pressure that he had faced in the months leading 
up to the sale. Iaroslav’skii never specified what kind of pressure he was under, but the media in 
Ukraine has since speculated that the pressure came from the leadership of the Partiia Regionov.  
 
Dnipro Dnepropetrovsk (previously known as Dnepr) was owned by Igor Kolomois’kii, 
who is also the founder and owner of Pryvatbank, one of Ukraine’s largest banks. After the fall 
of the Soviet Union, the first professional club of the former Soviet Union underwent a period of 
mediocrity and was unable to challenge Dinamo and Shakhtar for the Ukrainian championship. 
Thanks to investment by Kolomois’kii, which included a brand new stadium for 33,000 
spectators, the club started to become a more prominent member of the Ukrainian Premier 
League, and began to challenge the old duopoly of Dinamo Kiev and Shakhtar Donetsk.339 
Dnipro’s ownership by Kolomois’kii also illustrates how quickly the fortunes of owners and 
clubs could change in Ukraine. Kolomois’kii, who was one of the most influential members of 
the Dnepropetrovsk Clan (its post-Soviet reincarnation), was also a major political opponent of 
Rinat Akhmetov and the Partiia Regionov. At around the same time that Iaroslavs’kii sold 
Metallist, Kolomois’kii came under political and economic pressure, with several of his 
businesses under threat of bankruptcy.  His strong ties to various opposition parties, including at 
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times Blok Timoshenko, have been said to be the main reason why the Ianukovich 
administration began to financially target several of his companies.  
 
Kolomis’kii was not only involved in the business operations of Dnipro, but through 
various business contacts had also built himself a football empire, with part-ownership interests 
in several Ukrainian clubs including Arsenal Kiev. As Kolomois’kii’s business interests came 
under attack, several Ukrainian clubs began to experience economic difficulties, including 
Arsenal Kiev, Krivbass Krivoi Rog, and Volyn Lutsk,	 where Kolomois’kii through various 
business connections was the main financial contributor. Multiple-ownership of football clubs, 
although technically speaking prohibited by UEFA, had become a standard practice in Ukrainian 
football in the 2000s. Akhmetov, through middlemen, was involved in the business operations of 
various other clubs in Ukrainian football, and by 2012 the league was split into two camps - the 
pro-Akhmetov clubs and the pro-Kolomois’kii clubs.340 Yet by the 2012-13 season it seemed that 
Akhmetov and to a larger extend the Partiia Regionov was gaining control over the clubs of the 
Ukrainian Premier League, and in early 2013 critics began to remark that the Ukrainian Premier 
League had started to look like a competition of the Partiia Regionov.341  
 
When I lived in Ukraine in the spring of 2013, the shifting battle grounds between the 
two clans was perhaps most easily followed by observing which television station was 
broadcasting the home-matches of the individual clubs: if clubs aired their home matches on 
Ukraine’s largest station 2+2, which was owned by Kolomois’kii’s business group, they were 																																																								
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aligned with the Dnepropetrovsk-Clan, but if home matches were shown on Kanal Futbol, owned 
by Akhmetov, the club was associated with the Donbass Clan. The television war started when 
the Ukrainian Premier League decided to sign an official television deal with just one television 
station and when only half of the clubs had agreed to such a deal. As Tkach explained: ‘the 
television war actually showed if oligarchs were pro-Partia Regionov or in the opposition to the 
party.’342 Those oligarchs who allowed their club’s games to be shown on Kanal Futbol were for 
Ianukovich and the party, and those oligarchs who had their club’s games broadcasted on 2+2 
were in opposition to the party, whilst at the same time, were not necessarily politically aligned 
to the other 2+2 oligarchs.  To move from one station to the other was, a way to show the public 
that an oligarch, and therefore often an entire region, had changed its political allegiance.  
 
 Clubs and their owners, in this way, became a battleground for the different clans who 
fought over the control of various industrial, and economic sectors in the 2000s. As Aleksandr 
Tkach explains: ‘Few of the oligarchs were actually fans of the clubs that they would eventually 
end up owning. These men are not fans, that is not their motivation, it is all about gaining 
authority and influence.’343 The popularity of football clubs in Ukraine meant that football 
played a key role for the Partiia Regionov in gaining entrance to the hearts and minds of 
Ukrainians. In the 2000s football had also become an indicator of who was in charge of the 






 The struggle over the Ukrainian economy by the different oligarchical groups intensified 
even more in the winter of 2013-14 when the events of Euromaidan resulted in a revolution, 
coup, and civil war in Ukraine—events which once again had profound implications for 
Ukrainian football. Shakhtar Donetsk was forced to leave the Donbass, which had become the 
center of an armed struggle between so-called Russian separatists and the Ukrainian army, and 
played their home games in other parts of Ukraine.344 Akhmetov and many of the other oligarchs 
had to scramble to secure their economic and political futures, and in the case of Akhmetov the 
conflict in the Donbass meant huge financial losses that significantly impacted the operation of 
Shakhtar Donetsk.345  On the other hand Kolomois’kii managed to restore much of his previous 
power, and even emerged as one of the big profiteers of the revolution; in March 2014 he was 
named governor of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast.346  
The North Caucasus: Hybrid of State Owned Football and Berlusconization 	
The process of Berlusconization was not as clear in Russia; patriarchal ownership of a football 
club was not as pronounced, and the political ambitions of owners did not play as big a role in 
the 2000s, as it was impossible for oligarchs in Putin’s Russia to gain the same kind of political 
initiative as the oligarchs in Ukraine. The exception was the Russian Caucasus: here the Kremlin 
allowed oligarchs and politicians, political initiative as long as they cooperated with the centre. 
In fact, the Kremlin would cede political authority in the region if the individuals in question 
were willing to make financial contributions to the volatile Caucasus area. Two of the most 
recent examples include clubs from the Republic of Chechnia and the Republic of Dagestan. The 																																																								
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football club Terek Grozny represents Chechnia, and the President of Chechnia, Ramsan 
Kadyrov, owns the club. Chechnia has seen two brutal conflicts since the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and its capital Groznyi was completely devastated by the wars that took place 
between Chechen independence fighters and the Russian government. Terek was re-founded in 
2001 and started out in Russia’s Third Division. By 2005, however, the club had reached the 
Russian Prem’er Liga. Terek Groznyi only lasted in the top flight for one season, but returned in 
2008.  
 
In 2004 Akhmad Kadyrov, the owner of Terek and president of Chechnia, was killed 
during a football game, when a bomb exploded in his press box, in what was considered a 
political assassination. Akhmad Kadyrov’s son Ramsan replaced him both as the head of the club 
and president of Chechnia. Ramsan Kadyrov then made large investments in the club with the 
hope that success on the playing pitch symbolize growth and stability in Chechnya. A new 
football stadium was opened in 2011, new foreign players were signed, and new training 
facilities were built. All improvements were made possible by investment of the Russian 
government in the hope that improved infrastructure would enhance the image of Chechnia and 
attract foreign investment—that would further build up infrastructure and in turn would further 
increase stability in the region.347 Unlike the Ukrainian clubs, this team is owned by the Republic 
of Chechnia and is therefore indirectly controlled by the Russian government, but like many 
clubs from the Ukraine, Terek has become a vehicle through which its owners try to sharpen 
their political profile.  
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An even better example of Ukrainian style futbolocracy in Russia can be found in 
Dagestan. Dagestan’s capital Makhachkala is home to the football club Anzhi, which for a brief 
period could be described as one of the most interesting football projects in Europe. Unlike 
Terek, an individual billionaire by the name of Suleiman Kerimov, was the owner of Anzhi. 
Kerimov bought the club from the president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, and the 
Dagestani businessman Igor Iakovlev in January 2011. The Russia newspaper Vedomosti later 
reported that the club was given to Kerimov free of charge and in return the billionaire covered 
losses of 130 million roubles (£2.7 million) that the club had accumulated since 2009. Kerimov 
promised immediate investment into the club which included $30-50 million for players, as well 
as $200 million for the club’s infrastructure.348 In March 2011, Anzhi bought their first high 
profile player, the Brazilian Roberto Carlos, and in August 2011 the club bought Cameroonian 
Samuel Eto’o for £18.4 million from the Italian club Inter Milan. Eto’o signed a three year deal 
in which he would earn £8.7 million annually.349 Other players followed, attracted by the high 
salaries, but also perhaps by the fact that they did not actually have to live in Makhachkala, as 
the club was located in Moscow, where the club used the training facilities of the bankrupt club 
Saturn Ramenskoe, and only travelled the 1600 kilometres from Moscow to Makhachkala for 
their home games.350  
 
In March 2011 Frank Nienhuysen from Germany’s newspaper Die Sueddeutsche wrote 
that the Russian government had “kindly” asked Russia’s richest oligarchs to invest more into 																																																								
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local football instead of into foreign clubs, but the overriding motivation for Kerimov, who was 
born in Dagestan, was political. He was more interested in becoming the president of Dagestan 
than in creating a European super club.351 As in Ukraine, Anzhi was a political vehicle, but this 
was an anomaly in Russian football. Oligarchs in Russia don’t buy football clubs to sharpen their 
political profile, but use football clubs to buy political protection, or as a channel for investments 
abroad. Anzhi also demonstrated how short-lived the political ambitions of oligarchs in Russia 
could be, for by the summer of 2013 Anzhi underwent what the team officially called a 
rebranding operation. Within weeks the club put the entire squad up for sale. Officially, the 
reason given for this fire sale was that the club wanted to focus on redeveloping local talent from 
Dagestan. Just prior to Anzhi’s fire sale, however, Kerimov had come under economic pressure 
when he lost hundreds of millions in his fertilizer operation in Belarus, and was even wanted for 
crimes by the Belarusian authorities.352 The club had spent £290 million on new players since 
Kerimov took control of the club, and it was rumoured that along with financial difficulties 
Kerimov was also facing health problems. The club announced that it would reduce its budget 
from £116 million a season to between £32 and £45 million, which still placed it in the mid-table 
range for Russian clubs.353 But the sudden departure of top players, as well as the turmoil created 
by the owner, resulted in poor performances and at the end of the 2013-14 season Anzhi was 
relegated to the Russian First Division.  
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The events at Anzhi also sum up the main difference between ownership structures and 
the motivations of owners in Ukraine and in Russia; in Russia, the state structures are much more 
secured, and football cannot be used as a political tool because the state does not tolerate new 
political actors. The exception is the Caucasus, but here the Kremlin hopes to encourage 
financial investments from Russia’s oligarchs, and in return for the investment the Russian 
government grants them political power. The Caucasus is a geographically volatile area, 
however, and football investments are extremely insecure in this region, as we have seen in the 
case of Anzhi and Alania.  
Conclusion  	
In the Soviet Union and later in its successor states, football clubs were dependent on various 
forms of paternalism. In Soviet times football clubs were founded as part of government 
organizations, were owned and operated by local government, or were part of a state-owned 
factory. When the Soviet Union collapsed, clubs in Russia often remained under the umbrella of 
one state organization or another.  This was mainly due to the fact that sponsorship money and 
television income was and still is much lower than in Western Europe. Only two prominent clubs 
briefly experimented with individual ownership groups that operated independently from the 
state in the 1990s—Spartak under coach/manager/president/owner Romantsev, and Torpedo, 
which became part of the Luzhniki group. In the early 2000s there was a move toward 
investment not only by oligarchs, but also by large state-owned corporations. Although TsSKA 
was sold to an investment group, the state maintained minority shares through the Ministry of 
Defence. Other state-owned companies also began to invest into football, and here the purpose 
was marketing through sponsorship. In the newly independent Ukraine, clubs quickly came 
under the control of individual owners, called oligarchs, who used football to give their business 
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operations a façade of legitimacy. This is especially clear in the case of Dinamo Kiev, which was 
the front for numerous business operations; the Donetsk clan run by Akhmat Bragin and later 
Rinat Akhmetov later copied this model. The same was true for Dinamo Tbilisi: Georgia 
suffered economically after the fall of the Soviet Union, and Dinamo Tbilisi became part of a 
mafia apparatus that was deeply connected to the state, and that tried to use football for a 
multitude of illegal activities. This development was possible because football clubs were 
dependent on external income, and, as in Russia, TV money was insufficient to field competitive 
teams. In addition, when Ukraine and Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union, all 
ties with the central authorities in Moscow were severed. The football oligarchs filled this 
vacuum, and by the 2000s they realized the political value of their clubs. Ukraine quickly saw 
the development of a futbolocracy in the 2000s, and football ownership and politics became 
intertwined. This is perhaps the biggest difference between Ukraine and Russia: in Russia only 
the Caucasus region had football owners who were politically motivated, and this was only 
possible because the Russian government sanctioned the political involvement. What is, 
however, noticeable is the ever-increasing presence of the Russian state in the economic 














Stadiums are the theatres of football; it is here that thousands gather to watch their favourite 
teams and players compete. Unlike theatres, however, football stadiums are interactive arenas 
where the crowd is involved and part of the spectacle. The stadium is the home of the game and a 
reason why football has become a gathering place for thousands of fans. As was the case around 
the world, football stadiums were the People’s Theatres in the Soviet Union and in the later 
successor states. Yet, the situation in the Soviet Union was different from that in the United 
Kingdom, in that football stadiums were fashioned by various state authorities rather than by 
capitalistic clubs in an attempt to attract crowds in order to run a profit. When it came to stadium 
construction, the government authorities of the Soviet Union followed almost the same principle 
as professional North American sport leagues: build a venue and then allocate a professional 
sports team to play in it. The expansion of stadium construction in the Soviet Union is well 
outlined in Robert Edelman’s history of spectator sport in the Soviet Union.354 This chapter will 
expand on the Edelman’s work by including new sources as well as by tracing the process of 
stadium development in the post-Soviet space.  
 
  Stadiums are much more then simply a stage for football in that they are an integral part 
of the identity of a club. In the Soviet Union one’s decision to support a certain team could also 
be a conscious move to oppose or support the central control by Moscow. In his article ‘Our 
Own Internationale’, Manfred Zeller highlights how ethnic groups from across the Soviet Union, 																																																								
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excluding Russians, supported a non-Moscow based club.  Zeller describes that when Kiev won 
the Soviet Cup in 1966: “The event was transnational in that the euphoria for D[i]namo Kiev 
crossed the boundaries of national groups and the borders of national republics.”355 It is 
significant that these stances against perceived Russian domination of the Soviet Union often 
originated in football stadiums. As large structures, stadiums are important landmarks of cities, 
and in the case of the Soviet Union, even of entire republics. As fans rallied behind clubs that 
symbolized entire nations, their stadiums, to an extent, became icons of nationhood. This chapter 
will outline the perception of stadiums in places such as Armenia and Georgia, and will analyse 
what happened once independence was achieved and the major clubs were no longer seen as 
representative of an entire nation. In other parts of the former Soviet Union, however, stadiums 
continued to be seen as a manifestation of regional identity and pride. 
  
 This chapter also outlines the transition of stadium enterprises from communism to 
capitalism in the late 1980s. When the Soviet Union finally collapsed, many stadiums turned into 
private enterprises: one such example is the Luzhniki (Lenin) Stadium in Moscow, which after 
1987 was owned and operated as a private company. Stadiums are a fascinating example of the 
ownership structures of the former Soviet Union, and of the way in which these arrangements 
changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the transition from communism to capitalism. The 
economic instability that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union made improvement of 
stadium facilities nearly impossible. In the 1990s these old Soviet style stadiums became 
symbolic of the stagnation that the sport was facing in the former Soviet states. The general trend 
																																																								
355 Manfred Zeller. ‘“Our Own Internationale,” 1966’, 55. 
	 174	
of falling attendance in all the leagues was partly due to the poor condition of the stadiums. 
Soviet, and later Russian journalists lamented the deterioration of football facilities.  
 
With the return of relative political stability in Russia in the early 2000s, stadium projects 
once again became possible. The first club to build a modern football-only stadium was 
Lokomotiv Moscow; construction began in 2000 and was completed in 2002. In subsequent 
years Lokomotiv (owned by the Russian Railways) was one of the more successful clubs in 
Russia. What did the renovation and construction of stadiums mean for clubs in general, and 
what impact did the improved comforts and amenities of new stadiums have on the clubs? To 
what extent were new stadiums built and did the clubs with new stadiums benefit financially? 
More recently, Ukraine built a number of new stadiums in order to host the 2012 European 
Championships. Russia is hosting the 2018 World Cup, and many clubs have planned new 
stadium projects. This chapter will explain how the construction of large-scale sport 
infrastructure illustrates the continued influence of state patronage on major construction projects 
in the post-Soviet space. 
The Luzhniki Disaster - Football’s Chernobyl and the Mirage of Cutting-Edge Sport Facilities 	
The Luzhniki Stadium Disaster is one of the worst stadium catastrophes in the history of football. 
The Luzhniki Stadium was considered the largest and most modern in the Soviet Union, and was 
even renovated and expanded for the 1980 Olympic Games. The disaster unfolded on a very cold 
night when the terraces were covered in ice. Spartak was playing Haarlem in the UEFA Cup and 
had scored an early goal.  As the match was nearing its conclusion people started to leave early. 
Because only 23,000 people attended the match, security personal had opened only two gates to 
the stadium. Reports later indicated that one fan stumbled in the large crowd, which immediately 
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crushed those people who moved to help the fallen fan.  The exit was blocked by fans who were 
funnelled by metal banisters as they tried to make their way out of the stadium.  People fell over 
the crushed bodies and this created a domino effect.  Spartak then scored a late second goal and 
many people who were already on their way to the metro tried to return to the stands to celebrate. 
In all 66 people died during the stampede.356 The authorities reacted by keeping the extent of the 
deaths and injuries a secret. Only one local newspaper, Vecherniaia Moskva, escaped the general 
censorship and reported as follows: “An incident occurred yesterday in Luzhniki. After the 
football match, some spectators were injured.”357 As with the Chernobyl disaster that occurred 
three years later, the regime tried to hide the tragedy from the public. A few foreign press reports 
were, however, able to report on what happened at the match. Three days after the accident, the 
New York Times published a report in which it stated that 20 people were killed in a panic at the 
Lenin Stadium.358 The full extent of the accident that occurred at the Luzhniki stadium was not 
made public until after Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies were introduced. Even then 
it took until 1989 for the public to be made aware of the full extent of the stadium catastrophe.359 
    
 The fact that the catastrophe took place in the most important sport facility in the Soviet 
Union was a major blow for a society where sport was a central part of the international 
propaganda effort. This led to the reaction by the Soviet authorities to censor the true extent of 
the disaster. The mishap at the Luzhniki laid bare some of the shortcomings of the Soviet 																																																								
356 Izvestiia 20 Jul. 1989. 6.  
357 Guardian 4 May 2008. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2008/may/04/championsleague accessed at 25 
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facilities, but also that of the security forces such as the militia, which was in charge of security 
during that particular night.360  Although authorities managed to keep the full extend of the 
tragedy hidden, a full investigation of the events that let to it was conducted in 1983.361  
 
Most facilities where built during the three construction booms of the Soviet period: the 
first, in the 1930s; the second, right after World War II; and a third, in the 1960s. In 1952 the 
USSR had 1,020 stadiums, each with a capacity of more than 1,500 seats, and by 1968 that 
number had grown to 3,065 stadiums. The most recent increase in renovations came at the time 
of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, when facilities, especially in Moscow, but also in other cities 
around the Soviet Union, were upgraded.362 The authorities in Moscow spread the games of the 
Olympic Football tournament across the entire country: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk all 
hosted matches and their stadiums were upgraded for those events. Yet the Luzhniki disaster 
highlights the fact that most of these renovations were only cosmetic and did little to improve the 
actual standards of the sport facilities involved, especially in terms of comfort, and safety. Later, 
in 1985, the Soviet Union hosted the World Youth Championships with the group stage games 
played in Erevan, Tbilisi, Baku, and Minsk and the finals held in Leningrad and Moscow.363 
While this tournament was discussed excessively in the media, the competition did not act as a 
catalyst for improving football stadiums in the Soviet Union.    
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While the Soviet Union boasted a few large stadiums for big sporting events in the major 
cities, there was a gap when it came to providing facilities to secondary cities.  This is especially 
highlighted in Figure 1 that shows the football arenas that were available for the 1986 Soviet 
Vysshaia Liga. 
Figure	1	
Location Stadium name Capacity  
Moscow Tsentral’nyi stadion imeni B. I. Lenina (Luzhniki) 100360 
Kiev Respublikanskii stadion 100169 
Tbilisi “Dinamo” imeni B. I. Lenina  74328 
Leningrad Stadion imeni S. M. Kirova  74000 
Erevan Tsentral’nyi stadion “Hrazdan”  70402 
Minsk “Dinamo”  50862 
Moscow “Dinamo”  50475 
Odessa 
Tsentral’nyi stadion Chernomorskogo 
parokhodstva  43000 
Baku Respublikanskii stadion imeni B. I. Lenina  42616 
Donetsk Tsentral’nyi stadion “Shakhtar”  40485 
Kharkov “Metallist”  37000 
Moscow Sportivnyi kompleks “Olimpiiskii”  35000 
Dnepropetrovsk “Meteor”  30000 
Alma-Ata Tsentral’nyi stadion  28500 
Kutaisi Tsentral’nyi stadion  23800 
Moscow “Torpedo”  20000 
Vil'nius Tsentral’nyi stadion “Zhal’giris”  15000 
Moscow LFK TsSKA  3256 
		 All data via Sovetskii Sport364 		
 
Some of the arenas were shared:  Several clubs in Moscow, for example, used the Luzhniki and 
the Olimpiiskii complex.  The Olimpiiskii complex was an indoor arena primarily used for 
matches that could not be played outside due to bad weather. In addition, TsSKA primarily used 
other facilities in Moscow and would only play occasionally at the LFK TsSKA due to its small 																																																								
364 Sovetskii Sport 1 Mar. 1986. 3. 
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capacity. Many of the larger arenas on the list were so called multipurpose arenas, which were 
not built specifically for football and included running tracks that made viewing extremely 
difficult as the field was further from the stands. Also, there were only seven stadiums with a 
capacity of over 50,000 in the entire Soviet Union, whereas the country’s biggest sporting 
competitor, the United States, had nine such facilities in the State of California alone.365   Unlike 
the West, where many clubs were grounded (as the term home-ground suggests) in a specific 
locality, football clubs in the Soviet Union often lacked this foundation. The reason for this is the 
manner in which the Soviet Union financed sport:  the centralized approach meant that stadiums 
had to be used efficiently and were therefore shared between as many sporting events as 
possible. 
 
Soviet stadiums were partly paid for by the public through ticket sales from sporting 
events such as football games, in spite of the fact that ticket prices were fairly low. While clubs 
received all of the proceeds from ticket sales, football clubs were then required to pay a levy on 
their ticket income—which was intended to pay for the upkeep of the stadium. An example of 
how clubs were taxed is provided by statistics from Chernomorets Odessa’s home game against 
Spartak Moscow in 1975: On that day the income was 24610.10 roubles, from which a 10 per 
cent levy or 2461.08 roubles was deducted for Souizsportobespechenie (Union for Sports 
Provision), and another 25 per cent or 6152.70 roubles was deducted for the upkeep of the 
stadium. The remaining 15997.02 roubles were given to Chernomorets. Clubs did not have to 
pay the Union fee when playing friendlies or international matches. The formula of taxation was 
constantly adjusted after 1976.  Chernomorets, for example, then had to pay 20 per cent toward 																																																								
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the upkeep of the stadium and also was required to share the income with the visiting team. The 
sum was split 50 – 50 per cent in the event of a tie, 55 – 45 per cent in case of a home win and 45 
– 55 per cent if the away team won.366 This formula gave a special incentive to travelling teams 
like Spartak Moscow, especially if they were successful.  The rule was probably also introduced 
to make fixed games less likely, as Soviet football suffered from the frequent occurrence of 
prearranged matches in which both teams would arrange a tie ahead of the match. This rule was 
introduced along with the draw limit rule, which limited the amount of ties a club could get in a 
season, in order to provide incentives for teams to win their home matches against bigger clubs 
instead of just settling for a tie.367 Both these rules were supposed to make the Soviet Vysshaia 
Liga more exciting, less predictable, and more lucrative by attracting more fans, and 
consequently generating more ticket sales. Clubs and the football administration were trying to 
maximise profit in order to generate income which would pay toward maintaining facilities.  
 
 As has been pointed out, most clubs did not own their home stadiums, even Spartak 
Moscow, which did not move into its own stadium until the fall of 2014. Spartak is famous for 
having used whichever facility was available in Moscow, and has used both the Lenin Stadium 
(Luzhniki) and the Dinamo Stadium extensively. They rented the facilities because it was 
actually cheaper to use facilities provided by the state than to construct and maintain their own. 
This system had a downside, however, as clubs were not responsible for the upkeep of the 
facilities in which they played. Clubs like Torpedo Moscow and Lokomotiv Moscow, which 																																																								
366 TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 32, d. 1511, ll. 29-31, 35-36. 
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were associated with workers’ unions, played in facilities that were owned by the respective 
unions, which also operated the sports societies. Torpedo’s stadium, for example, the Strel’tsov 
Stadium, which is located not far from the ZiL auto works in the south of Moscow, was owned 
and operated by the car manufacturer ZiL. The Eduard Strel’tsov Stadium is a modest, yet by 
Soviet standards, a modern ground, with a capacity of 13,000—an ideal size for a club like 
Torpedo. The Luzhniki, on the other hand, had an official capacity of 78,000, and even Spartak 
and TsSKA, which have also used the stadium for their home matches, were unable to sell out 
the stadium on a regular basis.  In 1976, as part of the preparations for the Olympic games, the 
Strel’tsov was renovated to become the permanent home stadium of Torpedo Moscow. It was 
equipped with under soil heating and was one of the few facilities that could be used for football 
games in the harsh Moscow winter.368 Lokomotiv played their home games at the Lokomotiv 
stadium, which was owned by the Ministry of Transport, and run by the rail workers union. The 
fact that the union that ran the club directly owned Torpedo’s Strel’tsov stadium meant that the 
facility was much better maintained; it was often considered one of the most modern facilities in 
Moscow.  
 
 The unions to which the clubs were affiliated were responsible for the upkeep of the 
stadiums.369 Hence, the patrons of Torpedo and Lokomotiv, owned the stadiums, and as a result 
these clubs were much more grounded in their home facilities. But how did stadiums that were 
not closely associated with either a club or the patron of a club operate? An example of such a 
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facility is the Respublikankii Stadion (today NSK Olimpiiskii) in Kiev, which was owned by the 
republican government. Although the stadium had an independent management group, the 
facility actually fell under the direct control of the Ukrainian Committee for Physical Culture 
(Sportkomitet UkSSR). This is demonstrated by the manner in which the stadium received 
funding for repairs and improvements. In 1983, for example, minor repairs had to be made to the 
stadium and these were organized at a plenary session of the Ukrainian Sport Committee. This 
committee was responsible for both the selection of the construction company, as well as for 
allotting funds for the stadium project. In this particular case the committee selected 
Tsentrostal’konstruktsiia and Ukrmontakhimzashchita for the repairs; Tsentrostal’konstruktsiia 
was given 1,000 roubles and Ukrmontakhimzashichita 40,000 roubles to conduct the work. 
These sums came directly from funds allocated to the Ukrainian sport committee for cultural 
purposes.370 The direct involvement of the sport committee in the stadium project illustrates the 
command and control structures that were involved in the operation of the big republican 
stadiums in the Soviet Union. These stadiums were part of the sport committees of the individual 
Soviet Republics. In order to maintain stadiums or to build new stadiums, central committees as 
well as sport committees were allocated funds as part of five-year plans.  These five-year target 
plans included all facets of industrial growth in every corner of the Soviet Union including 
football and were overseen by the Soviet agency of industrial planning Gosplan.  
 
This management system is illustrated by the handling of facilities in Ukraine in the 
second half of the 1980s. In 1985, for example, for the five-year plan running from 1985 to 1990 
Ukraine was expected to increase its number of stadiums from 951 in 1984 to 1149 in 1990. The 																																																								
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city of Kiev alone was to increase its number of stadiums from 25 to 31 by 1990.371 To put these 
numbers in perspective, a stadium according to the Soviet definition was a field with any form of 
stands surrounding it; therefore the incredible number of 951 stadiums in Ukraine included many 
that would not qualify as such in Western Europe or North America. Furthermore, the list did not 
specify football stadiums, and may in fact have included stadiums for other sports. This 
quantitative approach clearly illustrates the extent to which stadium management and production 
was part of the central planning process of the Soviet Union.  
 
Dinamo Kiev, for example, was at the centre of a football production chain within the 
city of Kiev and even the entire Ukraine. The goal was to centralize football and the facilities 
from the top down. At the very top was Goskomsport, and below this level were the central 
committees of the various republics that usually operated the Republican stadiums as well as the 
biggest club. At the next level was the city, which ideally was centralized with the major club at 
its core (the exception was Moscow). Dinamo Kiev, therefore, was allotted control over all 
facilities within Kiev.  The club was given full power over all youth schools, which included the 
Dinamo SKA as well as the Dinamo DIuSSh. There were also 160 football fields and 24 
stadiums in the city, which were all controlled through the Dinamo Kiev football club and in this 
case were under the direct supervision of Valerii Lobanovskii who had to answer directly to the 
central committee of the UkSSR.372 This top down approach meant that individual clubs had 
very little influence over the creation and allocation of facilities. Yet this system of club 																																																								
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ownership and operation during the time of the Soviet Union worked well, as the units were all 
part of the same chain of command.  
 
The day-to-day involvement of the central sports committee of Ukraine and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine highlights the hierarchical chain of command in 
Soviet sport. More importantly this demonstrated a lack of proprietorship in the sense that these 
facilities operated as independent enterprises that simply received funds from various state 
agencies. The resulting management of facilities was not always clear-cut, as various groups 
could claim organizational oversight over stadiums. On paper, stadiums were operated by 
managers who were responsible for financing the upkeep of the facility through the income 
generated by clubs using the facilities. The central committees, or sports committees, of the 
various republics seemed to intervene only in refurbishment projects, or if funds were not 
available for important construction. The managers had, therefore, very little power, as they were 
simply to oversee the daily operation of the stadium and to implement projects as instructed from 
above. This meant that when things went wrong, as in the Luzhniki case, they could be held 
responsible even if they had just followed instructions.  
Reforming the Sport Economy: Khozraschet in Sport Facility Management 	
The management of sport facilities did change, however, due to the economic problems of the 
Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s. In the mid-1980s finance and material allocated to 
the upkeep of stadiums and infrastructures reached only 30 per cent of what was allotted 
according to the norms set by the five-year plans.373 The plenum of the Ukrainian Football 
Federation, for example, complained that by December 1985 the city did not have enough 																																																								
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facilities to house all of its youth teams. In addition, the upkeep of facilities and repair work at 
the Bolshevik stadium had come to a halt due to a lack of material.374 By the mid 1980s the 
Soviet Union had experienced a general slowdown in economic performance and the growth rate 
of industrial output had fallen dramatically. This was accompanied by supply imbalances.375 It 
became clear to the authorities that stadiums, much like other facets of the Soviet economy, had 
to be made independent from state subsidies in order to guarantee maintenance of an operational 
standard. The government therefore looked into new methods through which facilities could be 
financed.  
 
In the late 1980s advertisement boards were introduced into Soviet sport. Advertising 
played a significant role in the transformation of Soviet football, as will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. Stadium advertising was directly negotiated between Sovintersport (which was the 
enterprise responsible for setting up sponsorship deals) and the management of the individual 
stadiums. The structure through which such deals were set up between Sovintersport and 
Stadium management illustrates the process whereby stadiums were transformed from state 
owned facilities to khozraschet enterprises. On 31 May 1989, for example, the Soviet Union 
played a friendly match versus Iceland. As part of the sponsorship deal set up by Sovintersport, 
10 per cent of the income generated through advertising reverted back to Sovintersport.  The 
remainder, however, was directly transferred to the bank account of the Luzhniki Stadium 
(Promstroibank).376 The advertisement deal between Sovintersport and the stadium management 																																																								
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of the Luzhniki suggests that at this point stadiums were already acting as independent financial 
actors. In some cases stadiums were also receiving state funding. This indicates that in the period 
of the Gorbachev reforms, stadiums experienced the best of both worlds. The late 1980s also saw 
changes in economic laws that resulted in the establishment of khozraschet enterprises. As 
explained in chapter 2, financially, these enterprises were expected to run unassisted by the state. 
There is some evidence that not only clubs but also some stadiums were turned into self-funded 
organizations. Stadiums, in many ways, were among the earliest self-funded organizations in the 
Soviet economy. Financially, some organizations already operated independently from the state, 
and, therefore, when khozraschet was introduced, the step to self-sufficiency was quickly 
achieved. This could explain why khozraschet gained momentum quickly after 1987 as it simply 
affirmed already existing business practices. As mentioned above, stadiums were given a 
percentage of the income generated through ticket sales at football games. Soviet authorities 
permitted advertising boards in October 1987, and, in the early stages, stadiums did not share in 
the income generated. Instead, those funds were transferred to Goskomsport and to the 
republican sport committees. In March 1988, for example, Sovintersport simply sent a list of 
boards that had to be put up for the UEFA Cup Winners’ Cup match between Dinamo Minsk and 
Mechelen from Belgium. The letter simply informed the Director of the Central Dinamo Stadium 
in Minsk that advertising was permitted, what kind of boards would be delivered prior to the 
game, and where they should be installed.377 It was not until 1989 that the aforementioned 
documents between Luzhniki and Sovintersport show that stadiums received funds from 
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sponsorship deals. This suggests that the management structures of stadiums changed between 
1988 and late 1989. 
 
 As with infrastructure in general in the Soviet Union, the general disrepair of stadiums 
and sport facilities and the resulting decrease in attendance numbers for football and other sports, 
became part of a public debate. Low attendance numbers, especially, became an important topic  
for sport journalists and former athletes in major publications. The main criticism was the fact 
that football clubs in the Soviet Union had not yet learned that sport was also a business and that 
it was necessary to invest in sports in such a way as to not only offset the costs but also to make a 
profit. Critiques often pointed out that football had become a global commercial enterprise, but  
compared to the rest of the world, the organization of football in the Soviet Union was 
significantly behind. The usual comparison made was with sport in Canada and the United 
States, where hockey teams, for example, made 40 per cent of their profit from the audience.378 
The comparison with North American sport was especially interesting to Soviet officials from 
clubs and sport associations. Clubs that moved their enterprise status to khozraschet (self-
financing) declared that they would generate most of their income from attendance. In fact, 
Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk, which became the first self-financed club in the Soviet Union in 1987, 
was one of the few clubs that gained control over its own stadium when the club became an 
independent organization. Dnepr was, therefore, able to keep the income generated at its 
stadium.379 This set of circumstances was certainly due to the fact that authorities had a strong 
interest in Dnepr and wanted the club to succeed in order to set a benchmark for other clubs that 
																																																								
378 Argumenty i Fakty 15 Apr. 1989. 7. 
379 Izvestiia 28 Sep. 1987. 6.  
	 187	
were to become self-financing. In truth, however, most clubs would not gain control over their 
facilities until after the fall of the Soviet Union. Perhaps this was due to the fact that clubs did 
not necessarily want full control over facilities, as it meant that they would have had to pay for 
their upkeep.   
 
 This is especially demonstrated in the case of Dinamo Kiev. Here, the major training 
facilities were directly controlled by the sport society to which the club was affiliated, in this 
case, Dinamo’s patron the Ministry of Interior. Koncha-Zaspa, which is located in the Kiev 
suburb of the same name, had been the home base of Dinamo Kiev since 1961.380 In 1987 the 
central committee of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) approved the expansion 
plan of the training base, which once again underlines the connection between Dinamo Kiev and 
the highest echelons of political power of Ukraine. Vladimir Shcherbitskii, the secretary of the 
Ukrainian Central Committee, approved the redevelopment plan on 30 November 1987. At that 
point it had been 20 years since any sort of work had been done on the Dinamo Kiev training 
facility. The work that needed to be done was extensive: a press room, an indoor facility, new 
medical facilities, a swimming pool and two football fields were all to be added to the existing 
training complex. The central committee under the leadership of Shcherbitskii directly approved 
the funding, part of which came straight from funds provided to Ukraine by Gosplan.381  
 
As outlined in the chapter “Owning the People’s Game”, Dinamo Kiev was, in many 
ways, the official club of the Ukrainian central committee. Koncha-Zaspa was the political nerve 																																																								
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centre of Ukraine, as most of the political elite had their dachas in the forests surrounding the 
training base.382 It is, therefore, no surprise that Dinamo Kiev received funds from the central 
committee to lavishly expand the training complex. The working plan that was drawn up in 
December 1987 outlines in detail the cash flow from the state to Dinamo Kiev. Altogether 6.7 
million roubles were allocated to funding the Koncha-Zaspa project. Another 500,000 roubles 
were assigned to improvement projects at the sport youth school “Nivki”, which was also part of 
the Dinamo Kiev football club.383 This generous support came at a time when Dinamo was 
already officially moving towards becoming a self-funded enterprise, yet the Ukrainian central 
committee continued to be involved in the reconstruction process of the base all the way to its 
completion. In early 1990, for example, when the project experienced problems due to financial 
difficulties of some of the construction enterprises involved, the central committee offered direct 
assistance.384 Despite the fact that Dinamo was officially designated as an independent entity that 
no longer received state subsidies, the club continued to collect state funding indirectly through 
the construction of the training base. As is outlined in chapter 2, Dinamo was a special case, for 
the club was able to maintain its political connections in the dying days of the Soviet Union, and, 
therefore, maintained its image as the all-Ukrainian club even after the Union collapsed in 1991.  
Dinamo, therefore, was able to receive the best of both worlds: the freedom to act independently 
from the state in all matters involving the club, and state support through funding for its 
infrastructure. 																																																								
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Post-Soviet Debris: Stadiums in the Aftermath of Soviet Collapse 	
When the Soviet Union fell, the images of struggling post-Soviet societies became a major theme 
of the early 1990s. The pictures of Russia’s sprawling and crumbling industrial complexes 
transformed the perception of the Soviet Union as a major world power with massive military 
capabilities to that of the Russian Federation, a country in dire need of economic and industrial 
reform. In terms of football, the economic depression was reflected in the poor state of Russian 
football facilities. In 1992-93 TsSKA Moscow was the first Russian team to compete in the 
Champions’ League group phase. The team was not allowed to compete in Moscow, however, as 
no stadium in all of Russia was modern enough to deal with the severe Russian winter. TsSKA, 
therefore, had to play all of its home games in Germany; their first home match was played 
against the Glasgow Rangers in Bochum on 9 December 1992, and the other two were staged at 
the Berlin Olympic Stadium on 3 March against Olympique Marseille and on 7 April against 
Club Bruges.385  
 
Russian officials had tried to have the games take place in Russia, however, as they 
argued that, in the past, UEFA had allowed games to take place during the Russian winter, and it 
was speculated that the new ruling was caused by doubts on the part of the European football 
governing body regarding the political stability of the Russian Federation. Initially, TsSKA 
wanted to play their home games in Spain but this was rejected by UEFA. TsSKA was not the 
only Russian club threatened with having to play their home games abroad. Dinamo Moscow 
was told by UEFA that they had to play Benfica Lisbon in the Italian city of Bergamo.386 The 
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Dinamo match did, however, end up going ahead in the Torpedo stadium in Moscow—which 
was equipped with under soil heating but unfortunately for TsSKA was deemed too small for 
Champions League football.387 The Luzhniki stadium was considered big enough, but the former 
Lenin stadium lacked a roof, which meant that crowds were not protected from snow and rain 
during the winter months. In addition, the stigma of the now exposed disaster that took place at 
the facility during a match in the middle of winter was also a likely deterrent for the UEFA 
officials. In the past, the champion of the Soviet Union would have played such matches in the 
Caucasus, but, with the independence of the states in that region, this was no longer a viable 
option; political tensions would have made it difficult for a champion of the former Soviet Union 
to compete in the now independent republics. Ultimately, Germany (Berlin’s Olympic Stadium 
and the Ruhrstadion in Bochum) was chosen as the location for the home matches. The choice of 
Germany, especially that of Berlin, known for its extremely harsh winters, indicates that politics, 
in addition to weather, was the actual reason for the decision. UEFA may simply have been 
apprehensive of the political situation in Russia’s capital in the immediate aftermath of the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  
 
 UEFA’s mistrust of Russia’s facilities was not unfounded, however, as most sport 
facilities in the post-Soviet space in the early 1990s were in a dismal state of repair. With the 
onset of perestroika, street sellers moved into the fields around the stadium, which gave the area 
in the Luzhniki ground the atmosphere of a typical post-Soviet market place. Once again, the 
Luzhniki Stadium had become a synonym for the current state of affairs, this time in the Russian 
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Federation instead of the Soviet Union. As Alexandra Köhring writes in her journal article 
“Sporting Moscow”:  
Luzhniki was a place where the – sporting – successes of the Soviet state took place, 
but where, on the other hand, material problems were concentrated that forced people 
to confront its deficiencies.388 
 
It was symbolic that Russia’s first international football entry was forced to play its home games 
in Germany because the state of the Russian stadiums did not allow top international football to 
be played in Russia. The stadium situation in the Russian capital was especially precarious and 
continues to be so to this day. After the fall of the Soviet Union, not only the Luzhniki Stadium 
was considered to be below the international standard.  
 
In Volgograd, the home of Rotor Volgograd, one of the most successful Russian clubs of 
the early 1990s, the stadium had not seen repairs since it was built in 1962. The condition of the 
facility was so dreadful that Sovetskii Sport used the Volgograd Central Stadium as emblematic 
of the poor state of Russian stadiums in the early 1990s. The Volgograd Stadium was owned by 
the municipal government, and managed by the city sport committee (Oblsportkimitet). The 
sport committee of Volgograd, however, believed that it was up to the city of Volgograd to 
organize the much needed renovation of the entire sport complex, as the city also harboured 
leading teams in gymnastics, handball and several other sports.389 The poor state of repair of the 
stadium was one of the reasons why Rotor Volgograd began to struggle in the late 1990s and 
soon disappeared into the lower levels of Russian football. The situation also shows that, even 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, many clubs had still not gained control over their home 																																																								
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Soviet Union”, Urban History Vol. 32, Is. 02 (2010),  253-271. 
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stadiums, and that facility management often continued to rely on the methods used during the 
time of the Soviet Union. The facilities were run by either regional or city governments.   
Volgograd is an example in which the city was in charge of stadium development and also 
demonstrates that the hierarchical command structure for facility management from before and 
after the fall of the Soviet Union largely remained the same. Volgograd was not the only city in 
which sport facilities were in dire need of repair and renovation. After the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the successor states also struggled with financial difficulties as well as the necessary 
market reforms that came with the collapse of the centralized economy.  
Stadiums and Identity: The long decline of football Stadiums in the post-Soviet space 	
Georgia, and Armenia especially, have seen a long and brutal decline in the football 
infrastructure that was set up in Soviet times. Here the decline of facilities can be directly 
attributed to the weakening of the sport as a means to project national identity. Big clubs like 
Dinamo Tbilisi, or Ararat Erevan were now competing in national competitions, and, therefore, 
no longer received the unified support of an entire republic whose population had previously 
seen the clubs as replacements for national teams. This was evident, for example, in the 
Armenian nationalist movement that formed in 1988 and used chants that had previously been 
sung at Ararat Erevan games. One such football chant was called Hayer (Armenians). The 
Armenian anthropologist Levon Abramian, when interviewed by Simon Kuper, outlined the 
importance of the Republican teams as national symbols and also recalled that games became 
more violent in the late 1980s, especially when Russian teams came to visit. In fact, winning a 
match in Erevan became a dangerous pastime for Russian clubs. As Kuper wrote: ‘local 
policemen would often suggest to the Russians that if they won, there might be a regrettable 
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riot.’390 Ararat Erevan was the logical choice as the centrepiece of the region’s national upsurge: 
the club incorporated the national symbol of all Armenians in its club name, and its participation 
in the all-Union Soviet Vysshaia Liga gave Armenians the opportunity to use the club as a 
symbol of the struggle for national unification, and later of national independence. Pavel 
Katchatrian, former General Secretary of the now independent Armenian Football Federation, 
stated that, although the national celebrations were passionate after Armenia gained 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1992, they were not as passionate as when Ararat Erevan 
won the Soviet championship in 1973. In his own words: ‘to gain independence was truly a great 
achievement, but to beat the Russians at their own game seemed even better!’391 The stadium is 
crucial as a focus for collective emotions of this kind, as it can provide a community with a large 
public space in which to gather. ‘Repeated gathering in a communal space gives it historical 
significance and public memory.’392 The stadium in this case, the Hrazdan, was, therefore, the 
focal point of national joy, and a monument to the nation of Armenia.  
 
After the collapse of communism, the attitude toward football changed in the independent 
republics of the former Soviet Union. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the football leagues of the now 
independent republics experienced a major competitive decline, as most of the now independent 
republics struggled with economic collapse and poverty, and the best players moved to Russia, 
Ukraine or to the West. Suddenly, a club like Dinamo Tbilisi, which previously had competed in 
the Soviet championship, a tournament that was once one of the best in Europe, now played in a 
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national championship in a small and poor country in the middle of the Caucasus. Allison reports 
of a game in November 1995 when Dinamo played a match against Durugi in the Umaglesi Liga: 
‘There were 200 spectators in a stadium which can seat 80,000. I left when the score was 8-0 to 
Dinamo.’393 Although Allison slightly exaggerates the capacity of the Dinamo Arena, he is 
correct about the atmosphere of emptiness the huge concrete bowl can now project during an 
average league game of the Umaglesi Liga. During my time in Tbilisi I was able to attend several 
matches, and Dinamo still struggled to attract more than a few thousand people to a home match, 
despite attempts by the clubs to make the stadium more comfortable through renovation. In fact, 
90 per cent of the visitors were located in the stadium’s VIP area, and only a handful of fans 
were located in the open sections of the stadium. The sense I got from watching a game there 
was that games were now like a state function for the rich and famous of Tbilisi’s high society, 
who used the occasion to mingle, rather than to watch football.  
 
For the average fan, clubs like Ararat Erevan or Dinamo Tbilisi were no longer seen as 
vehicles of nationalism, but instead were perceived as former Soviet institutions. While sport 
was used as a vehicle of nationalism before the fall of the Soviet Union, once independence was 
achieved, fans looked upon the big clubs as sponsored by Moscow and therefore objects of 
scorn.394  
Post-independence it was no longer necessary to exploit football as a theatre of 
resistance. When party and national affiliations could be expressed openly through 
more direct political and civic institutions (such as political parties, trade unions, 
newspapers, partisan movements and so forth) in short term at least, there ceased to 
be a need for duplicitous forms of communication around football.395  																																																								
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394 Ibid.  719. 
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This certainly is the case with the two national stadiums of Georgia and Armenia. In 2014, both 
facilities had seen some repair work but not to a significant enough degree to return them to their 
original state of the art condition. I was able to tour both facilities on a research trip to Georgia 
and Armenia in April 2014 and observed that, while Dinamo Tbilisi has done much necessary 
repair work at the Dinamo Arena, the facility still lacks the comforts of a modern stadium. The 
same can be said for the Hrazdan, which received a €6 million facelift in 2011.396 This 
investment was not enough to repair all the damage inflicted by years of neglect; while the stands 
and the field now appear to be in good condition (see picture 1) the interior still seemed to be 
decaying, and the facility lacked any kind of modern infrastructure (see picture 2).  In addition, 
parking spaces outside the arena were used for a form of black market.  
																																																								









Interior of the Hrazdan Stadium. Picture by the author.  	
The poor condition of the stadiums in Georgia and Armenia is the result of two factors:  one, the 
facilities were no longer used to symbolize national pride once these nations achieved statehood; 
and two, in both countries football leagues and their national teams were no longer able to draw 
the necessary crowds for the state to invest into large football facilities. Football and stadiums 
could still, however, foster regional identity and pride. An example of the importance of 
stadiums to regional pride in the post-Soviet space is the Donbass Arena.   
 
 The Donbass Arena was in the news in 2014 mostly because of the damage it received 
during the conflict between Russian separatist forces, and the Ukrainian Army in a civil war that 
was triggered by the Euromaidan protests in the winter of 2013-14. Before the conflict, however, 
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the Donbass Arena, and its football club Shakhtar Donetsk, was a symbol of regional pride for 
Eastern Ukraine. After the fall of communism in Ukraine, Russian speakers dominated the south 
and the industrial regions around the Dnepr and the Donbass.397 Shakhtar became the centre of 
attention for the Russian speaking community of the Donetsk and Donbass regions. Despite 
financial backing from the industrial Donbass region, Shakhtar had failed to win a single 
championship in the Soviet Union, but the club was known as one of the best supported clubs in 
the Soviet Union, and was the symbol of the regional pride of the Donbass.398 When the Soviet 
Union collapsed in 1991, the Donbass Region was the most industrialized and russified region in 
eastern Ukraine, especially in the city of Donetsk. The 1989 Soviet census indicated that 
Russians were the majority in Donetsk at 53.5 per cent of the population, while Ukrainians 
accounted for 39.4 per cent. The region’s russification is underlined by the language data: the 
proportion of Russian speaking population in Donetsk was 80.5 per cent. Many of the people in 
the region did not see themselves as Ukrainians or Russians, but predominantly identified 
themselves as Donetskite (55.6 per cent), while another popular answer was self-identification as 
Soviet (40 per cent).399  
 
 The opening of Ukraine’s most modern football stadium in Donetsk in 2009 even further 
underlined the region’s aspiration to be taken seriously within Ukraine. Identification with the 
region is, however, based not on ethnicity but on cultural, and socio-economic issues: miners for 																																																								
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example play a significant role in the regional identity of the Donbass. The miners of the region 
were involved in bringing the Soviet Union to its knees: between 1989 and 1991 the Donetsk 
was part of a major miners’ strike, and many miners at the time supported independence of the 
Ukraine because they believed that they would be better off in a resource rich and independent 
Ukrainian state. As the independence project of the country stalled, however, the people of the 
Donbass became disillusioned with Ukraine’s nation building effort.  In a survey conducted in 
1995, half of the respondents in the Donetsk region would have decided against independence if 
they were given a chance to vote again. This strong nostalgia for the past is also highlighted in 
how the city failed to move on after Ukrainian independence.  Donetsk remains very much a city 
trapped in the past:  streets and monuments still bear the names of once glorious professions such 
as Shakhtar (miner) or Metallurg (steel worker, and also the name of Donetsk’s other football 
team); monuments to Lenin still occupy central locations of the city; and streets bear the name of 
Soviet politicians.400 While Shakhtar’s futuristic stadium stood in stark contrast to this Soviet 
nostalgia, the stadium very much served as an anchor for regional identity. Proudly named the 
Donbass Arena, the stadium was the symbol of a region that wanted to differentiate itself from 
the rest of the country and the rule of the central government based in Kiev. This is most aptly 
displayed in Jacob Preuss’ documentary The Other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk in which 
Preuss highlights the club’s connection with the local politics of the Donbass region, but even 
more importantly the status of the club for the coal miners of Donetsk. In his story Preuss 
follows the lives of several older miners who work in one of several small coal shafts that exist 
all over Donetsk. Just days before the stadium is supposed to open one of the miners explains to 
Preuss: ‘The government always changes the rules … but Akhmetov he kept his word, and 
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tomorrow he will open the Donbass Arena.’401 The stadium therefore not only served as a vehicle 
for regional pride, but also underlined that people looked to locals as the real power base of the 
region - in this case the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. It is therefore no accident that the stadium, 
along with the airport, was at the centre of Western reporting when the facilities were targets of 
significant shelling during intensified fighting in the Donbass during the summer and fall of 
2014.402  
Russia’s Slow Stadium Recovery 	
In Russia after the fall of communism, plans to refurbish stadiums existed but they often lay 
unfulfilled for years as the state recovered from the economic consequences of the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. Plans to refurbish the Luzhniki, for example, had existed since the autumn 
of 1992. Like many stadiums in the Soviet Union the Luzhniki was designed without a roof; 
since most Soviet outdoor sports were conducted in the spring and summer, there was therefore 
no need to design stadiums that protected visitors from rain and snow. The problem of a roofless 
Luzhniki was especially apparent for European football matches, such as the Champions League, 
the UEFA Cup (now Europa League) as well as the now defunct Cup Winners’ Cup, which were 
(and still are) held from fall to spring of the following year. The problem, of course, was that a 
project such as construction of a roof for the Luzhniki would be extremely expensive. In October 
1992, four designs were presented to the public. Two of the concepts included retractable roofs, 
which would have allowed football to take place in every season. In 1992 the retractable roof 
technology was still in its early stages, and there was doubt that retractable roof designs would 																																																								
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work at the Luzhniki because of its size or that the stadium management could afford such a 
project.403   
 
As it turned out, it was not until 1996 that the Luzhniki saw major refurbishment, and at 
this time the stadium was already run as an independent company re-organized as the Luzhniki 
Group. The Luzhniki Group was formed in 1992 when the then Mayor of the city of Moscow 
Iuri Luzhkov handed control of the stadium over to former Torpedo Moscow player Vladimir 
Aleshin. Prior to its privatization, the stadium was controlled by the city of Moscow government 
(Mossovet). Privatization was seen as a precondition for refurbishing the stadium and the sport 
complex.404 Aleshin was able to gain control over the stadium and the complex in 1992 during 
the early stages of the El’tsin privatization. It is not entirely clear how he managed this, as is 
often the case in the privatization drive of the early 1990s. Prior to being the manager of the 
Luzhniki Group Aleshin had been a football player with Torpedo Moscow. The Luzhniki 
Complex was handed over in a process that Andrew Barnes, author of Owning Russia, coined as 
nomenklatura privatization. The State Privatization Program of 1992 allowed managers to obtain 
up to 51 per cent of their enterprise share—all of which had voting rights405—and it was around 
this time that Aleshin took control over the massive sporting complex at the Moscow Sparrow 
Hills. The most likely scenario is that Aleshin was able to gather shares in much the same way as 
the so-called Red Directors did in other industries, that is by purchasing shares in the facility 
during the early privatization process in the 1990s when workers would often trade in company 
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shares for relatively low sums. In many ways the Luzhniki demonstrates how the mass 
privatization of state owned assets allowed officials to obtain the assets that they had previously 
managed.  
 
  Aleshin, however, inherited a sport complex that was not only in need of repair, but also 
did not have a permanent tenant. In the mid 1990s UEFA introduced stringent criteria for 
stadiums that were part of international fixtures in the UEFA Cup (later Europa League) or the 
Champions League. These new criteria could have meant that Moscow would have been without 
a stadium for clubs that took part in international competitions. In 1995 construction began on 
the stadium, which saw the installation of new seats as well as a massive steel roof. New screens 
were installed, and the sound and acoustic systems were replaced. The interior and the dressing 
rooms were also overhauled to meet the standard laid down by UEFA.406 Aleshin also solved the 
problem of not having a permanent tenant playing in the stadium, when he was able to purchase 
Torpedo Moscow from the struggling ZiL motor works in early 1996. Aleshin was able to 
negotiate a deal which allowed AO-Luzhniki to purchase the club and which saw Torpedo 
cleared of all its debts.407 The deal included the transfer of $3 million to Torpedo to enable the 
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 In spite of these positive changes, the Luzhniki was still in danger of becoming a white 
elephant, for the stadium was simply too large for the limited needs of post-Soviet football, even 
for big events such as Champions League group matches. The first such match since the fall of 
the Soviet Union was between Spartak and Dinamo Kiev, and only saw 30,000 people in 
attendance.  This left 50,000 seats empty in the massive concrete bowl.409 When in 2007 I 
attended a match between Spartak Moscow and the now defunct team Saturn Moscow Oblast, 
there were only about 25,000 people in the stadium; the stadium’s sheer capacity as well as the 
running track gave the game an almost ghostly atmosphere. The problem was that Moscow did 
not possess a football-specific stadium that met the strict UEFA criteria. The only other large 
football specific stadium in the capital was the Dinamo Stadium, which had been built in 1926 
and had not been used for international football since the opening of the Luzhniki Stadium in the 
mid-1950s. Torpedo Moscow never really seemed at home at the Luzhniki Stadium and often 
played in front of a dismal crowd; in the early 2000s the club declared bankruptcy, has since 
moved back under the umbrella of the ZiL plant, and now plays its home games at the Strel’tsov 
Stadium.  
 
 It was not until 2001 that Russia possessed a new football-specific stadium. In 2000 
Lokomotiv Moscow and its parent company, the Russian Ministry of Transport, announced that 
the club would rebuild its Lokomotiv Stadium. The Lokomotiv Stadium was in many ways a 
small Russian football revolution. It would be the first time that a club from the former Soviet 
Union would construct a new stadium. Until this moment, Lokomotiv Moscow was often 
considered the weakest of the Moscow clubs. The construction of the new facility, however, 																																																								
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transformed the team, at the turn of the millennium, from the most debilitated of the Moscow 
clubs, to the most modern club in Russia. The stadium was entirely paid for by the patron of the 
club, the Russian Railway Ministry (RZhD). The dividends from the new stadium were 
immediate, and in 2004 Lokomotiv became the first team since Spartak to claim the Russian 
championship twice. The new stadium also had a positive effect on club attendance, which 
increased from 4,480 in 2001 to around 15,000 in 2010.410 This made the club the best-supported 
club in Moscow after Spartak. 411 This typical mid-level team had become the first example of an 
up-to-date club in the post-Soviet space. The stadium in Cherkizovo became the home ground 
not only for Lokomotiv but also for many of the other Moscow-based clubs as well as for many 
games of the Russian national team. TsSKA Moscow, for example, has used the stadium for 
European fixtures. Unlike most stadiums in Russia the Lokomotiv Stadium has no running track 
and the fans are pressed right up to the side of the playing field.412  
 
The success of the Lokomotiv stadium makes for a stark contrast with the rest of the 
Moscow stadium situation. Until 2014 Lokomotiv remained the only club that had built a new 
football specific stadium in the Russian capital. With the renovation of the Dinamo Stadium, and 
the closure of the Luzhniki Stadium in the summer of 2013 due to its proposed reconstruction in 
preparation for the 2018 World Cup, many clubs have had a difficult time finding proper grounds 
in which to play. Dinamo, Spartak, and TsSKA have been forced to play in the Moscow suburb 
of Khimki, where a new stadium was opened in 2008. The Arena Khimki has a capacity of 
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18,000, which is small for Champions League matches, and TsSKA was even forced to play 
some of the 2013 Champions League group matches in Sankt Petersburg, as there was no 
stadium available in Moscow.413 The situation became almost comical and was called the 
Football Pitch Crisis by the Russian news agency RIA Novosti.414 The talented squads on the 
field that are assembled by oligarchs and big businesses in Russia are not matched by the 
facilities in which they play. Twenty years after TsSKA’s forced exile to Germany, the Russian 
capital has still not been able to move its football facilities up to the standard expected in the 21st 
century, a predicament that many hope will be corrected through the hosting of the 2018 World 
Cup.  
UFOs in the post-Soviet Landscape: Ukraine and the 2012 European Championships 	
Tournaments bring financial benefits in the form of government subsidies and incentives that 
allow clubs to build new stadiums, which in theory will increase the revenue of football 
generated in the host country. When Ukraine and Poland were selected to host the 2012 
European Championships in 2007 it was the first time that a major football tournament was to be 
played in the territories of the former Soviet Union. Like Russia, Ukraine’s football facilities 
were stuck in the Soviet past. Most clubs were competing in facilities that had been constructed 
in the above mentioned Soviet stadium construction boom of the 1930s, 50s and 60s. I visited 
Kiev in 2007, just weeks after Ukraine was awarded the European Championships, and had a 
chance to visit the old Respublikanskii Stadium in downtown Kiev. The poor state of the 
facility—the rust at the gates, the old wooden benches, and the crumbling concrete bowl of the 																																																								
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stadium—was apparent right away. In 2013, when I was able to attend a Ukraine national team 
match in the same stadium as a member of the press, the stadium and the infrastructure 
surrounding the facility were impressive and were easily comparable to that of the most modern 
stadiums that that can be found in Germany. The Respublikanskii stadium had been torn down, 
rebuilt, and renamed Olimpiiskii Komplex.415 As picture 3 highlights, the stadium was now a 
modern and attractive multi-purpose arena that indeed looked a bit as if a UFO had landed in 
downtown Kiev.  
Picture	3	
	
Olimpiiskii Komplex. Picture by the author. 																																																								




Yet, the build up to the 2012 tournament was filled with much drama as Ukraine struggled to 
complete many of the stadiums as well as the infrastructure in time to host the European 
Championships—the second largest football tournament in the world.  
 
One problem building the Olimpiiski was that it was unclear whether or not there would 
be enough space to construct a new stadium on the grounds of the old Respublikanskii. 
Moreover, the replacement of the Respublikianskii was just one of many difficulties which arose 
during the preparations for the tournament. Construction setbacks led to various rumours that the 
tournament could be taken away from Ukraine, and that some of the games could be moved to 
Germany. Another complication was that construction of the stadium became part of a political 
struggle between different oligarchical groups in Ukraine. In many Ukrainian cities, stadium and 
infrastructure projects were not listed internationally for open bidding, as is usually the case for 
international tournaments. Instead, oligarchs secured the construction projects for their privately 
owned construction companies. The European Championship therefore became an event that 
provided a massive subsidy of several billion dollars to the oligarchs, whose construction 
companies were presented as the only firms capable of building highways, airports, hotels, and 
stadiums.416 Altogether the country invested in the construction of about 500 projects that were 
part of the infrastructure for the European Championships. These undertakings included six 
stadiums, 16 airports, 18 highways, and 289 hotels. The estimated cost of the construction of 
infrastructure was estimated to be UAH 160 billion (about €16 billion). The state paid for a large 
proportion of these investments; about 17 per cent came from the Ukrainian federal budget, and 
																																																								
416 Wellgraf, ‘Die Millionengaben’, 104. 
	 208	
another 14 per cent from communal budgets. Two thirds of the investment was expected to 
originate from private sources.  
 
An additional problem was lack of transparency when it came to selecting construction 
companies—in particular the local companies Kievmetrobud and AzovInteks for construction of 
the stadiums in Kiev and L’vov. Both companies were selected by the state without prior 
competition. In the fall of 2008 Ukravtodor, a company responsible for city infrastructure, was 
hit by several corruption scandals. First the local head of Kharkiv was fired for pocketing UAH 1 
million. Then in November 2008, Petro Kravshuk, the head of Ukravtodor, was fired for ignoring 
government regulations concerning awarding projects, but shortly thereafter was named head of 
the Transport Ministry. Rinat Akhmetov (the owner of Shakhtar Donetsk) and his construction 
company SCM, invested $600 million in infrastructure in Donetsk.417 Other oligarchs followed 
suit.  Oleksandr Iaroslavs’kii, for example, invested $500 million in construction ventures in 
Khar’kov, which included €200 million on a new airport for the city.   Iaroslavs’kii had made his 
money in banking and in the construction business, and his construction company DCH 
(Development Construction Holding) was the main sponsor of Metallist. His connections to the 
construction business explained his investments into the infrastructure of Khar’kov, which 
secured Khar’kov a place as a host city for the Euro 2012 tournament. This, in turn, benefited 
DCH, because a major tournament like the Euro guaranteed investment by the government into 
the infrastructure of the host city, and therefore would provide contracts for DCH.418  
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The heavy investment of Iaroslavs’kii in Khar’kov highlighted another major problem in 
the build up to the tournament, which was the increased competition between rival oligarchs, 
which, in turn, led to further transparency problems. At the centre of the conflict were the so-
called clans that surround the two major oligarchs of the country: Igor’ Kolomois’kii and Rinat 
Akhmetov. Igor’ Kolomois’kii, for example, invested in the construction of a new football 
stadium in Dnepropetrovsk but in the end the city was scratched from the list of host cities for 
the European championships and Dnepropetrovsk’s spot was instead awarded to Khar’kov. The 
case of Dnepropetrovsk illustrates some of the underlying politics of the hosting of EURO 2012. 
During the period leading up to the tournament, Iaroslavs’kii was part of the Donetsk clan and 
was even considered a close friend of Rinat Akhmetov and a supporter of the governing Partiia 
Regionov.  (This relationship deteriorated in late 2012 and even led to Iaroslavs’kii leaving the 
football business.)419 It was therefore no surprise that Iaroslavs’kii’s hometown Khar’kov 
received the right to host the tournament even though Dnepropetrovsk was the first city to have 
constructed a new football specific stadium in Ukraine, and had been able to do so without using 
state funds, and instead had used municipal as well as private funding. The city council later 
complained that the new stadium was constructed in accordance with UEFA regulations and that 
the stadium as well as the surrounding business complex was only built in order to host the 
European Championships.420 Dnepropetrovsk also had a rich football history with a hometown 
team that had been one of the most successful Soviet clubs in the 1980s. Although dropped as a 
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host city for the European Championships, at least the arena in Dnepropetrovsk could be used in 
the aftermath of the European Championships, as the Ukrainian club Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk is 
able to fill the stadium on a weekly basis.  
 
In L’vov, however, the situation was more difficult, as the European Championship arena 
had turned into a white elephant. Prior to the European Championships, the German journalist 
Olaf Sundermeyer travelled through Ukraine and Poland in order to highlight some of the 
problems that had arisen in the preparations leading up to the tournament. These can easily be 
compared with those that have arisen during preparations for the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, 
which has been in the news for its poor treatment of guest workers and low building standards.421 
The theme of poor construction methods and bad treatment of migrant workers also echoed 
through coverage of the construction process in the Olympic and World Cup host city Sochi. 
Some of these issues had appeared even earlier, however, in the preparations for Euro 2012. 
Workers in L’vov were paid by performance rather than an hourly wage or a salary. Concrete 
pourers, for example, were paid UAH 25 (about €2,25 at the time) per meter of poured concrete. 
Many workers were not paid their wages for months, and did not have the right to complain to 
proper arbitration courts. Payment of workers by piecework rather than fixed salaries was 
reminiscent of the Soviet Union. Workers also were forced to pay every fifth Hryvna to their 
foremen. There have, in addition, been allegations that construction companies deliberately cut 
corners in order to save on material costs.  Despite the lower material costs and the poor wages 
paid to workers, many stadiums that were built for the European Championships were actually 
much more expensive than comparable facilities that had been built in Germany. The 																																																								
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construction of the new Olimpiiskii Complex in downtown Kiev, for example, cost €600 million, 
almost twice as much as Munich’s Allianz Arena.422 
 
The overriding problem with the construction of the new facilities in Ukraine was 
massive corruption. In 2014 Transparency International listed Ukraine in place 142—together 
with Uganda and Comoros, which made it the most corrupt country in Europe.423 Material and 
money that were supposed to be used to construct stadiums and infrastructure in the country 
often disappeared into the pockets of the managers who were responsible for the construction 
projects. The new arena in L’vov was mostly financed through state subsidies, and to a great 
extent it was state officials who were the big benefactors of the 2012 European 
Championships.424 The Arena L’vov cost €209 million to construct, an enormous amount of 
money for a stadium with a capacity of just 33,788425— in comparison, the Rhein-Neckar Arena 
in Sinsheim Germany, which was opened in 2008 and has a capacity of 30,000 and cost €60 
million.426 As the authorities approved the budget numbers it is clear that the Arena in L’vov, 
and other stadiums, were part of massive government fraud.  
 
Furthermore, the Arena L’vov has barely been used since the conclusion of the European 
Championships. The most logical tenant, Karpaty L’vov, refused to use the arena because of the 
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high rental fees and the poor location of the stadium outside the city centre. Karpaty instead 
played its home games in the Soviet-era Ukraina Stadium. The arena has since become the centre 
of a major conflict between the ownership of the club, which is closely associated with the 
Partiia Regionov, and the city council, which is controlled by the right-wing opposition party 
Svoboda. This has left one of the most expensive stadium projects in Ukraine mostly unused 
since the end of the 2012 European Championships.427 Only in the fall of 2014 did regular 
football return to the arena when Shakhtar Donetsk was forced to compete in L’vov due to the 
conflict in the Donbass.  
 
The European Championships in Ukraine demonstrated the dangers of hosting a global 
sports tournament in a post-Soviet country that has not adopted internationally transparent 
building policies. The preparation for the tournament also demonstrates the extent of government 
corruption in the country. There was no open bidding process and the oligarchs made use of state 
funding by directing it to their own construction companies. These companies, in turn, are often 
part of massive holding companies and conglomerates that somewhat resemble the old ministries 
of the Soviet Union. The interlocking of state and oligarchy was also evident in the preparations 
for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and is set to continue in the period leading to the 2018 
World Cup in Russia. In many ways Ukraine leads the way for the oligarchy in Russia when it 
comes to exploiting the economic potential of large-scale sporting events.   
Back to the Future: The 2018 World Cup and the Renationalization of Russian Sport Projects 	
Perhaps nothing better declares the return of Russia’s Football Union, and to a large extent the 
Russian Federation, onto to the world stage than its successful bid for the 2018 World Cup. 																																																								
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Initially Russia wanted to organize the 2012 European Championships, but, in 2005, UEFA 
declined any bid from Russia with the argument that Moscow did not possess the infrastructure 
to host major sport events. In 2008, however, Moscow proved its credentials by successfully 
hosting the UEFA Champions League final between Manchester United and Chelsea FC from 
London. After the 2008 Champions League final, the Russian Football Union announced its 
intention to host the FIFA World Cup in 2018.428 The Soviet Union, and later Russia, had never 
organized a major tournament at a senior level before—in 1985 the Soviet Union had hosted the 
FIFA World Youth Championships, and the country had bid unsuccessfully to host the 1990 
World Cup.429 This time, however, the bid was destined for success as Russia expended 
considerable effort in order to ensure that the bidding committee would accept their offer. In late 
2010, the hosts of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups were decided under a cloud of controversy as 
FIFA lurched from one scandal to another.  
 
At the time, Russia’s strongest rival for a World Cup bid was England.  England, 
however, had openly criticized the corrupt practices of FIFA’s leadership at a summit in 2002 
because they were unhappy that Germany had been given the 2006 World Cup—even though 
England had made a backdoor agreement with Germany in which both agreed that England 
would support Germany’s bid in return for Germany’s refusal to bid on Euro 1996. The heads of 
the English Football Association rightly feared that the voting delegation of FIFA had not  
forgotten the criticism, and would award the tournament to Russia. The English FA, in a last- 
ditch attempt to win the tournament, even used political channels in an attempt to silence the 																																																								
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media in Britain that had been critical of FIFA, in order to stand a better chance of securing the 
tournament. In the end, the tournament went to Russia anyway.430 It is possible that Russia’s 
Football Union bribed FIFA officials in order to gain the tournament, yet as dubious as Russia’s 
successful World Cup bid was, it brought the country full circle from a developing nation to a 
country powerful enough to host the world’s largest sporting event. In the immediate aftermath 
of the successful bid, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (now President) announced that Russia 
would invest 300 billion roubles ($10 billion) into the infrastructure of the country. Putin also 
vowed that some of the major oligarchs would be investing money as well in order to ensure that 
the state would not be overspending on the event. Furthermore, major Russian companies 
promised to invest in infrastructure in order to support the Russian government’s investment: In 
Moscow, for example, LukOil sponsored the construction of a new stadium for Spartak Moscow, 
a club that the oil giant owns.431  
 
 But, much like in Ukraine, the construction and re-construction of the major football 
stadiums by the Russian government, oligarchs, and leading companies has also created a black 
hole of corruption and money laundering. Since even before Russia was announced as the host 
country of the 2018 World Cup, stadium construction projects have met with serious difficulties. 
One example is the reconstruction of the former Kirov Stadium in Sankt Petersburg. A massive 
concrete bowl located on Krestovskii Island, this used to be the second largest sport stadium in 
the Soviet Union with a capacity for 74,000 spectators. In 2006 Zenit Sankt Petersburg and its 
owner Gazprom were faced with a ruling by UEFA that the old Petrovskii Stadium in downtown 																																																								
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Sankt Petersburg did not meet international standards and would no longer be allowed to host 
Champions League matches from the 2010/11 season onwards. The Kirov Stadium was 
thereupon dismantled in 2006 and a new stadium was to be built within the old concrete bowl.432 
The new Zenit Arena was supposed to be completed in 2008 but complications throughout the 
construction period have delayed the completion of the project.  At the same time costs have 
exploded, rising to about $1.3 billion, and the stadium is still far from completed. It is now hoped 
that construction will conclude in 2017, ten years after construction at the stadium started, and 
just in time for the Confederations Cup that is traditionally used as a test tournament one year 
prior to the World Cup.433 
 
 It is now estimated that the stadium will cost about $1.5 billion, which would make it the 
second most expensive sport stadium after Wembley Stadium in London. When taking the actual 
capacity into account, however, the Zenit Stadium will be the most expensive stadium in the 
world as the Wembley Stadium in London has a capacity for 90,000 spectators, whereas the 
Zenit Stadium will only have a capacity for 70,000. The Russian sport journalist Igor Rabiner 
compares the cost of the Zenit Stadium with that of the Allianz Arena in Munich, which at the 
time had a capacity of 70,000 spectators. The Allianz Arena cost $469 million (€340 million) to 
build, which is less than a third of the construction cost of the new Zenit Stadium. Rabiner 
argues that it is due to the marshy ground of Sankt Petersburg that it is more difficult to build a 
large stadium on the Neva than it is in Munich. This, however, does not account for the 
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extremely large difference in cost of the two projects: as Sundermeyer and Rabiner also point 
out, there is a major discrepancy between the overall cost of stadium projects in Germany and 
that of projects in Russia and Ukraine.434 This can only be explained through bad management, 
poor accounting and the embezzlement of government funds. In order to salvage the construction 
of the arena, the government has since become involved in the construction of the stadium. 
Furthermore, Gazprom, the main sponsor, has since pulled out of the project and has handed full 
control of construction to the municipality of Sankt Petersburg. In return, Gazprom no longer 
receives government funding for the construction of the Okhta-Tsentr, a large business centre 
that includes the headquarters for Gazprom. This deal left the completion of the arena entirely in 
the hands of the government.435 The major problem with the construction of the arena is not that 
Russia is inexperienced in developing new infrastructure, but that lack of transparency often 
accompanies construction projects in the former Soviet Union.436  
 
There were also problems in Moscow, where the Luzhniki stadium is scheduled to host 
both the opening as well as the final match of the World Cup. After the announcement of Russia 
as the host country, Luzhniki became the centre of a power struggle as the city of Moscow 
reclaimed the property from Aleshin’s company APS-Tsentr. The Moscow city council, under 
the leadership of mayor Sergei Sobianin, was able to force Aleshin to part with the majority 
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stake of the Luzhniki complex for a reported sum of €10 million.437 Aleshin, who together with 
other family members held a 58.61 per cent stake in the shareholding company Olimpiiski 
Kompleks Luzhniki, had previously agreed to sell part of his shares to the city of Moscow. In 
December 2011, the city of Moscow issued 100,000 new shares in the complex, which further 
reduced Aleshin’s stake in the company from 24 per cent to approximately 12 per cent. The city 
of Moscow claimed that this action was required in order to ensure sufficient investment in the 
complex prior to staging the 2018 World Cup—this investment was rumoured to be around 50 
billion roubles (€1.2 billion).438  
 
Both projects underlined a certain predicament in Russia’s attempt to host a major 
tournament. As private investment has failed to accomplish the construction of proper facilities 
in Russia; the preparations for the World Cup have shown a return of privately owned facilities 
to the umbrella of government actors. In Moscow, the case of the Luzhniki stadium especially, 
calls attention to this trend. The pressure on private companies that own sport facilities and the 
subsequent transfer of property shows that there has been a tendency in Russia to give state 
enterprises or orgnizations close to the Kremlin more control over investment projects. The 
construction costs of facilities in Sochi (host of the Winter Olympic Games in 2014 and one of 
the planned venues for the 2018 World Cup), is exemplatory for the state’s involvement in major 
building projects in the Russian Federation. The initial budget for Sochi 2012 was set at $12 
billion but skyrocketed to the exorbitant amount of $50 billion. Much of the funding was 
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supposed to originate from the private sector but funding problems forced the government to step 
in. In 2007 the Medvedev administration introduced a seven-year plan to guarantee that the 
Olympic Games would be a success and that the sporting facilities in Sochi would be finished on 
time. In order to facilitate construction, the Russian government founded a massive state holding 
company called Gosudarstvennaia Korporatsiia Olimpstroi (GKO) that combined all planning 
and construction processes. GKO is a very Soviet solution to the delivery of a major project. The 
holding company only answered to the government, and was given limitless resources by both 
state actors and oligarchs, all organized by the Medvedev and later Putin administrations.  
  
But similar to the European Championships in Ukraine the Olympics became a major 
money-making scheme for Russia’s political and financial elite. Many oligarchs, especially those 
close to the Putin administration, benefitted from the Olympics. Arkadii Rotenberg, who was a 
boyhood friend of Vladimir Putin, for example, won government contracts worth $7.4 billion for 
construction projects at the Olympics. The Russian Railways Company was awarded $9 billion 
to built roads connecting Sochi with several ski resorts. In addition to Olimpstroi, the Sochi 
project has led to the creation of several semi-government owned conglomerates that are now 
being tasked with the completion of the sport facilities at Sochi. The Economist has compared the 
construction of infrastructure at Sochi with that of the BAM railway in Siberia that was 
completed in 1988. The BAM cost the state $36 billion and took 36 years to build. Like the 
Olympic games, the BAM was a gigantic state funded project that demonstrated the inefficiency 
of the state-run economy.439 But there are important differences between the two projects, as the 
state’s involvement during the Sochi Olympics, and the preparations for the World Cup in 																																																								
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Russia, points out  state cronyism as oligarchs close to the Kremlin especially benefitted from 
receiving state subsidies.  As Karen Dawisha, author of the book Putin’s Kleptocracy writes, 
“more than half of the $50 billion spent on the Sochi Olympics simply disappeared into the 
pockets of Putin’s cronies.”440 As the Olympic city of Sochi will also be a host to the World Cup 
four years later, the nature of government involvement, and the oligarchs with close connections 
to the Kremlin, in the construction of the Olympic Games bodes ill for the construction of 
infrastructure for the World Cup in 2018.  
Conclusion 	
The Luzhniki Stadium serves as an introduction to the predicament of stadiums at the end of the 
Soviet period. The largest and most modern stadium at the time was the stage of one of the 
biggest catastrophes in the history of football. The reason for this disaster was poor crowd 
control combined with the poor condition of the facility, which was not sufficiently equipped to 
deal with the harsh Russian winter. The aftermath of the catastrophe also showed the inability of 
the Soviet authorities to admit to failure. Luzhniki was the football Chernobyl of the Soviet 
Union, and a symbol of the decay that had been slowly taking over sport facilities. Stadiums 
form the backbone of every professional sport. In the USSR they were controlled by the state. 
The management of sport facilities was directed, to varying degrees, by government institutions 
or factory unions. Dinamo Kiev, for example, received support not only from the Central 
Committee of Ukraine through financial and material sponsorship of its players, but also through 
funds which paid for the construction of sporting facilities throughout Ukraine.  Football clubs 
rarely owned their own facilities, and it was not until Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk became an 
independent khozraschet enterprise that a club owned the stadium in which it played.  Dinamo 																																																								
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Kiev was largely dependent on the Central Committee, as the Sport Committee controlled all 
work done on facilities of the club. Other than Dinamo Kiev, which enjoyed direct political 
patronage, Ukrainian sport institutions were very much part of the Soviet planned economy. 
Gosplan and the Central Committee in Moscow set goals in all forms of production, which 
included the number of fields, and stadiums that had to be constructed in every republic. In the 
mid-1980s, however, as the Soviet economy ground to a halt, many of these projects could no 
longer meet their targets. Stadium projects slowed down and there were no longer enough 
facilities in major cities for children to play football.  
 
With the introduction of the Gorbachev reforms, stadiums reflected the attempted 
transition of the Soviet economy. Facilities were now expected to pay for themselves, and in 
addition to rent revenue, also benefited from the majority of sponsorship contracts that were 
permitted in the Soviet Union as early as 1987. This left stadiums as independent actors in the 
new Soviet economy; sport was no longer regarded as an important tool of propaganda, but 
instead was expected to pay for itself. In the 1990s the former nomenklatura used their insider 
knowledge to grab the most financially valuable state properties. The way in which Aleshin took 
control of the Luzhniki stadium in 1991, illustrates the way in which many managers and 
directors were able to gain control over property simply by being in the right place at the right 
time. Yet throughout the 1990s, the stadium situation in Russia was a catastrophe with Moscow 
as the prime example of the lack of stadium planning in the Soviet Union. TsSKA’s exile in 1992 




Similarly stadiums outside of Russia and Ukraine also experienced problems, as the case 
examples of Armenia and Georgia highlight. Here, stadiums were no longer seen as symbols of 
national pride. This was mostly due to the fact that Armenians and Georgians no longer saw club 
teams as ersatz national teams. The deterioration of club football also meant that the biggest 
clubs in the region were no longer able to attract mass audiences; as clubs such as Dinamo 
Tbilisi and Ararat Erevan, for example, now just played in front of a couple hundred visitors. Yet 
this does not mean that stadiums were no longer a source of regional pride in the post-Soviet 
landscape. This is especially highlighted in the example of Shakhtar’s Donbass Arena. The 
Donbass Arena, for a time, was indeed the pride of an entire region, and can be viewed as a 
statement of intent by Rinat Akhmetov to grow his, and the region’s political profile. Stadiums 
are, therefore, important symbols that transpire with political progress especially if these arenas 
can host sporting events such as the European Championships, the Olympics, and the World 
Cup.  
 
The fact that it was not until 2000 that a Russian club began to construct a new football-
specific stadium, reflects the difficulties that Russia and Russian football went through in the 
1990s. Lokomotiv is still the only major Moscow-based club that has completed such a facility. 
This situation is supposed to be fixed through Russia hosting the 2018 World Cup. The 2012 
European Championships hosted by Ukraine and Poland, however, showed that such projections 
may be too optimistic. Corruption and lack of transparency led to an explosion of construction 
costs for stadiums and infrastructure in Ukraine and, in fact, it was primarily a small elite that 
benefitted from the 2012 tournament. The massive holdings of the Ukrainian oligarchs have 
replaced the ministry-owned enterprises. Much the same could now be said of Russia, where the 
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construction of the Zenit Stadium in Sankt Petersburg has shown the complicated relationship 
between various state actors and government-owned companies such as Gazprom. It is tempting 
to compare the state involvement in the post-Soviet landscape with that of the Soviet Union, but 
as observers—such as the journalists and writers Olaf Sundermeyer and Igor Rabiner, or the 
historian Karen Dawisha—have pointed out,  projects such as the 2012 European Championships 
(Ukraine), the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, and the preparations of the 2018 World Cup have seen a 
massive misappropriation of funds by individuals close to the state. Furthermore, in the case of 
Russia, this misappropriation of funds seems to be not just tolerated by the state but also 
















From Amateurs to Professionals: The Development of Player and Coach Contracts in the 
Soviet Union and the Successor States 
 
Introduction 	
In the Soviet Union, football players were officially treated as amateurs, and players were 
employed by the parent organization of each football club (such as the police, military or 
factory). This chapter will analyse the way that the contracts of football players were managed in 
the Soviet Union. What rules governed individual player contracts, and who enforced these rules 
if they did indeed exist? How did clubs negotiate player transfers, and to what extent did the state 
regulate player transfers? Were clubs entitled to compensation payments if a player was 
transferred to another club, and, if so, what kind of compensation was paid? What do player 
contracts and player transfers during the time of the Soviet Union tell us about labour rights and 
contracts in general? What happened when the Soviet Union opened its previously closed market 
to corporations from the West? How were the clubs and players affected by the market changes 
introduced during Glasnost and Perestroika? As a consequence of the opening of the Soviet 
economy after 1987, many high profile players left the Soviet Union to play abroad. These 
transfers were set up by the agency Sovintersport, and this chapter will delineate how the Soviet 
government remained in control of player contracts even after players had moved abroad. What 
were the rules and regulations regarding foreign players in the Soviet Union? Were there any 
parallels between the sale of football talent to the West for capital and the sale of state assets? 
There are a few examples of Soviet players leaving to go abroad before the market opened in the 
late 1980s. What rules were in place for Soviet players who wanted to play abroad?  
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 In addition, the chapter will outline how the market changed for professional football 
players when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The post-Soviet states that remained as part of 
UEFA were then also affected by the Bosman ruling in 1995, which allowed players to leave on 
a free transfer once their contracts were up. The Bosman ruling had a profound impact on player 
transfers in Europe. The European Court ruled that players who were out of contract could leave 
for a new club on a free transfer, and that there could be no nationality restrictions within the 
European Union. Even though the European Court made the ruling, it also had an effect on the 
players and clubs of the former Soviet Union. The European governing body of football, UEFA, 
backed the ruling and changed the transfer system; clubs were forced to let players whose 
contracts had expired to leave on a free transfer even if the club was from a country that was not 
part of the European Economic Area. This change of the transfer system by UEFA, and later 
FIFA, had a worldwide impact on the economics of football. Conversely, European clubs could 
now acquire players from the former Soviet Union without having to worry about nationality 
limitations. Furthermore, players whose contracts were up could now leave on free transfers. The 
new transfer system also made it easier for the bigger clubs from Russia, and Ukraine to acquire 
foreign players. At first, only players from the former Soviet states moved to Russia, and 
Ukraine. Subsequently, in the early 1990s many players from Africa made their way to play in 
Russia and Ukraine in the hope that they would be spotted by clubs from Western Europe. The 
African players were at first brought in as cheap replacements for the local stars, who had left to 
play in Western Europe.  
 
Then in the 2000s, the economy in Ukraine and Russia began to improve. Favourable 
taxation rules, coupled with the spending power of rich owners and corporations, meant that the 
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big clubs in Russia and Ukraine also began to attract big name players from Western Europe and 
South America. But, as we will see, Ukrainian clubs invented shady payment practices in order 
to cut the cost of expensive foreign talent, a practice that points out the level of corruption in the 
country during that period. This trend shows how large corporations, especially those from 
Russia, have been able to develop into internationally recognizable and desirable brands that are 
able to attract high calibre talent from all over the world. Players were not the only foreigners 
who signed to clubs of the former Soviet Union; clubs also hired managers and specialists from 
other countries to improve the infrastructure of football clubs. As it turned out, there was a 
significant shift from the late 1980s when the Soviet economy became a vast market for western 
capitalist clubs looking to tap a previously inaccessible market, to the 1990s when the economies 
of Russia and Ukraine began to improve and clubs were able to bring in cheap labour from 
outside the former Soviet Union, and again in the 2000s when the top Russian and Ukrainian 
clubs turned from sellers to buyers and attracted some of the best footballers in the world to play 
in Ukraine and Russia.  
Factory Workers, and Officers: The Soviet Transfer System 	
Foreign players were unheard of in the top divisions of communist states in Eastern Europe. The 
Soviet Union was no exception, as clubs from the individual Soviet Republics mostly fielded 
players from their respective Republics. When Ararat Erevan from Armenia won the Soviet 
championship in 1973, for example, all the players on the team were Armenians.441 This was not, 
however, necessarily true for clubs from the bigger republics, as is illustrated by the case of 
Spartak Moscow. Spartak had brought in players from all over the Soviet Union—most notably 
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Nikita Simonian, an Armenian.442 In the 1930s, Spartak was even managed by the Czech coach 
Antonín Fivébr.443 Another exception was the Moscow based club Kryl’ia Sovetov, which in 
1948 fielded two Basque players who had fled from the Spanish civil war.444 There is, in 
addition, the almost unbelievable story of the journalist and former British serviceman James 
(Jim) Riordan, who claims in his autobiography Comrade Jim: The Spy Who Played for Spartak, 
that he played a league game for Spartak Moscow under a Russian pseudonym.445 One further 
exception was the Greek player Vasilis Hatzipanagis, whose parents were communists who had 
fled Greece after the failed communist revolution in 1949. Hatzipanagis was born in Tashkent 
and played for Pakhtakor between 1972 and 1975, and also made an appearance for the junior 
Soviet national football team. Technically only Soviet citizens were allowed to play in the Soviet 
Vysshaia Liga, and for this reason Hatzipanagis became a Soviet citizen. In 1975 he left the 
Soviet Union to play in Greece and also became a Greek national team player.446  
 
Players with foreign or multi-cultural non-Soviet backgrounds like Hatzipanagis, 
however, remained the exception. In order to play in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga one had to be a 
Soviet citizen. In 1982, the make up of the individual clubs, therefore, remained mostly regional, 
with the majority of clubs bringing up players from their own youth programs.  																																																								
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Players from other 
Republics* 
Dinamo Kiev 
(Ukraine) 3 13 1 
Dinamo Tbilisi 
(Georgia) 8 11 0 
Ararat Erevan 
(Armenia) 9 8 1 
Dinamo Moscow 8 2 9 
Spartak Moscow 6 1 10 
Torpedo 
Moscow 2 4 10 
TsSKA Moscow 0 4 13 
*For Moscow clubs the numbers also included players from other cities.447 
 
Clubs from the Republics were more likely to integrate youth players into the senior squads of 
the their respective teams. Table 3 shows that clubs like Dinamo Tbilisi and Ararat Erevan put a 
strong focus on the development of players from their home republics. Even a big club like 
Dinamo Kiev did not import many players from other Republics. The Moscow-based clubs 
Dinamo and Spartak had good youth development systems, whereas the Army team TsSKA did 
not develop players but drafted them from all over the Soviet Union. As we will see later, 
TsSKA even used the military draft in order to obtain transfer targets and had a wide recruitment 
network. Torpedo’s heavy reliance on players from outside Moscow can be explained by the 
club’s status as a factory team, and many of the players were officially employed with the 
Moscow-based car company ZiL. In fact, regional clubs had an advantage over Moscow-based 
teams: in Moscow there were four major clubs competing for talent in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga 
alone, and the above table did not include the First Division club Lokomotiv Moscow. Clubs like 
Ararat and Dinamo Tbilisi had almost no regional competition and were able to draw from the 																																																								
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entire talent pool of their respective Republics. This was even true for Dinamo Kiev, which had 
the support of the Ukrainian communist party and often poached the best players from smaller 
Ukrainian clubs such as Shakhtar Donetsk, Chernomorets Odessa, and Zaria Voroshilovgrad 
(now Luhansk).448 This explains how clubs outside of Moscow could operate more or less 
without having to rely on their own youth systems as each could count on the talent pool of its 
entire region. There was no need to bring in foreign talent, since the big clubs had almost 
limitless resources within the Soviet Union.  
 
Furthermore, clubs did not allow their best players to go abroad. Unlike other communist 
states, players did not defect from the Soviet Union. East German players, on the other hand, had 
defected to West Germany and played for West German clubs.449 Anne Applebaum argues that 
East Germans were the most likely to defect to the West because of their proximity to the border, 
and also because East Germans did not have to adjust to a new culture and language once they 
crossed.450 Other defections from Eastern bloc countries to the west included many members of 
the famous Hungarian squad that finished second in the 1954 World Cup, among them Ferenc 
Puskás, who defected during the 1956 Hungarian revolution.451 In East Germany the Red Army 
had so called Sowjetische Armeesportklubs (Soviet Army Club, SASK) clubs that were farm 
teams in which players of army teams, such as TsSKA Moscow or SKA Rostov, could keep fit 
while on Army duty in Germany. Those clubs would often rent out their players to clubs in the 																																																								
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East German DDR-Liga (East Germany’s second division).452 With the exception of the DDR-
Liga, which allowed foreign players until 1984, and the Austrian Bundesliga that had one Soviet 
player in 1980 (see below), there were no other Soviet players playing abroad, and there were no 
notable attempts by Soviet players to defect to the west in spite of the fact that Soviet football 
players had plenty of opportunities to defect to the west when the best Soviet teams played in 
European tournaments. The same was true for the Soviet national team, which frequently took 
part in the European and World Championships. Travels abroad provided the best opportunities 
to defect Eastern Europe, most East German players who defected, for example, did not cross the 
Berlin Wall, but left their team whilst playing abroad.453 This was never the case for Soviet 
players, mainly because the Soviet Union was also an influential member of FIFA as indicated 
by Viacheslav Koloskov’s vice presidency of the world governing body of football in the 1980s. 
FIFA would therefore have banned any player who had defected from the Soviet Union to play 
in west. There was also another reason why players did not defect; Soviet players were on top of 
the social hierarchy in the Soviet Union, and they were well paid and cared for.  
 
Soviet players were officially designated amateurs, and were assigned a profession with 
the parent organization of the football club for which they played. This meant that most players 
were registered as factory workers or officers. In the case of TsSKA and Dinamo, for example, 
players were officially part of the military and the Ministry of Interior respectively. Unofficially, 
players in the Soviet Union were full-time athletes who received a monthly salary. The top 
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players in the late 1980s earned between 200 and 300 roubles a month and spent about 250 days 
annually in training with their respective clubs.454 These salaries were small compared to what 
players were making in the big European leagues. Players, however, received more than just a 
salary: Spartak’s players, for example, also received free apartments from Spartak’s parent 
organization Mossovet (Moscow city government).455 Players also received many gifts from 
team patrons. The patron of Dinamo Kiev, for example, was the leader of the Ukrainian 
Communist Party, Vladimir Shcherbitskii. Under Shcherbitskii’s tutelage Dinamo Kiev 
developed into one of the best clubs in Europe. Shcherbitskii succeeded in luring the best players 
of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) to Dinamo by promising players better 
apartments, new cars, and fur coats for their wives. Players were also allowed to go on shopping 
tours when they played abroad, and officials at the border would turn a blind eye when products 
were brought back from the west.456 Players were then allowed to profit from their foreign 
purchases by selling them on the black market. The authorities largely ignored these black 
market activities, and the extra money earned ensured that Soviet players had the highest 
possible living standard in the Soviet Union.457 With such incentives, it is clear why players from 
the Soviet Union resisted offers from clubs in the west, and did not defect.  
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There was also a functioning transfer system within the Soviet Union. There were, 
however, no transfer fees such as in the west. Players had to submit an official application with 
the Technical Sports Committee of the Soviet Football Federation (FFU), and the presidium of 
the FFU had the right to overrule any transfers. Transfers were then published in Sovetskii sport. 
There were no transfer fees for a simple reason: Soviet players were contracted not to the clubs 
for which they played, but rather to the parent organizations of the individual clubs. Officially, 
the Soviet Union maintained a policy of free labour movement, which was even laid down in the 
constitution. In fact, however, normal labour was not free to move and live anywhere in the 
Soviet Union, for the state severely limited the movement of people in general. Soviet players 
were high profile cases and had enormous power in the press and also had the backing of 
political patrons, and for these reasons were able to exercise their constitutional rights. Transfers 
were arranged in the following way: A player who wanted to be transferred from team A to team 
B had to announce his intention to leave the club for which he was currently playing. There were 
many reasons why players wanted to change clubs; some examples were dissatisfaction due to a 
lack of playing opportunities, the offer of a better salary, incentives offered by a new club, or the 
belief that the player could achieve more success at a new club. Usually the new club would 
approach a player before requesting a transfer from the club for which he was currently playing, 
and, more importantly, before contacting the Technical Sports Committee which was in charge 
of all player transfers within the Soviet Union.458 When a player asked for a transfer, the 
Technical Sports Committee would bring up the following issues: 
How would the move affect the competitive balance? Could the team losing the 
player afford to let him go? Was this a case of a young player moving up to a higher 																																																								
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level of competition or of a veteran seeking a better deal from another team? What 
were the implications of any transfer for the international goals of Soviet soccer? 459 
 
The problem, however, was that players did not always follow the guidelines for the application 
process. At Dinamo Kiev and elsewhere, patrons would shower the players with gifts such as 
apartments, and cars to ensure that they would play for their team. 
 
  Those patrons would also ensure, by using political influence, that the Technical 
Committee made the ‘right’ decision regarding any player transfers. As we saw in the case of 
Shcherbitskii, some patrons had powerful positions in the Soviet party-state. They could make 
certain that a player’s application to move to a new club would not be turned down. Once the 
Technical Committee had approved the decision, a player’s contract had to be moved from the 
organization that operated club A to the organization that operated club B. For example, when V. 
Kruglov was transferred from TsSKA Moscow to Torpedo Moscow, the Technical Committee 
had to put in a request for a demobilization order from the army for the player, because the 
Ministry of the Interior was the organizer of the club and thus the owner of all player contracts. 
After the demobilization was complete, the player was free to take an official job at the ZiL auto 
plant, which formally allowed him to play for Torpedo. This method also worked the other way 
around; SKA Rostov for example acquired several players in 1984, all of these players were 
formally recruited as officers in the army.460 This shows how much influence the organizations 
that acted as patrons of clubs had over the transfer activities of the clubs. It also demonstrates 
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that amateurism was simply a front, for players were hired by organizations for only one reason, 
and that reason was their talent on the football pitch.   
 
Even though the football transfer market of the Soviet Union was officially considered a 
free market in which a player could move to a new club without transfer fees, in reality, clubs 
were dependent on their patrons to sign players for them. While patrons did not have to pay fees 
directly to outgoing organizations, as was the case in the West, there was payment in kind in 
order to secure the service of a player. Patrons used their resources directly to attract players; this 
could include a lucrative job, or an officer’s commission with the army or Ministry of Interior 
forces. Many kinds of favours were also exchanged between the patrons of clubs in order to 
guarantee the transfer of a player from club A to club B. Football clubs and their patrons even 
made use of so called tolkachi, or “pushers”. Tolkachi were part of the Soviet shadow economy 
and helped companies that had to meet their targets by buying surplus material on the black 
market in order to obtain goods that they needed. This process was officially illegal, but 
commonly accepted and even discussed publicly in the press.461 Later on tolkachi became 
middlemen for numerous business practices.  In football, tolkachi were used as player agents by 
clubs and would try to obtain the services of a football player by showering them with gifts.462 
But when favours didn’t work to secure a transfer target, patrons were able to use other tools.  
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As explained above, army clubs would use another method to “attract” players: in 1981 
the Spartak defender Vagiz Khidiatullin refused a transfer to the Red Army club TsSKA and as a 
result he was drafted by the army. The only way to continue his footballing career as a soldier 
was to play for TsSKA.463 Both Dinamo Moscow and TsSKA made occasional use of this 
practice, and in some cases the patrons of the other clubs were able to withstand such pressure. 
In any case, there was a significant amount of underhanded negotiation between football clubs 
and players in the Soviet Union. The transfer market in the Soviet Union was, therefore, in a 
sense, a semi-free market in which the state could intervene at any time through various actions. 
Clubs used under-the-table negotiations to lure players from club A to club B, but the state, in 
the form of the sport committee, technically controlled all transfers. Also, certain state actors 
such as the Ministry of Defense or the ministries of the interior of the individual Soviet republics 
had significant pull over player destinations through the use of state mechanisms such as the 
draft to force players to play for ministry clubs. The Soviet football transfer system was a 
paradox: on the one hand transfers were controlled by the central authority of the Football 
Federation and various ministries, whereas on the other hand, players could at times exploit their 
market value by signing with the highest bidder.  
The Market Opens: The Gorbachev Reforms and their Impact on Player Contracts 	
The lack of regulations in the transfer system caused enormous debate within the football 
community of the USSR. Clubs complained that there was no transparency in the rules that 
governed the transfer of football players from one club to another. Furthermore, smaller clubs 
wanted to capitalize on their own successful youth systems. Then in 1987 the market began to 
change. As was mentioned in chapter 2, clubs now officially became professional institutions 																																																								
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and were forced to run a profit as part of the overall reform plan introduced by Gorbachev in 
1987. There was not much opportunity for clubs to make a profit because ticket prices were low, 
and there was not enough demand to raise them. When the economy began to struggle after 
1987, attendance figures went down; in 1987, twenty-seven thousand fans attended the average 
Soviet Vysshaia Liga game, after which the numbers decreased steadily until by 1991 the 
average attendance was only about twelve thousand. In the difficult Soviet economy, Soviet 
citizens were simply too busy pursuing the bare necessities and had no time or money to spend 
on Soviet football.464 Television stations refused to pay for a product that previously was aired 
for free. Clubs were now forced to pay for the facilities that they were using, which had also 
formerly been free. While clubs showed a profit in the early years, after the 1987 reform forced 
them to go khozraschet, they were not able to compete financially with the big clubs of Western 
Europe.  Russian clubs, as a result, began to liquefy their most valuable assets, which were their 
players.  
 
With the advent of professionalization it became necessary for clubs to introduce a 
contract structure. When Dnepr became a fully professional club, it moved swiftly to sign all of 
its players to three-year contracts and other clubs soon followed Dnepr’s example. For the first 
time in Soviet history, the clubs actually owned the contracts of their players. This was one of 
the cornerstones of professionalization. Most clubs had very few financial assets; the bigger 
clubs like Spartak owned their training facilities, but smaller clubs often rented their facilities 
from their former parent organizations. For many clubs this left the contracted players as the only 
real asset that could be used as liquid capital. By 1988, however, not all clubs were 																																																								
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professionalized, and, even though some clubs had signed their players to contracts, there were 
still no transfer fees for players who moved within the Soviet Union. In early 1989, players were 
still able to move from one club to another simply by applying to the technical sports committee. 
The rules stated that players and coaches had to have a solid reason to transfer a player.465 
Therefore the only way to capitalize on player transfers was by selling the contracts to clubs in 
the West. But as we will see, there were limitations placed on these transactions, in that the clubs 
themselves were not allowed to negotiate deals with clubs from the West.  
 
The Soviet state apparatus masked the transfers as part of a move towards greater 
openness (Glasnost). In reality, the transfer of football players abroad was a way to bring in hard 
currency from the West, which both the state and the clubs needed in order to survive.466 One of 
the first major transfers of a Soviet player abroad was Juventus’ acquisition of Dinamo Kiev 
midfielder Aleksandr Zavarov. But Zavarov was not the first Soviet player to be transferred 
abroad: in 1980 Anatoli Sintshenko was permitted a two-year transfer to Rapid Vienna in 
Austria. Officially Sintshenko was part of a cultural transfer that was organized between a 
member of the Austrian communist party and the Soviet Union’s foreign trade department, 
which paid Sintshenko’s salary during his stay in Austria. Also, Sintshenko was over 30, which 
prior to 1988 was a pre-requisite for players who wanted to play abroad.467 The “cultural” 
transfers of sport specialists were also not completely uncommon in the period before 1987. The 
Soviet Union frequently sent coaches to work abroad, especially to Africa.  																																																								
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In 1978, for example, Goskomsport signed an agreement with the Ministry of Finance of 
Angola to send coaches to aid the development of sporting structures in the African nation. This 
contract was renewed in 1982, and once again in 1988, this time between the newly set up sports 
agency Sovintersport (which acted on behalf of the Soviet Union) and the Angolan Ministry of 
Finance.468 In 1987 a deal was made to transfer a Soviet football coach to Mali, in exchange for 
Dollars and French Francs.469 Then, in 1988, Tekhnoexport (one of the many subsidiaries of 
Sovintersport) signed a deal with the Ministere de la Jeunesse et des Sports de la RADP of 
Algeria. This contract saw a multitude of football specialists transferred to Algeria. The price for 
each of the coaches was a one-time payment of between $5733 and $8763, and at least half of 
the payment had to be made in US dollars rather then Algerian dinars.470 All of these deals were 
organized by an agency that would later be known as Sovintersport. Sovintersport played a 
significant role in what was at first a transfer of sporting specialists to abroad, but what later 
became a large migration of the Soviet Union’s best football players. According to the 
Sovintersport fond at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Sovintersport was 
founded as a department of Goskomsport in 1984 and was originally called the vsesoiuznoe 
khozraschetnoe ob”edinenie Mezhdunarodnyi sportivno-alpinistskii tsentr (all-Soviet cost 
accountable company “International Sport-Alpine Centre”). As described in Chapter 2, cost 
accountability was introduced in order to force sports organizations to become self-financing. 																																																								
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Account lists found in the archives show that in 1986-87 the company was under the 
direct control of Goskomsport (the State Sport Committee of the Soviet Union) but acted as a 
self-financed enterprise under the rules of khozraschet.471 As a ministry, Goskomsport was not 
reformed under the principles of khozraschet, but single departments such as the International 
Alpine-Sport Centre became self-operating and cost-accountable. As more Gorbachev reform 
packages were introduced, the enterprise was no longer known as the International Alpine-Sport 
Centre; from April 1987 onwards it was known as Sovintersport, and remained under the control 
of Goskomsport.472 Sovintersport was structured as a large enterprise with several sub-companies 
that conducted international business on behalf of Soviet clubs and Goskomsport by signing 
advertisement deals and also by negotiating contracts for Soviet sports specialists that were sent 
abroad. For Sovintersport, football became one of its largest business operations, especially 
when the market opened for international player transfers after 1987.   
 
The renaming of the enterprise from International Sport-Alpine Centre to Sovintersport 
came right after the introduction of the 1987 Law on State Enterprise and the 1988 Law on 
Cooperation.473	The Law on State Enterprise was the single most significant legal change, having 
to do with control over state property, of the Gorbachev era. The law stated that corporations and 
enterprises received full possession (vladenie), use (pol’zovanie), and disposition 
(rasporiazhenie), of their individual assets. Enterprises were also entitled to transfer the assets to 																																																								
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(Sovintersport Account Statements) 
 
472 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 11. l. 2.  
(Sovintersport contract with Adidas) 
 
473 Barnes, Owning Russia, 54. 
	 239	
persons or other enterprises, were given permission to conduct foreign trade through ministerial 
foreign trade associations, and were allowed to maintain hard currency bank accounts through 
which to conduct international monetary transactions. The law also authorized state enterprises 
(as well as individuals) to form cooperatives. 474  Another development was foreign trade 
relationships between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. In 1986 the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade lost most of its powers, and a couple of years later was abolished and replaced by the 
Ministry for External Economic Affairs. In 1988 a law was passed that allowed Soviet 
enterprises unregulated trade in the world market.475 Goskomsport had previously dedicated a 
segment of its organization to international business because before the 1988 law, only 
departments of ministries were allowed to make deals with foreign companies. Now, however, 
Goskomsport was officially allowed to set up a trading company in the form of Sovintersport. 
For Goskomsport, Sovintersport had only one purpose, which was to create cash flow for the 
Soviet economy by marketing Soviet teams abroad to sponsors and to sell the best athletes to 
clubs in the west.476  
 
In order to guarantee cash flow, Sovintersport was to coordinate sporting events that 
included Soviet athletes abroad and foreign athletes in the Soviet Union. The association took 
charge of all export-import operations, which included the sale of sports facilities, sports 
equipment, and most importantly for this chapter, athletes. Sovintersport was to take into account 
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market prices and demand, and to establish joint (mixed) companies and organizations.477 
Sovintersport also included numerous subsidiary companies that were responsible for diverse 
economic partnerships with the west. These subsidiaries also acted as joint ventures. These 
companies would negotiate with the foreign parties and then take a percentage of the transfer 
sum (usually between 40 and 50 per cent, but in some cases even more).478 The transfer of top 
players, therefore, was not much different from the sale of other assets to companies in the West. 
An enterprise such as Sovintersport also benefited because cooperatives were taxed at a much 
lower rate than state enterprises.479 This meant Goskomsport could keep a much larger cut of a 
player transfer if the player was sold through Sovintersport.  
 
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s national football team gold medal performance at the 
1988 Seoul Olympics, as well as a second place finish at the 1988 European championships in 
Germany, Sovintersport was sitting on a football gold mine. The success of Soviet football 
created a market in which Soviet players suddenly were in demand in Europe, and the creation of 
Sovintersport and changes to trading laws meant that the Soviet Union had a previously untapped 
market with an abundance of football talent and was now open for business.  Several players 
immediately made the move to play abroad and, between 1988 to 1991, all major transfers that 
involved the movement of a high profile player from the Soviet Union to a foreign club, in some 
way involved Sovintersport as well. Many player contracts regarding Soviet national team 																																																								
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players who made the move abroad in 1988 are now accessible at the Russian State Archive. 
They give insight into how Sovintersport conducted international business, and how the 
company attempted to maximize profit not for the sake of the players or the Soviet clubs on 
whose behalf Sovintersport negotiated, but primarily for itself and the Soviet state. The first 
contracts signed between Sovintersport and the foreign clubs always used the same schemata, 
and negotiations never involved the Soviet club.  
 
The first case study is that of the Spartak Moscow player Vagiz Khidiiatullin. His transfer 
to the west was negotiated between Sovintersport and the Dorna Management Group (Eastern 
Europe section), with the intention to send the player to play for the French based Toulouse 
Football Club (Toulouse FC). Dorna Management (Eastern Europe) Limited was a player agency 
based in Vaduz, Lichtenstein, and they basically obtained the right to negotiate on behalf of 
Sovintersport with Toulouse FC. Khidiiatullin was signed for 24 months in a deal that was worth 
510,000 Swiss Franks per annum. Additionally, Khidiiatullin received undisclosed bonuses from 
the club, and was to receive a free apartment and free transport. Sovintersport, however, was able 
to recall the player at any point if they could provide Dorna with a replacement “specialist” of 
equal ability. All payments had to be made to the Bank of Foreign Economic Affairs of the 
Soviet Union.480 The contract is an example of the kind of business dealings Sovintersport 
conducted with Western clubs. The company cut out the clubs for which the players were 
playing, and also in a sense the players themselves by negotiating for them. This meant that 
Sovintersport had power over the income of the players, and as we will later see the agency 
abused this power in the name of the state by maximizing its own profit. 																																																								
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In a similar deal to the Khidiiatullin transfer, the Soviet national team keeper and 1988 
World Keeper of the Year Rinat Dasaev, was sold by Spartak Moscow to the Spanish club 
Sevilla for $2 million. In this case Goskomsport took 55 per cent, Spartak received 40 per cent 
and 5 per cent went to the sports agency Dorna.481 The money earned from the Dasaev deal was 
directly transferred from Dorna Management Ltd. to Sovintersport’s account with the 
Vneshekonombank, the state Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs. 
Sovintersport received $300,000 on February 15, 1989, June 15, 1989, December 15, 1989, June 
15, 1990, December 15, 1990, and 500,000 in a final transfer on June 15, 1991. Archive material 
does not, however, indicate how the money was distributed afterwards. Some reports at the time 
suggested that Dasaev received a salary of $1,300 from Sevilla and also had a free car and an 
apartment.482 This put Dasaev on a contract far below what average players were making at the 
time in European football. The average football player in England’s top flight in 1988 earned 
£37,284, for example, and, even taking into account the fact that players in England may have 
earned more then their counterparts in Spain, Dasaev’s wage was likely far below the average 
salary of a Spanish player at the same level.483  
 
Dasaev at the time was 31 and had been named goalkeeper of the year in the Soviet 
Union for the sixth time in a row. He was also considered one of the best keepers in the world 
and was part of the remarkable Soviet team that finished second at Euro 1988 in Germany.  Yet 																																																								
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his official earnings at Seville were meagre, while Sovintersport cashed in massively. After a 
poor performance at the World Cup 1990 in Italy, and finding himself on the bench frequently as 
the fourth foreigner—Spanish clubs at the time were only allowed to field three foreigners at a 
time—Dasaev retired from professional football in 1991. After he had disappeared from the 
public eye for several years, a reporter from the Russian newspaper Komsomol’skaia pravda 
finally tracked him down in 1998.484 Dasaev was living in poverty in Spain, and was persuaded 
to return to Russia where he was greeted as a hero and has since worked in several capacities for 
the Russian Football Union.485 The entire episode screams of foul play, for Sovintersport was 
able (via Dorna) to obtain the market value for the keeper from Seville, and the evidence 
suggests that Sovintersport pocketed the majority of the income that athletes earned abroad. 
 
Another famous deal was the signing of Aleksandr Zavarov by the Italian club Juventus 
Turin. Sovintersport negotiated a deal with Juventus, which saw Zavarov earning 250,000,000 
Lira (about $ 190,000 at the time) a year. But as with Dasaev, a large portion of the deal went 
back to the Soviet Union. Zavarov was given an apartment, a car, and free medical treatment. He 
was to receive 16,800 Lira a month while staying in Italy, while the remainder of the money was 
transferred back to the Soviet Union as income tax and social contributions. 486 A large portion of 
the transfer fee that according to Western standards should have been given to Dinamo Kiev 
went to Sovintersport as well as to Goskomsport.487 Only $2 million, of the overall $5 million, 																																																								
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went to Dinamo Kiev, with the remaining $3 million split between Goskomsport and 
Sovintersport.488 As with the Dasaev deal, Zavarov only received a fraction of his actual salary 
whilst playing in Italy, though Zavarov was a bit more fortunate, as his playing career continued 
past the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he was therefore able to earn hard currency while 
playing in France until 1995.  	
At the time it was common practice by Sovintersport to pocket the majority of the 
earnings of Soviet top athletes who were competing abroad. In tennis, for example, players who 
competed in international competitions at the time were only allowed to retain a fraction of the 
prize money they won at international tournaments. Andrei Chesnokov, at the time the USSR’s 
top male tennis player, only retained about $10,000 to $12,000 of the $500,000 he won in the 
period between 1984 and 1989. In 1988 he won $59,000 at a tournament in Orlando but the 
winnings went to the federation, which only transferred $496 to him. Viktor Galaev, the director 
of Sovintersport at the time, argued that Soviet athletes were fully supported by the system: ‘they 
get coaches, doctors, everything.’489 The practice of taking money from athletes can also be 
found in the contracts of Soviet ice hockey players. Here, at first, Sovintersport took 97 per cent 
of the salary but players were later able to negotiate a deal in which they received a base salary 
of $300,000, with slightly less going back to Sovintersport.490 The example of ice hockey and 
tennis players clarifies what happened to Dasaev’s salary while he was playing in Spain.  
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Football was the most lucrative of all sports in terms of generating currency for 
Sovintersport. For the other two big team sports, basketball and ice hockey, there was only one 
profitable market to sell to: North America, where Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) 
governed the leagues.  In ice hockey, for example, the National Hockey League (NHL) was able 
to negotiate a deal with the USSR Hockey Federation, which gave the league the full rights over 
the players in return for a release fee of $350,000. For the NHL this deal was essential as the 
Collective Bargaining Agreements of North American sports require that the full commercial 
rights of all its players lie with the parent organizations (in this case the league).491 This meant 
that Sovintersport could generate relatively little money through the transfer of hockey players. 
Football was an attractive business model because a player’s licence could be transferred to a 
club without the commercial rights going there as well. The lack of bargaining power on the part 
of the players meant that Sovintersport could sell a player’s licence, but still retain the 
commercial rights to the player, and therefore Sovintersport would be able to cash in on the 
player’s salary as well as on all commercial deals the player may have signed abroad. In fact, 
that is exactly what Sovintersport did when Sergei Rodionov was transferred from Spartak 
Moscow to Red Star Paris. Red Star paid $233,334 over 24 months to Sovintersport, and Spartak 
Moscow was to receive commercial and advertisement deals from the club.492 
 
This demonstrates that players were indeed part of an asset liquefaction that took place in 
Soviet sport in general. For the West, the Soviet Union was an untapped market and seemed to 
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possess endless sport assets. This market became hotly contested as foreign clubs, player agents, 
and companies, pounced to benefit. For clubs from Western Europe like Juventus, the transfer of 
Soviet players was not only a matter of bringing in new talent. Juventus was part of the Italian 
car manufacturer Fiat, which realized the marketing potential of a Soviet player. Zavarov later 
pointed out in an interview that Juventus was not the only club that bid for his contract and in 
fact he would have preferred a move to the Spanish club FC Barcelona, but Juventus had the 
better connection with the Soviet authorities and had also offered more money to 
Sovintersport.493 In fact the transfer of Zavarov to Juventus became a hot topic in the Soviet 
sport press, which followed the fortunes and misfortunes of the player in his first season in Italy. 
Zavarov certainly struggled with his play in Italy, but for Juventus and Fiat the transfer had 
exactly the effect that they had hoped for: access to a new market.494 For the Soviet Union, 
maintaining the commercial rights to the players also made sense, as agencies that wanted to use 
players for commercial deals back in the Soviet Union would have to negotiate these through 
Sovintersport. The Zavarov deal, in this case, was therefore a win-win situation for both sides in 
that Fiat hoped it would facilitate the signing of commercial agreements with Soviet agencies, 
whilst Sovintersport would gain compensation for any deal signed between Fiat and a third party 
in the Soviet Union.  
 
In all of these dealings, it is important to remember that Goskomsport played a major role 
in the business conducted by Sovintersport. Officially Goskomsport was supposed to ensure that 
all sides would get fair treatment: that money generated through player transfers would be shared 
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fairly between the player, the club, the sports association, and the state.  Goskomsport did play a 
major part in lifting the restriction of player movement to clubs abroad. Koloskov stated in the 
Soviet sport paper Sovetskii Sport, which frequently acted as the official spokesman of 
Goskomsport and its functionaries, that players, like all citizens, had the right to freely choose 
whether or not they wanted to move abroad, and that it would not be the right for Soviet football 
to veto player transfers abroad.495  In reality, however, Goskomsport, through Sovintersport, had 
the final say as to whether or not a transfer would be completed, and, as the Zavarov transfer 
showed, players also had very little say regarding where they were going to be transferred to. 
Hence, while Sovintersport was shown in public as a tool of perestroika and glasnost, it was in 
reality, a mechanism through which to accrue capital.  
 
The big question, however, is what happened to all the money that Sovintersport 
generated in the period leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union. Most of the money should have 
gone to Goskomsport to pay for sporting infrastructure and athlete development. In fact, 
Sovintersport was part of a huge trading network that was operated by the state security services, 
and, in the tumultuous period between 1987 and 1991, it appears that agents of the interior 
ministries used the agency to accumulate personal profit. The connection between Sovintersport 
and the Ministry of Interior is highlighted by payments made in 1986 and 1987, which included 
transfers of funds from Goskomsport to the International Alpine Center, and then several 
subsequent transfers of 3000 roubles, to the MVD of the USSR.496 Such financial transfers 
disappeared once the company was restructured to become Sovintersport. In 1988 Sergei 																																																								
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Chemezov became the new general director of Sovintersport.497 Chemezov has now built a 
lucrative career in business and politics. He is a deputy in the Russian Duma, in 2004 he was 
appointed as the chairman of the Russian export company Rosoborneksport, and in 2007 he 
became the chairman of Rostekhnologii, a massive holding company that combines state owned 
technology and car manufacturing firms such as AvtoVAZ.498 The business operations of 
Sovintersport are typical of trading companies in the period between 1989 to 1991, when 
individuals used the sale of state assets to amass personal fortunes. Authors such as Barnes and 
Solnick believe that members of the Soviet elite took advantage of the changing economic 
landscape by misappropriating government funds.499 There is evidence that Chemezov is one of 
many individuals who used this tumultuous time to accumulate wealth—some of this wealth was 
made through back channel deals that involved the sale of football players. Hence, Sovintersport, 
an agency designed to finance reform in Soviet sport, became a tool collect wealth for a selected 
few.  
 
The entire trading system would not have been possible without the reform of ownership 
structures of football clubs. But khozraschet was not designed to help the clubs. In fact 
khozraschet was a process through which the state to could withdraw from subsidizing high 
performance sports. With the end of the Cold War, sport lost its value as a propaganda tool, as it 
was no longer considered important to highlight the ideological and physical superiority of the 
Soviet man through sport. The Soviet leadership expected not only that fans would finance 																																																								
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football clubs, but also that clubs would be able to run a profit that would then pay for expensive 
sport facilities. In addition, trade organisations such as Sovintersport were set up in order to sell 
the best Soviet football players to clubs in Western Europe. Khozraschet was therefore envisaged 
as a strategy to keep a dying economic system intact. Sport played a distinct role in the 
liquidation of state assets by the Soviet Union. Unlike factories, football players were relatively 
easy to transfer to the west for hard currency.  Furthermore, Soviet football players were a 
sought-after commodity, whereas most Soviet industry was out-dated and therefore not sought 
after by investors from the West.  With the fall of the Soviet Union, high performance sport was 
no longer a vehicle to show the world the superiority of the Soviet system, and instead became 
simply an asset that could be privatized and sold off to the West.  This was a Janus-faced reform: 
on the one side, it was the dying act of the Soviet system of sports administration and on the 
other, it pointed forward to the coming age of privatization.  
The Salenko Case: The Introduction of Compensation Payments 	
Changes to the financial structures of football clubs also had an impact on the transfer dealings 
between Soviet clubs and later between clubs of the Russian Federation. In 1989 Oleg Salenko 
moved from Zenit Leningrad (after 1991 Sankt Petersburg) to Dinamo Kiev. The Salenko case 
was the first transfer of a player within the Soviet Union for which a fee was paid. Salenko 
applied for the move, and as a free agent who wanted to move from a fringe club to the best club 
in the Soviet Union, he had a very good chance of having his application approved by the 
Technical Sporting Committee. The transfer was duly approved, and under normal circumstances 
Salenko could have moved to Dinamo on a free transfer. But Zenit Leningrad refused to let their 
best player go on a free transfer to Dinamo Kiev, and asked for a compensation payment of 
500,000 roubles. The president of the Football Federation then sided with Zenit and annulled the 
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transfer. Officials of Dinamo were furious: they argued that the constitution of the Soviet Union 
allowed citizens the right to work and the freedom to choose one’s place of residence. Of course 
they omitted the fact that Salenko and his entire family had already moved to Kiev, where the 
club had set him up with a brand new apartment.500 
 
 For Dinamo, Salenko was part of a strategy to acquire the best young players from all 
over the Soviet Union and then to capitalize on their contracts by selling them to the west. As 
early as 1988 the manager of Dinamo, Valerii Lobanovskii had acquired two players from Dnepr 
Dnepropetrovsk on a free transfer and after only one season sold them to the west. Dinamo had 
then taken the money and used the funds to move the club to khozraschet and to begin 
construction on a new training facility.501 Construction of the training facility Konche-Zaspe 
began in 1988 and was concluded in 1991, at a cost in excess of 6.5 million roubles, much of 
which was paid by Dinamo’s player transfers.502 Both Dinamo and Salenko, therefore, benefited 
from this deal: Salenko believed that he would have a better chance of a transfer to big western 
club if he were part of Lobanovskii’s team, and Dinamo saw Salenko as another cheap asset on 
whom they could capitalize. Lobanovskii began to treat all clubs of the Soviet Union as his 
personal farm teams, and since there were, at this point, no clear regulations regarding player 
transfers, he was free to pursue players and bring them in to Dinamo on free transfers. At that 
time the laws were not clear, and not all players had signed legally binding contracts. This 
practice was even criticized by the Ukrainian sport committee, which believed that then coach 																																																								
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Valerii Lobanovskii was not doing enough to foster his own youth players.503 At that time, 
Lobanovskii was the coach of the Soviet national team as well, and the 1990 World Cup was 
only one year away. The 1988 European Championships had served as a showcase for the first 
wave of Soviet players who wanted to play abroad and the World Cup was an even bigger stage, 
so playing for Dinamo under Lobanovskii enhanced players’ chances to be picked for this event. 
  
 Salenko’s transfer, then, was a source of public debate and at the core stood the central 
question: how much is a footballer worth? The debate included all strata of the football 
community: the Trade Unions (to which Zenit was formerly associated), for example, declared 
that the transfer was not legal in its current form, since Dinamo was not paying enough for the 
service of Salenko. Also, the two Chairmen of the union believed that Goskomsport should take 
a more principled stand in times of economic transition for football clubs.504 Dnepr’s manager 
Evgenii Kucherevskii also spoke out against the transfer, as he believed that Zenit was not asking 
for enough money.505 In the end Goskomsport set the transfer sum at 37,500 roubles (at the time 
about $55,000), a small sum for a player of Salenko’s potential.506 At the time Zenit was already 
struggling with the economic transition that was part of the professionalization of Soviet football. 
Despite this Goskomsport sided with the bigger club Dinamo Kiev. At a forum on the new 
Football Union (see chapter 1) Kucherevskii again criticised the transfer and stated that players 
were given too many rights and that the youth development of football clubs should be protected 																																																								
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as a part of the new charter of the Football Union.507 Kucherevskii had raised a valid point: 
Dinamo would have easily been able to pay a larger sum for Salenko, especially after they had 
received foreign currency from the Aleksandr Zavarov transfer to Juventus Turin as well as from 
the players they took from Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk.  
 
At the same time, however, the Salenko transfer ended Dinamo’s practice of poaching 
free talent from across the Soviet Union. In 1990 Soviet lawyers suggested a new contract 
system to the Soviet football federation, and it was agreed that all players would sign contracts 
with their respective teams. The contracts were usually three years in length, and players were 
free agents after the contract expired. Previously it had been fairly simple for dissatisfied players 
to quit a team and to find work elsewhere.508 The groundwork for the new contract system was 
another feature of the Gorbachev reforms. As most clubs were now independent enterprises they 
could sign players to individual contracts as was stipulated in the new law on cooperatives. 
Cooperatives operated on a limited liability basis, and were allowed to employ labour, that 
received a wage and working conditions that were subject to individual contracts. The new 
legislation allowed cooperatives to issue shares, for sale only to their own members and 
employees, in order to raise capital.509 As we will later see, Soviet players still had greater 
freedom than their European counterparts, who until after the Bosman ruling in 1995 were not 
allowed to leave on a free transfer even if they were without a contract. The Salenko transfer was 
used as a benchmark for further transfers within the Soviet Union. The transfer sum was 
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calculated by Goskomsport’s Football and Hockey branch on the following parameters: The 
compensation fee for any Soviet player under contract in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga was to be 
25,000 roubles. If the player was a member of the national team, the sum would be doubled. For 
players like Salenko the fee was increased by 50 per cent.510  
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the now independent Professional League of Russia 
(PFL), a governing body that oversaw the top professional leagues in the Russian Federation, 
became the regulatory body of player transfers within Russia. In order to regulate transfers the 
PFL introduced a compensation scheme similar to the one that was used towards the end of the 
Soviet Union. Players were paid according to a formula, which included age as well as the 
transfer sum paid for their contract. The age factor worked in the following way: a player 
between the ages of 14 and 21 was given an annual salary worth his transfer sum divided by 12; 
for ages 21 to 24 it was divided by 10; for 24 to 27 it was divided by 8; for 27 to 30 it was 
divided by 5; for 30 to 32 it was divided by 3; and for ages 32 to 33 it was divided by 1.  For 
example 23-year-old goalkeeper Ruslan Nigmatullin was transferred from KAMAZ to Spartak 
Moscow in the beginning of the 1995 Season. Spartak paid 363,345,600 roubles for the rights of 
the player, and according to the wage formula, they had to pay him an annual salary of 36 
million roubles. In another example: Spartak paid 66 million roubles to Torpedo for the rights of 
the 30 year old defender Afanasiev, and according to the age factor he had to be paid 22 million 
roubles per season. The PFL also determined that contracts of youth players had to be signed by 
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the parents and that the club was responsible for paying school fees.511 The new transfer system 
went along the lines of wage scales, which had previously been used in the Soviet economy. 
Prior to the Gorbachev reforms, wages in state industries and sovkhozy were generally 
determined by a six-tiered wage scale that was linked to skills, as well as numerous gradations 
for difficulty, conditions, and location of work. Soviet planners used gradation in order to 
influence the movement of labour throughout industries and regions.512  
 
The introduction of this new transfer system after the fall of the Soviet Union 
demonstrates the state of Russia’s reform in the early 1990s. As the former Prime Minister of 
Russia Yegor Gaidar points out in his book State and Evolution: 
By the end of 1991 we had a hybrid market - part bureaucratic, part economic (the 
former still dominant). And thanks to fundamental legal ambiguity on property 
rights, nomenklatura capitalism was all but complete. Pseudostate capital activity 
reigned. In politics we also had a hybrid: a combination of Soviet and presidential 
forms of rule, a post-Communist but pre-democratic republic.513 
 
In the early 1990s, Russia was still operating on a combination of wild capitalism and the old 
bureaucratic principles of the Soviet Union. The football transfer system was a perfect example. 
Players were paid salaries and clubs received transfer sums, but at the centre of all player 
transfers was still a bureaucratic and highly regulating market authority, in the case of football, 
the PFL. The PFL used a complicated market formula to calculate wages and transfer sums, a 
system very reminiscent of the old Soviet Union. In the case of football it took outside forces to 
de-regulate the market: In 1995 Europe’s transfer system underwent a massive overhaul. This 
was due to a series of court cases between 1990 and 1995, which ended in the Bosman ruling. 																																																								
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The Bosman ruling, and the rulings that followed the Bosman case, will be subject to further 
discussion later in this chapter. As the market changed worldwide, Russian football was forced to 
adapt and change its transfer policies.  
The Big Migration: How the Fall of the Soviet Union Changed the European Football Labour 
Market 	
A consequence of the fall of the Soviet Union was that organizations that controlled the export of 
Soviet talent to the West lost their hold. Organizations such as Goskomsport were split up, and 
because the old Football Federation of the USSR was no longer a functioning body, it was  
unable to maintain control over the export of Soviet players to the West. Without Soviet export 
market regulations, clubs of the former Soviet Union were now more or less free to sell their 
most talented players to the highest bidder. As stated above, this was only the case for players 
who were transferred abroad—within Russia the market remained highly controlled—and for 
this reason it became all the more lucrative for clubs to sell their players abroad. Also, with most 
post-Soviet economies in peril, players realized that there was a huge economic advantage to be 
gained by playing in the West. The end of the Soviet Union marked the end of labour regulations 
that in the past had prevented the movement of highly talented football players from this 
economic periphery to the economic core. As Matthew Taylor, author of Global Player? 
Football, Migration and Globalization, c. 1930-2000 writes: 
Weak national economics and financial crises have often worked to ‘push’ players 
out while, on the ‘pull’ side, the wealthiest European leagues, in particular, have 
been able to offer unrivalled financial rewards.514 
 
Clubs in the West were the big beneficiaries of the fall of the Soviet Union, yet at this point most 
of Western Europe still had regulated football markets. When the USSR fell, its players who 																																																								
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were under contract were now able to move to clubs in the West for very little money, while 
Russian regulations allowed players from the former Soviet Union whose contracts were up to 
leave on a free transfer. The new market conditions generated a massive player migration from 
the former Soviet Union: approximately one thousand football players left the former USSR in 
the period between 1988 and 1996. Some players ended up with the better clubs in Western 
Europe. But players also left to play in China, Australia, the United States, and even Hong Kong. 
About forty players ended up playing in Israel, and thanks to a large Russian community and 
salaries of about $100,000, integration was fairly easy for the Russian players.515 This migration 
was even further accelerated when the Bosman ruling liberalized the European player market in 
1995.  
 
The Bosman Ruling is named after the Belgium football player Jean-Marc Bosman. 
Bosman went in front of the European Court of Justice after he was not allowed a free transfer 
from the Belgian club FC Liege to the French club Dunkirk in 1990. The Belgian club had used 
the Belgian player evaluation formula, a formula that was very similar to the one used in Russia, 
which determined that he was worth £500,000. Not surprisingly, Dunkirk refused to pay and 
Liege cut Bosman’s wage by 75 per cent. Bosman argued that as a footballer he had the same 
rights as any other normal labourer in Europe, and that he could move to Dunkirk as a free 
agent.516 By 1991, teams within UEFA were allowed to field three non-nationals as well as two 
additional players who had been nationalized or assimilated by being within the country 
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continuously for five years. UEFA had reached a gentleman’s agreement with the European 
Commission that football would operate under separate rules within the labour laws of the 
European Union. The court judged that sport, as a business, had to comply with the labour laws 
imposed by the European Commission and that compensation payments for players without 
contracts and nationality restrictions on EU citizens were in direct contradiction to European 
law.517 At that point, the Bosman ruling had little effect on Russian players, since European clubs 
could put restrictions on players from states outside the European Union. Some countries, 
however, used the new ruling to liberalize their market even further. In Germany, for example, 
the German Football Association (DFB) expanded the right to play football in Germany’s top 
two divisions to the extent that no player would be considered a foreign, who was a citizen of 
one of the fifty-one member states that were part of UEFA at the time.518 Other countries 
maintained restrictions on non-EU members, and as a result, Germany became one of the main 
markets for players from the former Soviet Union.  
 
Then in 2005, another ruling further liberalized the European football market. In 2005 the 
Russian player Igor Simutenkov sued his club Union Deportivo Tenerife. Simutenkov was 
registered as a non-EU player with the club—only three players with his status were allowed to 
play for the team at one time. Simutenkov, however, argued that because the Russian Federation 
had signed a labour agreement with the EU, he had the same rights as EU players. The court then 
ruled that any Russian (or any non-EU citizen for that matter) legally employed within the 
European Union had the same labour rights as EU citizens. The case banned all discrimination 																																																								
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against non-EU citizens who had a labour contract in the EU.519 Players from the former Soviet 
Union, therefore, had to wait almost ten years after the Bosman ruling before they were given the 
same labour rights within the European Union as EU citizens.  
 
The Simutenkov ruling was significant in that it created a football labour market within 
Europe that, because it was completely open regardless of citizenship, was an even greater draw 
for future transfers. Simutenkov’s case exhibits the effect that the fall of the Soviet Union had on 
the European football market: Simutenkov, as a Russian citizen, would not have been able to 
play in Western Europe without the Gorbachev reforms and the subsequent fall of the Soviet 
Union. Now, as a player from a non-EU country, he challenged the system that was in place, and 
was able, through his court ruling, to open the European football market even further. In fact, 
many of the changes to the European football market came with the advent of the Gorbachev 
reforms in the Soviet Union and were even accelerated when the Union collapsed. A main reason 
for this was the changing dynamics within UEFA which became more powerful through the 
influx of new member states, but also significant was the liberalization of the post-Soviet 
football market, which now flooded Europe with talent that had previously been unavailable. 
This migration of football talent put immense strain on existing economic rules, and ultimately 
meant that Europe’s existing transfer model would bend to the new labour realities.  
 
The rulings of the European Commission also had a global impact in that they changed 
the way transfers were handled worldwide. It became clear that Bosman did not only affect 
Europe, but was a case that led to the revision of the entire football transfer system. Transfers of 																																																								
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football players were now perceived as normal business activities that had to be regulated in 
accordance with competition law. Within the European Union, football federations were required 
to completely follow the new rulings. In 2001, FIFA put in place transfer regulations that 
included all member states. These regulations helped to improve the stability of player contracts, 
and a newly introduced system of training compensations for players under the age of 24 
encouraged clubs to train their own youth players. They were introduced in accordance with the 
European Commission and became standard procedures worldwide.520 Indeed, in Russia as well, 
the transfers of football players became deregulated in the sense that the above mentioned 
player-contract evaluation system was abolished. UEFA member states were forced to submit to 
the rulings of the European Commission—a clear demonstration of the economic influence of 
the European Union beyond its borders.  
 
 But the EU’s power did not extend to non-member states regarding the removal of 
limitations on foreign players used on the field. In 2003, the Russian Premier League reacted to 
the ever-increasing influx of foreign players into Russian football by limiting the number of 
foreign players who were allowed to play within the Russian Premier League. Previously, there 
had been no limitation rules in Russian football. As the clubs began to sign increasing numbers 
of cheap labour from smaller republics of the former Soviet Union, South America, and Africa, 
however, the Russian Football Union felt compelled to react. The federation, at the time, felt that 
clubs were not doing enough to develop young Russian talent for the national team. The new rule 
introduced in 2005 stated that teams were allowed to field only a maximum of five foreign 
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players at the same time.521 Similar rules have been implemented in Ukraine, in which the 
number of foreign players has been limited to seven.522 Although they were members of UEFA, 
Russia and Ukraine were in an advantageous position to change the rules: the two countries were 
not members of the European Union, and therefore did not have to agree to the part of the 
Bosman Ruling that guaranteed free movement for foreign labour. But, as we will see later, the 
new rules have done little to diminish the influx of foreign players to Russia.  
Import-Export: The Former Soviet Union as Showcase for the West 	
After 1988 many of the top Russian and Ukrainian players left the Soviet Union to play in the 
West. This migration became even more extensive after the collapse of the Union in 1991. 
Russian and Ukrainian clubs, however, were not simply exporting. The Ukrainian and Russian 
Premier Leagues also became prime destinations for players from smaller countries of the former 
Soviet Union. Because the new domestic leagues of these now independent states were not 
competitive, the top players from Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan began 
to migrate in order to play in Russia and Ukraine. In Russia and Ukraine, those players filled the 
gaps left by the migration of their top players to the West. Clubs from the newly independent 
republics that had strong youth development systems in the time of the Soviet Union, found it 
difficult to keep their best players after the fall of the Soviet Union. One such example is Dinamo 
Tbilisi, which had to sell its best players to Russia and Ukraine in order to stay afloat 
financially.523  When clubs from smaller countries could no longer offer their best players top 
football and financial wealth, the players started to relocate. As players of Russian or Ukrainian 																																																								
521 Telegraph 15 Oct. 2003. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/european/2423334/Russia-to-put-a-limit-on-
foreign-players.html accessed 19 February 2013.  
522 Terrikon 21 May 2007 http://terrikon.com/posts/4432 accessed 19 February 2013.  
523 Izvestiia 7 Feb. 1995. 8.  
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clubs, those top players were more likely to be discovered by the biggest clubs in Western 
Europe. In addition to the players brought in from the former Soviet states, Russian and 
Ukrainian clubs also tapped a new source when they began to open their doors to players from 
Africa.  
 
 The connection between Africa and the Soviet Union goes back to the period of 
decolonization in the 1960s. The Soviet Union provided aid that helped set up the Confederation 
Africaine de Football (CAF) and also was instrumental in the creation of the Coupe d’Afrique 
des Nations (CAN). But as stated above, the Soviet Union was a closed labour market, and 
players from abroad rarely played in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga. The USSR even encouraged 
African nations to keep their best players within their respective home countries. Until 1981, 
countries were only allowed to field players for the CAN who had not played abroad. For an 
African player, the Soviet Union was by no means a top address; instead, players preferred a 
move to European countries with which they had strong colonial ties like France and Belgium.524  
In spite the limitations mentioned above, the Soviet Union did have some influence on African 
football. Soviet coaches worked in countries that were friendly with the Soviet Union, as part of 
the USSR’s African aid program. In 1986, the USSR spent $26 billion on foreign aid, much of it 
in Africa.525 In the 1980s the Soviet Union also spent 2.5 million roubles on sport aid 
programmes in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which was more sports aid than that of any other 
country. In addition, the Soviet Union sent specialists to work in developing countries, and by 
1980, Soviet coaches worked with national teams in over 30 developing countries. The Soviet 																																																								
524 Poldi, ‘Migration and Trade of African Football Players: Historic, Geographical and Cultural Aspects’, 396-397.  
525 Guardian 25 May 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/may/25/russia-foreign-aid-report-
influence-image accessed at 7 February 2013.  
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Union also offered seminars and courses to coaches from third world countries at the Moscow 
Physical Culture Institute.526  
 
In 1989 the first division club SKA Rostov became the first club to apply to the Sport 
Committee to bring in players from Africa. The Rostov coach, B. Bodarenko, had spent time 
coaching the Mozambique club CD Matchedje de Maputo. Bodarenko wanted to bring in several 
players from his former club and he believed that such a transfer would be possible since 
Mozambique was an ally of the Soviet Union and Matchedje, like SKA, was an army team. 
Bodarenko proposed that the players would officially go on a military exchange to the Soviet 
Union and as part of the exchange play for SKA Rostov. At that point, the Soviet Union did not 
allow foreign players in the Soviet league.527 But just two days after the Bodarenko interview, 
Goskomsport changed the rules regarding foreign players and made it possible for every club to 
field two non-Soviet citizens.528  The transfer of the Mozambican players to SKA was never 
confirmed in the press and it can, therefore, be assumed that it never took place. Another team, 
however, the newly promoted SKA Pomir Dushanbe from the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 
(TSSR), signed three African players, Derby Mankinka, Wisdom Chansa and Richard Mwanza 
from Zambia. All three only played a handful of games in the USSR and left shortly thereafter, 
but they were the first foreign players signed from abroad to play in the Soviet Vysshaia Liga.529 
																																																								
526 Jim Riordan, ‘The Role of Sport in Soviet Foreign Policy’, International Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn, 
1988), 580-581.  
 
527 Sovetskii Sport 8 Feb. 1989. 1.	
528 Sovetskii Sport 11 Feb. 1989. 1. 
529 When Saturday Comes Jan. 2001. 
http://www.wsc.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3501&Itemid=29 accessed at 8 February 
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The contacts between African countries and the periphery of the Soviet Union were often used 
by the state for propaganda value. Athletes from regions such as Tajikistan were more often sent 
to foreign missions to demonstrate the development of peripheral regions under socialism.530 The 
three Zambians were, therefore, part of a program that was used to demonstrate both the 
openness of Soviet reforms and the success of a club from the periphery to friendly third world 
countries.  
 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union and the mass exodus of the best Soviet players to the 
west, former Soviet clubs were now looking to replace the lost talent. Clubs in Russia and 
Ukraine were now the main importers of players from all over the former Soviet Union, and even 
big clubs like Spartak Moscow in Russia and Dinamo Kiev in Ukraine were now also relying on 
talent brought in from further afield. This makes sense in terms of migration patterns: as the best 
players of the former Soviet Union were moving from the economic periphery to the economic 
centre, clubs were looking to replace the missing talent with players from economic areas that 
were even weaker than the former Soviet Union. Africa, therefore, became a logical talent pool 
for clubs of the former Soviet Union. Coaches were able to use the expertise that they gained 
from working abroad to find talent in Africa.  
 
Then clubs discovered a new source of players—South America. The first Brazilians to 
play in Russia were Luis Andre da Silva and Junior Mario Dos Santos, who signed for 
Lokomotiv Nizhny Novgorod in 1995.531 Brazilians, just like the players from Africa, had the 
																																																								
530 Riordan, ‘The Role of Sport in Soviet Foreign Policy’, 581. 
531 When Saturday Comes Jan. 2001. 
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economic advantage of being extremely cheap labour. Alex Bellos has outlined the reasons why 
clubs from all over the world make use of cheap Brazilian players. First of all, there is an almost 
endless supply of professional Brazilian football players. Brazil is home to 23,000 professional 
players in 500 clubs, and over 90 per cent of the players earn less then £100 a month. Many of 
the Brazilian clubs are designed as talent factories that are focused on selling players abroad. 
With salaries so low, it is easy to understand why Brazilians made their way to Russia, where at 
even a small club like Nizhny Novgorod, they would earn significantly more than they would in 
Brazil.532 There was, however, another factor drawing players to Russia: players from Africa and 
South America were also coming to Russia in the hope that they would be spotted by one of the 
big clubs in Western Europe. The idea was simple: clubs from the former Soviet Union would 
try to bring in relatively cheap talent from economically weak markets, and the players would 
then have the chance to compete in a European league and European competitions. With a little 
luck, a South American or African player would then be spotted by a big club from the West and 
sold at a profit.  
 
Fans, however, did not always see the purchase of players from South America and 
Africa in a positive light. In 1999, for example, Sheriff Tiraspol hired a Nigerian player with the 
name of Edward Anyamkyegh. Anyamkyegh came to Moldova with the hope that he would be 
spotted by one of the big clubs in Western Europe, or at least by a club from Russia and Ukraine 
where he could participate in the lucrative European competitions. Anyamkyegh was part of a 
new trend that started to develop in the late 1990s: just like the bigger clubs in Russia and 
Ukraine before them, smaller clubs from fringe countries like Moldova looked to Africa to 																																																								
532 Bellos, Futebol, 23.  
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replace the local talent that had left Moldova to play in Russia and Ukraine. But the big Eastern 
European clubs soon also bought those players. It seemed like a great deal when an agent from 
Moldova offered the Nigerian forward Edward Anyamkyegh for $500,000 to Karpaty L’vov. 
Anyamkyegh was young and had played for Nigeria’s under-17 team. The young Nigerian, 
however, only saw L’vov as a stepping stone to the west, and was not used to the rough 
Ukrainian game and the harsh winters of the Carpathian Mountains. Also, L’vov is the centre of 
Ukrainian nationalism. In Soviet times many L’vovians looked east at the cities of Kiev, 
Donetsk, Khar’kov and Odessa, and resented the fact that Russians were mixing with Ukrainians. 
With the fall of communism, Ukrainians began a project of cultural and national regeneration 
and as a result many Jews and Russians were bullied into speaking Ukrainian rather than 
Russian.533  
 
When Anyamkyegh arrived in Ukraine, the joy of freedom had for Ukrainians begun to 
feel commonplace and the project of Ukrainian re-nationalisation had stalled. Many Ukrainians 
felt their country was a plaything of the great powers: the Russians, the EU, and the Americans. 
Now they also had to import Nigerians to improve the game in Ukraine, and for many 
Ukrainians this felt like a humiliation. For many in L’vov, the purchase of Anyamkyegh, 
therefore, became the symbol of national shame. Under these circumstances it is hard to imagine 
that he and his Nigerian colleagues would ever be fully integrated into Ukrainian society or 
clubs. In fact, a large majority of African players have struggled to make an impact in Ukraine, 
																																																								
533 Foer, How Soccer Explains the World, 157-158. 
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and Karpaty is still one of many mediocre clubs in the Ukrainian football league. 534 
Anyamkyegh is not the only African player who has had this sort of experience: many African 
players who come to Ukraine and Russia today are confronted with racism, nationalism, and 
xenophobia. Nonetheless, clubs continued to purchase players from abroad. In fact, as the 
economy stabilized in the early 2000s, they focused even more on foreign talent; the only 
difference was that it was no longer fringe players that were the transfer targets of the big 
Russian and Ukrainian clubs.  
How the New Aristocracy of Russia and Ukraine Bought Europe’s Biggest Football Talent 	
As the oligarchs started to take over the biggest clubs in Russia and Ukraine, they also 
influenced the world transfer market. In the 2000s especially, the big clubs in Russia and 
Ukraine also became big spenders (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). The major spending began in the 
2003-04 season, and this is indicative of a real shift in which clubs changed from being sellers to 
buyers. In the summer of 1999, Andrei Shevchenko became the most expensive player of the 
former Soviet Union when he was sold for $25 million to AC Milan.535 That year, Dinamo Kiev 
reached the semi-final of the UEFA Champions League, with a squad that was mostly developed 
in their own youth academy. Clubs from Western Europe bought up most of those players, 
including Shevchenko. Then, in the early 2000s, clubs in Russia and Ukraine started to spend. 
This trend became especially apparent during the 2005-06 transfer period. As the leading 
Russian and Ukrainian players moved West, they were replaced by players from South America 
and, for the first time, players from southern Europe. 																																																								
534 Ibid. 157. 
535 Corriere della Serra  22 Mar. 2004. 




 In 2005 Dinamo Moscow, for example, had nine Portuguese-speaking players on the 
books, including Tiago, Derlei, Cicero, Maniche and Costinha, with the last two purchased for 
the staggering sums of £15 million and £16 million respectively. During the same season, 
Spartak Moscow outbid teams from Southern Europe for the service of one of Argentina’s most 
brilliant talents, Fernando Cavenaghi, who was purchased for £8 million. In 2006, Lokomotiv 
Moscow signed the first British player when they completed the transfer of the Scottish national 
team player Garry O’Conner.536 By 2005, the average club in the Russian Premier League had 













Russia           
Zenit Sankt 
Petersburg 
€1,050,000 € -€34,125,000  €1,150,000 € -€4,350,000  -€1,450,000  
TsSKA Moscow -€6,000,000  -€5,100,000 € -€4,550,000  €2,850,000  -€15,850,000  
Spartak Moscow -€7,350,000  €5,080,000  €1,000,000  -€26,950,000  -€7,250,000  
Rubin Kazan -€15,800,000  €700,000  -€1,000,000  -€3,600,000  -€4,150,000  
Anzhi Makhachkala €0  -€215,000  €0  €75,000  €200,000  
Dinamo Moscow -€12,750,000  €22,275,000  -€57,250,000  -€19,850,000  €2,700,000  
Lokomotiv Moscow €7,450,000  -€13,900,000  -€17,750,000  -€7,600,000  -€5,250,000  
Ukraine           
Shakhtar Donetsk -€4,900,000  €12,730,000  -€13,160,000  -€35,110,000  -€20,740,000  
Dinamo Kiev  -€8,630,000  €250,000  -€4,400,000  -€7,500,000  -€17,025,000  
Source: Transfermarkt.de538 
*Until 2011 the Russian season ran from Spring to Fall. For simplification the transfer balances are 																																																								
536 http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/teams/h/hibernian/4752964.stm accessed 18 February 2013.  
537 Riordan, ‘Football: Nation, City and the Dream. Playing the Game for Russia, Money and Power’, 554-555.  
 
538 Data accessed from: http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/premier-liga/transferentwicklung/wettbewerb_UKR1.html, 
accessed 12 February 2013.  and http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/premier-
liga/transferentwicklung/wettbewerb_RU1.html, accessed 12 February 2013.  
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calculated along the lines of the European season, which runs from Fall to Spring. 
 
 
As indicated in table 4.1, Ukrainian clubs were still outspending their Russian 
counterparts, but, fuelled by new owners, the Russian clubs were catching up fast. The example 
of Shakhtar Donetsk is perhaps the most telling. In the last ten years the club has specialized in 
combining the best Ukrainian players with highly talented players from South America. The 
philosophy of the club was simple, and thanks to continued success in the Champions League, 
the club could offer the best talents from Brazil a first step into Europe, with the prospect of 
being discovered by a big Western European club.  
Table 4.2 








Russia           
Zenit Sankt 
Petersburg 
-€102,010,000 -€15,100,000 -€41,400,000  -€8,600,000  -€28,500,000  
TsSKA Moscow -€22,500,000  €1,700,000  -€2,900,000  €8,410,000  €20,800,000  
Spartak Moscow -€24,700,000  -€16,150,000  -€21,100,000  €10,350,000  €6,800,000  
Rubin Kazan -€24,500,000  -€14,750,000  -€27,450,000  -€11,750,000  -€12,850,000  
Anzhi Makhachkala -€51,400,000  -€58,100,000  -€31,200,000  -€550,000  €30,000  
Dinamo Moscow €7,800,000  -€29,500,000  -€650,000  -€15,600,000  €27,600,000  
Lokomotiv Moscow -€11,300,000  -€14,500,000  €12,700,000  -€7,200,000  -€15,140,000  
Ukraine           
Shakhtar Donetsk €15,760,000  -€5,230,000  -€21,450,000  €26,185,000  -€2,783,000  




539 All data was accessed from these pages: http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/zenit-st-petersburg/transfers-
alle/verein_964.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/zska-moskau/transfers-alle/verein_2410.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/spartak-moskau/transfers-alle/verein_232.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/rubin-kazan/transfers-alle/verein_2698.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/anzhi-makhachkala/transfers-alle/verein_2700.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/lokomotiv-moskau/transfers-alle/verein_932.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/shakhtar-donetsk/transfers-alle/verein_660.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
http://www.transfermarkt.de/de/dynamo-kiew/transfers-alle/verein_338.html, accessed 12. February 2013. 
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This explains Shakhtar’s transfer numbers: the club has spent enormous sums in transfer fees in 
the past ten years, but has also managed to rake in a profit in 2007, 2010 and 2012. In fact, the 
club managed to make a profit of €12,482,000 in the five years leading up to 2012. The result, as 
indicated in table 4.3, is that of all big clubs in the former Soviet Union over the past ten years, 
Shakhtar has produced the smallest transfer deficit, and at the same time has developed into the 
best club of the former Soviet Union. In some ways Shakhtar still pursues the old maxim of 
buying talented players from South America for a relatively low price, and selling them at a 
higher price. But over the last ten years there has been a shift from purchasing talented South 
Americans in their twenties to acquiring young Brazilians who are under twenty and can be 
developed into star players. 
Table 4.3 
Club Ten Year 
Balance 




TsSKA Moscow -€23,140,000  
Spartak Moscow -€80,270,000  
Rubin Kazan -€115,150,000  
Anzhi Makhachkala -€141,160,000  
Dinamo Moscow -€75,225,000  
Lokomotiv Moscow -€72,490,000  
Ukraine   
Shakhtar Donetsk -€48,698,000  
Dinamo Kiev  -€94,326,000  
Source: Transfermarkt.de 
 
In Russia, the most fascinating development has been the transfer of financial power from the 
core (Moscow) to the periphery (the provincial capitals), which is evident in the overall spending 
of clubs such as Zenit Sankt Petersburg, Rubin Kazan and briefly Anzhi Makhachkala. As we 
will later see in Chapter 5, Zenit’s transfer activities are a part of Gazprom’s global sport 
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marketing strategy, of which Zenit is the cornerstone. The transfer activities of the clubs from 
Russia and Ukraine reflect the influx of new cash from the current oligarchy that owns the 
biggest clubs in the two countries. The oligarchs conduct themselves in ways not unlike the old 
aristocracy in tsarist Russia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, owners see football as a means to 
sharpen their profile in politics and business. Russian clubs also have a huge advantage when it 
comes to taxation: in Russia football players are considered artists and only pay a minimal tax of 
13 per cent on their salary.540  
 
The favourable taxation system has helped clubs to sign some of the best talent: one 
example is the signing of the Cameroonian striker Samuel Eto’o from the Italian club Inter Milan 
by Anzhi Makhachkala from Dagestan in 2011. At Anzhi, Eto’o earned an astonishing yearly 
salary of €20.5 million after tax.541 Eto’o was exemplary of the transition of the transfer market: 
one of the best players in the world left one of the best leagues in the world to sign with a club in 
Russia. At the time Eto’o was only 30 years old, the prime age for a footballer, and  this transfer 
could, therefore, not be compared with that of other players who had moved to fringe leagues 
when they were past their prime. Although restructuring and economic problems at Anzhi, 
directly related to the owners’ business troubles, led to many foreign players, including Eto’o, 
																																																								
540  Telegraph 4 Sep. 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/euro-2012/8740731/Russia-v-
Republic-of-Ireland-vast-riches-propelling-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-Russian-Premier-League.html accessed 19 
February 2013.  
541  Guardian 23 Aug. 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/aug/23/samuel-etoo-internazionale-anzhi-
makhachkala accessed 19 February 2013.  
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leaving the Dagestani club in 2013, other Russian clubs have continued to spend enormous 
amounts on foreign players.542  
 
But it wasn’t just players who were brought in to put a new shine on Russian and 
Ukrainian football. The high-class personnel that went to Russia and Ukraine included coaches 
from all over Europe. In the past, the Soviet Union had been an exporter of coaching expertise to 
the Third World. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the source of expertise for Russian clubs 
changed. Russian and Ukrainian clubs were falling behind the big clubs from Western Europe. 
Only Dinamo Kiev, under coach Lobanovskii, was able to compete on the international level. 
Shakhtar Donetsk, on the other hand, had a good support base, but no tradition of success. In an 
attempt to catch up with Dinamo Kiev, Shakhtar hired their first coach who was not from the 
former Soviet Union when they appointed Italian Nevio Scala in 2002. Scala only lasted one 
season at the club, but he left his mark. The club won its first Ukrainian championship, and Scala 
introduced modern training techniques and ended the practice of total control over player’s lives. 
As forward Andriy Vorobey stated to the British monthly football magazine World Soccer in 
2011: “Communism ended at Shakhtar with the arrival of Scala.” When Scala left, the club 
replaced him with the German, Bernd Schuster, who lasted only nine months. Next came the 
Romanian Mircea Lucescu, who completely rebuilt the squad and has been responsible for 
Shakhtar’s success both in Ukraine and in Europe, notably by bringing the UEFA Cup to 
Donetsk in 2009. Lucescu, who in 2011 earned £2.7 million annually, has also changed the 
infrastructure of the club and has been responsible for Shakhtar’s highly successful business of 
importing and exporting Brazilian stars. The club also employed the Dutchman, Patrick van 																																																								
542 Guardian 8 Aug. 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/aug/08/the-rumour-mill-chelsea-samuel-etoo 
accessed 23 January 2015. 
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Leeuven, who built Feyenoord’s successful youth academy, and was brought in to do the same in 
Donetsk, and the Englishman, Joe Palmer, who was partly responsible for turning Manchester 
United from a football club into one of the most recognizable sporting brands on the planet.543 
Palmer has since also been fundamental in recreating the club’s brand from one that was 
recognizable only in Eastern Europe to one that is now visible on a global scale.  
 
Furthermore, Shakhtar was one of the few Ukrainian clubs that paid their players no more 
than the official salary and paid taxes on those salaries. Many other Ukrainian clubs officially 
paid their players only the Ukrainian minimum wage.544 The rest of the players’ salaries were 
paid in bonuses, and because clubs were only responsible for paying taxes on the base salary, 
they could transfer the remaining money to the player tax-free. In 2014, the Ukrainian journalist 
Aleksandr Tkach was able to forward to me the wording of such a contract. In this case, the 
contract was between Karpaty L’vov and an unnamed player. The player was paid the base 
salary and the following bonuses: the player would receive compensation for every game played 
in the first squad of Karpaty L’vov in the Ukrainian Premier League. Further, bonuses were 
determined by the management of the club on the basis of applications from the head coach. In 
other words the manager could hand out further bonuses in order to provide a bigger salary. 
Clubs, however, made sure that they could not be legally challenged by Ukraine’s tax authorities 
by including the following clause: ‘The player is solely responsible for all payments due from 
the amounts received according to this Agreement.’ 545  In other words the players were 																																																								
543 World Soccer Nov. 2011. 58-61. Club Focus: Shakhtar Donetsk: ‘Making Dreams come true’. 
544 In 2014 the minimum wage in Ukraine was 1218 UAH: http://www.wageindicator.org/main/salary/minimum-
wage/ukraine/minimum-wages-faqs accessed 23 January 2015. 
545 Tkach 
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responsible for paying the proper taxes on all bonuses received from the clubs. Authorities have 
been extremely lax about following up on tax payments by football players and the issue of tax 
payments usually only arises when a player is in a contractual dispute with the club that employs 
him. This practice is not uncommon in Eastern Europe and has been heavily condemned by 
FIFPro, the global players union that is charged with protecting the rights of professional football 
players. In this system, players are treated as self-employed and are considered responsible for 
paying social security and tax bills. This system can also be problematic for the following 
reasons: as FIFPro board member Dejan Stefanović explained on FIFPro’s official homepage, 
‘It's quite incredible but the player has to pay these tax, social security and pension contributions 
even if the club does not pay him.’546 A FIFPro study in Ukraine showed that 15.5 per cent of 
players in the Ukrainian Premier League did not receive their payment on time.547 Some clubs 
had a particularly bad reputation, including Karpaty L’vov, which in July 2013 lost a contract 
dispute against a Spanish player, who was awarded €600,000 by Ukraine’s football governing 
body. In another case Tavriia Simferopol was fined $100,000 in October 2012 over an 
employment dispute with a Nigerian player, and was further banned from acquiring players for 
two transfer windows (or one year) by UEFA.548  
 
Ukrainian clubs also use other tricks to save money when bringing in top talent from 
abroad. When Shevchenko ran for Ukrainian parliamentary election in 2012, he had to disclose 																																																								
546 http://www.fifpro.org/en/news/unpaid-players-stung-for-tax-in-eastern-europe accessed 23 January 2015. 
547 FIFPro, FIFPro Black Book Eastern Europe (Hoofddorp, 2012), 97.  
548 Kyiv Post 19 Sep. 2013. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/a-sports-lawyers-inside-look-at-business-of-
ukrainian-football-329529.html accessed 23 Januart 2015. 
 
	 274	
his income, and he announced that his salary had been $1.65 million while playing for Dinamo 
Kiev. Before returning to Ukraine, Shevchenko earned £250,000 a week whilst playing for 
Chelsea in 2007. But Dinamo’s corporate form as a joint-stock company meant that the club 
could operate as a limited liability company, which in turn meant that the club only had to pay 
part of Shevchenko’s salary in Ukraine. This meant that both player and club could save on 
various taxes and social payments in Ukraine. The rest of the salary was then paid through 
various offshore organizations into offshore accounts held by the players or their agents in the 
form of bonuses and image rights, which, strictly speaking, was not classified as salary. This 
system, however, also had its downside, as clubs can, technically speaking, remove themselves 
from payment obligations.549 The practice of “grey-zone” payments was carried out by almost all 
Ukrainian clubs, and, as explained in Chapter 2, only Shakhtar Donetsk operated in a legal 
completely transparent manner. Perhaps this was also one of the key reasons for the club’s 
success; they were able to lure top foreign talent not only with the promise of high salaries, but 
also with the guarantee that they would actually meet their obligations. 
 
Shakhtar became a benchmark in Eastern Europe; the way the club was structured around 
a foreign manager with foreign specialists who turned the club into a recognizable brand was a 
pattern followed not only in Ukraine but also in Russia. Zenit Sankt Petersburg soon followed 
the Shakhtar principle. Perhaps the example of Zenit Sankt Petersburg is the most revealing: The 
club was from a city that had been built by foreign architects and specialists, and had been 
constructed by a tsar who wanted Sankt Petersburg to be a window to the west. By the winter of 
2012, Zenit had accumulated a transfer deficit of over €200 million and had bought players from 																																																								
549 Ibid. 
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all over the world to create a team that could compete not only in Russia but also in Europe. 
Gazprom’s investments in the club did not stop at bringing in high calibre players from South 
America or Western Europe; the club also began to rely on foreign managers and coaches. In 
November 2007, Dutchman Dick Advocaat coached Zenit Sankt Petersburg to win its first 
Russian championship, the first foreign manager to win a Russian championship. The following 
year Zenit won its first international title—the UEFA Cup.550 Under Advocaat, the club 
introduced modern infrastructure and hired Dutch specialists who were to revamp the youth 
academy and the management of the entire club.551 Zenit has followed the example of Shakhtar 
and built a club brand with the help of foreign advisors and specialists. When Advocaat left the 
club, Italian Luciano Spalletti, who has brought in an entire coaching staff from Italy, replaced 
him in December 2009.552 Since then, the club has won another two Russian championships and 
has become Russia’s most modern and recognizable football brand. In 2014, another foreign 
coach replaced Spalletti when the Portuguese André Villas-Boas took over from the Italian.553 
Villas-Boas’ task was to further Zenit’s brand in Russia, and also to improve on the club’s 
performance in Europe.   
 
This development did not stop at the Russian club level. Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russia’s national team had been a source of national misery and failure. In 2005 Russia 
failed to qualify for the 2006 World Cup in Germany after being defeated by Portugal 7-1. This 																																																								
550 Bennetts, Football Dynamo, 124.  
551 http://en.fc-zenit.ru/academy/managment/head/394.html accessed 15 February 2013.  
552 http://en.fc-zenit.ru/main/team/coaches/322.html accessed 15 February 2013.  
553 Guardian 20 Mar. 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/mar/20/andre-villas-boas-zenit-russian-title 
accessed 23 January 2015. 
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wasn’t Russia’s first failure since independence, but the result had a national impact. After the 
defeat and failed qualification, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin contacted the president of the 
Russian Football Union Vitali Mutko and told him to make structural changes to the national 
team. Russia’s defeat by Portugal came at a time when Russia’s economy, fuelled by oil and gas 
exports, was prospering, and a national team that failed to qualify for the world stage did not fit 
Russia’s new image as a resurgent economic power. Putin then “motivated” the oligarchs to 
invest not only in football abroad, but also in football at home. Vitali Mutko, together with 
Roman Abramovich, then contacted the Dutch coach Guus Hiddink. 554 Abramovich ended up 
paying the salary of Russia’s national team coach, a salary believed to be $1.3 million dollars 
annually.555  
 
Much like Nevio Scala at Shakhtar Donetsk, Guus Hiddink ended communism for 
Russia’s national team. Functionaries were no longer allowed in the dressing room, and players 
were not locked away in the old communist training complexes for weeks in preparation for 
matches.556 Hiddink also changed the way the national team trained: he did away with punitive 
methods, and allowed players to think for them selves on and off the pitch. In other words 
Hiddink did away with the “I only work here” attitude of Homo sovieticus that many players had 
displayed when representing Russia.557 In fact, Russia qualified for Euro 2008, and completed 
the qualification group in second place ahead of England. Then at the championship, the team 																																																								
554 Bennetts, Football Dynamo, 47-48. 
555 James Riordan, ‘Sports and Politics in Russia and the Former Soviet Union’ in Peter Lang, (ed.), Sport, 
Representation and Evolving Identities in Europe (Bern, 2010), 327. 
556 Bennetts, Football Dynamo, 105. 
557 Simon Kuper, and Stefan Szymanski, Soccernomics, (New York, 2012), 407. 
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played some of the most astonishing football and finished a remarkable third. It was Russia’s 
best finish at a tournament since the fall of the Soviet Union and put the country back on the 
football map.558  
 
When Hiddink’s Russia failed to qualify for the 2010 World Cup, he was replaced by 
Advocaat who had been hugely successful with Zenit. Advocaat guided Russia to Euro 2012, and 
after the tournament was replaced by the Italian coach Fabio Capello, who had previously 
coached the English national team. The salary for the coaches did not come from the Russian 
Football Union, but from a fund called the Russian Football Academy that had been established 
by a collective of Russia’s richest men, including Roman Abramovich. This academy is the 
sponsor of Russia’s youth national teams, pays the salaries of all coaches, and sponsors trips 
abroad. Officially, the Academy is responsible for overseeing the revival of Russia’s football.559 
The aim of the project is simple: to create a national team that can win the 2018 World Cup, an 
event that will be hosted by Russia. In order to achieve this goal, Russia’s richest men have been 
tasked to pay for the world’s leading specialists to improve Russia’s national game. By bringing 
in foreigners to coach the Russian national team and some of Russia’s biggest clubs, Russian 
football has been able to join Europe’s football knowledge network. Fuelled by oil and gas 
funds, Russia has made the big leap forward and joined Europe’s football elite. As Simon Kuper 
and Stefan Szymanski point out in their book Soccernomics, oil  (natural resources) has become 
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the major driving force in attracting major football talent.560 In Europe, Russia and Ukraine have 
become the prime examples of this trend.  
 
The football specialists have become the symbol of a new Russia, and the national team 
has been able to show the world a new Russian image. This has been made possible by the newly 
rich Russians: by acting as philanthropists for the national team, the oligarchs, in a sense, act no 
differently than the old aristocrats of tsarist Russia who paid Italian, Dutch, German, and French 
artists to work and live in Russia. At the very top of the process, however, is the Russian state 
under Vladimir Putin that needs the national team to succeed in order to gain international 
prestige. Putin, therefore, encouraged Russia’s richest men to work as philanthropists for the 
state by investing in football infrastructure that could be used by the national team. The state of 
the Russian national team also reveals the difference between Russia and other republics of the 
former Soviet Union such as Ukraine. In Ukraine, investment in personnel has not yet reached 
the Ukrainian national team. As of early 2013 no foreigner has ever coached the Ukrainian 
national team. Instead, the owners of Ukraine’s biggest clubs have focused on strengthening their 
individual clubs with the best personnel from abroad. The absence of a coherent policy on the 
part of Ukraine’s oligarchs toward the Ukrainian national team demonstrates both the 
fragmentation of post-Soviet Ukraine, and lack of control by the state. 
Conclusion 	
The headline of the chapter “From Amateurs to Professionals” tells only half the story. Players 
were very much professionals during the time of the Soviet Union: they received a salary and 
bonuses from their clubs. They trained at least as much as their compatriots abroad in structures 																																																								
560 Kuper, Szymanski, Soccernomics, 407. 
	 279	
that were very similar to those in the west. When the Gorbachev reforms changed the way 
football business was done in the Soviet Union, it only did away with the official amateurism of 
the Soviet sports machinery. In fact, it was common knowledge even in the West that the Soviet 
players were not amateurs. But the reforms that were put in place to end amateurism in Soviet 
football were not only targeted at sport: in fact football was just one part of overarching 
developments that affected many aspects of Soviet society after 1987. Football is an industry like 
many others. In the changing market economy of the Soviet Union, however, players were not 
comparable to normal labour. Football players exercised many rights which were not available to 
normal workers on the assembly line. For example, players before 1988 were free to move and 
change their place of work after they completed an official transfer request. These requests were 
more often accepted than not, simply because football clubs had backing from the upper 
echelons of society. When, towards the end of the Soviet period, market regulations were put in 
place that forced players into contracts and removed them from permanent free agency, football 
players were perhaps the only profession in the Soviet Union that had to give up rights. 
 
 There is another reason why it is not possible to compare football players with normal 
labourers in the Soviet Union. When clubs became professional between 1987 and 1988, players 
became resources that could be used to generate much-needed funds. Clubs became independent 
enterprises and for many of these newly independent enterprises, players were their only real 
assets. As clubs in the former Soviet Union struggled financially, they soon recognized that they 
could use these assets to generate funds. Players, therefore, became a commodity that could be 
traded. As the Soviet Union began to experience monetary difficulties, trading companies were 
set up that tried to obtain foreign capital through any means possible. For this purpose 
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Goskomsport, as the state enterprise, set up joint ventures that are comparable with today’s 
player agencies. The joint ventures had the advantage that because they were low-tax, they could 
achieve larger financial benefits for the parent enterprise. Some clubs also benefited, with 
Dinamo Kiev, for example, using the existing loophole of free agency to acquire players for free 
and then selling them off to the West. As was the case in many such operations towards the end 
of the Soviet Union, a few benefited and the industry as a whole suffered. In the case of the 
extensive player sell off the in the period between 1988 and 1991, it was individuals who went 
on to turn the profits they made with agencies like Sovintersport into personal fortunes during 
the mass privatization of the early 1990s. But some clubs, such as Dinamo Kiev, also used the 
cash generated in the period to construct new training facilities and to build up a successful 
business. Spartak Moscow was another benefactor of the player sale of the late 1980s, and along 
with Dinamo Kiev, gained a head start over every other club in Ukraine and Russia.  
 
 It was the Salenko transfer that changed the way the market operated in the Soviet Union 
and later Russia. Clubs had introduced, not only a contract system, but also a system that 
calculated how much a player was worth. It is telling that the immediate Russian post-Soviet 
society maintained the scaling system. Russia was a hybrid; on the one hand there was the 
introduction of a wild free market economy under El’tsin, and on the other hand the state 
maintained many of its traditional Soviet functions. While players had to undergo an extensive 
bureaucratic process in order to transfer from one Russian club to another, they had an easy time 
moving abroad. The best players did indeed leave the former Soviet Union to play in the West, 
and it was no accident that the football transfer market began to change after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. In Western Europe, the influx of players from the former Soviet Union put market 
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pressure on the transfer system, and when Bosman sued for market mobility in football, the 
European Commission introduced laws that allowed footballers to operate in their trade just as 
freely as any normal labourer. This also had an effect on the clubs of the former Soviet Union, as 
increasing numbers of players left to play in the now open market in the West.  
 
 As the market emptied in the former Soviet Union, clubs struggled to fill the void. The 
big clubs, such as Dinamo and Spartak, bought the best talent that was available to them in the 
former Soviet republics, and as a result, smaller clubs started to turn to new markets. It is no 
surprise that a small club like Nizhny Novgorod was the first Russian club to purchase Brazilian 
players. Other clubs used the contacts of their coaches to bring in players from Africa. It helped 
that coaches of the former Soviet Union, unlike players, had been relatively free to work abroad. 
Many coaches had been sent to work in Africa and South America as part of foreign aid 
campaigns. Those contacts became invaluable after the fall of the Soviet Union when clubs from 
Russia and Ukraine brought in talent from the third world. But players from abroad sometimes 
struggled to make the former Soviet Union their home, and most just came hoping to be 
discovered by big clubs from the West. For football fans of the Soviet Union, it was a new 
experience to see players of different racial backgrounds in the kit of their favourite clubs. Russia 
and Ukraine have had and continue to have massive problems with racism and hooliganism. 
Foreign players of visible minorities are often the targets of demeaning chants.  
 
 Then in the early 2000s the market began to change. Fuelled by profits from oil and gas, 
football clubs of the former Soviet Union were now able to purchase the most talented available 
players. South America, at first, still remained the most attractive source for clubs in Russia and 
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Ukraine—what changed was the amount of money paid. Clubs also began to obtain players from 
Southern Europe. In order to achieve the best results possible, clubs also began to bring in 
foreign specialists. At Shakhtar, the club began to change its entire infrastructure, with foreign 
managers, coaches, and specialists brought in to give the club a modern image. Shakhtar became 
the benchmark in Eastern European football; soon other clubs copied the model. In Russia, the 
most prominent example was Zenit Sankt Petersburg. It is ironic that a city constructed by 
foreign specialists under the auspice of a powerful tsar now became Russia’s most powerful 
football city due to the influence of foreign specialists under the direction of a powerful state 
agency. Zenit relied on foreign coaches and superstar players from the West to achieve 
maximum results, and the powerful state-sponsored gas company Gazprom fuelled the project. 
But the government did not stop at Zenit, and after a string of poor results, the Russian 
government introduced a program that was to change the way football was played in the rest of 
Russia—and at the forefront of this new program were foreign specialists. This sums up the 
process that Russia has undergone since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russian and Ukrainian 
football went from an export economy to an import economy: the best players no longer go 













Advertising, in various forms, has been a major component of football since the founding years 
of the game. Selling advertisement space on billboards, inside stadiums, on stadium scoreboards, 
as well as outside the stadium, has been an important source of income for football clubs. 
Another source of income is advertising on the players themselves: kit, training gear, and later 
boots. Companies that advertise in the stadium believe their brand name can benefit through 
being attached to successful football teams, and in fact, some brands have become better known 
for the football team they sponsor than for their own merits. According to Edelman, in the Soviet 
Union, football clubs were given permission to sign advertisement deals with foreign companies 
as a means to generate much needed currency in 1987.561 But advertisement of Soviet companies 
could be found in Soviet stadiums as early as 1981, as is illustrated by video material retrieved 
from YouTube. The first advertisements, at this time, came from foreign companies and were 
only allowed during international cup games between teams from the Soviet Union and Western 
European clubs. The advertising was not aimed at Soviet viewers, but at the Western European 
audience who were watching the games from home. At the same time, however, games were 
shown on national television in the Soviet Union, and this meant that Soviet citizens were made 
aware of the advertising potential of football. When market reform was introduced in the 1980s, 
Soviet companies started to advertise during national as well as international football games. In 
fact, the progress of Gorbachev’s economic reforms can be measured by the volume and style of 
billboard advertising in football stadiums.  																																																								
561 Edelman, Serious Fun, 221. 
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The negotiation of advertisement contracts with Western companies fell under the 
jurisdiction of Sovintersport, the same agency that was also responsible for the negotiation of 
international transfers of Soviet players. Before 1987, deals involving Soviet sport and foreign 
companies, were negotiated between Goskomsport functionaries, and foreign companies. But 
with the open commercialization of Soviet sport, Goskomsport set up a new agency called 
Sovintersport, which between 1987 and 1991 acted as an intermediary between Soviet clubs and 
stadiums, and international companies who wanted to use Soviet football for advertisement. As 
with player transfers, the goal was to generate as much foreign currency as possible in order to 
maintain the financial stability of Soviet sport in general and football in particular. As video 
material from the period suggests, by the late 1980s the average Soviet league game displayed as 
much advertising as the average football game in Germany, Britain, or Italy. There were three 
problems for foreign companies who wanted to advertise their products in the Soviet Union, 
however: one was cost, the second was availability, and the third was need. The products 
advertised cost more than the Russian people could afford, the goods were frequently not 
available for purchase, and many of the commodities were items that the Russian people did not 
want or need. 562 Even during the late Gorbachev years, the above problems meant that Soviet 
clubs could not generate the same amount of hard currency through advertisement as clubs in the 
West. Russian advertising in the late 1980s and early 1990s had plenty of oddities because 
advertising in the Soviet Union was a hybrid in which Western values were mimicked and 
combined with values set in the period before the Russian Revolution. These oddities—
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frustratingly expensive, unavailable, and useless products—were often on display at football 
games and were promoted to viewers on the screen and at the stadium.  
 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, many internationally recognized companies that began 
to advertise at football games did not understand the limitations and needs of a population that 
had just experienced such a dramatic economic shift. The advertising of western European and 
American companies and brands at Russian football stadiums was therefore only effective when 
Russian clubs played at the international level, when the games would be shown on international 
television. Effectively Western companies saw advertisement as a long-term investment: the goal 
was to establish brand names in preparation for a time when the Russian living standard would 
be high enough for the general population to be able to afford western products. After 1999, 
many companies from the Russian energy sector began to advertise at football games as the 
economic situation of Russia as a whole changed and the country began to recover from the 
economic aftershock experienced as a result of the decline and fall of the Soviet Union. This 
development, which started in the late 1990s, can still be seen today in advertisement during 
football games in the Russian Premier League (as well as other leagues of the post-Soviet space); 
sponsorship slogans from major local companies share the field with those of global 
corporations, such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola. Billboard advertising in Russia has followed the 
major global trend in which premium companies advertise at the world’s most popular and, 
therefore, most valuable sport in terms of advertisement visibility and brand recognition. This 
chapter will highlight how major Russian companies have discovered football as a platform to 
advertise, not only within Russia, but also in the European and international market.  
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Consumer Guides and Reklama: Advertising in the Soviet Union 	
As David Goldblatt points out in his global history of football The Ball is Round, ‘where the 
press and the public lead, the advertisers cannot be far behind’.563 From the very beginning, 
companies realized the commercial potential of football, especially since it brought the power to 
speak to a large group of predominantly male upper-working-class people. Companies’ 
advertising in the game made use of male obsessions, such as collecting, listing, mapping and 
numbering—an example is the collection of cigarette boxes with pictures of players on them. 
This trend, from its beginnings in England, where the game originates, has accompanied the 
game wherever it has been established, including Russia and the Soviet Union, and is part of the 
global football phenomenon today.564 Football reached Russia in the early twentieth century, and 
there, as in England, the game was soon discovered to be an ideal commercial vehicle. 
Department stores in Moscow and Sankt Petersburg, for example, used football to advertise 
sports clothing.565 After the revolution and the civil war, private business was taken over by the 
state, and many of these state-owned enterprises then took over as owners and operators of the 
football clubs. There was a brief period where the state experimented with de-centralization and 
a liberalized the market in the 1920s. But as Edelman explains, ‘neither the state nor many 
factories were yet in the business of lavishly sponsoring sports teams.’566 This changed in the 
1930s when most teams were operated by state ministries, companies, and local governments. 
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Thanks to state sponsorship, advertisements were virtually non-existent in football games in the 
Soviet Union from the 1930s to the early 1980s.  
 
As Adele Marie Barker writes in her book Consuming Russia, advertisements had a very 
different function in the Soviet Union than they had in Western European societies that were not 
operating under a command economy; they were often used to reinforce party policy rather than 
to advertise a product.567 The advertising on Soviet television, for example, was a program on 
Channel 2 that was called Reklama (advertisement), which ran for five minutes daily.568 Some 
Soviet TV commercials from the 1970s and 1980s are accessible on YouTube, and the range of 
themes extends from the national airline Aeroflot 569  to public awareness advertisements 
encouraging a decrease in the use of electricity.570 As Katherine B. Eaton outlines in her book 
Daily Life in the Soviet Union, most material goods were in short supply and workers in factories 
and on farms often skimmed the best products for themselves.571 The Soviet Union had no 
regular consumer market, and the unpredictable times at which products appeared in stores made 
it difficult to advertise for these products in advance. The culture of advertisement, therefore, 
evolved around products that could not be sold. As Ludmilla G. Wells has found in her study 
‘Western Concepts, Russian Perspectives: Meaning of Advertisement in the Former Soviet 
Union’: 
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 …domestic advertising would be used when overproduced goods were not [being 
bought] and were of poor quality. That’s when advertising would appear: ‘Drink 
Juices’… [or] in the 1950’s ‘Buy Crabs’ when they were piled in heaps and no one 
was buying them…572   
 
As products were state produced, there was no competition between companies to reach new 
consumers, and advertisement was simply used to promote low quality products.  
 
Since the Soviet Union had no regular consumer market, there was no need for 
companies to advertise at football games. Commercial product placement would also have been 
against the ethos of amateur sport.  In 1973, for example, Spartak Moscow played their first 
UEFA Cup Winners Cup, a season in which the club reached the quarterfinal of the competition. 
On March 7, 1973 Spartak faced AC Milan from Italy, for a place in the semi-final. Due to the 
severe winters in Moscow, Spartak had to play its home match in the Black Sea resort town of 
Sochi.573  
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Source: ‘Istroiia Futbol’nogo Kluba Spartak Moskva.574  
Pictures taken before the match show the inside of the Central Stadium in Sochi, with the 
Spartak players lined up in front of the main stand. There are four banners behind the main stand; 
the first three display the coats of arms of the local Soviet, the city of Sochi and the Soviet 
Union, and the fourth is a picture of Lenin. There were no product advertisements in the stadium.  
 
Billboard advertisement did, however, slowly make an entrance into Soviet sport in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The changes of the advertisement culture in Soviet football are 




early 1980s, and its many European campaigns are well documented through videos on 
YouTube. In 1978 Dinamo Tbilisi won the Soviet Top League and as a result qualified for the 
1979-80 European Cup. They were drawn against FC Liverpool in the first round, and after 
loosing 2-1 in Liverpool, Tbilisi managed to win the home game 3-0 and eliminated the English 
champion. The match highlights are available on YouTube, and what is immediately apparent 
when watching the footage is the relative lack of sponsorship. Instead there is a single slogan 
placed along the main stand, which welcomes ‘The Sportsmen from England,’ as well as a huge 
poster behind one of the goals that advertises the 1980 Moscow Olympics.575 In 1979 Dinamo 
won the Soviet Cup, which qualified them for the 1980-81 European Cup Winners’ Cup, and on 
May 13, 1981 Tbilisi defeated the East German team Carl-Zeiss Jena to win its first European 
trophy. Match highlights of every round of the tournament are available on YouTube, and as in 
the 1979 European Cup, the Boris Pachaidze Stadium is completely free of advertisements. In 
contrast, when Dinamo played away at Upton Park to face West Ham United in England, the 
stadium was plastered with advertising. Advertising was also displayed when Dinamo faced Jena 
in the Final, which was played on neutral ground in the West German city of Düsseldorf. In both 
cases all advertising displayed was from western European, American, and Japanese companies 
such as Coca-Cola, Gillette, Canon, and Toyota, but there was no Soviet product placement.576 
 
 European Cup games of Soviet teams were shown on Soviet television, which meant that 
Soviet citizens were very much aware of the product placement possibilities within football 
stadiums. As the title defender, Dinamo also competed the following season in the European Cup 																																																								
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Winners’ Cup, facing SEC Bastia from France in Tbilisi on November 4, 1981. The match 
highlights show a remarkable change in the appearance of the Boris Pachaidze Stadium, as 
commercial advertisement was now on display—judging from the videos displayed on YouTube 
this could even be the first time commercial advertisement appeared inside a stadium in the 
Soviet Union. The advertising was almost exclusively for French companies, and was placed 
inside the stadium for the French television audience.577 Remarkably, this took place before the 
death of Leonid Brezhnev and the economic and political reforms that came after his death. The 
reason for the French advertising is straightforward. Under the Brezhnev administration the 
economy had become stagnant and in the early 1980s was experiencing a significant decline. 
Economic decline resulted in an increased toleration for foreign advertisement in Soviet stadiums 
as long as that advertisement was not targeted at the Soviet audience; foreign advertisement for 
international matches was therefore used as an opportunity to raise much needed hard 
currency.578 
 
The first evidence of any form of sponsorship during Soviet Top League matches can 
likewise be found on YouTube. On June 28, 1984 Dinamo Tbilisi played Zenit Leningrad in a 
match that Zenit won 2-3. 579  The significance of this video is not the goals or the final score, but 
the fact that it shows advertisement placed inside the stadium for a regular Soviet Top League 
match. The advertisement was placed along the main stand of the stadium, and is visible in the 
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video immediately after Dinamo scores the first goal, and 51 seconds in when Guram Chkareuli 
scores the second goal. All of the advertisement displayed is in Cyrillic script.580 More evidence 
of advertisement can be found during further league matches of Dinamo Tbilisi, such as the 1985 
game against Shakhtar Donetsk.581 Since many games were shown live on national television, 
advertisement at football matches was an attractive way for Soviet companies to advertise 
products on Soviet television—as stated above products advertised in the Soviet Union were 
usually those that had been difficult to sell. Some of the Soviet companies that advertised at the 
above mentioned Dinamo games, for example, included the Lithuanian beer company Tauras, as 
well as the Latvian company Radiotekhnika, which specialized in producing television sets. The 
1980s thus mark the onset of advertisement in Soviet football, but at this point, with the 
exception of the occasional international match, the advertisement spaces were still limited to 
national companies. Then in the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union began to increase its 
imports from Western nations. With new market regulation laws in place in the Soviet Union, 
Japan, for example, began to increase its export of television sets to the Soviet Union.  This 
meant that Soviet companies now had more foreign competitors, and advertisement at football 
matches became an effective tool with which to maintain market share.582 
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Sovintersport and the Capitalization of Soviet Football 	
After 1987 with the onset of the Gorbachev reforms, more financial accountability was 
demanded from state-owned companies. This meant that companies were now in competition 
with one another over consumers, a fact which, in the changing economic landscape, is well 
displayed within the confines of Soviet football advertisement. Documents in the Sovintersport 
fond at the Russian State Archive (GARF) highlight the changing role of advertisement in Soviet 
sport in the late 1980s, and especially the onset of international finance in Soviet sport. As the 
Soviet market opened to international companies, football became a primary advertising tool. 
The role for setting up advertisement contracts between companies from the West and the Soviet 
Union was assigned exclusively to Sovintersport. As highlighted in Chapter 4, Sovintersport was 
created as a department of Goskomsport that would negotiate international deals. Sovintersport’s 
subsidiary company Sovsportreklama (Soviet sport advertisement) was responsible for the 
majority of international sport advertisement deals signed in that period. After August 1987, 
Soviet clubs competing in international competitions were allowed to place advertisement on 
their shirts for both international and national games. Those clubs were Dinamo Kiev (European 
Cup), Dinamo Minsk (European Cup Winners’ Cup), Dinamo Moscow, Dinamo Tbilisi, Zenit 
Leningrad, as well as Spartak Moscow (the last four all in the UEFA Cup). The sponsors were 
Commodore (Germany-USA), Inkheba (Czechoslovakia) and Dorna (Lichtenstein). 583  The 
German-American computer company Commodore paid clubs for every round in European 
competitions, for example, when Dinamo Kiev advanced against Besiktas Istanbul, the club 
received $6000 for both the home and the away matches. Then in the next round, when Dinamo 
faced FC Porto the club received $7,000 for both the home and the away matches. Similar deals 																																																								
583 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 42, ll. 4-6  
(Sovintersport: Sponsorship contracts between clubs and foreign companies). 
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were also made for international friendly matches.584 Sovsportreklama was primarily responsible 
for setting up the sponsorship deals between clubs and international companies.  Sovintersport 
was also responsible for marketing international friendly matches. On September 9, 1987, for 
example, the Soviet Union was scheduled to compete against France in a UEFA European 
Championship qualification match in Moscow, and prior to the match, Sovintersport signed an 
advertisement deal with the Finnish company AV-Consultants in which AV-Consultants was 
given the exclusive right to place advertisements within the Luzhniki Stadium (with the 
exception of three advertisement boards that were reserved for companies from the Soviet 
Union). The deal was worth 150,000 Deutsch Mark and AV-Consultants had to guarantee that 
there would be no political messages, and also no advertisements for medicine, pornography, 
alcohol, and tobacco displayed anywhere in the stadium.585 Yet these deals were not large-scale 
trades, and the Sport-Alpine Centre was merely responsible for advertisement agreements within 
the Soviet Union.  
 
 The introduction of advertisement initiated a remarkable change in the economics of 
Soviet sports and showed that the Soviet regime was coming to terms with the fact that new 
market systems were necessary to finance high calibre football in the country. In 1987 and 1988 
most advertisement contracts negotiated by Sovintersport and its subsidiary companies were still 
signed for international football matches. For example, for Dinamo Minsk’s European Cup 
Winners’ Cup match against the Belgium team Mechelen, Sovsportreklama sold 26 
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(Sovintersport: Sovsportreklama contracts between Dinamo Kiev and Commodore). 
 
585 GARF, f. 10029, op. 1, d. 4, l. 1. 
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advertisement boards. Some of the advertising placements were for Soviet companies, such as 
Aeroflot, that also operated on the international market; most of the advertisement displayed, 
however, was for international companies, most of which originated in Belgium. 586  The 
sponsorship contract for the match was negotiated between Sovintersport and the international 
companies in question, and Dinamo had no input in the negotiations since the club was part of 
the government sport apparatus. 
 
The funds generated for the match through advertisement were not given to the club but 
instead were received directly by Sovintersport. Dinamo was a subsidized sport association, 
which belonged to the Ministry of Interior of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Instead 
of directly informing the club, a letter from the subsidiary company was sent out to the Director 
of the Central Stadium in Minsk simply informing him that there would be advertisement on 
display for the match that took place on October 30, 1987. The kind of advertisement that would 
be on display was not specified. In the letter sent to the directorate of the stadium, Sovintersport 
referred to rule 33-06-2/87, which allowed advertisement in Soviet stadiums, and gave 
Sovintersport jurisdiction over placing advertisement within stadiums.587 As an independent 
government agency that was part of Goskomsport, Sovintersport had the right to negotiate on 
behalf of Soviet clubs, and any income went to Sovintersport and eventually to Goskomsport, 
since Goskomsport was in charge of allocating government sport subsidies. Goskomsport, in 
turn, was expected to use the generated money to subsidize sport programs.  																																																								
586 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 185, ll. 22-23. 
(Sovintersport: Sovsportreklama stadium plan outlining advertisement boards for game between Dinamo Minsk and 
Mechelen) 
 
587 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 185, l. 21. 




The economic times were changing, however, and in 1987 some clubs were required to 
turn their operations from reliance on state subsidies to cost-accountability. The first Soviet club 
that turned from a state-owned and funded operation to a fully self-funded club was Dnepr 
Dnepropetrovsk from Ukraine. As a self-funded club Dnepr was now able to negotiate player 
contracts, as well as make its own sponsorship agreements. In fact, sponsorship agreements 
together with membership fees were intended to become the main income of the 
eksperimental’nyi vedomstvennyi khozraschetnyi Klub Dnepr (the experimental self-supporting 
club Dnepr). The idea was that Dnepr would be able to obtain 300,000 roubles a year, which 
would allow it to compete on a professional level without being dependent on state funds.588 
Dnepr’s relationship with Sovintersport was, therefore, that of two independent companies 
operating within the confines of Soviet law. Before Dnepr’s UEFA Cup match with Girondins 
Bordeaux, Sovintersport and Dnepr negotiated a contract that allowed Sovintersport to sell 
advertisement boards for the match.589 Sovintersport then gave Sovsportreklama the contract to 
negotiate sponsorship deals with companies for the match—Sovsportreklama was able to sell 57 
advertisement spaces for the match.590 Unfortunately the archived documents from Sovintersport 
do not show actual contract values, and therefore we do not know how much money Dnepr 
received from selling advertisement rights, and how much Sovintersport retained in negotiation 
fees. Nonetheless, the contract is significant in that Sovintersport was forced to approach Dnepr, 																																																								
588 Izvestiia 28 September 1987. 6. 
589 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 185, ll. 56-58. 
(Sovintersport: Contract between Sovintersport and Dnepr) 
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and Dnepr was able to negotiate as an independent entity. Dnepr’s negotiation freedom, 
however, was still limited, as Sovintersport and its subsidy companies held a virtual monopoly 
over sport marketing in the Soviet Union, and Sovintersport was the only company that had a 
contact network in Western Europe and North America. Dnepr, therefore, although an 
independent club, was still dependent on negotiating sport advertisement contracts with 
government actors.  
 
Sovintersport’s negotiation power with Soviet clubs was also displayed when the 
organization negotiated a sponsorship contract between the Italian steel manufacturer Danieli 
and several clubs from the Soviet Union. In August 1988, Danieli offered to pay 10,000 roubles 
for advertising at one match in a UEFA competition, and 5,000 roubles per match in the national 
championship. 591  The negotiations between Danieli and Sovintersport were concluded on 
September 15, 1988 and Danieli was given the right to display their slogan on the shirts of a few 
Soviet clubs. The clubs selected by Danieli were Spartak Moscow, Torpedo Moscow, Dinamo 
Minsk, Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk, Zhalgiris Vilnius, and Metallist Khar’kov. The clubs received 50 
per cent of the sponsorship contract; the rest of the money went to the central Soviet state 
according to the Soviet decree USSR 25.12.86 No. 1535.592  
 
But the football clubs did not always receive their 50 per cent share; in case of Dinamo 
Minsk, for example, the funds were transferred to the Belarusian Vneshekonombank (Foreign 
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Trade Bank) where the Belarusian all-Soviet sport organization Dinamo Minsk had its accounts 
for funds that came from abroad.593 The football club Dinamo was just one section of the 
Dinamo Minsk sport organization, and funds received from sponsorship deals were often evenly 
split between the different sports of a sport organization. 
 
Sponsorship deals between Sovintersport, foreign corporations, and football clubs often 
did not correlate with the market conditions of the USSR in the late 1980s. In 1987 for example 
Spartak, through Sovintersport, signed a deal with the Italian company Ocrim Spa (a grain and 
food producer).594  The company’s name was placed inside the white ring of the jersey, 
effectively altering the design that had been virtually unchanged from 1922 to 1987. For the 
1988 season Spartak moved to a different sponsor, the Italian steel producer Danieli. The 
sponsorship deal between Spartak (and, as mentioned above, other clubs) and Italian 
corporations like Danieli was curious because the way the Soviet market was structured made it 
impossible for Soviet citizens to purchase the products of any Italian producers. These product 
placements were destined for the international market, as Spartak played many games on the 
international level. Early jersey sponsorship deals were still very cheap, and therefore the 
financial risk for a company like Danieli was small. Another reason for Danieli’s investment 
could have been the political connections that came with investing money in a prominent football 
club such as Spartak. Danieli might have taken a leaf out of the old Soviet patronage book, 
where supporting a football club could garner political support for your investment.  																																																								
593 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 185, l. 73. 
(Sovintersport: Contract confirmation by the Belarusian all-Soviet sport organization Dinamo) 
 




In the late 1980s the sponsorship landscape was changing for Sovintersport. The 
experiment by Dnepr Dnepropetrovsk proved to be an enormous success, and other clubs were 
soon applying to Goskomsport in order to become cost-accountable. By 1990, most clubs in the 
Soviet Union had made the transformation, and this hugely impacted the way Sovintersport was 
concluding deals with individual clubs. Clubs now negotiated advertisement contracts with 
Sovintersport that were more complex than in previous years. In June 1990, for example, 
Dinamo Kiev negotiated a contract that would give Sovintersport the right to negotiate with 
foreign companies to place advertisements at Dinamo’s matches in the Vysshaia Liga. The deal 
stated that Sovintersport would pay 300 roubles for one meter of advertisement space per match 
in the period between June 1990 and December 1991. Dinamo was therefore guaranteed the sum 
of 450,000 roubles (100 meters of advertisement space times 300 roubles for 15 matches) for the 
period in question.595 Dinamo Kiev had become an independent sport club in January 1989, and 
as such was now tasked with financing its own operations. In an interview with Sovetskii Sport, 
the President of Dinamo expressed the expectation that the club would generate a profit of 
around 300,000 roubles in its first year as an independent organization, and that a large 
percentage of that profit would come from advertisement deals. Sport organizations were now 
also exempt from taxation and Dinamo only had to pay 34 per cent of its gate receipts to the 
ownership group of the Respublikanskii Stadium in Kiev.596 Dinamo’s advertisement deal with 
Sovintersport exemplified the changing dynamics of negotiations between independent sport 
clubs in the Soviet Union and government run organizations. Dinamo was guaranteed a profit 																																																								
595 GARF, f. 10029, op. 2, d. 375, ll. 43-45. 
(Sovintersport: Sponsorship contract between Sovintersport and Dinamo Kiev) 
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from advertisement irrespective of whether Sovintersport was able to sell the advertisement 
boards.  
 
Sovintersport not only handled the commercial and advertisement aspects of Soviet 
football clubs, but also managed sponsorship arrangements. In 1990, Sovintersport signed 
exclusive sponsorship deals with the Football Federation of the USSR (FFU) to direct the 
commercial activities of the Soviet national football team. As the exclusive commercial partner 
of the Soviet national team, Sovintersport gained the sole right to negotiate all commercial 
contracts for all players, coaches, teams (junior teams), and other specialists attached to the 
national team. It also gained the exclusive right to negotiate advertisement contracts for the 
Soviet national team to handle exports and imports of all goods related to the national team. In 
return Sovintersport was responsible for setting up travel arrangements, such as transport to and 
from games and excursions during away games in other countries. It was also responsible for 
providing the national team with sport equipment.597 Thus, in 1990 Sovintersport changed from 
being simply an import-export company for sport equipment and specialists to being a marketing 
agency. Advertisement deals between Sovintersport and the FFU, as well as the sponsorship deal 
between Sovintersport and Dinamo demonstrate the changing economics of sport in the dying 
days of the Soviet Union:  
The 1980s saw a general trend in which advertisement was more widely introduced 
in football as a new form of revenue, which began to replace traditional forms of 
revenue such as money generated from gate receipts.598	
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For sport teams as well as Sovintersport, the changing dynamics were beneficial; clubs were able 
to gain much needed currency and Sovintersport gained a monopoly over the negotiation of sport 
advertisements in the Soviet Union.  
 
The operations of Sovintersport help us to understand the shifting economic roles of 
different commercial actors within the sport sector of the Soviet Union. In particular, they draw 
attention to the role of stadiums as independent operators. Previously, as shown above, the 
operators of stadiums were simply informed about sponsorship agreements and were also tasked 
with setting up and removing the advertisement boards before and after matches. This 
relationship, however, seems to have changed in 1989, when stadiums, just like clubs, were 
transformed to operate independently from the state. Clubs, as well as the national team, had to 
pay rent to play in facilities all across the Soviet Union. Clubs usually paid a user fee to the local 
sport union as well as to the stadium organization itself.599  
 
By 1989 the language of negotiation between stadium committees, Goskomsport and 
Sovintersport started to change. In April 1989, Sovintersport reached an agreement with the 
Respublikanskii Stadium in Kiev regarding the advertisement that was to be displayed for the 
match between the Soviet Union and East Germany (GDR). Goskomsport only received 10 per 
cent of the income generated through advertisement during the match. It was also agreed that one 
advertisement space would be sold for 280 roubles.600 A similar deal was reached in May 1989 
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between Sovintersport and the Tsentral’nyi stadion imeni V. I. Lenina (Lenin Stadium, more 
commonly known as Luzhniki). Archive documents from the Sovintersport fondy show that 90 
per cent of the money generated through advertisement was transferred to the bank accounts of 
the stadium organization, in this case the bank account of the Luzhniki Stadium at the 
Promstroibank USSR (Construction and Development Bank).601 These documents show that 
stadium committees were now operating independently from the state in a way similar to the 
experimental club Dnepr, as well as to other clubs that adopted khozraschet at about that time. In 
many ways Sovintersport substituted for the now absent government subsidies. Stadiums were 
now in an ideal position, in that clubs continued to pay fees to use the facilities, and 
advertisement money also helped some of the larger stadiums generate profits.  
Adidas and Co.: Sports Gear and Advertising 	
Next to billboard advertisement, sporting goods, such as jerseys, footballs, goalie equipment, and 
football shoes are the most important means of product placement. The Soviet Union was far 
behind the West in the production of sporting goods, and relied on foreign manufacturers to 
provide the proper equipment for its athletes. Adidas, for example, was the exclusive supplier of 
equipment for Soviet football players. Adidas had a head start over other companies from the 
West because they were the first sporting goods company to work in the former Soviet Union. 
Horst Dassler, the son of Adolf Dassler, who founded the company in 1924, was instrumental in 
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its trade negotiations with the Soviet Union.602 Starting with the 1972 European Cup, almost the 
entire Soviet national team was wearing the iconic Adidas shoes with the three stripes. This 
marks the beginning of the relationship between Adidas and the Soviet Football Federation. In 
fact, the year 1972 is no coincidence; Dassler was able to build contacts with Soviet dignitaries 
during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.603 In 1972, Dassler hired Christian Jannette, who was 
the chief of protocol of the Munich Olympic Games, and who had good connections with Soviet 
officials. During the 1976 Montreal Olympics, Jannette organized a trip to Niagara Falls for the 
Soviet sport minister Sergei Pavlov and Mikhail Mzareulov, the head of protocol for the Soviet 
delegation. The trip had to be arranged in secret since Soviet authorities in Moscow were 
opposed to it, and the Soviet officials used a private jet owned by Adidas for the excursion. In 
advance of the 1980 Olympics, Jannette made over 60 trips to the Soviet Union, including one to 
Iakutia, a region for which even most Soviets needed a visa. It was through Jannette that Adidas 
built a monopoly as the only sporting goods supplier in the Soviet Union.604  
 
In the 1980s, Horst Dassler negotiated a deal that provided Soviet athletes with Adidas 
products for international competitions. These deals, however, came with a big financial hit: in 
1988 for example, Argumenty i Fakty reported that the USSR state committee for sport was to 
receive $18 million over the next four years from Adidas.605 In the article itself A. P. Progrebnoi, 
the head of the foreign economic relations of Goskomsport, explained that Goskomsport was 
completely financially independent of the overall state budget thanks to foreign sponsorship 																																																								
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deals such as the one with Adidas. He also reported that the Soviet Union had negotiated licenses 
with Adidas to produce certain sports equipment products in the Soviet Union, in order to raise 
the local production of sporting goods to a higher level. Adidas, according to Progrebnoi, had 
started to produce shoes in the Soviet Union that were to be worn by Soviet athletes. In the 
interview Progrebnoi also made it clear that athletes, in particular football players, should not 
have worn Adidas products in domestic competitions since this was illegal. He did, however, 
understand why certain players chose Adidas over the local goods since Adidas products were of 
a higher quality: ‘it is ironic, but Soviet industry has failed to produce items such as well-fitting 
goalkeeper uniforms.’606 Adidas was certainly the favoured choice of football players in the 
Soviet Union; in particular the Dinamo teams from Moscow, Kiev, and Tbilisi wore Adidas 
jerseys, shoes, and pants, not only for international matches, but also for domestic matches. Most 
importantly, the flagship of Soviet football, the national team, wore Adidas jerseys for all 
international games. In the 1980s, the three Adidas stripes began to appear more often on 
football jerseys, as is evident from the very same YouTube videos that were used to examine the 
amount of sponsorship in Soviet football stadiums. 
 
But how did Adidas benefit from the deal? At the time the Soviet Union had no open 
market, and Soviet athletes wearing the three stripes did not translate into sales for the company 
on the Soviet market. Horst Dassler was very good at signing financial contracts that required 
athletes to wear his shoes, but financial benefits would not work with Soviet football players. 





well as to a hotel in Paris.  As the sport’s journalist Mihir Bose writes: ‘Soviet officials made it 
clear that on such trips they expected Adidas to finance their shopping fancies and Dassler was 
happy to oblige.’607  In retrospect it can be argued that Adidas was creating a future market, but 
the fall of the Soviet Union, and the opening of the market, was definitely not foreseeable, 
especially in the 1970s when Dassler began his forays into the Soviet arena. Instead, the 
sponsorship deal with the Soviet Union was part of a larger project in which Horst Dassler 
attempted to gain influence in the global sporting world.608 The return, for Dassler, was political 
influence rather than sales: as Bose explains, ‘Dassler courted world leaders and was probably 
better known inside the Kremlin then many heads of states.’609 The deal with the Soviet Union 
was not the only deal that Dassler made with a dictatorship: he was also able to convince Erich 
Honecker, the leader of East Germany, that East German athletes should wear Adidas shoes 
instead of the East German brand Zeha.610 Adidas would use the influence that it had created 
with sports officials around the world to become the premium sponsor for international 
tournaments, such as the Olympics, the European Football Championship, and most importantly 
the FIFA World Cup. 
 
Horst Dassler died in 1987 and by that time many teams in the Soviet Union were 
wearing jerseys made by Adidas for international and domestic games. The company itself, 
however, was running into financial difficulties and the French tycoon Bernard Tapie bought it 
in 1990. Tapie specialized in reviving struggling businesses. He had made a name for himself as 																																																								
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the owner of the French football team Olympique Marseille. In 1995, however, Olympique 
Marseille was found guilty of game manipulation, and as a result was banned from European 
football and relegated to the French second division, and Tapie was banned from football. As 
part of the match fixing scandal, Izvestiia also reported that it had come to light that one of the 
games that Olympique had fixed was the semi-final of the 1991 European Cup against Spartak 
Moscow. The police discovered this during an interview with Jean-Pierre Bernes, an official of 
Olympique. Officials from Spartak and the Russian Football Union denied any allegation of 
match fixing. Iurii Shliapin who was the president of Spartak in 1991 said that neither he, nor the 
manager Oleg Romantsev, nor president Starostin had ever heard of any deal made with 
Olympique. Shliabin also said ‘100,000 people saw the match—they would have known if 
something was wrong.’611 The president of the Russian Football Union Koloskov also stated that 
he did not believe that Spartak was involved in any kind of match fixing.612 The match in 
question, took place in April 1991 when the Soviet Union was still in existence. The kit provider 
for both teams was Adidas, and Spartak was still struggling with the changes that had 
accompanied the free market economy that had been introduced into the Soviet Union. Tapie 
would have had the political and economic influence to make a deal with Spartak Moscow that 
would guarantee Spartak giving Olympique a pass to the final.  
 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the advent of the free market economy in 
Russia and the former Soviet Republics, football clubs and football federations were free to sign 
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equipment deals with sport companies. Many clubs stayed with Adidas in the early 1990s, but 
numerous other sports companies made their forays into the now globalized sports equipment 
market. By 1999 all the major shoe companies (Adidas, Nike, Reebok, Umbro and many more) 
were equipping teams with shoes, goalie equipment and, most importantly, jerseys.613 The 1994 
World Cup was the first international competition for the newly independent Russian national 
team, and the shirts were no longer provided by Adidas, but instead were supplied by the 
American company Reebok. After the debacle at the 1996 European Championship, the Russian 
Football Union signed a new deal with Nike, which lasted until 2008. Today the Russian national 
team, like its Soviet predecessor, wears the three stripes that represent Adidas. For the 2010 
World Cup, Adidas produced a jersey that made a play on the Soviet legacy of the Russian 
national team, combining it with traditional Russian elements such as the tsarist empire; the 
golden thread symbolized the golden roofs of the orthodox churches, and the red symbolized the 
red stars of the Kremlin, as well as the red colour of football jerseys of the Soviet national team.  
																																																								





Source: ‘Adidas Kit Ad Campaign’614  
 
Jeremy Morris explains that advertisement in Russia ‘is often interconnected with a focus on the 
‘greatness’ and implicit destiny of the nation, tracing pre-revolutionary excess to the boundless 
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human and material resource of today’s Russia.’615 The ad campaigns for the World Cup were 
produced in November 2009, but ultimately the Russian national team that reached the semi-final 
of the 2008 European Cup failed to qualify for the 2010 World Cup that took place in South 
Africa. Yet the equipment deal with Adidas highlights the cultural importance of the football 
jersey. As stated in the campaign, ‘every team needs a shirt with a story.’  
 
The players do not care very much about the look of the jersey they wear, or the cultural 
symbols that are woven into the fabric. Players often talk about the honour of wearing a certain 
jersey, but in fact, the advertisement campaign by Adidas is targeted at the fan. Football fans are 
very nostalgic, and often bask in the past glories of their favourite teams. The jersey advertising 
speaks of a nation that was still trying to find the right way to come to terms with its heritage, 
which in this case was ultimately a combination of Tsarist and Soviet nostalgia. Liubov’ 
Borusiak writes in her article Soccer as the Catalyst of Patriotism that Russians especially ‘feel 
pride in regard of their grand history (as in the case of the Great War for the Fatherland), this 
feeling also relates not to the present but the past eras.’616 The 2009 Adidas jersey was able to 
incorporate all these elements of national pride and nostalgia.  
The 1990s: Football Sponsorship and Kapitalizm 	
By 1991, the product placement inside the stadium in the Soviet Union became as varied as in 
the West. Billboards went up, advertising a myriad of products, most of them produced by 
brands from Western Europe and the United States. The drive to capture Russia as a new market 																																																								
615 Jeremy Morris, ‘Drinking to the Nation: Russian Television Advertising and Cultural Differentiation’, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 59. No. 8. (Dec., 2007), 1388. 
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was further fuelled by scholarship published regarding Russia in the early and mid-1990s which 
suggested that the country was successfully proceeding on the path from communism to 
capitalism. Books such as Poe Richard’s How to Profit from the Coming Russian Boom (1993), 
Anders Aslund’s How Russia Became a Market Economy (1995), Richard Layard and John 
Parker’s The Coming Russian Boom (1996) emphasized Russia’s status as a hot investment in the 
early 1990s. As a result, the early 1990s saw many international advertisement agencies sweep 
into the relatively untapped post-Soviet advertisement market. International corporations started 
buying up advertisement space on national television and on billboards around cities as well as at 
football games—advertisements for products which did not always correlate to the actual needs 
of the post-Soviet population. As Jeremy Morris explains in his article, ‘Drinking to the Nation: 
Russian Television Advertising and Cultural Differentiation’: 
Advertisement for cat food, anti-perspirants and nappies ignored the realities of post-
Soviet life while creating a dream world which revealed an idealized view of 
Western life that barely corresponded to the immediate post-Soviet experience of 
unbridled capitalism.617 
 
Jeremy Morris explains the state of advertisement on Russian TV, but his description could 
likewise be applied to football stadiums, where companies from the West also dominated product 
placement. Advertising in post-Soviet football stadiums mostly reflected the economic euphoria 
that surrounded Russia after the collapse of communism. The untapped consumer market that the 
former Soviet Union represented, especially intrigued Western companies.  A report in 1990, for 
example, indicated,  ‘The marketplace is comprised of 286 million relatively well-educated 
consumers with a wide variety of unfulfilled needs and wants.’ In 1989 it was suggested that the 
unsatisfied consumer demand was 165 billion roubles.618 This market optimism continued into 																																																								
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the 1990s and, as a result, foreign companies were eager to be the first to advertise in any 
possible location, including at football games.  
 
Edelman describes the change of scenery that took place in the transition years following 
the fall of communism in Soviet Union: 
the old starkness of the domestic Soviet league events has been replaced by the 
standard hoopla for contemporary capitalist sport spectacle production, including 
dancing girls (and bears), laser shows, and production giveaways.619 
 
Russia made great strides in marketing football as an entertainment product that could be used 
for the benefit of commercial enterprises. Russian football was affected by the whirlwind of 
foreign investment groups and soon the non-Russian domination of advertisement almost led to a 
backlash as Russians began to view foreign advertisement as commercialized indoctrination that 
undermined Russian values and culture by enforcing a perception of domination by the United 
States. American products such as Pepsi, Coca-Cola, or Snickers became emblems ‘for a better 
life, but also symbolized a perceived cultural, economic and political imperialism [by the United 
States].’620 The problem was, however, that Russian teams in the 1990s were completely 
dependent on sponsorship money from Western companies in order to finance their operations. 
Many Russian companies were still coming to grips with the economic changes of post-Soviet 




619 Edelman, ‘There are no rules on planet Russia: post-Soviet spectator sport’, 231. 
620 Morris. ‘Drinking to the Nation: Russian Television Advertising and Cultural Differentiation’, 1392. 
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The Russian Football Union also soon realized that the league in itself was marketable and 
the idea of a name sponsor was soon introduced for the top division of the Russian football 
league. The idea to sell the naming rights of a football league to a sponsor was not entirely new: 
in England, the recently created Premier League sold its naming rights to the brewing company 
Carling in 1993. 621 Name sponsoring for a football competition was still deemed highly 
controversial in the early to mid-1990s, and England’s top flight was indeed to remain one of the 
only top leagues to carry the brand name of a corporation. The football federations of Germany, 
Spain, and Italy have certainly been reluctant to introduce name sponsoring for their premier 
football competitions, a stand that continues to the present day. In Russia, however, the Russian 
Top League signed a marketing deal with the American sports marketing company IMG, which 
then sold the league’s naming rights to the toothpaste company Stimorol.622 Spearheaded by the 
American lawyer Mark McCormack, IMG became one of the first international marketing 
companies to invest in Russian sport. By signing an agreement with the Russian Football Union 
and the Professional Football League, IMG received the exclusive right to sign advertisement 
deals with other companies in the name of Russia’s Top Division, which was an attempt to 
centralize sport marketing in Russian football. The deal determined that IMG receive an 
unnamed percentage of any sponsorship deal signed. The contract signed between IMG, and the 
Professional Football league guaranteed a sum of $3 million per season for the league and all the 
clubs participating in the championship, with an additional bonus of $500,000 for the league 
winner. In return, IMG signed a sponsorship agreement with Stimorol and the league was called 
Stimorol Chempionat Rossii. Clubs also had to wear patches of the company on the sleeves of 
																																																								
621 http://www.premierleague.com/en-gb/about/history.html accessed 2 June 2014.  
622 Izvestiia April 1, 1995. 4. 
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their jerseys, and the company received the right to place billboard sponsoring in all the 
stadiums, as well as to receive advertisement space during the broadcasts of football games. The 
contract was to run for three years with a two-year extension option for Stimorol.623  
 
Hygiene product companies like Stimorol, Proctor & Gamble, and Colgate-Palmolive were 
especially present in the post-Soviet market. The advertisement objective for these companies 
was to establish brand names, rather than to promote product availability. Soviet and post-Soviet 
consumers, however, were unaccustomed to this sort of western-style advertisement that aimed 
at creating brand awareness rather than promoting good cheap products. Many western products 
were much more expensive than domestic products.624 By the mid 1990s, therefore, many 
western companies realized that their traditional advertisement strategy in Russia had failed. In 
1997 Stimorol, for example, decided to pull out of the sponsorship deal with the Russian 
Football Union and the Professional Football League when the initial contract ran out. Also, the 
President of the PFL wanted to renegotiate the deal with IMG, as the league felt that $3 million 
was no longer sufficient. IMG, however, was reluctant to renegotiate the contract with the PFL 
and the Russian Football Union, as the deal with IMG was good all the way through to 1999 and 
included a yearly 12 per cent rise.625 IMG then replaced Stimorol with the American company, 
Pepsi, from 1997 to 2000.626 The deal between IMG, Pepsi, and the PFL could not have come at 
																																																								
623 Kommersant March 24, 1995. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/105048 accessed 2 June 2014.  
624 Wells, ‘Western Concepts, Russian Perspectives’, 89. 
625 Kommersant March 22, 1997 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/174775 accessed 2 June 2014.  
626 http://lenta.ru/news/2006/07/11/footgosstrah/ accessed 2 June 2014. 
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a better time, as it guaranteed the financial stability of the league in what would turn out to be the 
most turbulent financial period of the Russian Federation since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Post-1998 From Sponsorship to Ownership Sponsorship in Russia and Ukraine 	
By mid-1998, currency inflation and the underpayment of taxes by Russians meant that the 
government of the Russian Federation was in deep financial trouble, and by mid-August the 
El’tsin administration concluded that it could no longer afford to participate in what could only 
be called check fraud. The government was no longer able to find enough lenders who were able 
and willing to buy state securities, and this, combined with the fact that the government had run 
out of hard currency meant that the state faced bankruptcy. On 17 August 1998, the Treasury and 
the Central Bank announced that they could no longer satisfy their lenders. Last minute loans 
provided by IMF and Goldman Sachs did little to stem the tide of the country’s relentless 
progression toward bankruptcy. The financial collapse of the Russian Federation meant the 
collapse of 1,500 banks owned by the first generation of oligarchs who had used the loan for 
shares deals of the early 1990s in order to open banks. The only oligarchs to survive the crash of 
1998 were those who had insider information and secured their funds by purchasing natural 
resource companies. Mikhail Khordokovskii, for example, used funds from his Menatep bank to 
purchase the oil company Yukos in a loan for shares auction, and although the oil price had 
dropped to as low as $15 a barrel in 1998 due to the general slowdown of the world economy, 
resource companies would soon prove to be a secure investment for those oligarchs who had 
bought them prior to the financial crash of 1998. Those companies along with their oligarch 
owners would provide the base of Russia’s economic recovery in the early 2000s.627  																																																								




The financial meltdown of 1998 and the relatively quick recovery of the Russian market 
also had an impact on football sponsorship in the Russian Federation. The first decade of the 21st 
century would see an increase of advertisement contracts signed between large Russian energy 
corporations and Russian football clubs. Russia’s quick recovery from the economic collapse of 
1998 was mostly due to the fact that the oil price rose to $33 a barrel in 2000. The oligarchs who 
had invested in resource companies in 1998 realized Russia’s oil potential and invested in new 
technology to increase the production of oil and also to explore previously untapped oil fields.  
By 2006 Russia was producing more crude oil than even Saudi Arabia, and Russia for the first 
time since 1992 became the world’s largest producer of petroleum.628 The renaissance of 
Russia’s oil industry had a direct effect on sponsorship and advertisement in Russian football.  
 
 LUKoil became the first major Russian oil company to sponsor a football club, when it 
signed a deal with Spartak Moscow in 2000, beating out multi-national companies such as 
Heineken and Ford. Although financial details of the sponsorship contract between Spartak and 
LUKoil were undisclosed, the chairman of LUKoil Vagit Alekperov stated at the time that 
LUKoil had a sport budget of $7 million, and Spartak stated that the sum of the contract was 
larger than the previous sponsorship deal with the electronics company AKAI, which was worth 
$800,000 a year. LUKoil was especially interested in signing a sponsorship agreement with 
Spartak because the club was a regular participant in international competitions such as the 
UEFA Champions League, and this would guarantee international exposure for the oil 
																																																								
628 Ibid. 77-80. 
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company.629 As described in detail in the ownership chapter, the agreement between Spartak and 
LUKoil grew into a relationship that saw one of the principal shareholders of LUKoil, Leonid 
Fedun, become the owner of the club.  
 
 Spartak did not remain the only club to be backed by a resource-based company. In 
March 2004, the oil company Sibneft signed a three-year sponsorship agreement with TsSKA 
Moscow, worth $54 million, in what was the largest sponsorship agreement for any Russian club 
up to that moment. The sponsorship agreement was, however, ended after just two years when 
Roman Abramovich, the owner of Sibneft, sold the oil company to Gazprom. ‘A new owner has 
arrived and does not see the point of promoting the brand of a subsidiary company,’ Sibneft 
spokesman Alexei Firsov said.630 Sibneft’s sponsorship agreement with TsSKA was also not 
without controversy as Roman Abramovich had also purchased the London club Chelsea FC in 
2003,631 and the two clubs were drawn in the same group of the UEFA Champions League in 
2004. This prompted an investigation, by UEFA, into the exact ownership structure of the 
Moscow club.632 TsSKA was later cleared of being directly influenced by Roman Abramovich or 
anyone else involved at Chelsea FC, and the teams were allowed to compete against each other 
in European competitions.   
 
																																																								
629 Moscow Times March 18, 2000 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lukoil-scores-3-year-sponsorship-
of-spartak-moscow/265374.html accessed 3 June 2014.  
630 Moscow Times November 29, 2005. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2005/11/article/cska-loses-
sibneft-backing/208311.html accessed 3 June 2014.  
631 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3036838.stm accessed 3 June 2014. 
632  Moscow Times August 27, 2004. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/paid/2004/8/article/chelsea-cska-
draw-sparks-investigation/228731.html accessed 3 June 2014.  
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 In 2012, the following clubs topped the sponsorship table in the Russian Premier League: 
Spartak Moscow received $5 million from LUKoil, TsSKA Moscow got $9 million from 
Russian Aeroflot, Zenit Sankt Petersburg obtained $19 million from Gazprom, and Lokomotiv 
Moscow received $30 million from RZhD (Russian Railways).633 These numbers, however, do 
not take into consideration the fact that both Zenit and Lokomotiv are owned directly by their 
respective sponsors, and Spartak is owned by one of the principal shareholders of LUKoil, 
Leonid Fedun. These clubs function as advertising platforms for the corporations that own them. 
The new Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules that were introduced by UEFA in 2009 have made it 
necessary for certain ownership groups to mark their investment as sponsorship agreements 
rather than as straight up investments. FFP considers direct investments by the ownership as 
loans, but allows for sponsorship agreements between the owner, and the club. This explains 
why at Lokomotiv, Zenit, and Spartak, the owner is also presented as the official sponsor of the 
club.634  
 
 There are additional benefits beyond FFP compliance in merging the identity of a big 
corporation with a successful club. Today, Zenit Sankt Petersburg and Spartak Moscow are two 
of the three most popular clubs in Russia (the other is TsSKA Moscow). The identities of these 
clubs have practically merged with those of their main sponsors. The Zenit colour scheme, for 
example, is identical to that of its main sponsor and owner—gas giant Gazprom. Both Zenit and 
Gazprom use the sky-blue and white colour scheme. Both institutions used this colour scheme 																																																								
633 http://rt.com/business/aeroflot-will-sponsor-russian-cska-football-club-922/  accessed 2 June 2014.  
634  For more information on Financial Fair Play please visit: 
http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html accessed 8 March 2015. 
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prior to Gazprom’s investment in the football club, but Zenit’s colours were altered in order to 
make the link between Gazprom and the Zenit unmistakable. Pictures 6 and 7 show the 
transformation of the Zenit jersey since Gazprom took over as the sponsor of the club in 2000.  
Picture 6 
	
Source: ‘FC Zenit’s Kit’ FC Zenit official website635  
																																																								




Source: ‘FC Zenit’s Kit’ FC Zenit official website636  	
The transformation of the jersey became even more drastic after Gazprom became the majority 
owner of the club in 2005.637 In 2008 the colours of the jersey were changed from dark blue to 
the lighter sky-blue variant, which more closely resembles the colour scheme of the Gazprom 
Corporation. Similarly, Zenit, which evolved from a mediocre Soviet team to a top class Russian 
team with one of the highest budgets in Europe that plays successfully in the Champions League, 
had a specially made kit provided by the American sports apparel brand Nike. Most clubs use 
generic kit designs, and Nike, just like Adidas, only produces unique jerseys for its top brand 
clubs. Zenit’s new kit was introduced in the spring of 2011 to mark the beginning of the 2011/12 
football season. Together with the new kit, Nike also launched an extensive advertisement 
																																																								
636 http://en.fc-zenit.ru/main/history/colors accessed 26 March 2012. 
637 Sport Ekspress December 25, 2005. http://news.sport-express.ru/2005-12-25/114230/ accessed 11 June 2014. 
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campaign in the city of Sankt Petersburg, introducing the new football kit under the slogans 
‘Nashe imia Zenit’ (Our name is Zenit) and ‘Novaia domashniaia forma’ (the new home kit).  
Picture 8 
	
Source: ‘FC Zenit’s Kit’ FC Zenit official website638  
Through Nike and Gazprom, Zenit has indeed developed a corporate identity. According to an 
independent analysis conducted in 2010, no club from the former Soviet Union had more 
supporters then Zenit;639 60 per cent of Sankt Petersburgers support the club actively and 80 per 
cent of the citizens of Sankt Petersburg believe that the club is a symbol of the city of Sankt 
Petersburg.640 The club is highly visible in the city, with several flagship stores including a two 
story Zenit fan-shop on Sankt Petersburg’s famous Nevskii Prospekt. In an increasingly global 
environment ‘thematization of locality and nationality’ have become increasinly important.641 
																																																								
638 http://en.fc-zenit.ru/main/history/colors/ accessed 26 March 2012. 
639 For a list of Europe’s most popular football clubs see: http://www.sportundmarkt.com/index.php?id=5199  
accessed 11 June 2014. 
640 http://en.fc-zenit.ru/main/club/ accessed 11 June 2014. 
 
641 Tim Edensor, and Steve Millington. ‘‘This is Our City’: branding football and local embeddedness’, Global 
Networks 8, 2 (2008), 173. 
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This is especially illustrated in Zenit’s rebranding in the years following the takeover by 
Gazprom, which firmly roots not only the club but also Gazprom in the city of Sankt Petersburg. 
 
 The same study that had Zenit ranked as the most supported club of the former Soviet 
Union, still ranked Spartak in the top 20 in Europe, but the club had fallen behind both Zenit and, 
even worse, below its cross-town rival TsSKA Moscow.642 Spartak was sponsored from 2000 
onwards by LUKoil.643 From 2003 to 2004 the English company Umbro equipped the club. 
Umbro made almost no attempt to design a shirt that was in keeping with the traditional Spartak 
uniform. Instead, the Umbro kit that Spartak used was a generic red without the white horizontal 
stripe. Spartak began to perform poorly and Umbro’s equipment sponsorship at Spartak is now 
associated with the mediocrity of the club’s 2003 and 2004 seasons. This is especially evident 
when browsing through several Spartak fan pages that currently exist on the Internet. Fans were 
disappointed with the fact that the horizontal white ring had been taken off the Spartak kit; this 
move was described as a break with the Spartak tradition.644 When Fedun, who is not only the 
owner but also a Spartak fan, took over Spartak, a deal was negotiated with Nike, in which there 
was a return to a more traditional kit design for Spartak, as shown in Picture 9. 
																																																								
642 http://www.sportundmarkt.com/index.php?id=5199 
643 Komsomol’skaia Pravda June 1, 2004. 14. Feb. 2012. http://www.kp.ru/daily/23288/29289/ accessed 14 June 
2014.  




Source: ‘Istoriia 2006 goda. 2-e mesto v chempionate Rossii’ RedWhite.ru645  
 
Just like at Zenit, Spartak began to incorporate more and more elements of LUKoil into the 
Spartak brand. The return to the more traditional Spartak uniform is part of a global trend in 
which marketing companies realize that football brands have an extraordinarily strong 
sentimental value, which can prove to be profitable for the corporate sponsor. Prior to the 2011 
season, Nike released a Spartak jersey without a sponsorship slogan, which had a strong 
association to Spartak jerseys of the past.    
                                                         
 Like Zenit and Spartak in Russia, Ukraine’s major football club, Shakhtar Donetsk, also 
become closely associated with its major sponsor in the early 2000s. In Ukraine, most major 
football clubs have fallen under the control of major businessmen also known as oligarchs. The 																																																								
645 http://www.redwhite.ru/spartak/history/news_detail.php?ID=3884 accessed 27 March 2012. 
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relationship between these men and football clubs has been discussed extensively in Chapter 2. 
But in addition to using football clubs as political tools, clubs also became important marketing 
vehicles for the companies that the oligarchs own. Shakhtar Donetsk, Ukraine’s most successful 
club since 2000, for example, wears the sponsorship slogan of System Capital Management 
(known as SCM), the largest financial and industrial holding group in Ukraine, and the primary 
sponsor of the football club since 2006. The mission statement of SCM describes the unique 
relationship between the club and its major sponsor: 
Today FC Shakhtar is more than just a club: we establish new benchmarks and 
standards in the art of football! This is proved by many things: the European record 
of our club's achievements, unique football infrastructure, a children's and youth 
academy and the latest technologies in sports medicine... Also, the new stadium has 
become a real pilgrimage site for tourists and a recreational place for the city 
residents.646 
 
Shakhtar Donetsk’s owner Rinat Akhmetov, who founded SCM Holding in 2000, has held 99.98 
per cent of the company’s shares since 2009.647 In some way, SCM Holding is merely a way to 
provide the club with real financial income through sponsorship, in what can be seen as a way to 
circumnavigate UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations, which are aimed at increasing the 
financial sustainability of football clubs in Europe.648 In addition, sponsorship agreements 
between corporations and football clubs help to more firmly root the club in the corporate 
identity of the owner, as is the case with Rinat Akhmetov in Donetsk, Gazprom in Sankt 
Petersburg, and Leonid Fedun/LUKOil at Spartak. This is a model that has since been copied by 
																																																								
646 http://www.scmholding.com/en/business/sectors/football/shakhtar/ accessed 9 June 2014. 
647 http://news.finance.ua/ru/~/1/0/all/2009/04/08/157075 accessed 9 June 2014.  
648 For the exact regulations regarding UEFA’s FFP rules please see: 
http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html accessed 11 June 2014.  
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large investors from the Middle East, who have taken over leading football clubs in England and 
France (see Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain).  
‘We Light the Football’: Gazprom’s Football Sponsorship Empire 	
Zenit in many ways served as the starting point in the creation of Gazprom’s football empire, 
which included advertisement and sponsorship deals with major football clubs in Western 
Europe, as well as corporate agreements with football federations such as UEFA and FIFA. 
Gazprom’s investment in football is along the same line as sponsorship agreements instigated by 
government institutions of the Middle East. Just months after Qatar’s successful bid to host the 
2022 World Cup, the Qatar Foundation signed a £125 million deal with the Spanish football club 
FC Barcelona in December 2010. The Qatar Foundation is chaired by Her Highness Sheikha 
Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Missned, the wife of the Emir, and is a non-profit organization that 
primarily funds education projects in the Middle East.649 Through sponsorship of one of the 
world’s most prominent football clubs, the Qatar Foundation’s objective was to improve Qatar’s 
image. The Qatar Foundation is just one of many examples of Middle Eastern state owned 
foundations that have discovered football as a vehicle to improve the image of countries from the 
Arabian peninsula. Another example is French club Paris Saint-Germain, which was bought by 
the Qatar Investment Authority, which is directly controlled by Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin 
Jaber Al Thani, in 2012.650 In many ways these brands have followed in the footsteps of 
Gazprom’s sport development program. 
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 In addition to operating and owning one of Russia’s most successful clubs, Gazprom has 
also facilitated connections with major football clubs in Western Europe through sponsorship 
agreements. In 2012, for example, the company signed an advertisement deal with Chelsea FC, 
in which the company became the official energy supplier to the football club.651 The deal 
between Gazprom and Chelsea is perhaps less surprising given Roman Abramovich’s close 
connections to the upper echelons of the Russian government. For Gazprom, the deal meant 
prime-time advertisement space at one of the world’s most supported football clubs. For Chelsea, 
which like the Ukrainian club Shakhtar was dependent on the millions invested by a single 
owner, the deal with Gazprom meant less dependency on Abramovich’s funds which, in the light 
of the newly introduced Financial Fair Play regulations introduced by UEFA in 2009, became 
crucial for the club and its ownership. Thanks to the millions invested by Gazprom, the club was 
able to run a profit in 2012, which was the first time the club was in the black since Abramovich 
took over in 2003.652  
   
Another club that has become part of the Gazprom Empire is the German Bundesliga 
club FC Schalke 04 from Gelsenkirchen. Gazprom became the principal sponsor, or shirt 
sponsor, of Schalke in 2007. The deal was the first step in what would become a global image 
campaign of the Russian gas company designed to improve the image of a company that was 
associated in Western Europe with corruption and was seen as a soft power weapon of the 
Russian government in the near abroad. Gazprom had hired an American PR company with the 
intent to improve the image of the company; football was deemed one of the most efficient ways 																																																								
651 http://www.chelseafc.com/chelsea-article/article/2852061/title/gazprom accessed 4 June 2014.  
652 Guardian November 9, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/nov/09/chelsea-record-profit-roman-
abramovich-era accessed 4 June 2014.  
	 326	
to promote Russian gas in Western Europe.653 Schalke received €125 million for the five year 
contract that it initially signed with Gazprom; the club had been in a dire financial situation at the 
time and gas millions from Russia gave the club much needed financial breathing space.654 That 
Gazprom is much more than a sponsor of Schalke was demonstrated in 2011 when the Russian 
government tried to intervene in the daily operations of the club. As the German newspaper Welt 
reported, Vladimir Putin, the then Prime Minister of Russia, contacted the chairman of Schalke, 
Clemens Tönnies, personally to stop the transfer of Germany’s national team goalkeeper from 
Schalke to the Munich based club FC Bayern. Putin offered extra funds to convince Manuel 
Neuer to stay in Gelsenkirchen, a deal that the goalkeeper would later refuse.655 
 
The connection between Gazprom, Russia, and Schalke remains strong, and indeed 
Tönnies himself has benefitted from the partnership by using it to expand his own company 
Tönnies Fleischwerke (a meat producer) in the Russian Federation. Tönnies Fleischwerke, with 
an annual revenue of €5 billion has targeted Russia as a lucrative expansion market, and has 
already invested €200 million by building meat production facilities in the Voronezh region.656 
In many ways Schalke has become a political negotiation tool between the Kremlin and the meat 
producer. The political links between the leadership of the club, Putin, and Gazprom became a 
major source of debate in 2014 when the club was scheduled to travel for a state visit to Moscow 																																																								
653 Der Spiegel January 20, 2007. http://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/gasprom-vorstellung-auf-schalke-glasperlen-
und-fleecepullis-a-461112.html accessed 9 June 2014.  
654  Der Spiegel October 10, 2006. http://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/gasprom-einstieg-schalke-wird-nie-ein-
zweites-chelsea-a-441881.html accessed 9 June 2014.  
655  Welt October 26, 2011. http://www.welt.de/sport/fussball/bundesliga/fc-schalke-04/article13681553/Putin-
wollte-Neuers-Transfer-zu-Bayern-verhindern.html accessed 11 June 2014.  
656 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung March 9, 2014. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/sport/fussball/schalke-04-zu-putin-
schweinshaxen-sind-nicht-mehr-genug-12839024.html accessed 11 June 2014.  
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during the Euromaidan crisis that was taking place in Ukraine. In reaction to the Euromaidan 
protests in Kiev and in reaction to Russia and Gazprom’s role in the conflict that began in early 
2014, many fans of the club have become critical of Schalke’s link with the Russian 
government.657  
 
On the official homepage of Gazprom, the company lists Schalke as part of a social 
development and sports program, announces that ‘Gazprom and Germany are linked together by 
football and FC Schalke 04’, and in addition, the homepage reads ‘Germany is a large consumer 
of Russian gas and a long-standing partner of Gazprom’.658 Indeed without the millions of euros 
invested by Gazprom, Schalke might have experienced financial pressure to the point of 
bankruptcy. The club’s relationship with Gazprom might be described as a metaphor for Russia’s 
relationship with Germany and the rest of Europe. In 2014, Tönnies Fleischwerke was one of 
6,100 German companies that were economically involved in the Russian market, and the 
German economy was deeply dependent on natural resources that it imported from the Russian 
Federation.659 With the onset of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis and the discussions of economic 
sanctions to counter Putin’s strategy in Ukraine, football clubs like Chelsea and Schalke served 
as a daily public reminder of the interconnection between the Russian economy and the rest of 
Europe and the relative co-dependence of the European economy especially when it came to 
natural resources.  																																																								
657  Ruhr Nachrichten March 5, 2014 http://www.ruhrnachrichten.de/sport/schalke/aktuelles/Gute-Toennies-
Kontakte-Geplanter-Besuch-von-Putin-sorgt-fuer-Aerger;art15837,2296670 accessed 11 June 2014.  
658 http://www.gazprom.com/social/supporting-sports/schalke/ accessed 11 June 2014.  
659 Tagesspiegel January 29, 2014. http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ukraine-haengepartie-in-kiew/9405082.html 




 Other than sponsoring major football clubs in Russia, Western Europe, and the Balkans, 
Gazprom has also extended its sponsorship empire by signing sponsorship agreements for major 
tournaments. In a deal signed with FIFA, Gazprom is the exclusive energy partner (oil, gas and 
fuels sector) of FIFA and in turn receives the right to use FIFA and World Cup logos in 
advertisements and sponsorship slogans.660 Perhaps even more important than the FIFA deal 
could be Gazprom’s sponsorship agreement with the European football governing body, UEFA, 
to sponsor Europe’s premier football competition, the UEFA Champions League. The three-
season deal between UEFA and Gazprom was signed in 2012. Gazprom does not invest in 
football only to promote its image at home or abroad: Russia also can use these investments to 
directly influence the decision-making processes of major clubs. The Russian Federation is the 
majority owner of the company and is therefore able to use it as a policy tool.661 Like a kraken, 
the company is able to reach its tentacles into the decision-making processes of, for instance, one 
of Germany’s largest sporting clubs, which in turn has an impact on the overall affairs of the 
Bundesliga and the German Football Federation (DFB). Then German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder and Vladimir Putin, for example, facilitated the deal with Schalke in 2006 amidst the 
negotiations of the controversial Nord Stream pipeline project. Schalke was, therefore, a lobby 
mechanism to pave the way for Gazprom to sign further deals with gas companies in Germany in 
particular. The association with Schalke was an important victory in Gazprom’s campaign to 
improve its image as Schalke’s location in the Ruhr meant close association with some of 																																																								
660  http://en.ria.ru/news/20130914/183441305/Russias-Gazprom-Signs-FIFA-Sponsorship-Deal.html accessed 3 
June 2014.  
661  As a listed company Gazprom publishes its ownership structure on its homepage: 
http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/ accessed 11 June 2014.  
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Germany’s largest energy firms.  Gerhard Schröder hoped to benefit poltically; as a Borussia 
Dortmund fan (Schalke’s closest rival) he hoped that bringing substantial sponsorship money to 
financially troubled Schalke would increase his popularity and secure votes for future 
elections.662  This process is also taking place in other economic spheres, as Gazprom has been 
able to infiltrate major energy companies in Western Europe through minority stakes. Through 
these minority investments, Gazprom, in theory, has the power to influence policy decisions in 
countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.663 For now, the countries in which 
Gazprom is investing do not consider such projects dangerous. For them, this is a cosmetic 
matter. Yet, it can be argued that Russia, through Gazprom, is planting the seeds of control under 
the veil of pursuing major sport projects in Russia, at home, and abroad. 
Land of Fire: Azerbaijan, the Other Gazprom 	
Another example of football diplomacy in the former Soviet Union is Azerbaijan’s ‘Land of 
Fire’ campaign, as well as football advertisement campaigns by the national gas and oil company 
of Azerbaijan, SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic). The ‘Land of Fire’ 
campaign initiated by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Tourism included a major sponsorship deal 
with the Spanish club and 2014 UEFA Champions League finalist Atlético Madrid. The 2014 
Champions League semi-final between Chelsea FC and Atlético was played in a competition 
sponsored by Gazprom and involved a club owned and operated by a Russian oligarch and 
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another that was sponsored by Azerbaijan’s tourist board, a situation symptomatic of the change 
that sport sponsorship has undergone since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
 
Azerbaijan’s sponsorship agreement with Atlético is just a small part of the country’s 
ambition on the world stage and at home in the Caucasus. Driven by oil, Azerbaijan and its 
capital Baku have gone a long way in its investment into infrastructure such as hotels, 
apartments, and new sporting facilities. Similar to other oil-rich countries from the Middle East 
and Russia, Azerbaijan has faced criticism over its human rights record. The country has been 
censured for using Atlético as a propaganda tool to mask its suppression of opposition, 
restriction of the freedom to protest, limits on freedom of religion, and the forceable eviction of 
thousands of families to make way for construction projects. Although Atlético has stated that 
this is a two-way deal that helps to grow the Atlético brand beyond the borders of Spain, it can 
predominantly be understood as a marketing effort by Azerbaijan to improve the country’s 
tarnished image.664 The official mission statement on Atlético’s homepage even suggested that 
the link to the tourist board of Azerbaijan goes beyond that of a normal sponsorship agreement:  
The link between Azerbaijan and Atlético Madrid is much more than a traditional 
commercial sponsorship associated with a shirt sponsorship, because it has a 
tremendous value, as the tool to achieve important goals, through actions of a 
different nature, sports, commercial, communication, marketing and corporate social 
responsibility for the benefit of all parties.665 
 
Although the initial deal signed between Atlético and Azerbaijan in January 2013 was only 
worth €12 million, the deal was renewed in the beginning of the 2013-14 season for a higher yet 
																																																								
664  Guardian May 1, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/may/01/azerbaijan-sponsorship-atletico-
madrid-spectacular-success accessed 5 June 2014.  
665  http://en.clubatleticodemadrid.com/noticias/the-atletico-renews-its-agreement-with-azerbaijan accessed 5 June 
2014.  
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undisclosed fee for another two seasons, and also included wider strategic cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and the Spanish club.666   
 
 It is undeniable that football has become one of the major advertising venues for the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. The state oil company SOCAR signed a major sponsorship deal with 
UEFA in 2013 in which it became an official sponsor for the UEFA European Championship 
qualification games, the World Cup qualification games, as well the UEFA Euro 2016 
Championship.667 This deal is similar to Gazprom’s deal with UEFA and FIFA and is designed 
not only to promote Azerbaijani gas and oil exports but also to improve the image of Azerbaijan 
abroad. While Atlético and SOCAR serve as ambassadors to Western Europe, Azerbaijan has 
also used its oil wealth to sponsor football clubs and leagues in its own region, especially in the 
Caucasus. SOCAR, for example, has a strong foothold in the neighboring Caucasus republic of 
Georgia, where it sponsors the Georgian Umaglesi Liga (Premier League), as well as the 
Georgian national football team and various local football clubs. The company has been an 
official sponsor of the GFF since 2011, and has made significant investments in the football 
infrastructure of the country, including subsidizing the construction of a new stadium for the 
national team in the Georgian capital.668  
 
SOCAR was founded in 1992 and was headed by Ilham Aliev, the son of President 
Heidar Aliev. Now himself the head of state of Azerbaijan, he has used the company to 
																																																								
666 Guardian May 1, 2014. 
667 http://www.uefa.org/mediaservices/mediareleases/newsid=1952828.html accessed 5 June 2014. 
668 Georgia Today April 6, 2012. http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php?id=10012 accessed 9 June 2014. 
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strengthen the foundation of Azerbaijani statehood. 669 The company has been used as a soft-
power tool and more in the Caucasus region and beyond. On October 14, 2009, the presidents of 
Turkey and Armenia met in Bursa to watch a football match between the two countries, an event 
that marked the first steps of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, and is now often 
referred to as football diplomacy. Azerbaijan, which had seen conflict with Armenia over the 
separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh since the fall of the Soviet Union, considered the possible 
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia as a danger to its own political goals in the region 
and especially in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan then negotiated a deal with Russia and 
Gazprom that would see SOCAR selling gas to Russia, a move that was seen as a political snub 
to Turkey especially after Ilham Aliev declared in an official statement that Azerbaijan had been 
selling gas to Turkey for a third of the world price and would now be looking for alternative 
markets.670 For Azerbaijan, SOCAR is, therefore, as much a hard-power tool as Gazprom is for 
Russia. Through their financial influence they can dictate the fortunes of the teams, and the 
football federations that they sponsor and can be used to increase political influence in both 
Western Europe and the South Caucasus. By financially supporting popular teams such as 
Atlético Madrid in Spain, as well as in international and regional competitions, the country is 
building a network of international lobby groups that can be used to achieve political goals.    
Conclusion  	
Football advertisement can function as a reflection of society by showing its economic, and 
political priorities. This was especially the case for the Soviet Union, and later, the successor 
states, where major economic actors and state policies are strongly interconnected. In the late 																																																								
669 Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus, 172.  
670 Ibid. 225. 
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Soviet period, changes to international trade law and the end of economic subsidizing of sport by 
the state, under the label of khozraschet meant that new ways of financing sport had to be 
introduced. To make matters worse, the end of the Cold War meant that sport had lost its allure 
as a propaganda tool. The Soviet leadership expected that fans would finance football clubs, and 
also that clubs would be able to run a profit that would then pay for expensive sport facilities. As 
clubs, unlike players, could not be sold off to the west, alternative ways had to be found to use 
the clubs as financial assets. Advertisement was a logical step as it allowed the state, in the form 
of Sovintersport, to sell the commercial rights of their clubs to advertisement agencies located in 
the west. While clubs were forced to become independent from the state through the process of 
khozraschet, the state, in the form of Goskomsport, often maintained commercial rights over 
clubs, as the example of sponsorship agreements signed between the West and Sovintersport 
after 1987 highlights.  
 
Sovintersport is a typical example for this period, in that the reform of sport clubs was 
presented to the public as a great leap forward, a means to compete with the clubs from the West, 
and a way to modernize Soviet football. The sale of advertisement spaces to foreign companies 
was intended to show the West as well as the population of the Soviet Union that reforms were 
working. In reality Sovintersport was just part of a massive sale of state assets in which only a 
handful of people benefitted.  With the end of the Cold War, high performance sport was no 
longer a vehicle to show the world the superiority of the Soviet citizen, and instead became 
merely another asset that could be privatized and sold off to the West.   
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Kit design and sponsorship slogans on football shirts also fit the trend. Adidas was the 
first company from the West that was able to get a foothold in the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
football national team already wore Adidas gear at major tournaments in the 1980s, and was 
even able to use the shoes and equipment of the German sports apparel producer in the 1970s. 
This produced an oddity at major international tournaments: the Soviet Union, a communist 
country, was wearing football jerseys produced by the most global sports apparel company of the 
time. Adidas’ involvement with the national team also meant that players were more likely to 
wear Adidas equipment, such as shoes, at the club level. By the late 1980s most players were 
wearing Adidas shoes for domestic games, and clubs also started to wear Adidas jerseys, not 
only for international, but also for domestic games. Adidas, consequently, became associated 
with the Soviet Union, and the relative success of the Soviet national team. When Adidas 
returned to sponsor the Russian national team in 2008, the company was able to build on 
nostalgia and produced an advertisement slogan that played on the national pride of Russian 
citizens. 
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Top League was the premium-sporting 
product of the Russian Federation. This high status meant that the football league was able to 
attract some very notable Russian and foreign companies as sponsors, even though the products 
on display did not always reflect actual market needs. Indeed sponsorship and advertisement 
underwent a complete transformation in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union in 
the 1990s. Advertisement, first introduced as a way to earn hard foreign currency for both the 
football federation of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state, had become a normal part of football 
culture. In the early 1990s advertisement at the Russian Premier League closely resembled that 
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of the other major leagues in Europe; sponsorship slogans from major local companies shared the 
field with those of global corporations, such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola. Advertising in the post-
Soviet space followed the major global trend, in which premium companies advertised at the 
world’s most popular and therefore most valuable sport.  
 
Advertisement at football games in Russia and in other post-Soviet states also has 
reflected the economic changes that the region underwent from the early 1990s to 2014. The 
economic crash of 1998 directly influenced sponsorship deals in the Russian Premier League. 
The economic changes experienced in the Russian Federation after 1998 saw an increase in 
sponsorship from resource based companies that saw football clubs as an opportunity to grow 
beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. But for some companies, advertising at football 
games was not enough, and, following the lead of Gazprom, they started to invest in football on a 
much larger scale. Starting with the purchase of Zenit Sankt Petersburg, Gazprom targeted 
football as a major vehicle for sports diplomacy. From 2005 (the year that Gazprom bought 
Zenit) onwards, the company began to build a football empire with improvement of the company 
image at home and abroad as its goal. This program was continued through advertisement 
campaigns that included major football clubs in Germany (Schalke) and the United Kingdom 
(Chelsea), as well as through sponsorship of major football competitions such as the UEFA 
Champions League. Gazprom’s majority holder is the government of the Russian Federation and 
its advertisement campaign can therefore be identified as sport propaganda for the Russian 
Federation, rather than the often-suggested term diplomacy. The Gazprom campaign was in 
many ways copied by countries of the Middle East and republics of the former Soviet Union, 
such as Azerbaijan. To a great extent, Russia has come full circle in that it has rediscovered that 
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sport has value as a propaganda tool. Russia is now using modern methods such as advertisement 
























Final Thoughts and Conclusion 
 
This thesis follows the story of football from 1987 to 2014; how events starting with the 
Gorbachev reforms after 1987, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
economic crisis in Russia in 1998, the subsequent ascension of Vladimir Putin in 2000, and 
finally the Maidan Protests in Ukraine that took place in the winter and spring of 2013-14, have 
affected the sport. Football does not always reflect society. Nevertheless, there are important 
lessons that we can learn from the transition of professional football from communism to 
capitalism in the Soviet Union and in its successor states.  
Economic and Political Reform 
 
As outlined in this thesis, football, like other segments of the Soviet economy, experienced 
frequent tinkering and small-scale reform up to the late 1980s. Large-scale reform in football did 
not begin until Gorbachev introduced sizeable reform packages which were designed to make the 
Soviet economy more competitive. This thesis has investigated the impact of thes reforms on 
football clubs and the Soviet league pyramid, as well as on football players. But can football be 
used to illustrate the impact of glasnost and perestroika on the Soviet economy more generally? 
The truth is that the politics, and economics of football can deliver some answers to questions 
regarding how perestroika impacted segments of the Soviet economy and also how institutions 
reacted to reform initiatives. Football is an example of struggle between the state and emerging 
actors over the control over importat state assets. In the case of football, this is illustrated by the 
restructuring process of football in the late 1980s, and was manifested in the power struggle 
between members of the Football Federation of the Soviet Union and the management of the big 
clubs.  As Edelman pointed out in his work on the topic, the struggle between the federation and 
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club officials quite simply boiled down to a fight for money and power: the federation wanted to 
maintain its grip on the league, whereas the clubs wanted a larger share of the pie. Clubs justified 
their stance with the objective of decentralization, which was one of the main points of the 
Gorbachev reforms.671  
 
 As the case of Sovintersport shows, state institutions, on the other hand, had a substantial 
interest in maintaining their control over football clubs. Sovintersport was an institution that was 
designed to capitalize on the investments that the Soviet Union had made in football. The 
opening of the football transfer market to the West after 1987 meant that clubs were now allowed 
to sell their best talents to clubs abroad. At the same time, Sovintersport ensured that a certain 
percentage of the transfer fees would remain with the state. Sovintersport was, however, a Janus-
faced apparatus. On the one hand it was expected to allow clubs to make a profit by selling 
players abroad. In turn clubs were supposed to use this profit to become financially independent 
from the state organizations. But Sovintersport took a cut from both the salary, as well as the 
transfer sum, of any player who moved abroad. The government justified this with the position 
that, as the state was largely responsible for funding the athletes’ training; it was therefore 
entitled to receive the financial gains made by selling them to foreign clubs. Yet Sovintersport’s 
business operations were not always transparent, and it remains unclear whether all the funds 
collected by the agency found their way back to the state. Indeed, the murky story of Sergei 
Chemezov, who launched a successful business career after his time at the agency, is telling. 
Sovintersport is, therefore, representative of the sort of nomenklatura-privatization of the late 
																																																								
671 See Edelman. ‘The Professionalization of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’. 
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1980s and early 1990s that allowed managers to gain control over assets at the expense of the 
central administration.672 
 
 The same mechanism can later be found with the football clubs themselves, as most 
major teams in the immediate post-Soviet space fell under the control of the managers or coaches 
who happened to run the clubs at the time. The example of Dinamo Kiev is especially telling; 
charged with moving Dinamo Kiev towards khozraschet, Viktor Bezverkhii managed to privatize 
the club, and at the same time installed himself as the owner of the football team. Bezverkhii 
then turned Dinamo into a major export-import company with the team’s economic deals 
extending far beyond football. Bezverkhii benefited from the fact that football clubs could be 
used to acquire trading licences that went beyond merely selling football players to foreign clubs.  
Bezverkhii was not the only example—other figures, such as Spartak coach Romantsev, were 
also able to acquire their clubs during the privatization process of football in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Another example is Aleshin’s takeover of the Luzhniki Stadium Complex in 
Moscow, as he managed to take over the facility thanks to the fact that he possessed inside 
knowledge of the impending privatization. Steven Solnick has called this practice nomenklatura-
privatization, or reverse bank run; a process in which the state forced organizations into cost 
accountability and managers were able to take control over the budgets of these organizations. 
Furthermore, managers found it easier to find new revenue opportunities, and were therefore able 
to erode state control over organizations.673 In terms of reform, therefore, football highlights that 
																																																								
672 See Solnick, Stealing the State, 251.  
673 Ibid. 232. 
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moving organizations into cost-accountability resulted in the state ultimately losing authority 
over these organizations entirely.  
 
This, in turn, explains the struggle in other areas of football. The power struggle between 
the clubs and the football federation over who would run the Soviet Vysshaia Liga is such an 
example. In this case, managers were given more control of their clubs and began to push for 
more autonomy in other areas as well.674 The public conflict between Koloskov and Lobanovskii 
must, therefore, be understood as a power struggle between the state and individual actors over 
assets. As the state gave more autonomy over individual assets, the managers who were given 
more power pushed for further decentralization in order to accrue even more financial profit. At 
the same time, institutions such as Sovintersport were put in place to ensure that the process of 
privatization would guarantee the maximum profit for the state. In the end, however, the lack of 
transparency of the agency meant that Sovintersport became a mechanism through which 
individuals were able to accrue wealth. For the purpose of this thesis, football became an 
example of how the reform of the Soviet economy allowed individuals, from the bottom up, to 
collect wealth via assets that were formerly controlled by the state or state institutions. Football, 
consequently, became an asset that could be turned into profit, and the struggle between actors 
who wanted to reform the game was in reality a struggle over who would control the financial 
profits of the game.  
Patronage and Politics 	
As the Soviet Union collapsed, football fell under the control of the very managers who were 
able to wrest away assets from the state. But the case of Ukraine, in particular, highlights the fact 																																																								
674 See Edelman. ‘The Professionalization of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’. 
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that football soon became the target of individuals who had acquired assets in other economic 
spheres. The connection between politics and football in Ukraine is a theme that has been 
touched upon by other authors.675 But the culture of patronage actually extends back to the time 
of the Soviet Union, when the country’s most important clubs were often dependent on the 
political and financial support of high ranking party officials—the most prominent case is the 
example of the involvement of Shcherbitskii at Dinamo Kiev. Hence, it is no coincidence that the 
oligarchs who rose from the ashes of the post-Soviet political landscape emulated practices that 
had already been used in the time of the Soviet Union. For the oligarchs, football clubs in 
Ukraine served as social capital that could be used to grow political influence.676 The 2012 
European Championships are a great example of this, as the infrastructure development and 
stadium construction would not have been possible without financial investments by the political 
elite. 
 
In a sense, the oligarchs are best understood as an evolution of the former communist 
elite, as they copied party practices with the wealth achieved through an emerging free market 
economy. This evolution also included looking beyond the post-Soviet space, as the contact 
between businessmen and the outside world meant that oligarchs were able to imitate business 
practices in other countries. The patrons of Ukrainian football, therefore, soon started to follow 
the examples found in other countries, most prominently Italy, the biggest football market in the 
late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. The thesis calls this process Berlusconization, as the 
patrons of Ukrainian football all followed the model of Silvio Berlusconi. In a sense, the most 
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remarkable feature of this process is that it combines the old patronage system of the old Soviet 
Union with the free market patronage system of a western European country.  
 
 Yet the strong role of the oligarchs in Ukrainian football is also what sets Ukraine apart 
from the Russian Federation. As in Ukraine, Russian football clubs were very much dependent 
on patronage. But unlike Ukraine the biggest Russian clubs were less dependent on individuals, 
but rather received most of their financial contributions through state-owned organizations. Most 
Russian clubs were taken over by the coaches who managed the clubs in the 1990s, but by the 
late 1990s and early 2000s the state began to reassert itself on football. This is also true for the 
oligarchs in Russia, as they only made their presence felt in football after 1998, as the economy 
switched from one that was largely driven by the banking sector to a market that was focused on 
natural resources. In the early 2000s Russian football experienced a major revival, mostly driven 
by oil and gas profits. At the same time, it was somewhat telling that one of Russia’s richest 
oligarchs—Roman Abramovich—bought a team outside of Russia when he purchased London’s 
Chelsea FC. The purchase of clubs by Russian oligarchs was understood as a means to diversify 
their financial portfolio. The same could be said for Leonid Fedun, the wealthy oil magnate who 
bought Spartak Moscow in the early 2000s.677 There is certainly some truth to this belief, as 
oligarchs such as Abramovich also made significant investments—although through sponsorship 
and backdoor deals—in Russian football. Major Russian companies such as Gazprom also 
followed this pattern. The company, for example, bought Zenit Sankt Petersburg in the early 
2000s, purchased the sponsorship rights to various clubs in Europe, and sponsored major 
tournaments such as the UEFA Champions League, the European Championships, and the FIFA 																																																								
677 Goldman, Petrostate, 204. 
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World Cup. The example of Gazprom in football not only strengthens the perception that 
Russian organizations were diversifying their investments through sport, but also illustrates that 
they used football to increase their commercial presence abroad. Therefore, like the oligarchs in 
Ukraine, football investors in Russia used the sport as a portal to western markets. In a sense, 
football became an image platform for Russian companies—we can see similar examples in 
other post-Soviet states such as Azerbaijan—and this suggests that football was also used as an 
image campaign that goes beyond mere commercial interests.   
Football Stadiums: Between Regionalism and Internationalism 	
Football stadiums now also play an important role in this image campaign, as they are a major 
part of international tournaments such as the European Championships that took place in Ukraine 
in 2012, and the upcoming World Cup in Russia. Both the European Championships and the 
World Cup can be seen as an immense marketing vehicle for its host nation. In the case of 
Ukraine, this meant that regional oligarchs used the construction of infrastructure and stadiums 
to enhance their personal images. This is evident in the cases of Metalist Kharkiv owner 
Aleksandr Iaroslavs’kii, who through massive investments into the infrastructure and the stadium 
of Kharkiv was able to bring the European Championships to his hometown. Another example is 
Rinat Akhmetov’s investments in Donetsk, where he built an airport, as well as the most modern 
stadium in the post-Soviet space. The German historian Wellgraf, in his essay ‘Die 
Millionengaben,’ points out that by investing into infrastructure and stadiums, oligarchs gain 
international recognition and at the same time also gather local political support.678  
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The historian Kerstin Zimmer has pointed out the importance of Soviet nostalgia in the 
identity of Donbass.679 The Donbass Arena seems to stand in a bizarre contrast to this notion, as 
architecturally the modern arena is in stark contrast to the Soviet past. But in this case, the 
stadium became a symbol that only local businessman and politicians, such as Akhmetov, have 
the best interests of the workers of the region in mind. Hence the stadium is an important link 
with an internationally successful club that can serve as a tool for international recognition and 
business contacts, as well as local politics. This is especially emphasized in Jacob Preuss’ 
documentary The Other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk where he interviews several local miners 
as well as politicians. From these voices it is evident that the Donbass Arena is both a symbol for 
a modern international football club, and also a symbol of regional pride for the miners who live 
in the Donbass.680 This sets the regional identity that came with the Donbass Arena apart from 
examples from the time of the Soviet Union. As this thesis shows, some stadiums, such as the 
Hrazdan in Armenia and the Dinamo Arena in Tbilisi, toward the end of the Soviet Union, were 
seen as gathering places where the  national sentiments of Armenians and Georgians respectively 
could be expressed. These stadiums became neglected after independence was reached, as the 
facilities were no longer viewed as a symbols of national resistence. 
Post-Soviet Football in the International Sphere 
 
The interconnection between post-Soviet football and the global football market is perhaps the 
most important lesson of this thesis. In fact, it has shown that the fall of the Soviet Union not 
only influenced the politics and economics of football in the post-Soviet region, but also had far 
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reaching implications on the globalization of football. The opening of the transfer market after 
the 1987 reforms meant that, suddenly, major European clubs had access to a previously 
untapped market. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that UEFA grew from having 25 
member states in 1990 to 54 member states in 2015. Hence, after 1992, the business of football 
changed dramatically in Europe and, as a result, all over the world. Events such as the 
introduction of the UEFA Champions League, the Bosman Ruling, and the Igor Simutenkov 
Ruling would change European football dramatically, which in turn had significant impacts on 
post-Soviet clubs. Major Ukrainian and Russian clubs became more involved in the global 
football business as well, and shaped a global player transfer market; similarly, major post-
Soviet brand names discovered football as an important tool to develop a brand that could be 
used to gain influence in the transnational field. Hence, the study goes beyond the field of sport 
in Soviet and post-Soviet history—it also crosses into the domain of the globalization of football. 
This is an important factor, as the fall of the Soviet Union drastically accelerated globalization, 
and nowhere is this reflected more than in football. 
  
 In some ways that transition can be understood by the transfer patterns explained in this 
thesis, in which clubs from the post-Soviet space moved from being sellers in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s to becoming buyers in the 1990s. Some academics believe that the global football 
transfer market reflects economic trends, as strong economies are able to attract players, whereas 
weak economies have the tendency to push players out.681 When observing the transfer flows 
published on transfermarkt.de, one can see that there is truth to this view; ith the recovery of the 
Russian economy after 1998, Russian clubs became major players in the global transfer system 																																																								
681 See Taylor, ‘Global Players? Football, Migration and Globalization, c. 1930-2000’, 19. 
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as well, which in turn was reflected in the financial ability of clubs to procure more talented 
players. The financial ability of some clubs to buy some of the best talent money could buy, 
however, did not reflect Russia as a whole, instead, it reflected the financial wealth of a new 
economic elite: the oligarchs and state corporations. Football in Russia, therefore, did not reflect 
wider society, but rather the rise of a new economic elite, as well as a turn away from banking to 
the energy sector. While clubs were able to spend large sums on players, the wealth did not 
necessarily translate to the general population, but instead became a reflection of the fact that 
Russia was a country run by a small economic elite with close ties to the Kremlin.682 This new 
wealthy elite discovered football as a means to interact on the global market. Meanwhile the 
Kremlin, in the form of state companies, realized that football was the perfect marketing tool 
with which to grow the image of state-run companies such as Gazprom.  
From Communism to Capitalism – Football in Transition 	
What then can we learn from the transformation of football from communism to capitalism? 
Within the Soviet Union, clubs reacted to the economic reforms that were brought in by the state. 
In some ways football, therefore, serves as an example of how Soviet reforms could impact a 
single economic branch within the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the reform processes launched in 
the Soviet Union had an impact on football in Europe, and therefore around the globe, as the 
game has radically altered since the late 1980s. This is, in no small part, due to the rapid changes 
that came to football in the Soviet Union, and later to the successor states after 1987. Yet most 
studies of football in the Soviet and post-Soviet space focus on the history and politics of the 
game in the region without taking into account outside influences and changing market dynamics 
elsewhere. But football is an international business, and changes in one market can have an 																																																								
682 See Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy and David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs.   
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immediate impact on other football markets around the world. For example, reforms in the 
Soviet Union that allowed Soviet clubs to transfer players to the West for currency, resulted in an 
unparalleled effect on the European football market, as Western leagues suddenly had access to 
relatively cheap talent from the post-Soviet space. The growing wealth of the oligarchs, and state 
companies, in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Ukraine and Russia meant that, quickly, post-
Soviet clubs could afford players from Europe and South America, who has previously been 
inaccessible to them.   
 
It is also no coincidence that reforms to European football, such as the Champions 
League, the free movement of football players, and the expansion of the European 
Championships, came immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The history of football 
in the late Soviet Union, and its successor states is, therefore, not just the history of football in 
the region; it is instead, a history of the impact of these reforms on the global market, and how 
the globalization of football, in turn, impacted post-Soviet clubs as well as all the actors that 
were involved with the game. Therefore, the transition of football from communism to 
capitalism in the Soviet Union, and later in the successor states, must be viewed from a global 
perspective. In many ways, this thesis has shown that it is not merely a case study on how reform 
from within the Soviet Union impacted the game from the Soviet Union to the post-Soviet space, 
but indeed it has expressed what the transition from communism to capitalism meant for 
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